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x RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW  [Vol. XXIII:iii 
 
Dear Readers, 
 
 
 On behalf of the Richmond Public Interest Law Review, it is my 
honor to present the final issue of Volume XXIII: the 2020 General 
Topics in the Public Interest Issue. 
 
 Our authors address a variety of topics focusing on how society is 
evolving. This issue explores whether Virginia’s Gubernatorial “No 
Succession” Rule is a democratic pillar or a constitutional relic; ex-
amines the effects of Florida’s nutrient policy on the Everglades’ na-
tive ecosystem; discusses how an educational adequacy suit could 
remedy Virginia’s educational inequities; considers how birth control 
sabotage is a rampant part of domestic violence and should be cov-
ered by domestic violence law; analyzes whether monetary exactions 
should be subject to heightened constitutional scrutiny under Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause jurisprudence; and includes a transcrip-
tion of an Equal Rights Amendment Conference hosted by the Uni-
versity of Richmond School of Law and organized by VARatifyERA. 
 
 The publication of this issue warrants a special thanks to our Lead 
Articles Editors, Kim Simmons and Caitlin Yuhas, for their hard 
work and dedication. Additionally, we are thankful to our authors: 
Philip O’Neill, Matlin Brown, Ashley Phillips, and Sahba Saravi. I 
am also grateful for the opportunity to publish my work in this issue. 
On behalf of the Richmond Public Interest Law Review, we sincerely 
hope this issue provides insight on these interesting topics. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Elizabeth A. Ritchie 
 
 
Editor in Chief 
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VIRGINIA’S GUBERNATORIAL “NO SUCCESSION” RULE: 
DEMOCRATIC PILLAR OR CONSTITUTIONAL RELIC? 
 
Philip O’Neill* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	
* Counsel, Jacobson Holman PLLC, Washington, D.C., an intellectual property law firm, where the au-
thor practices in litigation. J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; A.B. in Political Science, Univer-
sity of Chicago.  Mr. O’Neill resides in Williamsburg, Virginia.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
A 245-year old provision of the Virginia Constitution makes 
the Governor ineligible to seek reelection immediately following an 
initial term unless and until he or she rotates out of office for a speci-
fied period, now four years. In practice, this “No Succession” Rule 
has prevented all but a handful of Governors from serving multiple 
terms, the last being Mills Godwin in mid-century. The Rule was 
adopted as part of the State’s first Constitution, which embodied a 
“weak” executive model of government favored by many of the origi-
nal colony-states. That model has long since been abandoned in Vir-
ginia in favor of the modern strong executive, the No Succession 
Rule being the last remaining vestige of that earlier scheme. During 
the 19th century, the General Assembly modified several aspects of 
the Executive’s tenure but left the Rule basically intact. The Rule’s 
unusual persistence is the result of several factors working in combi-
nation, including Virginia’s conservative political ethos; the preva-
lence of one-party rule in much of the State’s history; the redundant, 
multi-year process for amending the state constitution; and, most im-
portantly, the age-old competition for power between the General As-
sembly and the governor. There have been notable attempts in recent 
decades to change the Rule. One such attempt occurred during the 
1969-70 revision of the Constitution, when proposals to repeal it 
were debated in both houses of the General Assembly but ultimately 
voted down by large margins. These debates were recorded and pub-
lished, and the same arguments made by the legislators then, pro and 
con, continue to be voiced today, mostly in articles and editorials in 
many of the State’s leading newspapers, virtually all of which favor 
repeal of the Rule. Taken together, one can distill from these sources 
the major themes that resonate whenever the Rule’s continued vitality 
is discussed. The State’s Democratic Party leadership has endorsed 
repeal of the Rule, and the Party’s ascendancy in the General Assem-
bly makes it likely in the near term that Commonwealth voters will 
have the opportunity at long last to choose whether a Governor 
should be able to serve consecutive terms. 
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2020] “No Succession Rule” 3 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Virginia has never seen fit to limit legislative or judicial mem-
bers’ terms in office of. In contrast, since adoption of its original con-
stitution in 1776, Virginia has prohibited the governor from serving 
consecutive terms, although a former governor has always been eligi-
ble to serve another term after having rotated out of office for a speci-
fied period, now four years.1 Numerous states had limits of this kind 
in the past, but all except Virginia have repealed them,2 most long ago 
and the last two, Mississippi and Kentucky, in 1986 and 1992 respec-
tively.3 Remarkably, Virginia’s 244-year old ban on gubernatorial suc-
cession (the “No Succession Rule”) has never been the object of an up 
or down vote by its citizens—it has always been entirely the work of 
their representatives in the General Assembly.4 There are clear signs, 
however, that this may change in the not-too-distant future. A thorough 
reexamination of the Rule’s origin, history, and merits is well in order. 
 
The No Succession Rule was enacted as part of Virginia’s orig-
inal constitution and has remained essentially intact ever since.5 When 
it was conceived, American colonialists widely shared a belief that reg-
ular election and rotation of a governmental executive would limit his 
ability to amass and wield political power and, thereby, deter a repeti-
tion of the abuses practiced by British monarchy and its agents, the 
royal governors.6 The ban on successive terms was a key component 
of the “weak executive” scheme of government that proliferated in the 
early constitution-making by the several states.7 The Rule has persisted 
to this day despite Virginia’s abandonment of every other aspect of 
that scheme in favor of the powerful modern governorship that exists 
here and in many other states.8 	
1 See VA. CONST. art. V, § 1 (“The chief executive power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a 
Governor. He shall hold office for a term commencing upon his inauguration on the Saturday after the 
second Wednesday in January, next succeeding his election, and ending in the fourth year thereafter im-
mediately upon the inauguration of his successor. He shall be ineligible to the same office for the term 
next succeeding that for which he was elected.”). 
2 Term Limits on Governor, U.S. TERM LIMITS, https://www.termlimits.com/governor_termlimits/ (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2020).  
3 KY. CONST. of 1891, art. VII, § 71 (1992); MISS. CONST. of 1890, art. V, § 116 (1986).  
4 Martin Austermuhle, Why Can Virginia Governors Only Serve One Term? And Should that Change?, 
WAMU (Sept. 28, 2017), https://wamu.org/story/17/09/28/single-virginia-governors-commonwealth-
cant-stand-re-election-change/.  
5 Id.  
6 Id.  
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
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In practice, the No Succession Rule has made Virginia’s gov-
ernors one-term officeholders, with only a handful of exceptions.9 Of 
the seventy-three governors in the state’s history, just four have served 
a second time after having rotated out of office.10 The first state gov-
ernor, Patrick Henry, served three one-year terms in office (1776-79) 
(the maximum initial tenure at the time) and, after a five-year hiatus, 
served two additional years (1784-86).11 James Monroe served three 
successive years (1799-1802) and was elected to another term a decade 
later (1811), but he resigned after several months to become President 
Madison’s Secretary of State.12 William “Extra Billy” Smith governed 
in the period before the Civil War and then again during its last year 
(1846-49, 1864-65).13 In the past century and a half, only Mills God-
win served a second term (1966-70, 1974-78), and he did so after hav-
ing switched political parties.14 The reality is that once a Virginia gov-
ernor is out of office, “the theoretical opportunity to run again at some 
future time is hardly . . . meaningful.” 15 
 
Some scholars have claimed that the number of repeat Virginia 
governors would have been higher but for the fact that some of Vir-
ginia’s one-term governors were subsequently elected or appointed to 
federal office, such as the U.S. Senate.16 That is undoubtedly so, but 
the data concerning the numbers of governor who held federal office 
before and after serving as governor point to a more basic explanation 
for the infrequency of two-term executives in the state’s history. Of 
Virginia’s sixty-nine governors who served one term or less, twenty-
two were subsequently elected to Congress, the Presidency or a Cabi-
net position, or were appointed to a federal judgeship or as an 	
9 See Governors of Virginia, ENCYCLOPEDIA VA., https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Gover-
nors_of_Virginia (last modified Jan. 25, 2018).  
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 William “Extra Billy” Smith, HOLLYWOOD CEMETERY, https://www.hollywoodcemetery.org/william-
smith (last visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
14 James R. Sweeney et al., Mills E. Godwin (1914-1999), ENCYCLOPEDIA VA. (Dec. 19, 2016), 
https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Godwin_Mills_E_1914-1999#start_entry. 
15 2 A.E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 590 n.18 (1974). Of 
course, the total number of ex-governors who, in theory, could have served twice is less than seventy-
three. For example, the current and next most recent governors are not yet legally eligible to serve again; 
and another governor died in an 1811 fire while in office. Gov. George William Smith, NAT’L 
GOVERNORS ASS’N, https://www.nga.org/governor/george-william-smith/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2020).  
16 HOWARD, supra note 15 (“[A]nother reason for the infrequency of a second term . . . is that the gover-
nor often moves on to an intervening office.”); Joseph E. Kallenbach, Constitutional Limitations of Reel-
igibility of National and State Chief Executives, 46 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 438, 453 (1952).  
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ambassador, and several others obtained other federal posts such as 
head of a department or member on an independent commission.17 
Conversely, eleven individuals became governors of Virginia after 
having served in federal office, but all of them served only a single 
term as the state’s executive, too.18 For both groups, officeholder mo-
bility was more pronounced in the nineteenth century than later.19 At 
least during the state’s early history, therefore, the prestige of being 
governor was great enough to entice a significant number of former 
federal officeholders to seek and obtain the Virginia governorship for 
the first time.20 Yet—just like the one-term governors who then moved 
on to federal office—no one in this latter group was elected governor 
a second time either.21 Why? The answer is implicit in the Rule, 
namely, its forced period of ineligibility. Faced with the prospect of 
sitting out four long years, every ex-governor must make a new plan 
for his life and career going forward, be it securing higher office or 
working in the private sector, which, once put in place, he is naturally 
reticent to disrupt simply for the chance to be nominated and elected 
governor again.22 Likewise, a former governor’s popularity inevitably 
diminishes the longer he is out of the public’s eye.23 In short, the reason 
why there have been so few two-term governors is the most obvious 
one: The ineligibility period depletes their motivation to seek the office 
twice. 
 
             To be sure, vast changes have occurred in Virginia since it de-
clared its independence. The state’s population has grown eleven-
fold;24 its economy, modern and diversified, would rank in the top 
thirty-five in the world if Virginia were a nation by itself;25 it has 	
17 Governors of Virginia, supra note 9. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 HOWARD, Supra note 15, at 590; Joseph E. Kallenbach, Constitutional Limitations of Reeligibility of 
National and State Chief Executives, 46 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 438, 453 (1952).  
23 Jessica Taylor, 5 Things You Should Know About Jim Gilmore, NPR (July 8, 2015), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/07/08/421145703/5-things-you-should-know-about-jim-
gilmore.  
24 Virginia had the largest population of the 13 colonies in 1776 at approximately 747,000. Douglas A. 
McIntyre, In July 1776, 2.5 Million People Lived in the 13 Colonies And … , 24/7 WALL ST. (July 4, 
2019), https://247wallst.com/economy/2019/07/04/in-july-1776-2-5-million-people-lived-in-the-thir-
teen-colonies-and/. The Census Bureau estimated the state’s population in July 2019 to be 8,535.000. 
Quick Facts: Virginia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/VA. 
25 GDP by Country, WORLDOMETER, https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-by-country/ (last updated 
Feb. 16, 2020); Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the United States in 2018, by State, STATISTA, 
15
et al.: General Topics
Published by UR Scholarship Repository,
Do Not Delete 4/15/20  8:46 AM 
6 RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW  [Vol. XXIII:iii 
160,000 public employees;26 and its annual governmental budget is 
nearly $59 billion.27 Unquestionably, the scope and complexity of the 
state’s affairs today are enormous. The job of being governor of any 
state is daunting, but it is particularly so for a one-term Virginia gov-
ernor who has a lot to do and little time to do it. Former Governor 
James Gilmore has called the No Succession Rule a “museum-piece of 
old politics that should not exist in the modern world today.”28 All but 
one of the last ten occupants of the same office share that view.29 
 
Of the half dozen generally recognized forms of direct democ-
racy available to the people of the states, Virginia’s citizens have ac-
cess to only one: the power to vote to amend the constitution.30 For 
such a measure to be put to a state-wide referendum, a majority of both 
houses of the General Assembly must first approve it, and then approve 
it again after an intervening House of Delegates election.31 Only after 
this two-stage legislative evaluation is complete can it go before the 
voters for their approval in a state-wide referendum.32 The people’s 
right to vote on constitutional amendments is thus a qualified one, sub-
ject to the filter of a multi-year, redundant legislative referral process. 	
https://www.statista.com/statistics/248023/us-gross-domestic-product-gdp-by-state/ (last updated May 
2019).  
26 See 2018-19 Salaries of Virginia State Employees, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, https://data.rich-
mond.com/salaries/2018/state (last updated June 20, 2019).  
27 Frequently Asked Questions, VA. DEPT. PLAN. & BUDGET, https://dpb.vir-
ginia.gov/budget/budget.cfm?biennium=2018-2020 (last updated July 16, 2018). 
28 Austermuhle, supra note 4.  
29 FORMER GOVERNORS ROBB, BALILES, WILDER, GILMORE, WARNER, KAINE, 
MCDONNELL, AND MCAULIFFE FAVOR ALLOWING CONSECUTIVE TERMS, AS 
APPARENTLY DOES CURRENT GOVERNOR NORTHAM; ONLY FORMER GOV. GEORGE 
ALLEN WOULD RETAIN THE RULE. JOHN DINAN, THE VIRGINIA STATE CONSTITUTION: 
A REFERENCE GUIDE 117–18 (2006); TRAVIS FAIN, GENERAL ASSEMBLY: 
REDISTRICTING REFORM, TWO TERM GOVERNOR BILLS ADVANCE, DAILY PRESS 
(JAN. 3, 2015), HTTPS://WWW.DAILYPRESS.COM/TIDEWATER-REVIEW/DP-NWS-GA-
REDIST-TWO-TERMS-20150120-STORY.HTML; SHELBY MERTENS, VIRGINIA’S SENATE 
OK’S LETTING GOVERNOR SERVE TWO TERMS, LOUDOUN TIMES-MIRROR (FEB. 2, 
2013), HTTPS://WWW.LOUDOUNTIMES.COM/NEWS/VIRGINIA-SENATE-OK-S-LETTING-
GOVERNOR-SERVE-TWO-TERMS/ARTICLE_6CB101CA-A2C6-51BA-9AD1-
C79F6AEA11F2.HTML; MICHAEL POPE, SHOULD VIRGINIA’S GOVERNORS BE 
ALLOWED TO RUN FOR REELECTION?, CONNECTION (JAN. 3, 2013), 
HTTP://WWW.CONNECTIONNEWSPAPERS.COM/NEWS/2013/JAN/03/SHOULD-VIRGINIAS-
GOVERNOR-BE-ABLE-RUN-REELECTION/.  
30 Forms of Direct Democracy in the American States, BALLOTPEDIA, http://bal-
lotpedia.org/Forms_of_direct _democracy_in_the_American_states (last updated Sept. 7, 2013) (“The 
generally acknowledged forms of direct democracy are the legislatively referred constitutional amend-
ment, the legislatively referred state statute, the initiated state statute (direct or indirect), the initiated 
constitutional amendment, the veto referendum (sometimes called the citizen referendum or the statute 
referendum), . . . and statewide recall.”). 
31 A.E. Dick Howard, Constitutional Revision: Virginia and the Nation, 9 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1974). 
32 VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1. 
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             There have been near-annual but ultimately unsuccessful ef-
forts in the General Assembly in recent decades to initiate the process 
of repealing the Rule. In 2013 and again in 2015, for example, the Re-
publican-majority state Senate voted in favor of allowing the governor 
to serve two successive terms only to see the measures defeated in the 
House of Delegates.33 Likewise, a Senate proposal in 2019 to change 
the Rule passed in committee but was defeated in a floor vote.34 De-
spite these setbacks, there continues to be a strong body of support in 
the General Assembly for letting the voters decide whether to allow 
their governor to serve consecutive terms. The House Democrat caucus 
is on record as supporting a constitutional amendment to establish a 
two-term governorship,35 and with Democrats having gained control 
of both houses of the General Assembly in the November 2019 elec-
tions, renewed efforts to pass reform legislation appear almost certain. 
As one long-term supporter of abandoning the Rule confidently 
claimed, “The greatest fear opponents [of repealing the Rule] have is 
it will get on the ballot,” he says, “because their fear is [that] it will 
pass overwhelmingly.”36 
 
I. The Rule as a Particular Form of Term Limit 
 
A political term limit is a legal restriction, usually constitu-
tional in nature, that limits how long an officeholder such as a governor 
or legislator may serve in a particular elected or appointed office.37 
There are no gubernatorial term limits of any kind in fourteen (14) U.S. 
states, including Iowa, New York, and Texas.38 Five of those states are 	
33 Jason Spencer, Should Virginia Allow Governors to Serve Two Consecutive Terms? Senate Says Yes, 
ARLINGTON PATCH (Feb. 3, 2013), https://patch.com/virginia/arlington-va/should-virginia-allow-gover-
nors-to-serve-two-consecut04b7e0840b; Patrick Wilson, Va. Senate OKs Measure Allowing 2-Term 
Governor, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.pilotonline.com/government/virginia/.  
34 S.J. 290 was introduced by Sen. Adam Ebbin, but was defeated by a vote of 22-18. S.J. Res. 250, 2019 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2019); Rosemarie O’Connell, Virginia's One-Term Governor Policy May 
Change Soon, DELMARVANOW.COM (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.delmarvanow.com/story/news/lo-
cal/virginia/2019/01/28/virginias-one-term-governor-policy-may-change-soon/2698874002/. 
35 Laura Vozzella, Democrats Want Longer Terms for Virginia Governors, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 
2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/virginia-politics/post/democrats-want-longer-terms-for-
va-governors/2011/12/12/gIQA6x5BqO_blog.html. 
36 Sarah Harney, The Last One-Term Statehouse, GOVERNING (Oct. 1, 2005), https://www.govern-
ing.com/topics/politics/Last-One-Statehouse.html. 
37 Michael Roberts, Term Limits Defined, BALANCE CAREERS (Jan. 4, 2020), https://www.the-
balancecareers.com/term-limits-1669489. 
38 States with Gubernatorial Term Limits, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/States_with_gubernato-
rial_term_limits (last visited Feb. 4, 2020). 
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among the original thirteen states but none of them had a Virginia-style 
no succession rule in the era of independence.39 The remaining thirty-
six (36) states have some type of term limit for their governors. All of 
these except Virginia allow gubernatorial succession.40 
 
The No Succession Rule does not control the number of terms 
a person may serve but instead limits his eligibility to serve. It is a less 
common form of term limit that, experience shows, indirectly restricts 
the number multi-term governors. It is therefore useful to distinguish 
between two types of gubernatorial term limits: (i) fixed duration, be-
ing those which specify the maximum number of terms or years that 
one may serve as governor;41 and (ii) reeligible-after-rotation, in 
which a governor after having served a specified number of terms or 
years of initial service, must rotate out office for a specified period 
before becoming eligible for reelection.42By the early 1950s, some-
twenty states, including Virginia, had constitutional provisions permit-
ting a governor to be reelected but only after a period of rotation.43 
Within two decades, that number that dwindled to fourteen, including 
Pennsylvania, Indiana and the entire South except for Arkansas.44 One-
by-one these states jettisoned their anti-succession rules. In 1970, for 
example, after having defeated similar proposals four previous times, 
West Virginia’s voters approved a constitutional amendment to allow 
a governor to serve two successive terms followed by one term of in-
eligibility.45 By the 1980s, only three states retained the ban in their 
constitutions: Mississippi, Kentucky, and Virginia.46 Within a decade 
the first two of those states passed constitutional amendments allowing 
governors to serve consecutive terms, leaving Virginia the lone 
	
39 Id. 
40 Id. Eight states restrict their governors to a lifetime maximum of two terms, consecutive or not. Ex-
cluding Virginia, the governors of the remaining twenty-seven states that have term limits are eligible to 
serve consecutive terms but must then sit out for a specified rotation period. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Joseph E. Kallenbach, Constitutional Limitations of Reeligibility of National and State Chief Execu-
tives, 46 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 438, 443 nn.23–24 (1952).  
44 HOWARD, supra note 15, at 592. 
45 W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 7-4; id. at 592 n.24; West Virginia 1970 Ballot Measures, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/West_Virginia_1970_ballot_measures (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).  
46 KY. CONST. § 71; MISS. CONST. art. 5, § 116; VA. CONST. art. 5, § 1; Article V, Mississippi Constitu-
tion, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Article_V,_Mississippi_Constitution (last visited Feb. 6, 
2020); The Executive Department, Kentucky Constitution, BALLOTPEDIA, https://bal-
lotpedia.org/The_Executive_Department,_Kentucky_Constitution (last visited Feb. 6, 2020). 
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holdout.47 Political term limits of all stripes have been controversial 
throughout American history. Arguments about term limits have often 
spilled over into litigation, and state anti-succession laws are no ex-
ception.48 Seeking to overturn their state’s limit on consecutive terms, 
two state governors sought redress in the courts, predictably without 
success given the presumptive legitimacy of constitutional provisions. 
The leading case is State ex rel. Maloney v. McCartney (1976), where 
West Virginia’s highest court upheld the state’s law restricting eligi-
bility for a third successive term.49 When Archie Moore, the state’s 
first two-term governor, filed a certificate of candidacy for a third term, 
a rival candidate, Maloney, filed an action for a writ of mandamus 
against the Secretary of State to prevent Moore’s name from appearing 
on the ballot.50 Moore claimed that the constitutional prohibition of a 
third term violated section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution by denying equal protection of the laws to those persons 
who would wish to elect him to an immediate third term.51 The court 
rejected Moore’s claim and granted the writ.52 
 
             In its opinion, the court relied in part upon a prior decision by 
the Georgia Supreme Court, Maddox v. Fortson (1970), rejecting Gov. 
Lester Maddox’s analogous suit to declare his state’s constitutional no 
succession rule invalid on grounds that it denied him his right to equal 
protection and denied voters their right to freedom of association under 
the First Amendment.53 The Maloney court summarized the holdings 
in prior term limits cases, mostly involving legislative officeholders, 
this way: “The universal authority is that restriction upon succession 
of incumbents serves a rational public policy and that, while re-
strictions may deny qualified men an opportunity to serve, as a general 
rule the over-all health of the body politic is enhanced by limitations 
on continuous tenure.”54 Finding that the public’s voting franchise 
would be affected only incidentally by the anti-succession rule, the 	
47 KY. CONST. § 71; MISS. CONST. art. 5, § 116; VA. CONST. art. 5, § 1; Article V, Mississippi Constitu-
tion, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Article_V,_Mississippi_Constitution (last visited Feb. 6, 
2020); The Executive Department, Kentucky Constitution, BALLOTPEDIA, https://bal-
lotpedia.org/The_Executive_Department,_Kentucky_Constitution (last visited Feb. 6, 2020). 
48 See State ex rel. Maloney v. McCartney, 223 S.E.2d 607, 610 (W. Va. 1976), appeal dismissed sub 
nom. Moore v. McCartney, 425 U.S. 946 (1976). 
49 Id.  
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 617. 
53 Id. at 611 (citing Maddox v. Foreston, 172 S.E.2d 595, 599 (Ga. 1970)). 
54 Id. at 611.  
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court in Maloney held that when balancing its salutary purpose of as-
suring competitive elections, the rule was reasonable and, therefore, 
lawful.55  
 One may disagree with that result, but these cases do seem to have 
been correctly decided.56 If little else, they confirmed that the only av-
enue of relief for opponents of anti-succession laws is by political 
means—that is, by the process of constitutional amendment.57 
 In Virginia, a proposal to allow two consecutive terms came before the 
full General Assembly a half century ago but the legislators over-
whelmingly voted against it, accepting the recommendation of the 
1969 Commission on Constitutional Revision (CCR) to retain the sta-
tus quo.58 Fifteen years later sentiment had shifted, albeit not enough 
to carry the day. In 1985, both houses of the General Assembly ap-
proved a constitutional amendment to rescind the ban on consecutive 
terms—the closest Virginia has ever come to repealing the Rule—only 
to reject the measure when it came up again for required second legis-
lative vote under the State’s amendment procedures. 59 
 
II. Rotation in Office at the Time of Virginia’s Founding 
 
Term limitation is not a new idea. The concept of regular rota-
tion in office originated in ancient Greece and Rome, and was revived 
by European intellectuals during the Renaissance, debated in numer-
ous public writings before and during the American Revolutionary pe-
riod, waxed and waned through the course of nineteenth century 	
55 Id. at 612–13. The Maloney court described the purpose of anti-succession rules with a noticeably 
modern focus on the evils of political “patronage” and “machines”: 
The reasons for limitations upon the right of incumbents to succeed themselves 
have their origin in the political structure of yesteryear when direct access by the 
candidates to voters was circumscribed by poor communications, illiteracy and in-
difference. The power of incumbent officeholders to develop networks of patronage 
and attendant capacities to deliver favorably disposed voters to the polls raised fears 
of an entrenched political machine which could effectively foreclose access to the 
political process. Consequently, . . . , it was thought that regular changes in the chief 
executive would stimulate criticism within political parties for the purpose of at-
tracting attention among political parties by providing occasions on which en-
trenched machines would be so disrupted by internecine strife as to insure a mean-
ingful, adversary and competitive election.  
Id. (citing Maddox v. Foreston, 172 S.E.2d 595, 599 (Ga. 1970)). 
56 Hugh B. McNatt, Constitutional Law – Incumbency Prohibition – Is Georgia In Step with the Times?, 
22 MERCER L. REV. 473, 476–77 (1971) (criticizing Maddox as infringing the people’s basic right to 
choose their elected officials). 
57 Maloney, 223 S.E.2d at 613. 
58 JOHN DINAN, THE VIRGINIA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 117 (2006) 
59 Id. at 118. 
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politics, was codified in the Twenty-Second Amendment to the Con-
stitution in 1951, and served to inspire the legislative term limit debates 
of the 1990s.60American political leaders in the Revolutionary era 
were keenly aware of earlier writings and practices involving rotation 
in office, and widely shared the belief that republican “government 
should be kept as near to the people as possible, chiefly through fre-
quent elections and rotation-in-office.”61 Advocates of rotation chiefly 
cited concerns about the corrupting influence of political power and 
the fear of political dynasties.62 As one popular colonial publication 
claimed: “A rotation . . . in power and magistracy is essentially neces-
sary to a free government.”63 A few colonies actually already experi-
mented with gubernatorial terms limits. For example, Connecticut’s 
charter, the Fundamental Orders of 1639—sometimes called the na-
tion’s first constitution—barred the governor from serving consecutive 
terms, fixing a term of one year and providing that “no person be cho-
sen Governor above once in two years.”64  In Virginia, many important 
figures including Washington, Lee, Paine, Jefferson, Mason, Randolph 
and Monroe publicly supported the idea of rotation in office.65 
 
In May 1776, the Continental Congress issued resolutions ad-
vising the colonies to adopt new governments “under the authority of 
the people.”66 The goal of the early constitution-makers was to “pre-
vent power, which they identified with rulers or governors, from en-
croaching upon liberty, which they identified with the people or their 
representatives.”67 For them, the best way to ensure this result was to 
strip power from the new executive and surround him with structures 
(e.g., a Council) whose members would be elected by the legislature, 
	
60 Mark P. Petracca, Rotation in Office: The History of an Idea, in LIMITING LEGISLATIVE TERMS 19–20 
(Gerald Benjamin & Michael J. Malbin eds., 1992).  
61 CLINTON ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 418 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1953).  
62 Id.  
63 John Trenchard, Cato’s Letters, No. 61, U. CHI. (Jan. 13, 1721), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/found-
ers/documents/v1ch17s7.html. Cato was the joint pseudonym of two London essayists writing in the 
early 18th century, whose Letters were “the most popular, quotable, esteemed source of political ideas in 
the colonial period.” ROSSITER, supra note 61, at 141. 
64 FUNDAMENTAL ORDERS OF 1639, order 4; WILLI P. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 
250–51 (2001).  
65 CHARLES RAMSDELL LINGLEY, THE TRANSITION IN VIRGINIA FROM COLONY TO COMMONWEALTH 
172–73 (Faculty of Pol. Sci. of Colum. U. eds., 1910) (support for Mason); Mark P. Petracca, Rotation 
in Office: The History of an Idea, in LIMITING LEGISLATIVE TERMS, supra note 60, at 19–20 (support for 
Washington, Lee, Paine, Jefferson, Randolph, and Monroe). 
66 WILLI P. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 60 (2001).  
67 GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A HISTORY 67 (2003). 
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thus rendering him a weak and inferior officer.68 The effect was to 
transfer nearly all political authority from a single ruler to the people’s 
representatives—truly, a “radical” change in governing rarely seen in 
human history.69 
 
In 1776-1777, ten states adopted written constitutions, while 
two others (Connecticut and Rhode Island) retained their preexisting 
charters, which were already republican in nature.70 Notably, when the 
thirteenth state, Massachusetts, passed its own constitution in 1780, it 
deviated from most of the others by adopting a British-style bicameral 
legislature balanced by a strong executive able to veto laws and appoint 
local officials, a precursor of the modern separation of powers model 
of government.71 Many of these new constitutions were accompanied 
by a declaration of rights, which articulate a panoply of individual lib-
erties that resemble those established in the first ten amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution.72  
 
On May 15, 1777, the Fifth Revolutionary Virginia Convention 
adopted its famous resolution calling for independence and appointed 
a committee to draft a declaration of human rights and a plan of gov-
ernment.73 The Declaration of Rights was adopted by the Convention 
less than a month later.74 It was drafted by George Mason, an erudite 
Potomac planter “so liberal he could not swallow the [later U.S.] Con-
stitution and so aristocratic he regarded Washington as an upstart.”75 
The Declaration presages the rotation principle embodied in the later-
approved Constitution,76 which is not surprising given Mason’s pivotal 
role in drafting both instruments. Section 5 of the Declaration pro-
claims that freedom from oppression and enhanced quality of repre-
sentation would be secured by reducing “at fixed periods” the members 
of the executive and legislature “to a private station . . . from which 
	
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
70 ALAN TAYLOR, AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS: A CONTINENTAL HISTORY, 1750-1804, at 356 (2016).  
71 Id. at 360–61. 
72 Id. at 357. 
73 Continental Cong. Preamble & Res. of the Va. Convention, May 15, 1776 (Va. 1776). 
74 The Virginia Declaration of Rights, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/vir-
ginia-declaration-of-rights (last visited Feb. 9, 2020).  
75 1 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, AMERICAN REPUBLIC 235 (3rd ed. 1942). 
76 The Virginia Declaration of Rights, supra note 74.  
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they were originally taken” by means of “frequent, certain and regular 
elections.”77 
 
 Mason’s was only one of a half-dozen drafts and outlines of a 
new constitution, which “makes the question of authorship of the Vir-
ginia Constitution a complex and difficult one.”78 Nonetheless, it is 
widely accepted that Mason’s drafts were the most influential to the 
final form of the document.79 It is clear that Mason’s original draft 
contained almost the exact form of the prohibition on gubernatorial 
succession that was adopted by the Convention.80 On June 29, 1776, 
Virginia became the third state to adopt a constitution,81 and its provi-
sions relating to the governor reflected the idea of frequent elections 
and rotation in the new constitutional order.82 The new Constitution 
had two basic features. First, and more pertinently, it declared that the 
future form of the government of Virginia would include an executive 
annually elected by the legislature who could serve no more than three 
years out of any seven.83 The No Succession Rule thus read: “A Gov-
ernor, or chief magistrate, shall be chosen annually by joint ballot of 
both Houses . . . who shall not continue in that office longer than three 
years successively, nor be eligible, until the expiration of four years 
after he shall have been out of that office.”84  	
77 Id.  
78 Editorial Note: The Virginia Constitution, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/docu-
ments/Jefferson/01-01-02-0161-0001 (last visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
79 Id.  
80 CHARLES RAMSDELL LINGLEY, THE TRANSITION IN VIRGINIA FROM COLONY TO COMMONWEALTH 
172–73 (Faculty of Pol. Sci. of Colum. U. eds., 1910) (“The Constitution followed almost completely 
the Mason Plan which called for a governor to be chosen annually by the assembly, to be eligible for 
three years and then be ineligible for four years.”); see also Robert L. Hilldrup, The Virginia Convention 
of 1776: A Study in Revolutionary Politics 253–55 (May 1, 1935) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Uni-
versity of Virginia) (on file with author); Letter from Edmund Pendleton to Thomas Jefferson (May 24, 
1776), in 1 THE LETTERS AND PAPERS OF EDMUND PENDLETON 1734-1803, at 180 (David John Mays 
ed., 1967) (“The Political Cooks are busy preparing the dish, and . . . Colonel Mason seems to have the 
Ascendancy in the great work . . .”); JEFF BROADWATER, GEORGE MASON: FORGOTTEN FOUNDER 93 
(2006). The Committee on the Constitution slightly revised Mason’s proposal to require a four-year pe-
riod of rotation instead of three. See Robert L. Hilldrup, The Virginia Convention of 1776: A Study in 
Revolutionary Politics 264 (May 1, 1935) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (on 
file with author).  
81 Mark A. Graber, Contribution: State Constitutions as National Constitutions, 69 ARK. L. REV. 371, 
378 (2016). 
New Hampshire was first and South Carolina second to adopt constitutions. Id.  
82 Robert Struble, Jr., House Turnover and the Principle of Rotation, 94 POL. SCI. Q. 649, 650, 652 
(1979-1980). 
83 Robert L. Hilldrup, The Virginia Convention of 1776: A Study in Revolutionary Politics 253–55 (May 
1, 1935) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file with author).  
84 The Constitution as Adopted by the Convention, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/doc-
uments/Jefferson/01-01-02-0161-0008 (last visited Feb. 7, 2020) (presenting the language used in the 
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             Second, the Constitution redistributed the powers previously ex-
ercised by royal governors, lodging judicial power in a separate court 
system; executive power in a new eight-member Council of State that 
the legislature elected that would approve the governor’s acts, and leg-
islative power in a bicameral general assembly.85 The Governor had 
no veto or other power over legislation or to call or prorogue the leg-
islature.86 His function was to execute the laws and make appointments 
with the advice and consent of the Council, and to supervise the militia. 
Succinctly put, “[t]he executive apparatus that emerged from the Con-
vention was weak in constitutional status, confused in lines of author-
ity, and wholly . . . subservient to the legislative will.”87 
 
With Virginia taking the lead, six other states adopted guber-
natorial rotation provisions in their original constitutions of 1776-
1777.88 Maryland adopted a provision that in relevant part was identi-
cal in wording to Virginia’s, prohibiting a governor to serve no more 
than three years out of any seven.89 Except for Pennsylvania, which 
adopted the same limitation as Virginia’s for the members of its plural 
executive, the period of ineligibility in the remaining states were less, 
either two or three years: 
 
State & Date of Adoption Term & Rotation Period  
Delaware  
10 September 1776 
3-year term; ineligible for 3 
years90  
North Carolina 
18 December 1776 
3- one-year terms; ineligible for 
3 years91  
Georgia 
5 February 177 
1-year term; ineligible for 2 
years92 	
text of the Virginia Constitution of 1776 as it was adopted by the Virginia Convention on June 29, 
1776). 
85 BRENT TARTER, THE GRANDEES OF GOVERNMENT 108 (2013); id.   
86 First Virginia Constitution, June 29, 1776, LIBR. VA., https://edu.lva.virginia.gov/online_class-
room/shaping_the_constitution/doc/va_constitution (last visited Feb. 12, 2020). 
87 Rowland Egger, The Governorship of Virginia, 1776 and 1976, 52 UNIV. VA. NEWSL. (The Univ. of 
Va., Va.), Aug. 1976, at 45–46.   
88 First Virginia Constitution, June 29, 1776, supra note 86. 
89 MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXI (“That the governor shall not continue in that office longer than three 
years successively, nor be eligible as Governor, until the expiration of four years after he shall have been 
out of that office.”); PENN. CONST. of 1776, § 19 (plural executive composed of twelve citizens; 3 one-
year terms; ineligible for 4 years).  
90 DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. VII.  
91 N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XV.  
92 GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XXIII.  
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In 1778 South Carolina revised its two-year old constitution and like 
the others limited the number of years that the executive could succes-
sively hold office:   
      
State & Date of Adoption Term & Rotation Period  
South Carolina 
17 March 1778 
2-year term; ineligible for 2 
years93 
 
 
             To be sure, there were Virginians who opposed the possibility 
of a governor serving even three years before rotation as being too 
long.94 Charles Lee, a general and hero of the Revolutionary War, 
feared that three years would allow a man to court “favor and popular-
ity at the expense of his duties.”95 Two centuries later proponents of 
retaining the ban on successive terms raise precisely the same argu-
ment.96 
 
             Nonetheless, there were strong opponents of rotation outside of 
Virginia, and within just a couple of years of the initial wave of state 
constitutions, the pendulum favoring mandatory rotation in office be-
gan to swing in the opposite direction.97 The second wave of constitu-
tion making (New York in 1777, Massachusetts in 1780, and New 
Hampshire in 1792 as its second constitution) saw the creation of a 
more powerful role for the executive so as to counterbalance the power 
of the legislature.98 For example, the chief architect of Massachusetts’ 
Constitution, John Adams, had long argued that “the people’s rights 
and liberties, and the democratic mixture in a constitution, can never 
be preserved without a strong executive” endowed with powers to veto 
laws and appoint local officials.99 None of these states limited the 
length or times of a governor’s tenure in office.100 	
93 S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. VI.  
94 See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 140 (1998) 
(arguing three years is too long because the governor will favor popularity over duty).  
95 Id.  
96 Harney, supra note 36 (showing modern proponents of the ban arguing frequent turnover is good to 
keep the governor focused on governing rather than re-election). 
97 Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade: Pennsylvania’s Radical 1776 
Constitution and its Influences on American Constitutionalism, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 541, 546–47 (1989). 
98 Id. at 547.  
99 WOOD, supra note 94 (quoting John Adams). 
100 Kallenbach, supra note 43, at 439 n.5. 
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The states’ individual preferences for a weak or strong execu-
tive thus exhibited a noticeable sectional bias, with states from Penn-
sylvania southward favoring the former, and northern states in New 
England and New York the latter.101 The same sectional alignment also 
existed over the manner of choosing a governor. In northern states, 
which allowed popular elections, there were no constitutional provi-
sions barring reelection of a governor, and many early governors of 
those states were repeatedly reelected.102 Conversely, all of the south-
ern states, where the governor was chosen by the legislature, prohibited 
their governors from succeeding themselves once the initial term had 
expired.103  
 
III. The Rule in Virginia from the Founding to the Present 
 
Twice during the nineteenth century, Virginia made minor 
changes to the No Succession Rule. When the state adopted a new con-
stitution in 1830, it provided that the governor would henceforth be 
elected to a full three-year term, and the period of ineligibility was de-
creased from four to three years.104 He still could not be re-elected, 
however, immediately after completing a term.105 The members of the 
1829-1830 Constitutional Convention extensively debated the merits 
of a stronger executive but they did not consider allowing a governor 
to serve consecutive terms.106 There was an attempt to change the way 
the governor was elected—to that of a popular vote of the electorate—
but it went nowhere.107   
 
In that matter, the reformers succeeded two decades later. Vir-
ginia’s third constitution, adopted in 1851, provided for election by 
popular vote and altered the term of the governor’s office from three 
to four years.108 A study committee of the 1850-1851 Constitutional 
Convention considered the possibility of allowing the governor to be 	
101 Id. at 438–39. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 438–40.  
104 VA. CONST. of 1830, art. IV, § 1. 
105 Id.  
106 WOOD, supra note 94 (noting that early Virginians were concerned over a three-year term, much less 
consecutive terms). 
107 ROBERT P. SUTTON, REVOLUTION TO SECESSION: CONSTITUTION MAKING IN THE OLD DOMINION 78, 
98–99 (1989); A.E. Dick Howard, “For the Common Benefit”: Constitutional History of Virginia as a 
Casebook for the Modern Constitution-Maker, 54 VA. L. REV. 816, 888 (1968). 
108 VA. CONST. of 1851, art. V, § 1. 
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elected for a second term and be ineligible thereafter, but this measure, 
too, fell short.109 There was a strong east-west divide generally during 
the Convention and specifically over this matter. In the main, eastern 
members were suspicious of increased gubernatorial tenure, while 
westerners thought it would strengthen the dignity and effectiveness of 
the office.110 Said one supporter, “if you allow an Executive Officer to 
be reelected, you at once put him on his good behavior, instead of mak-
ing him a corrupt officer to prostitute the public place.”111  
 
             With those ancillary adjustments in place, the No Succession 
Rule would go undebated by the General Assembly for well more than 
a century. The subject of the governor’s term limitation was at last 
taken up in earnest during the 1969-1970 revision of the Virginia Con-
stitution.112 Following a period of study, which included receiving 
written comments and holding public hearings, the CCR established 
by the Assembly recommended retaining the prohibition against con-
secutive gubernatorial terms.113 Observing that the issue had aroused 
“considerable interest” in the state, the CCR reasoned that no material 
change was needed to the Executive article because the governor had 
“sufficient powers” to carry out his responsibilities effectively.114 
 
             When the CCR’s Report came before the General Assembly 
for action, both the House and Senate General Laws Committees pro-
posed an amendment that the governor shall be ineligible for the same 
office for more than two terms in succession and as much as two years 
of a previous governor, or ten possible years in total.115 The accompa-
nying floor speeches were relatively “lively”116 but also short (less than 
one hour in each chamber) and unfocused. Speakers who favored keep-
ing the Rule, especially in the House of Delegates, dominated the 
	
109 ROBERT P. SUTTON, REVOLUTION TO SECESSION: CONSTITUTION MAKING IN THE OLD DOMINION 78, 
124 (1989). 
110 Id.  
111 Id.  
112 REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 18, 161 
(1969). 
113 Id. at 161–62. 
114 Id. at 161. 
115 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE SENATE OF VIRGINIA PERTAINING TO AMENDMENT OF THE 
CONSTITUTION: EXTRA SESSION 1969, at 710–11 (Charles Woltz ed., 1970); PROCEEDINGS AND 
DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES PERTAINING TO AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION: 
EXTRA SESSION 1969, at 28, 835 (Charles Woltz ed., 1970).  
116 HOWARD, supra note 15, at 591. 
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debates.117 The Assembly soundly rejected the proposal by votes of 
21-14 (3:2) in the Senate and 61-31(2:1) in the House.118 
 
In the years since, attempts to repeal the Rule have been a re-
curring feature of Virginia politics. Between 1972 and 2004, legisla-
tors introduced some 250 constitutional proposals to modify the elec-
tion, terms and powers of the governor and General Assembly.119 Two 
early attempts enjoyed partial success.120 The full General Assembly 
approved a new two term limit during its 1985 session but voted it 
down when it came before them again after the 1986 election.121 A 
decade later, in 1995, the Senate approved a similar measure only to 
see the House narrowly disapprove it.122 Later, in 2004, the Assembly 
established a special joint subcommittee to consider the existing bal-
ance of power between the executive and legislature.123 In its 2005 re-
port, the subcommittee recommended allowing Virginia governors to 
serve consecutive terms if also accompanied by measures to increase 
the powers of the Assembly.124 
 
IV. What Explains the Persistence of the Rule? 
 
Today, the condition of the governor in Virginia compares fa-
vorably with the strongest state executives in the country in terms of 
actual authority, tools of leadership, and public esteem.125 Every fea-
ture of the weak executive scheme adopted by the state’s founders in 
1776 has long since been eliminated through a series of constitutional 
amendments and statutory enactments, save one: the No Succession 	
117 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES PERTAINING TO AMENDMENT 
OF THE CONSTITUTION: EXTRA SESSION 1969, at 31–35 (Charles Woltz ed., 1970).  
118 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE SENATE OF VIRGINIA PERTAINING TO AMENDMENT OF THE 
CONSTITUTION: EXTRA SESSION 1969, at 128, 132 (Charles Woltz ed., 1970); id. at 31, 35. 
119 Michael Pope, Should Virginia’s Governors Be Allowed to Run for Reelection?, CONNECTION (Jan. 
3, 2013), http://www.connectionnewspapers.com/news/2013/jan/03/should-virginias-governor-be-able-
run-reelection/. 
120 DINAN, supra note 58, at 118. 
121 Id.  
122 The proposed amendment passed the Senate by a vote of 22-18 and was narrowly defeated in the 
House by a vote of 49-47. 1995 Session: SJ 282 Constitutional Amendment, VA. LEGIS. INFO. SYS., 
http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?951+sum+SJ282 (last visited Feb. 9, 2020) (legislative sum-
mary of S.J. 282, 1995 session). 
123 Pope, supra note 119.  
124 Id.  
125 DINAN, supra note 58 (“Although the 1776 Constitution created a weak executive, . . . each of the 
subsequent Virginia state constitutions has taken important steps toward empowering the executive.”); 
THOMAS R. MORRIS & LARRY J. SABATO, VIRGINIA GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 207 (4th ed. 1990).  
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Rule. It has survived for the entirety of the state’s history of self-gov-
ernment, and with remarkably little controversy. The question is, what  
explains its uncanny persistence? Although historical causation is of-
ten difficult to assess, the answer here almost surely involves a combi-
nation of several factors. 
 
One must first acknowledge that resistance to change is a basic 
human characteristic. Psychologists employ the term “status quo bias” 
to describe the instinctual preference for one's environment and situa-
tion to remain as they already are.126 When human make decisions, 
they tend to prefer the more familiar choice over the less familiar, even 
if a new course might entail greater benefits.127 The popular aphorism, 
“if it ain’t broke don’t fix it,” reflects this attitude. As one legislator 
who opposes changing the Rule says, “I don’t know why we’re getting 
all bent out of shape about this, . . . what’s broken about Virginia that 
needs to be fixed?”128 It is likewise often observed that Virginia seems 
to have elevated conservatism in politics to the status of a cultural im-
perative. “Virginia’s political culture has almost always exhibited an 
inhospitality to change.”129 That Virginia is the only state to retain the 
ban on gubernatorial succession seems to matter little to most and may 
even be a source of pride to some. “In Virginia, nothing ever happens 
for the first time. So the fact that we have this system in place has a 
force of its own . . . The power of inertia is a hugely powerful force in 
area code 804.”130  
 
An even more decisive factor in the Rule’s persistence is the 
prevalence of one-party rule for a significant portion of Virginia’s his-
tory.131 Leaders of the dominant party control the process for amending 
the state’s constitution.132 An incidental effect of sustained one-party 	
126 William Samuelson & Richard Zweckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision-Making, 1 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988). 
127 Cynthia Vinney, Status Quo Bias: What it Means and How it Affects Your Behavior, THOUGHTCO. 
(Feb. 9, 2020), https://www.thoughtco.com/status-quo-bias-4172981.  
128 Pope, supra note 119. 
129 BRENT TARTER, THE GRANDEES OF GOVERNMENT 392 (2013) 
130 Pope, supra note 119. 
131 Democrats controlled all levels of Virginia government from the readmission of Virginia into the Un-
ion after the Civil War up to the 1960s, when party members migrated en masse to the Republican Party. 
Not until 1982 did the opposition party win the governorship, signifying a new era of competitive elec-
tions for that office. See James R. Sweeny, Bridge to the New Dominion: Virginia’s 1965 Gubernatorial 
Election, 125 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 246, 248, 272 (2017); see also Virginia, BRITANNICA (Feb. 
9, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/place/Virginia-state/Government-and-society. 
132 See VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (describing the amendment process, a multi-step process requiring ma-
joritarian approval in each house of the state legislature). 
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rule is to diminish the incentives of legislators to upset the constitu-
tional status quo, particularly when there are clear benefits to inac-
tion.133 The No Succession Rule means more turnover in the office of 
governor—which legislators aspiring to higher office and particularly 
those who are members of the dominant party would agree is desira-
ble.134 Continued operation of the Rule also assures the dominant party 
that even if the personality of the officeholder turns over every four 
years, he would still broadly share the same basic political views of the 
majority of legislators and voters.135 In the calculus of party leaders, 
the best and safest course is to do nothing. The only saving grace for 
the minority party is that regular turnover at least offers a chance for 
redemption, although a slim one at best.  
 
             Another reason why the Rule has persisted is that a potential 
constitutional amendment faces significant procedural hurdles to be-
coming law.136 Once an amendment secures a majority vote in both 
houses of the General Assembly, itself problematic, it must be voted 
on again—after the next election for the House Delegates.137 In effect, 
the legislature gets a do-over, only this time the voting is by a House 
(and possibly also the Senate if elections in both chambers occur the 
same year) that has been newly-constituted by an intervening elec-
tion.138 During reconsideration by the Assembly incumbent legislators 
may change their minds and new members will weigh in, perhaps neg-
atively. That is what happened in the mid-1980s when the Rule came 
the closest it ever has to being repealed; it failed on the mandatory 
second vote.139 
 
Assuming a measure is twice approved by the General Assem-
bly, the voting public must be then persuaded to concur,140 no simple 
matter because proponents must wage an energetic and expensive cam-
paign to marshal public support. Success is far from assured. For 	
133 See Michael D. Gilbert, Entrenchment, Incrementalism, and Constitutional Collapse, 103 VA. L. 
REV. 631, 632–33 (2017) (discussing the legal stability that entrenchment promotes as well as the diffi-
culties and consequences of changing constitutions and other laws). 
134 Governors of Virginia, supra note 9 (illustrating the relative continuity of party control over the gov-
ernorship despite the turnover in individual governors). 
135 Id.  
136 VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1. 
137 Id.  
138 Id.  
139 Harney, supra note 36.   
140 Howard, supra note 31, at 9.  
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example, when, the six constitutional amendments approved by the 
General Assembly in 1969 came up in 1970 for vote, two of them 
failed.141 In short, unless a proposed amendment is embraced by  
a clear and committed majority of both houses, and is aggressively 
promoted, the likelihood of ultimate success at the ballot box is far 
from certain.142 
 
Protection of institutional power is another reason for the per-
sistence of the Rule. This, in fact, may be the most important factor in 
explaining contemporary resistance to its repeal. Separation of powers 
makes the governor and the legislature competitors for authority and 
prestige. The General Assembly is jealous of its primacy in state poli-
cymaking, and its leaders and members are predisposed to disapprove 
of anything that would diminish the body’s power and status.143 As 
Virginia government has increased in size and reach, so too has the 
authority and prestige of the governorship.144 Allowing a popular gov-
ernor to serve for one or more additional terms would to a degree affect 
the uneasy balance of power between the two branches in favor of the 
executive, something that historically the General Assembly has re-
sisted.145 Current proponents of the Rule cite balance of power consid-
erations as often or more as any other reason for keeping the status 
quo.146  
 
A corollary theme heard repeatedly in opposition to the Rule is 
that if the power of the governor were to be enhanced by allowing con-
secutive terms, he must give some power back to the legislature in re-
turn.147 When the legislative logjam preventing constitutional reform 
ultimately breaks in the future, it may well be due to some sort of grand 
bargain which joins repeal of the Rule with transfer of some of the 
governor’s authority to the Assembly. Legislators who consistently 	
141 Id.  
142 Id. at 10 (describing campaign to win voter approval of the 1970 referendum). 
143 Jeff E. Schapiro, Opinion/Commentary: Virginia’s Alone In Banning Two-Term Governors, DAILY 
PROGRESS (Jan. 27, 2019), https://www.dailyprogress.com/opinion/opinion-commentary-virginia-s-
alone-in-banning-two-term- governors/article_0563cef8-2033-11e9-8797-7b7ee80c5208.html. 
144 Howard, supra note 31, at 23.  
145 Schapiro, supra note 143.  
146 Id. (“Preserving [legislative] primacy, for reasons of policy, politics or personality—or all of the 
above—was foremost among senators who recently killed a [2019 Senate] proposal to eliminate the 
only-in-Virginia prohibition on a governor serving consecutive terms.”).  
147 Travis Fain, General Assembly: Redistricting Reform, Two Term Governor Bills Advance, DAILY 
PRESS (Jan. 3, 2015), https://www.dailypress.com/tidewater-review/dp-nws-ga-redist-two-terms-
20150120-story.html.  
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vote to retain the Rule contend that its removal would have to be ac-
companied by a reduction in the gubernatorial appointment power, if 
not also of other powers.148 The governor’s authority to make admin-
istrative and other appointments is considered a ripe subject for a deal, 
inasmuch as by one estimate he makes some 4,000 appointments dur-
ing one term and many such appointees serve longer than the governor 
who appointed them.149  
 
The question before legislators is likely to be what kind 
of offset package will be acceptable. For legislators 
who are already suspicious of the idea [of a trade off] 
in the first place, coming up with a set of recommenda-
tions might be tricky. How many appointments should 
the General Assembly get to make [in any given 
area]?150 
 
V. Arguments For and Against Retaining the Rule 
 
Inevitably, perhaps sooner than later, a new full-fledged debate 
will occur in the General Assembly over the future of the Rule, and a 
majority may decide to replace it. When they do, what arguments for 
or against the Rule will likely be most persuasive? The answer comes 
into focus by analyzing the public statements of commission members, 
legislators, governors, business groups and the press. 
 
A. Those who favor retaining the Rule make three basic 
claims: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	
148 DINAN, supra note 58, at 118. 
149 Interview with Douglas Wilder, former Governor of Va., in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 28, 2017).  
150 Pope, supra note 119; see also Fain, supra note 147 (stating that the governor “will need to negotiate 
away some of the executive branch’s powers”); Tyler Whitley & Jim Nolan, Two-Term Governor is 
Sought, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Dec. 15, 2008), https://www.richmond.com/archive/ (“Traditionally, 
legislators who have been willing to contemplate a two-term governor have said the governor ought to 
give up a lot of appointed powers if there is going to be a two-term governor.”).  
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1. It Deters Corruption.  
 
Sub-theme Commentary 
As power of governors has 
grown, it is more important than 
ever to limit term guard against 
their pursuit of self-interest. 
“The greater the powers of the 
Governor’s office, the more rea-
son to want some safeguards 
against self-perpetuation in of-
fice.”151 
The need to campaign for re-
election distract the governor 
from pursuit of the public good.  
Affairs of the state would be 
“better managed if the Governor 
is not facing the prospect of an 
election campaign.”152 
 
Governor would concern himself 
with “political considerations” 
related to reelection.153  
Governor might misuse his 
powers to achieve election.  
Such as his power over political 
appointments.154 
 
Or his power to propose a budget. 
Do not give him “four shots” at 
the budget.155 
 
Governor’s already large powers 
over expenditures “would tempt 
any Governor to use them to per-
petuate himself in office.”156 
Regular rotation means fresh 
ideas.  
“I don’t know whether being a 
Methodist has anything to do 
with the position I am taking, but 
very often we are very happy to 
get rid of our preacher at the end 
of our years.”157 	
151 REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, supra note 112, at 162.  
152 Id. at 161–62.  
153 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES PERTAINING TO AMENDMENT 
OF THE CONSTITUTION: EXTRA SESSION 1969, supra note 117, at 28 (statement of Del. McMath). 
154 Id. at 32–33 (statement of Del. Rawls). 
155 Id. at 33 (statement of Del. Pendleton). 
156 Id. (statement of Del. Dudley). 
157 Id. at 35 (statement of Del. Pope). 
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2. It Is a Key Element of the Existing Balance of 
Power.  
 
Sub-theme Commentary 
Allowing consecutive terms 
would alter the existing balance 
of power in favor of legislative 
branch, which reflect public 
opinion.  
Balance already favors gover-
nors; allowing consecutive terms 
would “diminish the already 
powerful executive.”158 
 
“I don’t have a problem with a 
second term, but I do have a 
problem with a king, and that’s 
what you’d have.”159 
 
One term restriction balances a 
Virginia governor’s far-reaching 
powers.160 
 
“We have governors that come in 
for four years. They have a large 
amount of control: they can ap-
point members of boards of com-
missions; they have a line-item 
veto, they can refuse or decide to 
spend money; they can name 
their own executives agencies. 
They have a tremendous amount 
of control as an executive, and 
the way we temper that is that we 
limit them to one term.”161 
 
	
158 Id. at 33–34 (statement of Del. Dudley). 
159 Alicia Petska, Push for Two-Term Governor Expected to Fail Again, NEWS & ADVANCE (Feb. 16, 
2015), https://www.newsadvance.com/news/local/push-for-two-term-governor-expected-to-fail-
again/article_02d1f9b4-b63b-11e4-b693-9fea3a70dc0a.html. 
160 Bob Brown, Should Va. Let Governors Serve Two Terms? No, Says Norment, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH 
(Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.richmond.com/news/local/government-politics/should-va-let-governors-
serve-two-terms-no-says-norment/article_ddf7e026-20d7-5a11-8a1c-0a950e2c873a.html. 
161 Austermuhle, supra note 4.   
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3. State Government has Been Good Under The 
Rule.162 
 
Sub-theme Commentary 
Repeal of the Rule would not 
necessarily produce better gov-
ernment than Virginia has actu-
ally experienced.  
“The Commission concludes that 
the one-term limit has worked to 
the advantage of the Common-
wealth.”163 
 
B. Proponents of allowing consecutive terms principally 
claim that: 
 
1. Rule Is Outmoded.  
 
Sub-theme Commentary 
The Revolutionary era model of 
a weak executive has been dis-
credited.  
“The reason for this prohibition 
is as a dodo bird.”164 
 
2. Repeal Would Allow Better Administration.  
 
Sub-theme Commentary 
Policy continuity needed in 
budget matters.  
“It’s been the same for every pre-
vious governor—they come into 
office, inherit their predecessor’s 
already-crafted budget, operate 
under their own budget for only 
two years and present a second 
budget that likely will be com-
pletely reworked by their succes-
sor.”165 	
162 Harney, supra note 36 (“Virginia ranks among the best-administered states in the nation.”). Of 
course, the argument that the State has been well governed while the Rule has been in place, is a straw 
man. The counterfactual—what would have happened if Virginia’s governors had been allowed to suc-
ceed themselves during all or part of the past 244 years—cannot be proved. It is therefore equally possi-
ble that without the Rule the State’s governance would have been better than it has been. 
163 REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, supra note 112, at 162.  
164 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE SENATE OF VIRGINIA PERTAINING TO AMENDMENT OF THE 
CONSTITUTION: EXTRA SESSION 1969, at 131 (Charles Woltz ed., 1970) (statement of Sen. Howell).  
165 Editorial Board, The Case for a Two-Term Governor, NEWS & ADVANCE (Mar. 10, 2017), 
https://www.newsadvance.com/opinion/editorials/the-case-for-a-two-term-governor/article_fa6dc81e-
050e-11e7-b262-17421ffab750.html. 
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One term encourage compla-
cency.  
It leads governors to “kick the 
can down the road” on tough 
problems that require long-term 
planning, such as transporta-
tion.166 
Two terms would incentivize 
building a good record to run for 
reelection.  
CCR Report167 
Limits governor’s ability to see 
his long-term initiative to frui-
tion.  
“A two-term governor would en-
able Virginia’s ability to resolve 
numerous challenges, which 
simply require longer than four 
years to address.”168 
 
Northern Va. Chamber of Com-
merce.169 
Second-term governors would 
have more experience and need 
less on-the-job training.  
The Virginian-Pilot170 
 
3. Repeal Would Enhance Democracy and Accounta-
bility.  
 
Sub-theme Commentary 	
166 Vozzella, supra note 35. One expert in Virginia politics, Larry Sabato, has expressed a different view 
of the risk/reward trade-off. He suggests that the Rule promotes efficient government by incentivizing 
chief executives to be focused on day one and use their time well in order to be effective. Is One Term in 
Office Better than Two?, WBUR (May 3, 2017), https://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2017/05/03/vir-
ginia-governors-consecutive-terms. 
167 REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, supra note 112, at 162; HOWARD, supra 
note 15, at 591.  
168 Bob Purkey, The Governorship of Virginia, 1776 and 1976, 52 UNIV. VA. NEWSL. (The Univ. of Va., 
Va.), Mar. 2005, at 1.  
169 NORTHERN VA. CHAMBER OF COM., 2019 LEGISLATIVE AGENDA 9 (2019) (“The current economic 
situation and ever-increasing global competition demands long-term strategic thinking and planning, 
which is not available under the limits of a one-term governorship.”). Business leaders in the State have 
regularly weighed in on the subject. For example, former Governor Mark Warner established an inde-
pendent commission composed of business representatives and others to study and make recommenda-
tions for improving the efficiency of state government. In its 2002 Report, the Commission on Effi-
ciency and Effectiveness supported removal of the one-term limit for governors, claiming that allowing 
popular election to consecutive terms would improve “long-term planning and [executive] accountabil-
ity.” GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON EFFICIENCY & EFFECTIVENESS, FINAL REPORT 24 (2002).  
170 Give Governors Chance for Re-Election, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Jan. 22, 2019), 
https://www.pilotonline.com/opinion/article_ad4f67e4-4edb-529e-badd-ebe6f4976bfb.html (“[T]he 
power shift wouldn’t be extreme, and it would hardly diminish the legislature’s strong hand on state 
government.  It would, however, create a more effective executive branch.”).  
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Consecutive terms would allow 
voters to decide whether to 
reelect a governor.  
“We ought to give the voters the 
opportunity to decide whether a 
governor should keep his job and 
be reelected.”171 
 
A two-term governorship “creates 
accountability, demanding an ex-
ecutive keep his or her promises 
or risk getting kicked out by vot-
ers.”172 
 
4. Prior Officeholders Favor Repeal.  
 
Sub-theme Commentary 
Recent Governors support con-
secutive terms.  
 
Views of these former office-
holders are persuasive.  
Public statements.173 
 
Views of former governors 
“should be enough reason” to de-
cide the matter.174 
 
VI. What Should Replace the Rule? 
If the General Assembly were to decide to change the Rule, the 
question would be, what should replace it? Forty-nine states allow their 
governors to serve successive terms.175 Of these, a minority permit a 
governor to serve as long as the public elects him,176 and a majority 
allow a governor to serve successive terms followed by mandatory ro-
tation out of office, sometimes for life but usually for a fixed number 
of terms or years.177 If Virginia were to repeal its Rule, the choice for 
a substitute would be between those two positions. 	
171 Jason Spencer, Should Virginia Allow Governors to Serve Two Consecutive Terms? Senate Says Yes, 
ARLINGTON PATCH (Feb. 3, 2013), https://patch.com/virginia/arlington-va/should-virginia-allow-gover-
nors-to-serve-two-consecut04b7e0840b.  
172 Schapiro, supra note 143.  
173 This argument was a key element in the CCR’s decision to recommend retention of the Rule and it 
figured in the 1969 Debates. At the time, the living former Governors agreed with the Rule. REPORT OF 
THE COMM’N ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, supra note 112, at 162. Now the same shoe is on the other 
foot. See Kallenbach, supra note 43, at 453.  
174 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE SENATE OF VIRGINIA PERTAINING TO AMENDMENT OF THE 
CONSTITUTION: EXTRA SESSION 1969, supra note 164, at 130 (statement of Sen. Stone).  
175 See States with Gubernatorial Term Limits, supra note 38.  
176 See id.  
177 See id.  
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 Allow succession with no term limits. The General Assembly could de-
cide to repeal the Rule without more. With that act and voter approval, 
Virginia would join the fourteen states that have no limitations on the 
number of terms a governor may serve. If so, Virginia would go from 
one extreme (no succession) to the other (unlimited succession). Apart 
from the merits of doing so, that would seem to be an uncharacteristi-
cally bold step for the state’s politicians and voters to take.  
 
Allow succession with some form of term limit. Alternatively, 
the General Assembly could decide to permit gubernatorial succession 
but impose a limit on the maximum number of terms; or allow succes-
sive terms followed by rotation period before becoming eligible again 
for one or more terms.  
 
             If the General Assembly were to vote to repeal the prohibition 
upon gubernatorial succession, it would likely propose to establish a 
term limit rather that permit a governor to serve as long as the people 
will elect him or her. A two-term limit (eight total years) similar to that 
imposed by the Twenty-second Amendment upon the U.S. President 
seems most likely. Such a limit would operate as an effective check 
upon prolonged power while allowing voters to reelect popular gover-
nors. Editorialists and journalists who have weighed in on the subject 
regularly support a two-term limit.178 
 
             Regardless of which term option a majority of Virginia’s leg-
islators may select, it is almost assured that the incumbent governor 
would be ineligible for successive terms.179 When Kentucky repealed 
its rule in 1992, the then sitting governor agreed not to seek reelection, 
no doubt to satisfy the opposing political party that he would not 	
178 See, e.g., Roger Chesley, It’s Time for Virginia to Allow Two Terms for Governors, VIRGINIAN-PILOT 
(Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.pilotonline.com/news/columns/article_d9bc15ef-c611-5bcb-a924-
b9b61ac556ff.html (“Change would do Virginia good. Governors here are lame ducks from the time 
they take the oath of office. Governors in a second term would have more experience and need less on-
the-job training.”); Harney, supra note 36 (“If Virginia governors could serve two terms, they'd get a lot 
more done.”); Norman Leahy, A Two-Term Virginia Governor?, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2011), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/all-opinions-are-local/post/a-two-term-virginia-gover-
nor/2011/03/10/gIQAhKo9tO_blog.html; Re-electing Governors Is Good For Virginia, DAILY 
PROGRESS (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.dailyprogress.com/opinion/opinion-editorial-re-electing-gover-
nor-is-good-for-va/article_41f8286e-24d9-11e9-ae04-17c5e3b683bf.html (advocating two terms).  
179 For example, H.J. 608, 2019 Sess. (Va. 2019) would not have allowed the sitting governor (Northam) 
to succeed himself in office but would have permitted a Governor elected in 2021 and thereafter to do 
so. See S.J. 282, 1995 Sess. (Va. 1995); see also PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE SENATE OF 
VIRGINIA PERTAINING TO AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION: EXTRA SESSION 1969, supra note 164, 
at 128, 130–31; Harney, supra note 36. 
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exploit his incumbency advantage.180 Prior bills in the Virginia Assem-
bly have contained this feature.181  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
             In Virginia, old habits die hard. Nearly two and a half centuries 
after adopting its first constitution, and more than a quarter of a century 
as the sole state to ban gubernatorial succession, Virginia is the last 
state to adhere to this constitutional anachronism.182 Virginia’s gover-
nor today enjoys all of the powers that modern state chief executives 
possess, save one: He cannot ask the voters to reelect him unless he 
first sits out for four years—sufficient time to see his popularity and 
achievements erode from public view.183 Practically speaking, no suc-
cession means no reelection. The alternative is to join ranks with all 
other U.S. states by allowing Virginia’s governor to serve two (or 
more) consecutive terms. That the position espoused by nearly all liv-
ing former Virginia governors, a sizeable group of legislators in both 
houses of the Assembly, and many leading newspapers in the state. 
According to a recent statewide poll, that is also what Virginia voters 
want.184 “[I]n the final analysis [the Rule] is an expression of lack of 
faith in the electorate’s ability to make an intelligent decision” about 
whether to retain a governor in office.185 At long last, its viability 
	
180 KY. CONST. § 71; 1992 KY. ACTS ch. 168, § 19; The Executive Department, Kentucky Constitution, 
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/The_Executive_Department,_Kentucky_Constitution (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2020). 
181 Harney, supra note 36. Delegate Dawn Adams introduced a constitutional amendment to repeal the 
Rule, H.J. 608, offered January 9, 2019, but it died in subcommittee. H.J. 608, 2019 Sess. (Va. 2019). 
The amendment would not have allowed the sitting governor (Northam) to succeed himself in office but 
would have permitted a Governor elected in 2021 and thereafter to do so. Id. Senator Andrews made ef-
fectively the same proposal during the 1969 debates over constitutional revision. PROCEEDINGS AND 
DEBATES OF THE SENATE OF VIRGINIA PERTAINING TO AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION: EXTRA 
SESSION 1969, supra note 164, at 128, 130–31. The 1995 constitutional amendment proposed by Sen. 
Mayre, S.J. 282, 1995 Sess. (Va. 1995), would have barred both the existing governor and his immediate 
successor from reelection. 
182 Harney, supra note 36. 
183 Id.  
184 CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT UNIV.’S JUDY FORD WASON CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY, VIRGINIANS THINK 
MCDONNELL PRISON SENTENCE FAIR; BACK GIFT BAN, REDISTRICTING REFORM, REPORTING CAMPUS 
RAPE TO POLICE, LOOSER MARIJUANA LAWS 2 (2014) (on file with author) (64 percent of voters favor 
allowing Virginia’s governors to run for reelection at least once). The analysis accompanying the Poll 
results observes: “While majority support exists across all demographic categories, support is higher in 
Hampton Roads, and among voters under 45, liberals, and Democrats, and lower in Richmond and cen-
tral Virginia, and among men, conservatives, and Republicans.” Id.  
185 Kallenbach, supra note 43, at 448. 
 
39
et al.: General Topics
Published by UR Scholarship Repository,
Do Not Delete 4/15/20  8:46 AM 
30 RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW  [Vol. XXIII:iii 
deserves to be tested through a statewide ballot measure, so that the 
people may themselves set the rule for their governor’s tenure in office. 
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ABSTRACT 
The Florida Everglades is one of the most unique ecosystems in the 
world, yet for over a century, it has been under assault by federal en-
gineers and Florida developers seeking to redirect water and pave the 
way for suburban sprawl. The consequences of such a battle are felt 
by all Floridians in the form of frequent algae blooms, polluted wa-
terways, increased taxes, and a wounded tourism industry. More di-
rectly, there has been a widespread catastrophic shift in both the biol-
ogy and hydrology of Florida’s Everglades. By providing historical 
background on the Everglades and the development of South Florida, 
this article discusses the rise of nutrient pollution issues in Florida 
and the legal measures taken to alleviate them. Further analysis of 
key water policy legislation at both the federal and state levels, in 
conjunction with their respective regulatory schemes, reveals glaring 
threats to what remains of native Florida. Finally, this article dis-
cusses the lack of accountability to such threats and presents potential 
solutions to Florida’s nutrient pollution problems. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Florida is a vulnerable state. With rising sea levels already 
claiming low-lying coastal areas, hurricanes constantly threatening to 
obliterate life as we know it, and sinkholes regularly consuming en-
tire houses,1 it is no wonder the Everglades is facing a major ecologi-
cal crisis. However, this crisis is unique in that it is almost entirely 
manmade, rooted in decisions dating back to the 19th century.2 One 
might think having centuries to solve such a crisis may make it an 
easier task, but this is not so because Florida’s water quality and nu-
trient policies are just as perplexing and enigmatic as the Everglades 
itself. 
 
This article will first discuss the Florida Everglades and its 
unique ecosystem composition and function. Next, this article will 
briefly describe the Everglades’ history of development and 	
1 Laura Parker, Why Obama Went to the Everglades for Earth Day, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 22, 
2015), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/04/150422-everglades-obama-climate-change-florida-
environment/.  
2 The Everglades, NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, https://www.nwf.org/Educational-Resources/Wildlife-
Guide/Wild-Places/Everglades (last visited Feb. 24, 2019).  
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restoration as it relates to South Florida’s ever-growing population 
and expansion. This article will then transition into a discussion about 
the Clean Water Act and how it has shaped both the state and federal 
responses to Florida’s water quality issues. Finally, this article will 
present possible solutions to the problems discussed, as well as what 
it might mean for Florida’s future.  
 
I. The Everglades 
 
A. History  
 
Florida has the fourth highest rate of biodiversity in the 
United States and is home to a substantial number of endemic spe-
cies—nearly 670—not found anywhere else in the world.3 Florida 
possesses “highly unique and nationally-valued ecosystems that in-
clude coral reefs, fresh and saltwater marshes, swamps, and man-
groves.”4 The Everglades alone includes four of these five highly 
unique and specialized ecosystems.5 Given their high biodiversity 
and specialized nature, these ecosystems are particularly sensitive to 
the introduction of excess nutrients6—a problem that has plagued the 
South Florida region since its initial settlement.7 
 
The Everglades is a subtropical wetland ecosystem encom-
passing one-and-a-half-million acres across South Florida.8 In fact, 
the Everglades is the only subtropical wilderness in North America 
and is the largest wilderness east of the Rockies.9 With Lake Okee-
chobee to the north and Florida Bay to the south, the Everglades is a 
unique ecosystem in both composition and function.10 Historically, 
Lake Okeechobee would overflow in the rainy summer months and 
	
3 Fla. Wildlife Fed’n, Inc. v. Jackson, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1149 (N.D. Fla. 2012).  
4 Id.  
5 Habitats, FRIENDS EVERGLADES, https://www.everglades.org/habitats (last visited Feb. 24, 2019). 
6 The Everglades Still Threatened By Excess Nutrients, AM. GEOPHYSICAL UNION (Aug. 31, 2012), 
https://phys.org/news/2012-08-everglades-threatened-excess-nutrients.html.  
7 Jackson, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1149–50 (“This biological diversity relies on sufficient quality habitat and 
other natural resources, including clear, transparent waters low in phosphate and nitrogen nutrients. Ef-
fectively managing nutrients in Florida lakes, flowing waters, estuaries, and coastal waters is important 
to maintaining ecosystems.”). 
8 The Everglades, supra note 2.  
9 Parker, supra note 1. 
10 Development In The Everglades, NAT’L PARK SERV.,  
https://www.nps.gov/ever/learn/historyculture/developeverglades.htm (last updated Apr. 14, 2015). 
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the water would slowly flow south on its way to Florida Bay.11 Un-
like today, the “land south of the lake was part of the Everglades, the 
ecologically precious ‘river of grass’ that moved water south from 
Lake Okeechobee to the coasts.”12 As the water flowed south, saw-
grass, inhabiting much of the Everglades, filtered small amounts of 
phosphorus, nitrogen, and other nutrients out of the nutrient-rich lake 
water, while serving several other critical ecological functions.13 
However, human development has played a significant role in dis-
rupting the natural flow of water, contributing to the gradual and 
tragic collapse of the Everglades’ fragile ecosystem.14 
 
Currently, sugar and cattle farms within a wide swath of land 
south of Lake Okeechobee called the Everglades Agricultural Area 
use phosphorus-based fertilizer in the growth of sugar cane and pas-
ture grass.15 Stormwater runoff carries excess phosphorus from the 
farms, through drainage canals cooperatively managed by the South-
west and South Florida Water Management Districts (SFWMD) and 
into the protected Everglades region.16 While phosphorus is an essen-
tial nutrient for many plants and animals, it has had a detrimental im-
pact on the historically nutrient-poor Everglades,17 causing imbal-
ances in the native vegetation and destroying the natural landscape.18  
 
While population growth, urban development, restructuring 
natural rivers, constructing highways, constructing drainage canals, 
and implementing flood-control mechanisms have significantly con-
tributed to the degradation and need for restoration of the Everglades, 
this article focuses on excess nutrient pollution and its devastating ef-
fects on native sawgrass prairies.19 Excess nutrients are one of the 	
11 The Everglades, supra note 2.  
12 Christopher Flavelle & Anna Edgerton, Florida’s Algae Blame Sticks to ‘Red-Tide Rick’ in Senate 
Race, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-29/florida-s-
algae-blame-sticks-to-red-tide-rick-in-senate-race. 
13 Id. 
14 See generally Development In The Everglades, supra note 10 (describing the history of human devel-
opment of the Everglades and the effects therein). 
15 See Andy Reid, Sugar-Cane Growing on State Land Misses Pollution-Cleanup Goal, Records Show, 
SUN SENTINEL (Dec. 18, 2016), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/palm-beach/fl-everglades-pollution-
from-state-land-20161211-story.html. 
16 Why is it Important to Restore the Everglades?, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/everglades/why-it-important-restore-everglades (last visited Feb. 18, 2020). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Kristin Schade-Poole & Gregory Möller, Impact and Mitigation of Nutrient Pollution and 
Overland Water Flow Change on the Florida Everglades, 8 SUSTAINABILITY 940, 940 (2016).  
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greatest challenges for Everglades restoration, as it is no secret that 
Florida’s flat topography, warm and humid climate, nutrient-rich 
soils, and vulnerability to natural disasters make controlling nutrient 
pollution a particularly difficult task.20 
 
B. Native Sawgrass 
 
Native sawgrass plays a critical role in the Everglades ecosys-
tem but it is ruthlessly outcompeted by invasive cattails which have 
detrimental effects on biodiversity.21 It is important to note that while 
cattails are native to Florida, they are considered to be invasive in the 
Everglades because the ecosystem has been “disturbed” by construc-
tion and altered flow, allowing cattails to fall out of natural balance 
and become invasive.22 Botanists and conservationists are in agree-
ment that nutrient enrichment of the Everglades has contributed to the 
invasion of sawgrass by cattail.23 While sawgrass thrives in condi-
tions of limited nutrient supply, cattail gained the competitive ad-
vantage when the altered flow of water through the Everglades re-
sulted in a high nutrient habitat.24 In other words, sawgrass and cattail 
have an inverse relationship and compete with each other for control 
of the Everglades ecosystem.25 
 
Sawgrass communities support the growth of a ground-grow-
ing algal mat called periphyton, which becomes the basis for the en-
tire wetland food chain.26 Small fish and insects feed on the periphy-
ton and become the prey of larger fish and several species of 
endangered birds.27 While sawgrass is very efficient at utilizing nutri-
ents in low levels, cattails proliferate under high-nutrient regimes.28 
Cattails grow in dense strands that starve the water of oxygen, 	
20 The Everglades Still Threatened By Excess Nutrients, supra note 6.  
21 Neil Santaniello, War on Cattails May Help Wildlife in Everglades, SUN SENTINEL (Jan. 9, 1999), 
https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-1999-01-09-9901080515-story.html. 
22 Everglades: Why Manage Exotic Vegetation?, NAT’L PARK SERV., 
https://www.nps.gov/ever/learn/nature/whymanageplants.htm (last visited June 6, 2019). 
23 STEVEN M. DAVIS, SOUTH FLA. WATER MGMT. DISTRICT, TECHNICAL PUB. 90-03: GROWTH, 
DECOMPOSITION AND NUTRIENT RETENTION OF SAWGRASS AND CATTAIL IN THE EVERGLADES iii 
(1990). 
24 Id.  
25 Id. at 20. 
26 Drew Fulton, Sawgrass Prairie, EVERGLADES IMAGERY, http://www.evergladesimagery.com/ever-
glades/communities/communities-sawgrass.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2020). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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inhibiting periphyton growth and disrupting aquatic food chain devel-
opment.29 This restructuring also diminishes the Everglades’ role as a 
habitat and foraging ground for native wildlife.  
 
Cattail communities often grow so thick that “alligators, tur-
tles, wading birds, and other native wildlife can’t move through it.”30 
This makes it difficult, and often impossible, for these species to hunt 
and mate. Cattails also disrupt important fire regimes that are essen-
tial to controlling plant growth, nutrient dispersal, and diversity of 
habitats for native plants and wildlife.31 Cattails burn poorly com-
pared to sawgrass and do not form intermittent dense strands to pro-
tect the ground layer from intense fire.32 Because of the cattail inva-
sion, fires are now consuming larger, more uniform areas of 
landscape and causing widespread destruction rather than their tradi-
tional role of ecosystem maintenance.33  
 
C. Development 
 
So, what set all of this in motion? The short answer is human 
greed and the desire to develop Florida’s coasts. The long answer is 
much more complicated. 
 
By the 1870s, Florida was gaining national attention for its 
year-round mild climate and northerners flocked to what was flaunted 
as a tropical paradise.34 Developers descended upon South Florida to 
seize exotic real estate opportunities and expand farming opera-
tions.35 Wetlands were drained to make the land suitable for farming 
	
29 Id. 
30 Madeline Fisher, Restoring the Greater Everglades Ecosystem, CSA NEWS (Feb. 3, 2014), 
https://dl.sciencesocieties.org/publications/csa/articles/59/2/4. 
31 Yegang Wu et al., Impacts of Fire and Phosphorus on Sawgrass in an Altered Landscape of the Flor-
ida Everglades, 1 ECOLOGICAL PROCESSES 1, 3 (2012). Historically, the Everglades would experience 
periodic fires caused by lightning strikes. The dense nature of sawgrass communities and the underlying 
periphyton deprived fires of oxygen and prevented high-intensity burns. Cattails, on the other hand, burn 
quickly and do not support periphyton growth, meaning fires that were once low-intensity now have the 
fuel load and oxygen to burn longer and encompass larger swaths of land. These bigger, high-intensity 
fires slow new plant growth and create a more uniform ecosystem, which diminishes biodiversity. 
32 Id. at 11. 
33 Id. at 2. 
34 Florida Development, FLA. DEP’T ST., https://dos.myflorida.com/florida-facts/florida-history/a-brief-
history/florida-development/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019). 
35 Id. 
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and swamps were filled to make way for subdivisions and cities.36 To 
combat the soggy, inhospitable marshland, the Kissimmee River was 
straightened to move water more quickly and a dike was built around 
Lake Okeechobee to prevent its natural spillovers and spare southern 
residents and farmlands of flooding.37  Further, a series of drainage 
canals allowed efficient farming of the land, giving rise to the state’s 
massive sugar industry.38 As a result, very little water was able to 
travel its natural southward path and instead accumulated in the lake, 
along with farm runoff and sewage effluent.39 Essentially, Florida al-
lowed three million acres that drain into Lake Okeechobee to become 
overdrained and overdeveloped.40 Nevertheless, Florida real estate 
continued to boom along with its population. 
 
The end of World War II saw even greater growth with the 
construction of Disneyworld, shuttle launches at Cape Canaveral, and 
the development of Miami as a military hub.41 To accommodate a 
rapidly growing population, roads were paved over the Everglades 
and along the coasts, subdivisions were built alongside and on top of 
historic wetlands, and farmlands overtook the State’s interior.42 The 
result? Seventy seven percent of Florida’s 21.3 million population 
now lives in coastal counties, with 46 percent living on the Atlantic 
Coast and 31 percent on the Gulf Coast.43  
 
Unfortunately, Florida’s aging infrastructure has simply not 
been able to keep up with the growing population, exacerbating de-
mands for land and water resources. As a result, the dike around Lake 
Okeechobee has become strained under its normal water capacity, 
prompting the Army Corps of Engineers to release lake water into the 
Caloosahatchee River to the west and the St. Lucie River to the east 	
36 See Tim L. Setter et al., Agricultural Use of Wetlands: Opportunities and Limitations, 105 ANNALS 
BOTANY 155, 155 (2010); Alexander Heilner, The Boomtown That Shouldn’t Exist, POLITICO (Oct. 10, 
2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/10/20/fastest-growing-city-america-florida-cape-
coral-215724.  
37 Fisher, supra note 30.  
38 Flavelle & Edgerton, supra note 12. 
39 Fisher, supra note 30. 
40 David Fleshler, Algae Problem Stems From Decades of Lake Okeechobee Pollution, SUN SENTINEL 
(July 8, 2016), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/fl-lake-pollution-20160708-story.html. 
41 World War II and Post-War Boom, FLA. DEP’T ST., https://dos.myflorida.com/florida-facts/florida-
history/a-brief-history/world-war-ii-and-post-war-boom/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019). 
42 Id. 
43 JUDITH KILDOW, NAT’L OCEAN ECON. PROGRAM, PHASE 1: FACTS AND FIGURES, FLORIDA’S OCEAN 
AND COASTAL ECONOMIES 1, 4 (2006). 
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to prevent flooding of nearby sugar farms.44 This nutrient-rich lake 
water flows out to the Gulf and the Atlantic, but some also makes its 
way south through the Everglades, bringing with it harmful levels of 
phosphorus and nitrogen.45 These water releases, combined with the 
increased agricultural runoff from farmlands, have had detrimental 
effects on Florida’s existing nutrient pollution problems. 
 
In addition to degradation of the Everglades, nutrient pollu-
tion “fuels the proliferation of harmful algae outbreaks . . . that grow 
so quickly that ecosystems are overwhelmed by them.”46 Florida al-
gal outbreaks or “blooms” affect both inshore and coastal waterways 
and are caused primarily by two types of algae: blue-green algae (cy-
anobacteria) and red tide (Karenia brevis).47 The two types of blooms 
vary in origin, but it is now widely accepted by the scientific commu-
nity that both types of algal blooms are exacerbated by the presence 
of excess nutrients, particularly phosphorus and nitrogen.48 Accord-
ing to Karl Havens, a local biologist specializing in water pollution, 
algae blooms follow a basic recipe: pollution, sunlight, and warm wa-
ter.49 In other words, Florida. 
 
In their Valuing Florida’s Clean Waters report, Earthjustice 
claimed the prevalence of harmful algae outbreaks throughout Florida 
was the impetus for filing suit against then Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) administrator, Lisa Jackson.50 While the report notes 
that both types of algae are naturally-occurring and manageable in 
low concentrations, the combined effects of increased rain, agricul-
tural runoff, and water releases, had created the perfect storm for ex-
tended and highly devastating algae blooms in Florida.51 Experts also 
note that the State has always “focused on tracking red tides once 
	
44 David Guest, South Florida’s Tourist Season from Hell, EARTHJUSTICE (Mar. 2, 2016), 
https://earthjustice.org/blog/2016-february/south-florida-s-tourist-season-from-hell. 
45 See Katrina Elsken, Phosphorus – It’s Everyone’s Legacy, LAKE OKEECHOBEE NEWS (Dec. 26, 2018), 
https://lakeokeechobeenews.com/lake-okeechobee/phosphorus-its-everyones-legacy/. 
46 Elizabeth A. Stanton & Matthew Taylor, Valuing Florida’s Clean Waters, STOCKHOLM ENVTL. INST. 
– U.S. CTR. 1, 3 (Nov. 13, 2012), http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/ValuingFloridasClean-
Waters.pdf. 
47 Id. at 8.  
48 Id. 
49 Karl Havens, What is Causing Florida’s Algae Crisis?, GAINESVILLE SUN (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://www.gainesville.com/opinion/20180815/karl-havens-what-is-causing-floridas-algae-crisis. 
50 Stanton & Taylor, supra note 46, at 8.   
51 Id. 
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they arrive, not on the pollution that’s driving them.”52 Over the last 
eight years, the State, under the guidance of Governor Rick Scott, 
drastically reduced funding for water quality monitoring programs 
and agencies that focus on red tide research.53 Without hard limits on 
how much phosphorus and nitrogen are allowed into the ecosystem, 
these best-management practices essentially became voluntary 
measures.54 For example, the target phosphorus level for Lake Okee-
chobee is 105 metric tons a year, but last year the lake received a 
mammoth 450 metric tons.55 Perhaps an unsurprising outcome: In the 
summer of 2018, 90 percent of Lake Okeechobee’s 730-square mile 
surface was covered in blue-green slime.56 It cannot be ignored that 
just after the lake exploded with blue-green algae and water managers 
started flushing its water to the coasts, the Gulf’s existing red tide 
deepened, resulting in widespread fish kills and a toxic coastline with 
its epicenter being the Caloosahatchee River—Lake Okeechobee’s 
western relief outlet.57 
 
A decades-old federal study concluded that man-made pollu-
tion worsens red tide, making the lake and its high levels of phospho-
rus and nitrogen an undeniable contributor.58 How can this unchecked 
pollution be managed? Adopting numeric nutrient limits would force 
major polluters to be held responsible through enforcement by the 
Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP) and the 
U.S. EPA. Further, hard limits would lead to the adoption of better 
overall best-management practices to reduce nitrogen and phosphorus 
loads entering Lake Okeechobee, the Everglades, and Florida’s 
coastal and inland waterways.  
 
D. Restorative Measures 
 
	
52 Jenny Staletovich, Red Tide May Be ‘Natural’ But Scientists Believe Coastal Pollution Is Making It 
Worse, MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 3, 2018), https://phys.org/news/2018-09-red-tide-natural-scientists-
coastal.html. 
53 Id. 
54 Fleshler, supra note 40.  
55 Id. 
56 Jenny Staletovich, What’s An Algae Bloom and How Did It Wind Up Sliming Florida’s Biggest Lake?, 
MIAMI HERALD (July 10, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/environment/arti-
cle214620390.html. 
57 Staletovich, supra note 52. 
58 Id. 
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Despite the overwhelmingly negative circumstances sur-
rounding the historic treatment of the Everglades, there have been 
several positive strides in recent decades towards restoring the natural 
flow. Two positive measures are of substantial importance: the Kis-
simmee River Restoration Act and the Everglades Forever Act. 
 
1. The Kissimmee River Restoration Act 
 
In order to combat the over-draining of water as a result of the 
1960s’ transformation of the meandering Kissimmee River into one 
hyper-streamlined canal, water managers have undertaken a 20-year 
restoration effort to recurve the river.59 In a massive, expensive, and 
seemingly endless undertaking, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
has been acquiring land, backfilling canals, and restoring wetlands all 
in an effort to undo damage inflicted just a few years earlier.60  
 
Once the Kissimmee River’s channelization was completed in 
1971 and the river had effectively been transformed into a series of 
impoundments, the ecological devastation was immediately appar-
ent.61 While the goal was flood control, the ultimate result was sub-
stantial loss of wetland habitat, elimination of historic water level 
fluctuations, increased nutrient loads, and greatly modified flow char-
acteristics.62 Downstream ecosystems and economies were suffering 
greatly and pressure mounted on the State to correct its blunders.63 
1976 saw the passage of the Kissimmee River Restoration Act, which 
was designed to restore the historic flow, reestablish the natural 
floodplain and wetland habitat, and recreate conditions favorable to 
increasing production of native flora and fauna.64 In other words, the 
overarching goal was to improve water quality and restore native 
populations. 
 
	
59 Amy Green, The Kissimmee: A River Re-Curved, NPR (Oct. 19, 2014), 
https://www.npr.org/2014/10/19/356647396/the-kissimmee-a-river-recurved. 
60 Kissimmee River Restoration Project, U.S. ARMY CORPS ENGINEERS (Jan. 2019), https://usace.con-
tentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p16021coll11/id/3340. 
61 Joseph W. Koebel, An Historical Perspective on the Kissimmee River Restoration Project, 3 
RESTORATION ECOLOGY 149, 149 (Sept. 1995). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
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With the project finally nearing completion decades later, the 
ecological benefits have been overwhelming.65 Since the project’s 
commencement, native birds have returned to the riverbed and sur-
rounding wetlands, dissolved oxygen has increased to healthy levels, 
organic deposits in the riverbed have decreased substantially, fish 
communities have repopulated, and native wetland plants have taken 
hold of the floodplain.66 This significant cooperative effort between 
the Army Corps of Engineers and Florida’s Water Management Dis-
tricts to restore historic flow patterns represents the consensus that 
Florida’s water resources are imperiled and require drastic measures 
for improvement. Restoring the upstream components of the Ever-
glades ecosystem is a remarkable starting point, but much is still to 
be done to repair the damage to downstream systems. Fortunately, 
downstream systems are the focus of the Everglades Forever Act.  
 
2. The Everglades Forever Act 
 
In 1948, the Florida Legislature designated a large swath of 
land south of Lake Okeechobee for agricultural use.67 Named the Ev-
erglades Agricultural Area (EAA), it encompassed nearly 700,000 
acres of the original Everglades and was primarily used for sugarcane 
farming.68 While the EAA’s designation was helpful in ensuring only 
a relatively small part of the Everglades would be converted into 
farming operations, the EAA quickly became a hotspot for intensive 
use of fertilizer and water, and thus, harmful agricultural runoff.69 
Following the unprecedented levels of phosphorus-rich runoff, the 
entire “Everglades ecosystem [became] endangered as a result of ad-
verse changes in water quality, and the quantity, distribution, and 
timing of flows.”70 This finding by the legislature was codified in the 
1994 passage of the Everglades Forever Act, a long-term plan em-
ployed to restore and protect the Everglades by reducing excess phos-
phorus levels.71 The Act further authorized the Everglades Construc-
tion Project, a monumental restoration effort involving construction 	
65 Kissimmee River Restoration Project, supra note 60.  
66 Id. 
67 Everglades Agricultural Area, DUKE U. WETLAND CTR., https://nicholas.duke.edu/wetland/eaa.htm 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2019). 
68 Everglades Agricultural Area, CONSERVANCY SOUTHWEST FLA., https://www.conservancy.org/our-
work/policy/everglades/EAA (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
69 Id. 
70 Everglades Forever Act of 1994, FLA. STAT. § 373.4592(1)(a) (2019). 
71 Id. § 373.4592(17) (2017). 
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of 57,000 acres of wetlands known as stormwater treatment areas 
(STAs).72  
 
STAs are living wetlands designed to capture excess runoff 
and hold nutrient-rich water for treatment before it is permitted to 
flow through the Everglades. STAs encourage phosphorus removal 
via sedimentation and utilize native wetland plants to filter and treat 
phosphorus organically before the water makes its way south.73 The 
STAs have proven highly effective at reducing the amount of excess 
phosphorus entering the Everglades and additional STA projects are 
at the forefront of the SFWMD’s long-term plan.74 However, while 
water quality and quantity monitoring are vital components of STA 
operations, one critical piece is missing: a numeric phosphorus crite-
rion. Without criteria to define the maximum allowable limit of phos-
phorus entering the ecosystem, water managers are essentially imple-
menting “best management practices” for farms and STAs.75 While 
best management practices are helpful to making strides towards re-
storative goals, they do not provide concrete commitments to reduce 
nutrient loads.76 Further, best management practices are simply vague 
guidelines for accomplishing a goal, not specific standards that can 
be enforced pursuant to the Clean Water Act.77 
 
II. Water Policy 
 
A. The Clean Water Act of 1972 
 
The 1972 Clean Water Act (“CWA”) is the principal federal 
law governing water pollution and regulation in the United States.78 
Polluted water was posing a serious threat not only to the health of 
the nation’s waters, but also to people who were drinking, living near, 	
72 Fisher, supra note 30. 
73 Everglades Stormwater Treatment Areas, S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DISTRICT, 
https://www.sfwmd.gov/sites/default/files/documents/bts_sta.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
74 Id. 
75 S. H. Daroub et al., Best Management Practices in the Everglades Agricultural Area: Controlling Par-
ticulate Phosphorus and Canal Sediments, IFAS EXTENSION (U. Fla. Institute Food Agricultural Sci., 
Gainesville, Fla.), 2005, at 1. 
76 See Press Release, Randy Smith, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., Phosphorus Reductions Continue to Im-
prove Everglades Water Quality (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.sfwmd.gov/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/nr_2014_0814_phosphorus_reduction.pdf. 
77 See United States v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 88-1886-CIV-MORENO, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
114510, at *14 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 2011). 
78 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2020). 
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and using water for recreation.79 The CWA’s primary objective was 
the “restoration and maintenance of chemical, physical, and biologi-
cal integrity of the Nation’s waters.”80 Further, it defined the national 
goal as, where attainable, “water quality [should] provide for the pro-
tection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides 
for recreation in and on the water…”81 In other words, the CWA 
called for fishable, swimmable, and drinkable waters for all Ameri-
cans.  
 
The CWA preserves the rights of the States to establish and 
regulate their own standards for water pollution with the goal of re-
storing, preserving, and enhancing water resources.82 It is the respon-
sibility and the right of the States “to prevent, reduce, and eliminate 
pollution, to plan the development and use of land and water re-
sources, and to consult with the [EPA] Administrator (the “Adminis-
trator”) in the exercise of his authority under this chapter.”83 States 
are to consult with the Administrator to manage pollution standards 
and federal agencies are to aid the states in the development of com-
prehensive management solutions.84 In other words, states are permit-
ted to adopt their own water-quality standards under the guidance of 
the Administrator and the Administrator is required to approve a 
state’s changes to its water-quality standards. However, if a state fails 
to adopt timely or adequate water-quality standards, the Administra-
tor has the authority to do so on the State’s behalf.85 In that case, the 
Administrator may wait no longer than 190 days to intervene and 
promulgate new standards.86  
 
B. Florida’s Nutrient Policy 
 
	
79 The Challenge of the Environment: A Primer on EPA’s Statutory Authority, U.S. ENVT’L PROTECTION 
AGENCY, https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/epa-history-water-challenge-environment-primer-epas-
statutory-authority.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
80 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2020). 
81 Id.   
82 Id. § 1251(b). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. §§ 1251(e), 1251(g). 
85 Id. § 1313(b). 
86 Id. 
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In 1977, the CWA was amended and agricultural stormwater 
became exempt from regulation.87 The impetus then fell to the State 
of Florida “to regulate phosphorus in stormwater leaving the sugar 
farms, [otherwise] the population of flora and fauna in the Everglades 
remained at risk from stormwater laden with phosphorus.”88 Under 
the CWA, “Florida had to categorize its surface waters and establish 
water quality standards for each water body to preserve the water 
body for its designated uses and protect the water body from degrada-
tion.”89  
 
1. The 2001 Consent Decree 
 
In 1988, the United States initiated litigation against both the 
SFWMD and the Florida Department of Environmental Protection 
(FDEP) under the CWA for “failing to regulate polluted waters from 
entering the Everglades Agricultural Area [EAA] . . . that contain 
harmful nutrients.”90 This litigation continued for three years before 
the parties entered into a settlement agreement where they agreed that 
nutrient discharges into the EAA were an immediate threat to the 
ecosystem’s health.91  
 
At the time of the settlement agreement’s inception, the stand-
ard for protection against excess nutrients was a narrative standard.92 
Nonnumeric “narrative” standards describe the desired conditions of 
a water body.93 For example, the pre-settlement narrative standard 
read: “[i]n no case shall nutrient concentrations of a body of water be 
altered so as to cause an imbalance in natural populations of aquatic 
flora or fauna.”94 Narrative standards are vastly unfavored for two 
major reasons: First, applying such vague standards is resource-
	
87 See Memorandum: Clean Water Act Section 404 Regulatory Program and Agricultural Activities, 
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/memorandum-clean-water-act-sec-
tion-404-regulatory-program-and-agricultural-activities (last visited Feb. 17, 2020). 
88 United States v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., Nᴏ. 88-1886-CIV, 2011 WL 4595016, at *1, *3 (S.D. Fla. 
Jan. 4, 2011). 
89 Id. at *18–19. 
90 Id. at *13.  
91 United States v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 847 F. Supp. 1567 (S.D. Fla. 1992). 
92 South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 2011 WL 4595016, at *20–21. 
93 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK CHAPTER 3: WATER QUALITY 
CRITERIA 5 (2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-10/documents/handbook-chap-
ter3.pdf. 
94 South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 2011 WL 4595016, at *21–22. 
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intensive and time consuming;95 and second, narrative standards do 
little by way of facilitating effective implementation of water quality 
protection programs to prevent nutrient impairment.96 For example, a 
natural consequence of the State’s narrative standard was that by the 
time the water had reached problematic nutrient concentrations, “it 
would be too late for Everglades protection to wait for cattail to ap-
pear.”97 Perhaps ironically, at the time the narrative standard was es-
tablished, the scientific community posited that an imbalance had al-
ready occurred in the natural flora and fauna due to nutrient 
pollution.98 So, the settlement agreement’s drafters outlined a process 
for developing numeric criteria to substitute for the inadequate narra-
tive standard.99 The settlement agreement was subsequently con-
verted into a consent decree (the “2001 Consent Decree”), which 
“imposed a process rather than a result, in effect recognizing an ad-
ministrative framework while preserving [the] Court’s ultimate juris-
diction.”100 Following the decision, there was widespread agreement 
that narrative standards were ineffective and needed to be replaced by 
consistent numeric standards.101 
 
While sound in theory, the 2001 Consent Decree’s framework 
caused a series of circular litigation and blame-shifting among federal 
and state agencies.102 Essentially, the decree compelled the water 
management districts to propose regulations and methods to protect 
the Everglades from excess nutrient pollution.103 However, state 
agency authority was restricted by obligations under state law and 
Florida’s administrative procedure.104 According to the CWA and 
Florida procedure, nutrient pollution standards were the responsibility 
of FDEP, and if FDEP failed to develop adequate standards, the bur-
den was then shifted to the EPA.105 It was quickly realized that nutri-
ent criterion development required substantial resources and time, 
and FDEP ultimately allowed the deadlines to pass, automatically 	
95 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 93, at 5–6.  
96 MARK R. POIRIER, ENVTL. LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 18(1)(iii) (2019). 
97 South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 2011 WL 4595016, at *5.  
98 Stanton & Taylor, supra note 46.   
99 South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 2011 WL 4595016, at *5. 
100 Id. at *7. 
101 Florida Wildlife Fed’n, Inc. v. Jackson, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1150 (N.D. Fla. 2012). 
102 Id. at 1142. 
103 Id. at 1146–47.  
104 South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 2011 WL 4595016, at *7.  
105 33 U.S.C. § 1313(b) (2020). 
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shifting the responsibility to the EPA pursuant to the CWA.106 When 
the EPA failed to timely act, state and federal agencies battled back 
and forth over who held responsibility for the promulgation of ade-
quate nutrient standards, all while Florida’s nutrient pollution prob-
lems worsened and the State suffered substantial economic loss as a 
result of ongoing harmful algal blooms.107 Because the original settle-
ment agreement and the subsequent 2001 Consent Decree did not 
prescribe any remedies for dispute resolution, all disagreements per-
taining to the creation, adoption, and regulation of nutrient standards 
in the Everglades found their way back into court.108 The results have 
been disheartening. Following the 2001 Consent Decree, several on-
going series of cases litigated issues relating to nutrient standards in 
the Everglades.109 Two of those cases, specifically addressing the nu-
trient standards, are analyzed below. Despite this ongoing litigation, 
nutrient standards either remain in narrative form or have been ren-
dered inadequate to protect the economy and the interests of millions 
of Floridians whose livelihoods are currently tied up in this litigation. 
 
2. The 2009 Consent Decree 
 
In July 2008, Florida Wildlife Federation, alongside several 
major conservation groups, sued the U.S. EPA and its Administrator, 
Lisa Jackson, in the Northern District of Florida for failing to comply 
with the 1998 Clean Water Action Plan (the “Action Plan”) devel-
oped by the EPA Administrator and Secretary of the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture.110 The 1998 Action Plan acknowledged that nearly 40 
percent of state waters did not meet the CWA’s water-quality goals 
and outlined a new strategy to alleviate pressing water-quality prob-
lems.111 This case represented 20 years of back-and-forth debate be-
tween conservation groups, the EPA, the FDEP, and various industry 	
106 Jackson, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1147.  
107 Florida Wildlife Fed’n, Inc. v. Jackson, No. 4:08cv324-RH/WCS, 2009 WL 5217062, at *2 (N.D. 
Fla. Dec. 30, 2009). 
108 South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 2011 WL 4595016, at *7.  
109 See generally, Jackson, 2009 WL 5217062, at *2 (“[T]he state did not adopt or even propose numeric 
standards – not by December 31, 2003, and not by today, as 2009 draws to a close.”).  
110 Id. at *1. The 1998 Clean Water Action Plan was developed by the EPA in order to overhaul its en-
forcement of clean water laws and promote meaningful action to improve the nation’s water quality. The 
action plan acknowledged that the EPA had changed its focus from enforcing point source pollution (ex: 
discharge pipes) to nonpoint source pollution (ex: agricultural runoff) without developing the proper 
framework to do so. In response, the action plan outlined expectations for enforcement, plans to improve 
dialogue with state water quality agencies, and methods for improved data collection. 
111 Id. 
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interests within the Everglades Agricultural Area. The primary dis-
putes were over the FDEP’s failure to set adequate nutrient standards, 
the EPA’s failure to assume responsibilities in the wake of FDEP’s 
shortcomings, and the continual discharge of nutrient-rich stormwater 
runoff into the protected Everglades region.112 
 
The Action Plan focused on the regulation of two nutrients 
that are excessively present in the nation’s—and particularly in Flor-
ida’s—water supply: phosphorus and nitrogen.113 Most states cur-
rently utilize both numeric and nonnumeric criteria to outline pollu-
tion standards.114 But, “many states, including Florida, had [only] 
nonnumeric or ‘narrative’ standards governing the introduction of ni-
trogen and phosphorus into water bodies.”115 In its Action Plan and in 
light of the fact that vague and undefined narrative standards had 
been unsuccessful in adequately protecting the nation’s waters, the 
EPA required “all states . . . adopt and implement numerical nutrient 
criteria by December 31, 2003.”116  
 
In accordance with the Action Plan and the 2001 Consent De-
cree, FDEP, with guidance from the State’s water management dis-
tricts, conducted extensive research, produced detailed studies, and 
held public meetings in an effort to develop numeric nutrient crite-
ria.117 However, the State missed its 2003 deadline and “retained its 
narrative standard: the concentration of nutrients in a water body 
must not be altered ‘so as to cause an imbalance in natural popula-
tions of aquatic flora or fauna.’”118 Unsurprisingly, this standard con-
tinued to be inadequate and damaging algae blooms continued to 
plague Lake Okeechobee and surrounding Florida waterways into 
2009.119  
 
Pursuant to the CWA, FDEP’s missed deadline triggered a 
nondiscretionary duty for the Administrator to “promptly prepare and 
publish proposed regulations setting forth a revised or new water 	
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 See Nutrient Pollution: An Overview of Nutrient Reduction Approaches: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Envir. & Pub. Works, 112th Cong. 74–75 (2011). 
115 Jackson, 2009 WL 5217062, at *1. 
116 Id. at *2. 
117 Id. at *1–2. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
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quality standard.”120 Because the Administrator took no action to 
timely intervene after FDEP failed to develop their own nutrient 
standards, plaintiff environmental groups filed suit under the CWA’s 
citizen suit provision121 “to compel her to perform a duty that the Act 
makes nondiscretionary.”122 Prior to the issue being resolved, the 
EPA sent a letter on January 14, 2009 to FDEP notifying them that 
the narrative standards were still insufficient.123 
 
Subsequently, the plaintiffs and the EPA entered into an 
agreement (the “2009 Consent Decree”) in 2009.124 The 2009 Con-
sent Decree was the result of a court-accepted settlement between 
parties that required the Administrator to approve new numeric nutri-
ent criteria for Florida water bodies by January 14, 2010 and to adopt 
these standards by October 15, 2010.125 The 2009 Consent Decree 
further provided that the requirements imposed on the Administrator 
would no longer apply if the State ultimately generated its own nu-
meric nutrient criteria subject to the Administrator’s approval.126 Be-
cause it was shown that both parties made a reasonable, good-faith 
compromise, the court entered the 2009 Consent Decree.127 The 2009 
Consent Decree essentially enforced the CWA, deemed Florida’s nar-
rative nutrient standards inadequate, and bound the EPA to good-faith 
efforts to propose new or revise current nutrient standards.  
 
 
 
3. Subsequent Litigation 
 
After the time provided for the Administrator’s action had 
elapsed, the plaintiff conservation groups once again intervened in 
the Northern District of Florida in 2012. Pursuant to the 2010 dead-
lines that the 2009 Consent Decree established, in 2011, the Adminis-
trator finally released new numeric nutrient criteria for FDEP to codi-
fiy.128 Litigation in this case represents the series of back-and-forth 	
120 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4) (2020). 
121 Id. § 1365(a)(2). 
122 Jackson, 2009 WL 5217062, at *2. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at *3. 
125 Id. 
126 Id.  
127 Id. at *7. 
128 Florida Wildlife Fed’n, Inc. v. Jackson, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1142–43 (N.D. Fla. 2012). 
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debates between environmental groups and the EPA for failure to es-
tablish adequate numeric water-quality standards for Florida’s water 
bodies. The plaintiff groups challenged the Administrator’s numeric 
nutrient criteria, claiming the stream and downstream-protection cri-
teria were arbitrary and capricious.129 The court conducted a lengthy 
analysis of the data collection methods and findings at each type of 
aquatic location (lake, spring, and stream) that led the Administrator 
to adopt a certain standard.130 
 
After the 2009 ruling in Florida Wildlife Federation v. Jack-
son, the Administrator got to work developing adequate lake, spring, 
and stream nutrient criteria in compliance with the numeric standards 
requirement that the 2009 Consent Decree imposed.131 However, the 
Administrator was unable to do so based on modeling and field stud-
ies, and failed to identify a standard which caused a harmful change 
in flora and fauna.132 In other words, the Administrator’s new ap-
proach for development of nutrient criterion was designed to identify 
any change in nutrient level rather than a harmful change.133 While it 
is true that any increase in nutrient concentrations was likely to 
change the composition of flora and fauna, it is not necessarily true 
that an increase in nutrient concentrations would have constituted a 
harmful change.134 Additionally, the Administrator’s numeric stand-
ards were based on the nutrient levels in an unimpaired lake135—quite 
the opposite of the seasonably toxic Lake Okeechobee.136 The court 
ruled that some of the Administrator’s standards (specifically the 
standards applying to stream criteria and unimpaired lakes) were not 
based on sound science and were therefore arbitrary and capri-
cious.137 According to the Administrative Procedures Act, agency ac-
tions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or oth-
erwise not in accordance with law must be set aside by a court.138 In 	
129 Id. at 1143. 
130 Id. at 1142–43. 
131 Water Quality Standards for the State of Florida’s Streams and Downstream Protection Values for 
Lakes: Remanded Provisions, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,985 (proposed Dec. 18, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 131). 
132 Jackson, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1142–43. 
133 Id. at 1160–61. 
134 Id. at 1168. 
135 Id. at 1146.  
136 Manuel Bojoquez, Toxic Algae a Slimy Mess for Florida’s Lake Okeechobee, CBS (July 6, 2018), 
cbsnews.com/news/florida-lake-okeechobee-toxic-algae-problem-2018-07-06/.  
137 Jackson, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1176–77. 
138 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2020). 
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accordance with federal procedure, the court determined that all re-
maining valid provisions of the rule would go into effect in March 
2012.139 The court also called for all invalid provisions to be modi-
fied and corrected by May 2012 and scheduling extensions were only 
to be provided if done so in accordance with the 2009 Consent De-
cree.140 
 
Clearly frustrated with the perpetual inaction, the court sym-
pathized with the plaintiff conservation groups and expressed its frus-
tration with the persistent nutrient pollution and increasing magnitude 
of harmful algae blooms.141 Quoting the FDEP’s own water quality 
assessment report, the court explained that nearly 25 percent of all of 
Florida’s waterbodies were suffering from nutrient impairment with 
little being done to mitigate the problem.142 The court further empha-
sized the threat harmful algal blooms pose to surface drinking water 
resources and recreation, while explaining that they are increasing in 
frequency, duration, and magnitude.143 The court then proceeded to 
detail FDEP’s long history of missing deadlines and modifying com-
pletion schedules, the EPA’s history of acknowledging FDEP’s short-
comings but failing to intervene, and the constant blame-shifting be-
tween the FDEP and Florida’s Environmental Regulation 
Commission—the body charged with approving water quality stand-
ards.144 
Unsurprisingly, conservation groups again deemed the criteria 
unacceptable and they appealed the 2012 decision to the Eleventh 
Circuit in 2013.145 The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal, hold-
ing that it lacked appellate jurisdiction because the Northern District 
of Florida remanded the case to the EPA for modification of the 
stream and lake criteria.146 Another case, Florida Wildlife 	
139 Jackson, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1151. 
140 Id. at 1177. 
141 Id. at 1145. 
142 Id.  
143 Id.  
144 Id. at 1146, 1148 (discussing FDEP’s submission of numeric nutrient criteria plans to the Environ-
mental Regulation Commission to promulgate rulemaking and lack of control over ERC’s schedule and 
the resulting effect of rule creation taking over fifteen years-from the EPA’s initial input-to be put into 
place). 
145 Mohammad O. Jazil & David W. Childs, Numeric Nutrient Criteria in Florida: The Road to Cooper-
ative Federalism, AM. BAR ASS’N (Feb. 23, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environ-
ment_energy_resources/publications/trends/2015-2016/november-december-2015/numeric_nutrient_cri-
teria_in_florida_the_road_to_cooperative_federalism/. 
146 Id. 
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Federation, Inc. v. McCarthy, was filed in the Northern District of 
Florida in 2014 on the basis that the 2009 Consent Decree affected 
substantial rights and put the parties in a worse position than they 
were in before.147 The conservation groups then appealed that unfa-
vorable decision to the Eleventh Circuit in 2015148 and the result was 
again unfavorable, with the court denying an evidentiary hearing to 
test the EPA’s approval of the FDEP’s newly modified criteria.149  
 
While these losses are setbacks for protection and restoration 
of the Everglades and its valuable water resources, this is certainly 
not the end of the fight. The EPA and FDEP are required to reevalu-
ate nutrient standards every three years so the plaintiffs may be able 
to challenge the modification of standards based on their current ef-
fectiveness in reducing the prevalence of harmful algal blooms and 
controlling nutrient pollution.150 Unfortunately, nutrient criteria 
quickly becomes outdated given our changing climate and substantial 
human influence on nutrient introduction. Further, the current proce-
dural framework surrounding the development and modification of 
nutrient criteria makes it nearly impossible to get adequate standards 
approved while they are still relevant. The length and scope of this 
essentially unresolved litigation make considerations of the Florida’s 
future nutrient pollution issues disheartening. 
 
However, it seems as though the South Florida judiciary may 
have taken on a role as the last line of defense in this legal battle. In 
February 2019, Judge Moreno of the Southern District of Florida re-
jected a SFWMD petition to be discharged from its duties under the 
2009 Consent Decree.151 The District complained that three levels of 
enforcement (the EPA, FDEP, and SFWMD) hampered its efforts to 
meet standards over time, but environmental groups argued that leav-
ing the consent decree in place would ensure that the District’s work 
would end only once the water was clean.152 The judge agreed, noting 	
147 Florida Wildlife Fed’n, Inc. v. McCarthy, No. 4:08cv324-RH/CAS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1343, at 
*28 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 7, 2014). 
148 Jazil & Childs, supra note 145. 
149 Id. 
150 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2020). 
151 Jenny Staletovich, Federal Judge Rejects Move by South Florida Water Managers to End Everglades 
Oversight, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/environment/arti-
cle226117900.html. 
152 Id. 
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that the District provided no evidence to support its claims for termi-
nation of the 2009 Consent Decree.153 
 
III. Solutions 
 
A. Cooperative Federalism 
 
The first step in confronting such a widespread and multi-lay-
ered problem is to carefully delegate tasks to the appropriate parties 
in an act of cooperative federalism. Cooperative federalism essen-
tially involves federal, state, and local governments working together 
to attack specific layers of a problem rather than one level of govern-
ment taking full responsibility.154 Cooperative federalism relies on 
the commonly accepted theory that the state is the most capable party 
in handling issues pertaining to that state specifically.155  
 
In the nutrient limit litigation, there were clear negative ef-
fects of federalism; for example, when the EPA took over the duties 
of FDEP, the EPA failed to timely develop adequate nutrient stand-
ards, and was ultimately sued by Florida to take back FDEP’s du-
ties.156 In response, Florida passed a law to keep the EPA out of its 
nutrient standard development process, but later argued in court to al-
low the EPA back in to certain aspects of the process.157 Removing 
the responsibility from the state placed all responsibility on the EPA, 
despite the fact that the state already began the development process 
and was in the best position to accomplish the task on an extended 
timeline. Further, it can be argued that because the State is also 
charged with implementing and monitoring best-management prac-
tices on private farms, the State is in a better position to develop a 
framework for implementation and enforcement of nutrient standards. 
According to Richard Grosso, a professor at Shepard Broad College 
of Law at Nova Southeastern University, “agricultural runoff is 
chiefly the responsibility of the State, not the federal government [be-
cause it is] the State [that] enforces, and requires, best management 	
153 Id. 
154 Cooperative Federalism at EPA, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/home/co-
operative-federalism-epa (last visited Feb. 17, 2020). 
155 Id. 
156 Florida Wildlife Fed’n, Inc. v. Jackson, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1142–44 (N.D. Fla. 2012).  
157 Jazil & Childs, supra note 145. 
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practices on farms.158 Incorporating principles of cooperative federal-
ism would have allowed the EPA and FDEP to work together to pool 
resources and promulgate adequate nutrient standards in a timely 
manner as both the settlement agreement and the CWA require.  
 
Engaging in cooperative federalism also relieves some pres-
sure on the court system that blame-shifting between governments 
and agencies exacerbates.159 Given the sheer number of organizations 
involved in or represented by the litigation, jurisdictional issues are 
unavoidable and complaint filings are often cyclical, with frequent 
dismissals and appeals.160 The court system’s role is also limited by 
resource and time constraints; after all, thirty years of litigation his-
tory requires extensive background research. Even if the court was 
able to entertain all challenges in the nutrient standard litigation, its 
intervening role is limited. For example, the court can compel an 
agency to act in compliance with a law, but each agency is still re-
stricted by its own lack of resources and its obligations under federal 
law (like the CWA).161 Incorporating principles of cooperative feder-
alism into federal laws would likely promote inter-agency coopera-
tion and result in less stress on the judicial system.  
 
 
B. Reducing Political Influence 
 
A second solution involves the reduction of political influence 
in the process of adopting nutrient criteria. Stricter campaign funding 
regulations would prevent private interests from influencing state and 
federal officials’ decision-making;162 former Governor Scott’s rela-
tionship with Big Sugar serves as a cautionary tale. Lobbied by U.S. 
Sugar, a major campaign contributor, Scott and his appointees at the 
SFWMD rejected a deal to buy U.S. Sugar land south of the lake for 
water storage.163 Further, Scott infamously spared Florida’s sugar and 
cattle farming industries from nutrient regulations by requesting that 	
158 Flavelle & Edgerton, supra note 12. 
159 Ruhl et. al, Agencies Running From Agency Discretion, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 97, 147 (2016). 
160 FOAI Guide, 2004 Edition: Litigation Considerations, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://w.jus-
tice.gov/oip/foia-guide-2004-edition-litigation-considerations (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
161 Ruhl et. al, supra note 159, at 146. 
162 Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, How Corporate Law Can Help Democracy Post–Citizens United, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/how-corpo-
rate-law-can-help-democracy-post-citizens-united. 
163 Fleshler, supra note 40.  
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the EPA delegate all nutrient regulatory duties to the state in 2011, a 
move that essentially allowed him to decide how the state would 
manage agricultural runoff.164 While this decision would make sense 
under the principles of cooperative federalism, the undue influence of 
campaign funding provides a complicating factor that has led to a 
windfall for the farming industry at the detriment to those who rely 
on Florida’s waters for recreation and their income.165 However, 
Scott’s subsequent moves to push for narrative rather than numeric 
standards and cancel a 2015 deadline limiting nutrient flow into Lake 
Okeechobee were without logical explanation.166  
 
While removing politics from the enforcement of environ-
mental regulations is a critical step in ensuring healthier waterways, 
political candidates should place a greater emphasis on funding re-
search and finding solutions for Florida’s water quality problems. If 
candidates placed a stronger emphasis on initiatives to regulate nutri-
ent runoff and protect the sensitive Everglades ecosystem, the long-
term rewards would be undeniable. Nutrient pollution and the result-
ant algae blooms and ecosystem restructuring affect every aspect of 
Florida’s economy, and the State therefore expends significant re-
sources in mitigation and recovery efforts.167 Last summer, Governor 
Scott declared a state of emergency and ordered that six million dol-
lars be spent to help with cleanup and tourism.168 Even then, many 
people believed those efforts were to further Scott’s senate campaign 
rather than to prove any real dedication to addressing the underlying 
issues.169 Oddly, Florida’s nutrient pollution problems have seem-
ingly become partisan issues, with politicians (like the mayor of 
Clewiston, a South Florida farming town) lashing out at environmen-
talists for misplaced blame and a misunderstanding of facts.170 How-
ever, the facts overwhelmingly support the contention that the Ever-
glades is being overloaded and degraded by the same nutrients from 	
164 Flavelle & Edgerton, supra note 12. 
165 Fleshler, supra note 40.  
166 Flavelle & Edgerton, supra note 12. 
167 Governor Ron DeSantis Recommends $625 Million for Everglades Restoration and Protection of 
Water Resources, FLA. GOV. (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.flgov.com/2019/01/29/governor-ron-desantis-
recommends-625-million-for-everglades-restoration-and-protection-of-water-resources/. 
168 Flavelle & Edgerton, supra note 12. 
169 Victoria Ballard, Gov. Scott Declares State of Emergency Over Algae Bloom, SUN SENTINEL (July 9, 
2018), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/florida/fl-reg-scott-algae-emergency-20180709-story.html. 
170 Phillip Roland, Environmental Activist’s Claims About Everglades Water and Farmers Don’t Square 
with Facts, FLAPOL (Feb. 24, 2016), http://floridapolitics.com/archives/202642-phillip-roland-environ-
mental-activists-claims-about-everglades-water-and-farmers-dont-square-with-facts. 
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farming operations and urban septic tanks, all of which are found in 
excess in South Florida’s waterways.  
 
An encouraging development for Florida water policy hap-
pened in 2018 when Floridians elected Republican gubernatorial can-
didate Ron DeSantis as the State’s forty-sixth governor.171 To the sur-
prise of many, Governor DeSantis immediately got to work 
overhauling Florida’s neglected water policy.172 A mere two months 
after taking office, he issued an Executive Order, “Achieving More 
Now for Florida’s Environment,” which implemented reforms to en-
sure ongoing protection of Florida’s natural environment and water 
quality.173  Recognizing that Florida’s waterways and natural re-
sources form the foundation of “our economy and our way of life,” 
DeSantis pledged 2.5 billion dollars over the next four years for Ever-
glades restoration, established a blue-green algae taskforce, ordered 
the immediate construction on the Everglades Agricultural Area Stor-
age Reservoir project, created the Office of Environmental Accounta-
bility and Transparency, and appointed a Chief Science Officer.174 
DeSantis’ immediate action came as a surprise to many skeptical of 
politicians’ commitments to clean water, but has invigorated an old 
fight with new optimism and promising initiatives.175 While more 
work is still left for his administration to accomplish, the Governor’s 
emphasis on nutrient pollution issues bridges historical gaps between 
political parties and unites Floridians under a common goal: protect 
Florida’s precious aquatic resources.176 
 
C. Infrastructure Improvements 
 
A third solution involves improving and expanding existing 
infrastructure to prevent seasonal overflow discharges into the Ca-
loosahatchee and St. Lucie Rivers. With the current infrastructure, 	
171 Id. 
172 Governor Ron DeSantis Announces Major Water Policy Reforms, FLA. GOV. (Jan. 10, 2019), 
https://www.flgov.com/2019/01/10/governor-ron-desantis-announces-major-water-policy-reforms/.  
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 See Jenny Staletovich, Ron DeSantis Unveils Sweeping Environmental Plan to Fix Florida’s Water 
Woes, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.tampabay.com/florida-poli-
tics/buzz/2019/01/10/ron-desantis-unveils-sweeping-environmental-plan-to-fix-floridas-water-woes/. 
176 See Jackie Flynn Mogensen, The New Governor of Florida Is Not the Environmental Disaster Every-
one Thought He’d Be, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/poli-
tics/2019/04/ron-desantis-florida-governor-environmental-record-red-tide. 
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summer discharges average anywhere between 300 to 700 million 
gallons of lake water per day depending on rainfall.177 This solution, 
while costly, is arguably the most feasible because the infrastructure 
is already in place. The Army Corps of Engineers manages the Her-
bert Hoover dike surrounding Lake Okeechobee, which was built fol-
lowing a 1928 hurricane that caused lake water to spill over and flood 
nearby towns and farmland.178 In its current state, the dike experi-
ences constant maintenance to the tune of 870 million dollars every 
ten years and has not been majorly renovated in decades.179 Making 
the overdue repairs to the dike—which is upwards of an 800 million 
dollar project—would alleviate the pressure to release water into the 
rivers and drastically reduce the magnitude and frequency of algal 
blooms.180 While the nutrient pollution battle would rage on and 
phosphorus-rich water would continue to accumulate in the “toxic 
tank” that has become Lake Okeechobee, the dike repairs would pre-
vent polluted water from flowing to both coasts during periods of 
heavy rainfall. 
 
D. Infrastructure Construction 
 
Finally, there has been a decades-long political fight over be-
ginning the construction of a 60,000-acre reservoir near Lake Okee-
chobee that would hold contaminated water for treatment prior to 
sending it south through the Everglades.181 Without the reservoir, that 
nutrient-laden water continues to be pumped directly into the rivers 
and sent east towards the Atlantic and west towards the Gulf of Mex-
ico.182 While Rick Scott cancelled the project shortly after being 
elected governor, Congress later authorized the project in its 2018 
Water Infrastructure Act.183 As of now, the SFWMD has broken 	
177 Andy Reid, Recent Rains Still Leave South Florida Facing Groundwater Shortage, SUN SENTINEL 
(June 20, 2011), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/sfl-south-florida-groundwater-shortage-20110620-
story.html. 
178 Ten Things to Know About the Herbert Hoover Dike and Why Trump is Weighing In, PALM BEACH 
TIMES (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.palmbeachpost.com/2017/04/28/ten-things-to-know-about-the-her-
bert-hoover-dike-and-why-trump-is-weighing-in/. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Everglades Agricultural Area Storage Reservoir, S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DISTRICT, 
https://www.sfwmd.gov/our-work/cerp-project-planning/eaa-reservoir (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
182 Id. 
183 See Trump Signs Water Projects Bill with Aims in Flint, Florida, CHI. SUN TIMES (Oct. 23, 2018), 
https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/donald-trump-signs-water-projects-bill-americas-water-infrastruc-
ture-act-of-2018-flint-florida/.  
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ground and Governor DeSantis granted approval to move forward, 
but the State awaits appropriation of guaranteed federal funds for the 
project.184 While construction of the reservoir seems to be the best so-
lution for the time being, the entire project detracts from the underly-
ing need to better manage nutrient pollution and hold polluters ac-
countable. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Everglades is currently the epicenter of a controversial 
battle over nutrient pollution. With nutrient pollution to blame for 
decimating fisheries, contaminating drinking water, and sending tour-
ists north in droves, now is the time for policy action. Unfortunately, 
administrative roadblocks and lengthy court proceedings have mired 
meaningful progress in a political swamp, leaving Florida’s water 
policy and the livelihood of its residents in limbo. The development 
and adoption of proper nutrient standards is the first step in ensuring 
agencies can effectively regulate farming operations, manage storm-
water treatment areas, and ultimately restore the Everglades to its 
more natural state. Once standards are adopted, the next priority 
should be drastically reducing phosphorus flow to encourage the re-
colonization of sawgrass, which will in turn promote healthy fire re-
gimes, the reestablishment of native species, and improvements to 
water quality. Proper nutrient management is essential to reducing 
nutrient loads entering the Everglades, restoring the Everglades’ nat-
ural biodiversity, and preserving the Sunshine State’s reputation as 
America’s paradise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	
184 Everglades Agricultural Area Storage Reservoir, supra note 181.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
          In 1994, the state of Virginia successfully defended what was, 
even then, an outdated and insufficient educational finance formula. 
Because this formula remains untouched by the General Assembly, 
educational equity continues to worsen across the state. This Com-
ment argues that while the 1994 case of Scott v. Commonwealth may 
seem to validate the current system, the Supreme Court of Virginia 
may have implied that a remedy for such disparities could become vi-
tal for educational adequacy in the state. Today, figures used by the 
court show a widening gap in educational spending that shocks the 
conscience. This Comment explains how an adequacy suit, emphasiz-
ing educational inequality over differences in spending alone, could 
remedy Virginia’s growing educational inequities. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 “The diffusion of information and the arraignment of all abuses 
at the bar of public reason, [is] deem[ed] [one of] the essential princi-
ples of our government, and consequently . . . ought to shape its ad-
ministration.”1 Yet, despite America’s deeply rooted value of educa-
tion, Virginia’s public education system is riddled with gross inequities 
and disparities such that some students within the state do not receive 
an adequate education.  
 
Motivated by such disparity, eleven public school districts and 
seven local school boards filed a suit against the state––Scott v. Com-
monwealth—in the 1990s.2 Although the Supreme Court of Virginia 
recognized a fundamental right to education, it denied extending the 
plain meaning of the State Constitution to require funding be equal, or 
substantially equal, between localities.3 Still, the language of the Scott 
case could lend itself to a modern, plaintiff-friendly adequacy lawsuit. 
The court considered a number of factors, expressing concern as to the 
growing inequities and possibly highlighting the issue for a legislative 
remedy.4 Since then, the Virginia General Assembly failed to provide 	
1 President Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801) (emphasis added). 
2 Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 139 (Va. 1994). 
3 Id. at 142.  
4 Id. at 142–43.   
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any sort of relief or modification to the state-mandated Standards of 
Quality (“SOQ”). Instead, the Scott court’s concerns have become Vir-
ginia’s reality.  
 
As evidenced by mass inequality in the state’s education sys-
tem, the SOQ and its finance formula are fundamentally flawed. The 
General Assembly weighs local ability-to-pay to calculate mandated 
local contributions and the additional state funds to meet the projected 
cost, but caps local contribution at eighty percent, moving funds away 
from inherently at-risk districts.5 Meanwhile, after the local SOQ con-
tribution is made, each school district is allowed to spend exponential 
amounts of local funds on public education within the district, creating 
significant disparities throughout the state.6 Notably, the SOQ do not 
include costs for educational facilities despite the inherent role of a 
sound structure in administering an adequate education.7 Given these 
shortcomings, the Scott factors have worsened considerably.  
 
Virginia’s stifling educational disparities call for a statewide 
remedy and would likely require a court order to address such a prob-
lem. Virginia’s geographic divides create differentiating interests, es-
pecially between the state’s northern and southwestern regions. Ineq-
uities are most apparent in available programs and educational 
facilities. 
 
This Comment will address Virginia’s educational disparities 
and analyze the relationship between the Scott holding, Virginia’s cur-
rent finance formula, and localities’ ability to meet the SOQ and pro-
vide an adequate education. Part I details the SOQ requirements and 
how the state provides funding to localities to enable them to meet 
these standards. Part II reviews the Scott case and how the once un-
friendly holding could now serve to support an adequacy suit. Here, 
this section will present the case in a new light, considering how the 
language of the opinion could potentially be plaintiff friendly today. 
Part III analyzes the adequacy litigation movement and details how 
such a suit could potentially remedy Virginia’s growing educational 	
5 See Ashley McDonald Delja, Across Four Aprils: School Finance Litigation in Virginia, BYU EDUC. 
& L.J. 191, 197 (2004).  
6 Id. 197–98. 
7 KENT DICKEY & BRIAN LOGWOOD, COMMONWEALTH OF VA. DEP’T OF EDUC., PUBLIC SCHOOL 
FINANCE PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: 1998–99, at 21–22 (2000).  
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disparity. In conclusion, Part IV discusses possible remedies for creat-
ing a more equitable education finance formula.  
 
Over twenty years has passed since the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held for the State in Scott v. Commonwealth. Since then, the idea 
of an “adequate” education has deteriorated exponentially in a number 
of Virginia’s school districts. It is time to address growing inequalities 
in the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
 
I. The State-Mandated SOQ: Minimum Education in Vir-
ginia 
 
The Virginia Constitution imposes a duty on the General As-
sembly to establish an efficient system of public education guided by 
the SOQ.8 Still, the SOQ acts as Virginia’s educational floor. These 
standards are determined by the General Assembly, and each locality 
has the responsibility to meet these standards.9 The statutes detail what 
the General Assembly presents as the foundations of education includ-
ing educational objectives, student-teacher ratios, and accreditation 
processes.10 
 
A. The Value of Education: Virginia’s Constitutional Require-
ments for an Effective Education System 
 
The value of education is one inherent to the American ideals 
of a free society. The Virginia Constitution is not an exception to this 
traditional emphasis on the importance of education nor is it silent on 
the State’s role in facilitating it. Article I, section 15 describes the qual-
ities necessary to maintain a free government: 
 	
8 VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.  
9 VA. CODE §§ 22.1-253.13:1–13:10 (2020).  
10 Id. Some believe Virginia’s SOQ cost projections have been inadequate since the General Assembly 
originally crafted the SOQ system. See ROBLEY S. JONES ET AL., VA. EDUC. ASS’N, FUNDING K-12 
EDUCATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH: SCHOOL FINANCE 101 (2009). The General Assembly’s assump-
tions as to the average number of personnel within a school, the impact of inflation, and the lifespan of 
buses are only some of a number of compelling concerns. See Chris Duncombe & Michael Cassidy, Vir-
ginia’s Eroding Standards of Quality, COMMONWEALTH INST. (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.thecommon-
wealthinstitute.org/2016/01/06/virginias-eroding-standards-of-quality/. For additional analyses of the 
inconsistencies in Virginia’s formula that are beyond the purview of this Comment, see sources noted 
supra, along with WILLIAM A. OWINGS & LESLIE S. KAPLAN, VA. ASS’N FOR SUPERVISION & 
CURRICULUM DEV. BD. OF DIRS., FUNDING PUBLIC EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA (2001).  
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That free government rests, as does all progress, upon 
the broadest possible diffusion of knowledge, and that 
the Commonwealth should avail itself of those talents 
which nature has sown so liberally among its people by 
assuring the opportunity for their fullest development 
by an effective system of education throughout the 
Commonwealth.11 
 
Article VIII, section 1 further provides that “[t]he General Assembly 
shall provide for a system of free public elementary and secondary 
schools for all children of school age throughout the Common-
wealth.”12 To institute an “effective” system of public education, the 
state “shall seek to ensure that an educational program of high quality 
is established and continually maintained.”13 
 
Article VIII, section 2 establishes Virginia’s minimum stand-
ards of education—the Standards of Quality.14 The constitution dele-
gates the legislative power to determine these standards to the Virginia 
Board of Education.15 Such authority is only subject to revision by the 
General Assembly.16 The constitution details the legislative process for 
establishing appropriate funding for localities to meet the SOQ: 
 
The General Assembly shall determine the manner in 
which funds are to be provided for the cost of maintain-
ing an educational program meeting the prescribed 
standards of quality, and shall provide for the appor-
tionment of the cost of such program between the Com-
monwealth and the local units of government compris-
ing such school divisions. Each unit of local 
government shall provide its portion of such cost by lo-
cal taxes or from other available funds.17 
 
 
 	
11 VA. CONST. art I, § 15 (emphasis added). 
12 Id. art VIII, § 1. 
13 Id.   
14 Id. § 2. 
15 Id.  
16 Id.   
17 Id.  
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B. A Bare Minimum Standard  
 
The Virginia Constitution acts as the educational floor, detail-
ing a number of mandates and standards which localities must meet or 
surpass with state and local funding.18 
 
Section 22.1-253.13:1 of the Virginia Code prescribes the 
standards for instructional programs that support the Standards of 
Learning and other education objectives.19 Within the section, the Gen-
eral Assembly announces its stance on the importance of a quality ed-
ucation: “The General Assembly and the Board of Education believe 
that the fundamental goal of the public schools of the Commonwealth 
must be to enable each student to develop the skills that are necessary 
for success in school, preparation for life, and reaching their full po-
tential.”20 The General Assembly deems the following as essential to a 
quality education:  
 
(i) the appropriate working environment, benefits, and 
salaries necessary to ensure the availability of high-
quality instructional personnel; (ii) the appropriate 
learning environment designed to promote student 
achievement; (iii) quality instruction that enables each 
student to become a productive and educated citizen of 
Virginia and the United States of America; and (iv) the 
adequate commitment of other resources.21 
 
Section 22.1-253.13:2 of the Virginia Code details important 
requirements for student-teacher ratios within each classroom.22 
Schools are required to keep student-teacher ratios to around 25-to-1 
in classrooms of all ages, with a mandatory duty to notify parents of 
children if, after the school year begins, the ratio exceeds state-man-
dated limits.23 
 
	
18 Id.   
19 VA. CODE § 22.1-253.13:1 (2020).  
20 Id.   
21 Id.   
22 Id. § 22.1-253.13:2 (2020).  
23 Id.  
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           Section 22.1-253.13:3 of the Virginia Code lays out the school 
accreditation process.24 Here, the Board of Education is charged with 
the duty to promulgate accreditation guidelines that emphasize partic-
ularly important factors such as student outcome measures, require-
ments and guidelines for instructional programs, and auxiliary educa-
tion programs such as library and media services.25 The accreditation 
standards must announce and support “the philosophy, goals, and ob-
jectives of public education in Virginia.”26 
 
           The Virginia Code demands local schools comply with the SOQ. 
Section § 22.1-253.13:8 of the Virginia Code requires that every 
school provide—with state and local funds—an education that satisfies 
the SOQ at minimum.27 The state public education finance formula 
determines how much of the cost is supplied by the state or apportioned 
to the locality.28 
 
C. Funding the SOQ: Calculating Cost and Local Ability-To-
Pay  
 
On average, educational funds amount for one-third of the 
State’s general budget.29 The SOQ cost is one of six categories in the 
state public education funding scheme but accounts for a majority of 
educational funding from the state to local level.30  
 
           The General Assembly is responsible for apportioning funds be-
tween the state and local levels to meet the SOQ.31 The legislature 
therefore crafted and implemented a formula to project the total 
amount of funds necessary for each locality to meet the SOQ.32 Costs 
are determined by three components: (1) required number of 	
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
26 Id.   
27 Id. § 22.1-253.13:8 (2020). Here, the Constitution implies local districts will be able to meet the SOQ 
with state and local funds. See id.  
28 CARY LOU ET AL., THE URB. INST., SCHOOL DISTRICT FUNDING IN VIRGINIA 2 (2018). 
29 KENT C. DICKEY, VA. DEP’T OF EDUC., OVERVIEW OF K-12 EDUCATION FUNDING IN VIRGINIA 2 (July 
2013), https://www.nvic.org/cmstemplates/nvic/pdf/state-legislature/soq-funding-presentation-3.pdf.  
30 Id. at 1. In 2014, the SOQ funding amounted to 88.5% of all direct state education funding for school 
divisions at $5.3 billion. Id. at 6. The SOQ formula will be the particular focus of the financial analysis 
in this Comment given the standards substantial weight on funding, their close relationship with existing 
inadequacies, and the Scott court’s implicit holding that the state must provide sufficient funds for each 
locality to meet the SOQ.  
31 Id. at 13.  
32 Id. at 13–14.  
75
et al.: General Topics
Published by UR Scholarship Repository,
Do Not Delete 4/14/20  5:57 PM 
66 RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW  [Vol. XXIII:iii 
instructional positions based on the state staffing standards, (2) recog-
nized support positions, and (3) recognized nonpersonal support 
costs.33 The formula weighs these SOQ costs against local revenue and 
population indicators.34 
 
After calculating the projected cost of meeting the SOQ, the 
State considers each district’s local ability-to-pay through the Local 
Composite Index (“LCI”).35 The LCI weighs three factors to determine 
a local school district’s ability to meet SOQ cost requirements: true 
value of real property, adjusted gross income, and taxable retail sales.36 
The formula additionally accounts for varying locality populations by 
weighing each of the previous indicators against two measures of pop-
ulation: local population and student enrollment.37  
 
From this calculation, an index value is quantified that repre-
sents the local share of cost, ranging from zero to one.38 An LCI of 
zero means a locality has absolutely no ability to fund SOQ costs.39 An 
LCI of one shows that a locality has the full ability to meet SOQ costs 
with local funds alone.40 The State makes up the difference for SOQ 
funding after each district’s LCI.41 Therefore, the “state share” of fund-
ing is the State’s estimate of funding required to meet the SOQ’s minus 
a locality’s LCI.42 As a result, wealthier districts with a higher LCI 
have higher local contribution requirements.43 In contrast, socioeco-
nomically disadvantaged districts receive more state funds than their 
wealthier counterparts.44  
 
	
33 Id. at 8.  
34 Id. at 14.  
35 Id. at 13.  
36 Id. at 14.  
37 Id.  
38 See WILLIAM A. OWINGS & LESLIE S. KAPLAN, VA. ASS’N FOR SUPERVISION & CURRICULUM DEV. 
BD. OF DIRS., FUNDING PUBLIC EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA (Sept. 2001), http://ww2.odu.edu/~wow-
ings/funding_public_education_in_virginia.ppt. 
39 See id.   
40 See id.  
41 Delja, supra note 5.  
42 Id.   
43 See id. Most notably, higher paying districts have an LCI cap of .8; therefore, no district pays more 
than eighty percent of the costs for funding the SOQ, despite actual ability to fund the SOQ entirely 
through local funding. Id. The cap ensures that the State shares SOQ costs (as a state-mandated require-
ment) with all localities. Id.  
44 Id. at 198.   
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Prior to finalizing the mandatory state and local shares, each 
district receives a flat grant based on state sales tax.45 Of the State’s 
4.3 percent sales tax, one cent is earmarked for education.46 Here, 
“[e]ach district’s share of the sales tax revenue is subtracted from the 
cost of funding the SOQ in that district before computing the manda-
tory state and local shares.”47  
 
II. Closing the Door on Equity Suits in Virginia: Scott v. Com-
monwealth 
 
Debates concerning Virginia’s educational inequity date back 
to integration in the 1950’s.48 The Virginia Supreme Court last visited 
the constitutionality of the State’s public education finance system in 
1994.49 By the 1990’s, a coalition (the Coalition for Equity) formed to 
address levels of inequity that had garnered public concern.50 “The 
group was formed ‘out of desperation’ because ‘the disparities were 
getting worse and worse . . . People were discouraged.’”51 When the 
General Assembly eventually failed to address these increasing dispar-
ities, the Coalition for Equity filed a complaint, naming seventh grader 
Reid Scott—a student from Buchanan County, Virginia—as the plain-
tiff.52 The Bill of Complaint listed an additional eleven public schools 
and seven local school boards.53  
 
The plaintiffs contended that the State Constitution established 
education as a fundamental right.54 Relying on proof of financial ineq-
uities alone, the complainants alleged that the State violated their rights 
based on gross inequities within the state public education system.55 	
45 Id. at 196.   
46 VA. CODE § 58.1-603 (2020); Delja, supra note 5, at 196.   
47 Id. at 197.   
48 See id. The issue has continued to escalate, with certain education commissions claiming that disparity 
greatly hinders the success of Virginia’s public education system. Id. at 199.   
49 See Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994). 
50 Delja, supra note 5.   
51 Id. at 200–01 (citing Telephone Interview with Ralph Shotwell, Dir. of Div. of Fin., Research, Retire-
ment, and Spec. Serv., Va. Educ. Assoc. (Mar. 31, 2003)). 
52 See Delja, supra note 5, at 207. Buchanan is notably still one of the State’s poorest counties today. 
The Ctr. Square, By the Numbers: Buchanan Ranks the Poorest of Virginia Counties, CTR. SQUARE: VA. 
(June 14, 2019), https://www.thecentersquare.com/virginia/by-the-numbers-buchanan-ranks-the-poor-
est-of-virginia-counties/article_fae62300-8cba-11e9-8675-8b50e508044b.html. 
53 See Delja, supra note 5, at 207.  
54 Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 141.   
55 Id. By relying on disparities in spending and resources alone, the plaintiffs were making a standard 
equity-based argument. For a comparison of equity to adequacy lawsuits, see note 49 and accompanying 
text.  
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Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed the State was “denying the student 
complaints and other children ‘an educational opportunity substan-
tially equal to that of children who attend public school in wealthier 
divisions.’”56 Their arguments relied on a comparison of Virginia’s ed-
ucational inequities under the current finance formula with language 
from the State Constitution that allegedly established a duty to provide 
an efficient education system.57  
 
A. Growing Discrepancies: Plaintiffs’ Argument Reveals Sig-
nificant Educational Inequities 
 
The court recognized the fundamental right to education under 
the Virginia Constitution.58 Therefore, the court applied strict scrutiny 
to review the alleged violation.59 To make this determination, the Scott 
court considered in part the financial landscape of the State through 
four spending factors: total spending per pupil, average teacher salary, 
instructional personnel-to-pupil ratio, and spending on instructional 
materials in comparison to the explicit language and requirements of 
the constitution.60  
 
The court recognized a number of substantial inequities within 
the State’s public education system. The court found significant differ-
ences in total spending per pupil, noting that “the Commonwealth and 
its subdivisions” spent 2.5 times more on some school children than 
others.61 Secondly, the court recognized that wealthier districts paid 
teachers thirty-nine percent higher salaries on average than poorer dis-
tricts.62 Thirdly, the court dwelled on a “great disparity” in the person-
nel-to-student ratios between the districts, detailing an average ratio 
twenty-four percent higher in wealthier districts than in the State’s ten 
poorest districts.63 Finally, the court noted that wealthier districts spent 
nearly twelve times more on instructional materials than their poorer 
	
56 Id. at 139.  
57 Id. at 141.  
58 Id. at 142.   
59 Id.   
60 Id. at 140.  
61 Id. At the time, the Virginia districts ranged from $2895 to $7268 in total funds spent per student. Id.  
62 Id. The court average salary between localities ranged from $27,471 in the ten poorest school divi-
sions to $38,095 in the ten wealthiest. Id.   
63  Id. “The ten wealthiest divisions had an average instructional personnel/pupil ratio of 81.8/1,000, and 
the ten poorest divisions had an average instructional personnel/pupil ratio of 66.2/1,000.” Id.  
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counterparts, a range of $17.52 to $208 per pupil.64 Although the court 
recognized substantial inequality, the court held that Virginia’s Con-
stitution did not mandate “equal, or substantially equal” education 
funding.65 
 
B. The Scott Court’s Interpretation: Equal Spending Is Not 
Mandated by the State Constitution 
 
In holding for the State, the court reasoned that the Virginia 
Constitution simply requires each school division to “provide an edu-
cational program [that meets the] standards of quality as determined 
and prescribed by the General Assembly.”66 During its analysis of ar-
ticle VIII, sections 1 and 2, the court divided the language into either 
compulsory or aspirational language.67 Within section 1, the court rec-
ognized a legislative duty to establish and maintain a system of schools 
throughout the Commonwealth.68 But, the court held the second clause 
of section 1—that the State “shall seek to ensure that an educational 
program of high quality is established and continually maintained”—
to be simply aspirational.69 The court regarded section 2 as merely em-
powering the General Assembly “to make the final decision about both 
standards of quality and funding.”70  
 
The court supported its interpretation with the language of ar-
ticle I, section 15: “the Commonwealth should . . .” 71 Here, the court 
indicated that, while article I, section 15 encourages the importance of 
education, its language is unambiguously aspirational.72 As a result, 
the court upheld the state education finance formula, closing the door 
on future equity lawsuits in the state of Virginia.73 
 
	
64 Id. Specifically, spending per library materials was twenty-two times greater in some divisions, rang-
ing from $2.22 to some $50 per pupil. Id.  
65 Id. at 142–43.  
66 Id. at 142.  
67 Id. at 141–42.   
68 Id.  
69 Id.   
70 Id. at 142.   
71 Id. (quoting VA. CONST. art. I, § 15). 
72 Id. The court reasoned that “[u]nquestionably, the language in § 15 cannot be read to impose a re-
quirement of uniformity in spending and programs among and within the Commonwealth’s school divi-
sions.” Id.   
73 Id.  
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C. Scott’s Second Holding: Funding Must Be Sufficient to 
Meet the SOQ  
 
Although Scott held for the defendant and validated the state 
educational finance system, the case laid the foundation for a future 
adequacy suit by outlining a rule that requires funding to sufficiently 
enable a locality to fulfill the SOQ.74 In its analysis, the court distin-
guished voluntary spending, which supports a modified education fi-
nance formula that accounts for higher voluntary local spending.75 Ad-
ditionally, the language goes beyond what may have been necessary to 
record funding disparities. Here, the court emphasized a legislative 
remedy76—one that notably has not come. 
 
While the Supreme Court of Virginia did not mandate equal 
spending under the State Constitution, it seems the court set out a rule 
that state funding must be sufficient to meet the required standards.77 
In its reasoning, the Scott court mentioned not once but twice, that the 
plaintiffs did not contend that “that the manner of funding prevent[ed] 
their schools from meeting the standards of quality.”78 Here, an ade-
quacy suit would be more compelling as the premise emphasizes qual-
ity of education instead of financial differences alone.79 Presumably, if 
a school district were to show that funding was inhibiting them from 
meeting the SOQ, the court may be compelled to hold for the com-
plainant.80  
 
The court also made important distinctions between what 
spending is controlled by the State. Here, the court separated the “two 
major components the funding system for the Commonwealth’s public 
elementary and secondary schools” as funds that either are or are not 	
74 Id.   
75 Id.  
76 Id.  
77 See id.; Editorial: Did the Virginia Supreme Court Show School Districts How To Sue over Dispari-
ties?, ROANOKE TIMES (Oct. 20, 2018) [hereinafter How To Sue over Disparities], https://www.roa-
noke.com/opinion/editorials/editorial-did-the-virginia-supreme-court-show-school-districts-how/arti-
cle_f3e07697-879d-50d1-9ac9-573b741856c7.html.  
78 Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 142.  
79 See Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the Third Wave: From Equity 
to Adequacy, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1151, 1153 (1995). Equity suits (such as Scott) “sought to reduce 
spending disparities and focused on traditional input measures such as per-pupil and overall educational 
spending. In contract, the more recent adequacy decisions concentrate on the underlying sufficiency of 
school funding . . .” Id.   
80 How To Sue over Disparities, supra note 77.  
80
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“mandated by the Commonwealth.”81 Mandatory funds included those 
“state and local funds mandated by the state aid system.”82 Voluntary 
funds encompassed those local funds that are not mandated.83 This dis-
tinction could lend the court to accept a potential remedy—changing 
the required proportions between state and local funding to divert state 
funds to struggling school districts.84  
 
Interestingly, the court may have been signaling the issue to the 
General Assembly’s attention as one to address in the near future. The 
court concluded the Scott opinion by stating, “Therefore, while the 
elimination of substantial disparity between school divisions may be a 
worthy goal, it simply is not required by the constitution. Conse-
quently, any relief to which the Students may be entitled must come 
from the General Assembly.”85 While considering educational funding 
inequities, the court conveniently identified the arbiters of state fund-
ing and also the SOQ.86 Specifically, the court explained the responsi-
bility of the Virginia Board of Education to “determine[] and pre-
scribe[] the standards of quality. . . ,”87 a responsibility delegated from 
the General Assembly.88 The case language also highlights the General 
Assembly’s power to review the Board of Education’s decisions re-
garding standards of quality.89 Although the court plainly detailed the 
then funding crisis, the General Assembly has yet to provide relief to 
these struggling localities. Instead, the state funding formula has con-
tinued to exacerbate Virginia’s public education inequities.90  
 
While discussing the indicators of state spending, the court 
pointed to statistics that lay the foundation for a modern remedy. For 
example, under the total-per-pupil funding analysis, the court went be-
yond the range of spending to highlight cases where spending more 
	
81 Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 140.   
82 Id. (describing most mandatory costs as instructional and support costs required by the SOQ). 
83 Id.   
84 Id. at 141.  
85 Id. at 142–43.   
86 Id. at 142 (noting that “the General Assembly is empowered to make the final decision about both 
standards of quality and funding”) (citing VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2).   
87 Id. at 140.  
88 Id.   
89 Id. (noting that the Board’s standards of quality are “subject to revision by the General Assembly) 
(citing VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2).  
90 See infra Part IV.  
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than doubled for some students in the state.91 In concluding its analysis 
of inequities resulting from the State’s education funding structure, the 
court expressed concern in the growing disparity between the highest-
funded and lowest-funded schools.92 Should a plaintiff claim that fund-
ing is insufficient to meet the SOQ, based on strong evidence of edu-
cational inequities, the court may be compelled to order the legislature 
to reconsider the state education finance formula.93  
 
III. School Finance Litigation: A Viable Remedy for Institu-
tionalized Educational Inequality 
 
Currently, in the United States, a majority of states derive most 
of their public education funding through local property and sales 
taxes.94 This localized funding system allows wealthier districts to 
raise revenues that far surpass that of poorer districts in the same 
state.95 School finance litigants recognize that, in reality, academic 
success is more easily attainable to advantaged students in wealthier 
districts and thus challenge systems that encourage these discrepan-
cies.96 
 
 
 
 
 	
91 See Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 140. The court went on to note other substantial inequalities such as local 
spending on library materials. Id. Here, the court provided that spending for these supplies was more 
than 22 times greater in wealthier divisions, ranging from a mere $2.22 per student to a total of $50 per 
student. Id.  
92 Id. The court emphasized the growing gap in funding by pointing to the fourteen percent increase in 
the funding disparity from the 1987–88 to 1988–89 school year, when the disparity increased from 
$3844 per pupil to $4372 in just one academic year. Id. Given today’s data, this problem is even more 
prevalent and could therefore expound upon Scott’s sympathetic reasoning.  
93 How To Sue over Disparities, supra note 77.  
94 See William E. Thro, Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in 
Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639, 1647 (1989). 
95 See id. at 1647–48 (describing educational funding as being predominantly determined by wealth). 
“Almost every school district enrolling large numbers of low-income students has an average academic 
performance significantly below the national grade-level average, . . . ” Jonathan Rabinovitz, Local Edu-
cation Inequities Across U.S. Revealed in New Stanford Data Set, STAN. NEWS (Apr. 26, 2016), 
https://news.stanford.edu/2016/04/29/local-education-inequities-across-u-s-revealed-new-stanford-data-
set/ (detailing empirical findings that on average the most and least socioeconomically advantaged dis-
tricts have average performance levels that are more than four levels apart).  
96 Thro, supra note 94, at 1649–50. “Overall, they must close the gap between the best and the worst fi-
nanced system in the state, and give to the many what has been reserved for the fortunate few: equal op-
portunities for excellence in education.” Deborah A. Verstegen & Robert C. Knoeppel, Equal Education 
Under the Law: School Finance Reform and the Courts, 14 J.L. & POL. 555, 575 (1998). 
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A. Rich or Poor: Equal Opportunity for Educational Success 
 
The goal of plaintiffs in school finance litigation is to provide 
equal opportunity for educational success to all students, no matter the 
school district they live in.97 In general, proponents of educational eq-
uity seek “to mitigate the outside factors that hinder students’ academic 
success.”98 Notably, advocates do not claim that increased funds will 
address intrinsic societal problems that inherently impact academic 
performance.99 
 
           Although equalizing school funding may not get at the roots of 
inequality, it may be the best alternative available. Poor student per-
formance has many root causes. The 1966 Coleman Report found that 
schools are only one of the inputs that predict academic success.100 The 
report emphasized the impact of soft variables like family, friends, and 
students’ innate ability.101 In this sense, some argue that policies that 
target the socioeconomic status, the home, or the environment of dis-
advantaged students may be a more effective way to create a more just 
society.102 
 
This assumption misstates the goal of adequacy suits.103 School 
finance litigation does not aim to remedy all of society’s injustices.104 
Instead, the goal is to mitigate them by providing equal opportunity for 
educational success.105 Policy and legislation are generally not prime 
to interfere in the home to impact future success in areas such as edu-
cation.106 Changes to school finance may prove to be an essential 	
97 See Thomas A. Downes, The Effect of Serrano v. Priest on the Quality of American Education: What 
Do We Know? What Do We Not Know?, 89 NAT’L TAX ASS’N 336, 336 (1996).  
98 Barry Gabay, Comment, Socioeconomic Integration and the Greater Richmond School District: The 
Feasibility of Interdistrict Consolidation, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 397, 415 (2015).  
99 See Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance “Reform” May Not Be Good Policy, 28 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 423, 449 (1991). 
100 See generally NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, OE-38001, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL 
OPPORTUNITY iii-iv (1966) (listing a number of inputs as having a potential effect on educational suc-
cess with some being in the control of the legislature, such as characteristics of schools, teachers, and 
curricula).  
101 See id. at 292–93, 466.   
102 Frederick M. Hess, Courting Backlash: The Risks of Emphasizing Input Equity over School Perfor-
mance, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 11, 12 (1998).  
103 Id. at 13 (describing the efforts of school finance litigation as attempting an all-purpose social rem-
edy).  
104 See, e.g., Downes, supra note 97.   
105 See id.   
106 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486–93 (1965) (Goldburg, J., concurring) (describ-
ing the right to privacy in the home as being fundamental and deeply rooted in American tradition).  
83
et al.: General Topics
Published by UR Scholarship Repository,
Do Not Delete 4/14/20  5:57 PM 
74 RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW  [Vol. XXIII:iii 
alternative to overstepping boundaries between private and public as-
pects of students’ lives because financial resources are tangible, meas-
urable, and accessible for change.107   
 
B. Foundational Beliefs: Why School Finance Litigation May 
Be the Most Attainable Remedy 
 
           School finance litigation relies on a number of societal conven-
tions. In general, support is grounded in one main conclusion: in-
creased funds will equal an increase in educational opportunity and 
student performance.108 Within this idea lies the belief that schools will 
use the additional funds efficiently.109 Additionally, advocates assume 
that courts are both qualified and empowered to solve these issues and 
that court order will eventually lead to more equitable results.110 Alt-
hough critics argue against these foundational beliefs, studies show 
that generally school finance litigation is a viable, if not the most at-
tainable, remedy for educational opportunity.111 
 
Supporters of school finance litigation generally assume that 
increased or equalized funding will positively impact student perfor-
mance in poorer districts.112 Yet, while the United States has steadily 
increased education funding in the past half a century, student-perfor-
mance indicators have not improved as expected.113 Critics hold that 	
107 See JOHN E. COONS, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 26 (1972); Hess, supra note 102. 
Due to the difficulty of possible alternatives, school finance litigation provides “a standard appropriate 
to the rigors of judicial proof, and the only convincingly quantifiable item in the spectrum is money 
available for the general task of education in each district.” JOHN E. COONS, PRIVATE WEALTH AND 
PUBLIC EDUCATION 26 (1972). Additionally, education is an area relatively susceptible to government 
intervention. See Hess, supra note 102, at 13.  
108 JOHN E. COONS, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 27 (1972) 
109 Carmel Martin, et al., A Quality Approach to School Funding, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 13, 2018), 
https://www. 
americanprogress.org/issues/education-k-12/reports/2018/11/13/460397/quality-approach-school-fund-
ing/.  
110 See Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, School Finance Litigation in the Name of Educational 
Equity: Its Evolution, Impact, and Future, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE 34 
(Helen F. Ladd, Rosemary Chalk, & Janet S. Hansen eds., Nat’l Acad. Press 1999). 
111 See C. Kirabo Jackson et al., The Effects of School Spending on Educational and Economic Out-
comes: Evidence from School Finance Reforms 39 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
20847, 2015); see also Verstegen & Knoeppel, supra note 96, at 559 (showing school finance litigation 
is viable nationally and effective). 
112 Heise, supra note 79, at 1166.  
113 See Hanushek, supra note 99, at 428 (noting that while national spending on education has increased, 
SAT scores fell overall); Hess, supra note 102, at 17–18; Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson, The Ade-
quacy Lawsuit: A Critical Appraisal, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF 
EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 1 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007) (pointing to stagnant high 
school graduation rates and test scores). 
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therefore the relationship between spending and performance is ques-
tionable at best.114 Others argue that the data is simply missing as to 
the cause and effect of the two.115 Yet, recent studies have shown that 
increased spending does in fact have a positive impact on student per-
formance.116 Specifically, researchers have noted to the profound sta-
tistically significant impact of increased spending on economically dis-
advantaged students in particular.117  
 
           With assumptions about increased spending comes the belief 
that schools will use these excess funds efficiently. Critics emphasize 
that some systemic issues could be solved with new accountability 
measures for efficiency.118 Unfortunately, increased performance 
measures could have the exact opposite effect on school efficiency by 
imposing additional hurdles on funding.119 Moreover, inefficiencies do 
not explain the shocking disparities within Virginia specifically. 
Within the State, lacking performance and disparity generally line up 
with local levels of wealth.120 In fact, much of the State’s struggling 
areas are not arbitrarily located but fall in the rural, less affluent Appa-
lachian Region along Virginia’s southwest border.121 
 
By supporting school finance litigation, advocates assume that 
courts have the political authority and expertise to hear issues on edu-
cational equity and spending. Litigants base claims on the plain lan-
guage of state constitutions, which generally call for school systems of 
	
114 See Jackson et al., supra note 111 (detailing the limitations of studies on the effects of spending on 
student performance); see, e.g., Rabinovitz, supra note 95 (comparing data that revealed the most and 
least socioeconomically advantaged districts have average student performance levels of four grades 
apart with the finding that the size of this gap has little to no association with a district’s per capita stu-
dent spending). 
115 See Rabinovitz, supra note 95 (emphasizing that the findings do not prove cause and effect, but point 
to promising areas of further study).  
116 See Jackson et al., supra note 111.  
117 See id. Research shows that “[f]or children from low-income families, increasing per-pupil spending 
yields large improvements in educational attainment, wages, family income, and reductions in the an-
nual incidence of adult poverty.” Id.  
118 See Hanushek, supra note 99, at 424–25; Hess, supra note 102, at 11–12.  
119 See Hess, supra note 102, at 46 (arguing for increased efficiency while simultaneously warning that 
efficiency could lead to more restrictions on teachers and administrators and do more harm than good).  
120 See Amy Friedenberger, Teachers, School Leaders Push General Assembly for More Education 
Funding, ROANOKE TIMES (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.roanoke.com/news/local/teachers-school-lead-
ers-push-general-assembly-for-more-education-funding/article_2dbfd5f9-5f24-5d14-97e4-
212a73b7cc63.html; see also infra Section III.B. for a full discussion of Virginia’s poorest counties and 
the impact of low funding on educational quality.  
121 See Friedenberger, supra note 120. 
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high quality.122 Despite these legal theories, opponents argue that the 
courts do not have the authority to hear such “political questions.”123 
Even if such questions were justiciable, critics argue the judiciary 
should still decline to hear them as the court would lack “judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards” to resolve the issue.124 
 
Still, the judiciary is charged with the duty to protect funda-
mental rights.125 Recent trends show a willingness by courts to hold 
education as a fundamental right under state constitutions.126 Specifi-
cally, the Scott court recognized this right as well.127 Generally, to ad-
dress concerns of democratic input and judicial adequacy, courts will 
simply charge the legislature with a duty to appropriately disperse ed-
ucation funds to provide for an adequate system of education.128 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
122 See, e.g., Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994) (describing plaintiffs rationale based 
on three sections of the Virginia Constitution).  
123 See Michael Heise, Adequacy Litigation in an Era of Accountability, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE 
LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 262, 269 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007) 
(citing Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and 
the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002)) (noting that questions of school fi-
nance have already been committed to another political branch and therefore are off limits to the judici-
ary under the political question doctrine). 
124 See id. at 270 (citing Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill.2d 1, 28 (1996)).  
125 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 167 (1803) (“The question whether a right has vested or not, is, 
in its nature, judicial, and must be tried by the judicial authority.”).  
126 See Verstegen & Knoeppel, supra note 96, at 584 n.208. 
127 See Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994).  
128 See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 216 (Ky. 1989) (noting that “[t]he [Ken-
tucky] General Assembly must provide adequate funding for the system. How they do this is their deci-
sion.”)  
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IV. Virginia’s Gross Disparities Present Cause to Bring an Ad-
equacy Suit 
 
Adequacy suits are recent to the realm of school finance litiga-
tion. In the last of what scholars call the “Waves of Litigation,” ade-
quacy suits have worked to redefine the constitutionally required level 
of education within a state.129 In particular, litigants focus on what dol-
lars can buy, in addition to the difference in spending between school 
districts.130 The complainants in these cases rely on the plain meaning 
of a state’s constitutional education requirements, such that all students 
must receive a quality education.131 Significant disparities exist in ar-
eas previously considered by the Scott court. Generally, almost every 
factor considered by the Scott court has worsened since 1994.  
 
A. The Scott Factors Today 
 
Virginia is home to a number of the richest counties in the 
United States.132 The State’s top ten wealthiest counties include Falls 
Church City, Loudon, Fairfax, Arlington, Stafford, Prince William, 
Fairfax City, Poquoson City, Fauquier, and Goochland County.133 In 
contrast, Virginia’s top ten poorest counties include Martinsville City, 
Danville City, Lee, Bristol City, Northampton, Emporia City, Grayson, 
Carroll, Buchanan, and Charlotte County.134 These counties are ana-
lyzed in comparison to the Scott court’s 1994 data. When considered 
today, the previous Scott factors reveal gross educational disparities 
across the state.    
 
1. Total per Pupil Funding  	
129 See Verstegen & Knoeppel, supra note 96, at 559. Nationally, studies show that numerous states have 
and are reconsidering state public education finance formulas. Lauren Camera, In Most States, Poorest 
School Districts Get Less Funding, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-
states/articles/2018-02-27/in-most-states-poorest-school-districts-get-less-funding.  
130 See Verstegen & Knoeppel, supra note 96, at 559.   
131 VA. CONST. art VIII, § 2; see Verstegen & Knoeppel, supra note 96, at 559.   
132 See Rebecca Lerner, The 10 Richest Counties in America 2017, FORBES (July 13, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rebeccalerner/2017/07/13/top-10-richest-counties-in-america-2017/; see 
also Median Household Income in Virginia, CTY. HEALTH RANKINGS & ROADMAPS, http://www.coun-
tyhealthrankings.org/app/virginia/2014/measure/factors/63/data?sort=desc-2 (last visited Jan. 31, 2020) 
(detailing a median household income range of $29,550 to $121,250 in the state). Notably, Virginia 
ranks poorly on a national scale for its state support of public education, despite being the eighth wealth-
iest state in the country. See OWINGS & KAPLAN, supra note 38.  
133 See Median Household Income in Virginia, supra note 132. Some Virginia counties, like Falls 
Church City, have a median household income over $100,000. See id.  
134 See id.  
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 Virginia’s total spending per pupil has increased greatly since the Scott 
case in 1994.135 The current gap seems to have improved compared to 
the Scott case, in which the State spent 2.5 times more on some stu-
dents than others.136 Virginia’s highest spending county, Arlington 
County, spent an average of $19,323 per child in the 2015–16 fiscal 
year.137 Meanwhile, the lowest spending county in the state spent only 
$8962 per child.138 This disparity creates only a 2.15 times difference 
on its face.139 
 
Still, the Scott case focused on more than the ratio of spending 
per child, emphasizing the disparity between the levels of spending in 
the State’s highest and lowest-funded divisions.140 Whereas in Scott, 
when the funding difference was $4372, the current disparity sits at a 
looming $10,361.141 Today’s disparity reveals a thirty percent increase 
from Scott’s 1989–90 value, doubling the court’s then-recorded four-
teen percent change.142  
 
2. Teacher Salaries  
 
	
135 Compare VA. DEP’T OF EDUC., FISCAL YEAR 2015 SUPERINTENDENT’S ANNUAL REPORT FOR VA., 
TABLE 15, http://www.doe.virginia.gov/statistics_reports/supts_annual_report/2014_15/table15.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2020) [hereinafter TABLE 15] (showing most cities and counties in Virginia spending over 
$8000 per pupil in 2015), with Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 140 (Va. 1994) (discussing 
spending values from $2895 to $7268).  
136 Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 140.   
137 See TABLE 15., supra note 135 (using “Total Per Pupil Expenditure”). 
138 Id. (reflecting spending per student in King George County, Virginia). King George County is not 
one of the states ten poorest districts and is used here to create an accurate range of spending per pupil in 
Virginia today. 
139 Often, the data itself does not explicitly provide conclusions as to range, disparity, or percent in-
crease. Data points such as these were calculated by the author based on the data from the 2015–16 Su-
perintendent’s Annual Report.  
140 Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 140 (noting that the disparity “between the highest-funded and the lowest-funded 
school divisions continues to increase”). 
141 Id.; TABLE 15, supra note 135. The disparity in spending reflects the difference between the highest-
funded and the lowest-funded school divisions for the 2015–16 fiscal year: Arlington versus King 
George. 
142 See Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 140. Here, the percent increase reflects the change from the 1989–90 to the 
2015–16 spending gap amount. The percent change was calculated including inflation. Here, the 1989–
90 amount of $4372 would be equivalent to $7954 in 2016, assuming both numbers were taken at the 
end of their fiscal years. See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. & STAT., 
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2020). Without calculating for in-
flation, the 1989–90 value of $4372 increased 139% by 2016. 
88
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [], Art. 2
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol23/iss3/2
Do Not Delete 4/14/20  5:57 PM 
2020] “For the Common Wealth” 79 
Despite its rank as the 8th wealthiest state in the country, Vir-
ginia ranked 29th in the country for average teacher salary.143 The State 
also fell well below the national average salary of $56,610 in 2016, 
with an average of $49,826.144 Many of Virginia’s wealthiest counties 
provide teachers a salary of over $70,000.145 Meanwhile, teachers in a 
number of Virginia’s least affluent counties are not as well off. In Vir-
ginia’s poorest counties such as Lee and Buchanan County, teachers 
receive a salary of around $40,000, while other more rural counties fall 
near an average salary of $30,000.146 In sum, some teachers within the 
state are paid 116% more than others.147 The current data dwarfs the 
thirty-nine percent difference that the Scott court noted in 1994.148 Fur-
ther, the range of highest to lowest-paying locality creates a disparity 
of $40,618, quadrupling the $10,624 difference in 1994.149  
 
3. Student-Teacher Ratios  
 
Despite other indicators of increasing inequity, Virginia’s 
counties have relatively consistent student-teacher ratios. The Super-
intendent’s Annual Report measures ratios for Kindergarten through 
seventh grade (“K–7”) and eighth grade through twelfth grade (“8–
12”) separately.150 The State’s ten wealthiest counties average K–7 stu-
dent-teacher ratios of 12.77 and 8–12 ratios of 12.40.151 Notably, the 
ten poorest counties averaged ratios lower than those of the most af-
fluent counties, with averages of 12.33 in K–7 and 10.64 in 8–12.152 	
143 VA. DEP’T OF EDUC., DLAS DOCUMENT SUMMARY, 2015 Sess., at 4 (2016); Becca Mitchell, Virginia 
Listed as 8th “Richest State in America”, WTKR (Sep. 19, 2017), https://wtkr.com/2017/09/19/virginia-
listed-as-8th-richest-state-in-america/.  
144 VA. DEP’T OF EDUC., DLAS DOCUMENT SUMMARY, 2015 Sess., at 4 (2016).  
145 Median Household Income in Virginia, supra note 132. Falls Church City, the State’s wealthiest 
county, provides a salary of $75,564. VA. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 144, at 6. Although not one of the 
top ten wealthiest counties in the state, Alexandria City provides a notable salary of $75,604. Id.  
146 VA. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 144, at 5–7. In 2016, Lee County provided an average teacher salary 
of $42,325. Id. at 5. Buchanan County came in lower at an average of $35,834. Id. at 5–7. Although not 
listed in Virginia’s top ten poorest counties, rural counties like Craig and Tazewell County provided 
shockingly low salaries of $37,974 and $34,986. See id. at 5–6.  
147 See generally id. at 4 (using the highest paying county, Alexandria City ($75,604), and the lowest 
paying county, Tazewell County ($34,986) to calculate percent change).  
148 Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 140 (Va. 1994). 
149 Id.   
150 VA. DEP’T OF EDUC., FISCAL YEAR 2015 SUPERINTENDENT’S ANNUAL REPORT FOR VA., TABLE 17A, 
http://www.doe.virginia.gov/statistics_reports/supts_annual_report/2014_15/table17.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2020).  
151 Id. Averages were calculated using the ten wealthiest and poorest counties per median household in-
come.  
152 Id. No data was provided for one of Virginia’s poorest counties as listed previously: Emporia City. 
Therefore, the average consisted of the other nine counties previously discussed.  
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 Overall, the nature of student-teacher ratios may not be as impactful as 
other indicators, such as per pupil spending. Firstly, because student-
teacher ratios are capped by the State, it is also possible that the lack 
of variation is due to state-mandated standards.153 Further, given the 
close correlation between Virginia’s highly populated areas and higher 
median household income, it is highly likely that the State’s poorest 
counties have less students to serve.154 Lastly, student-teacher ratios 
may not reflect the quality of personnel within a school.155  
 
4. Spending for Instructional Materials  
 
 Given its ranking as one of the nation’s wealthiest states, it is not sur-
prising some of Virginia’s wealthier counties are able to spend large 
sums of money on instructional materials. For the 2015–2016 aca-
demic year, Virginia spent over $391 million on instructional materi-
als.156 Notably, Fairfax County made the list of counties with spending 
over $50 million for the same year.157 Here, Fairfax was in the com-
pany of notably larger and wealthier counties, such as Los Angeles, 
California and New York, New York.158  
 
           MDR recently analyzed the spending power of each state by 
county, including Virginia.159 As Figure 1 shows, Virginia’s 
	
153 See VA. CODE § 22.1-253.13:2 (2020). 
154 See, e.g., Hamilton Lombard, Population Growth in Virginia Is Reversing Decades-Old Trend, Esti-
mates Show, STATCHAT (Jan. 27, 2016), http://statchatva.org/2016/01/27/population-growth-in-virginia-
is-reversing-decades-old-trend-estimates-show/ (describing the increased population in northern Vir-
ginia areas, such as Loudon County and Alexandria); see also Nathan Vardi, America’s Richest Coun-
ties, FORBES (Apr. 11, 2011), https://www.forbes.com/2011/04/11/americas-richest-counties-business-
washington.html#378f55ea6653 (describing northern Virginia’s current economic layout). “Boasting a 
strong school system and positioned about six miles from the nation’s capital, Falls Church has for years 
enticed rich families, making it the nation's richest county . . . In recent decades northern Virginia has 
become an economic dynamo, driven by a private sector that feasts on government contracting.” Id.  
155 See Cynthia D. Prince, Attracting Well-Qualified Teachers to Struggling Schools, AM. FED’N 
TEACHERS, https://www.aft.org/periodical/american-educator/winter-2002/attracting-well-qualified-
teachers-struggling (last visited Nov. 14, 2018) (noting that “[s]tudents who attend schools with concen-
trated poverty have vastly unequal opportunities to develop literacy and other academic skills”) (citing 
GARY ORFIELD, SCHOOLS MORE SEPARATE: CONSEQUENCES OF A DECADE OF RESEGREGATION (Harv. 
Civil Rights Project, July 2001)). High-poverty schools struggle with fewer applications for vacancies, 
higher absenteeism among teachers and staff, and higher rates of teacher and administrator turnover. Id.   
156 MDREDUCATION, PUBLIC SCHOOL BUYING POWER MAPS 2 (2018). 
157 Id. at 3.   
158 Id.   
159 See generally id. (surveying how much public schools spent on supplies and materials used for in-
structional purposes, such as textbooks and library sources, in the 2015–16 academic year). 
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educational spending power is concentrated in wealthy areas, such as 
the suburbs of both northern Virginia and Richmond.160 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1 – MDR Public School Buying Power Maps161 
 
Notably, most of Virginia’s poorest counties, including Lee, 
Buchanan, and others, fall below the lowest spending category of un-
der $1,000,000.162 Therefore, a majority of Virginia’s poorest counties 
fall several million dollars (if not $49 million or more) behind their 
highest spending counterparts.163 This discrepancy reflects the Scott 
court’s concerns with growing inequality in the state.164 In 1994, some 
districts spent more than twelve times more than others on instructional 
materials.165 Now, it is likely the data reflects a potential difference of 
fifty times higher spending per district. 
 	
160 Id. at 50. Compare Lombard, supra note 154 (describing the booming northern Virginia economy and 
therefore wealth), and Vardi, supra note 154 (same), and Gabay, supra note 98, at 397–98 (discussing 
the affluent Richmond suburbs in comparison to Richmond City urban schools), with Andria Caruthers, 
Mapping Poverty in the Appalachian Region, COMMUNITY COMMONS (Aug. 9, 2016), https://sto-
ries.communitycommons.org/2016/08/09/mapping-poverty-in-the-appalachian-region/ 
(describing poverty levels in the East Coast’s Appalachian Region).  
161 MDREDUCATION, supra note 156, at 50.  
162 Id. Notably, almost all of Virginia’s poorest counties, including Lee, Buchanan, Carroll, Charlotte, 
and Grayson County, rank in the lowest spending categories, despite state and federal funding. See id.  
163 Id. (comparing counties such as Lee to high spending counties like Falls Church City). 
164 Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 141 (Va. 1994) (reporting twenty-two times greater spend-
ing per pupil in some districts).  
165 Id.   
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B. Additional Adequacy Issues: Inequities in Programs and 
Facilities 
 
            In Virginia, the growing disparity surpasses financial statistics. 
Because more affluent counties have the ability to put more local 
money towards education, the quality of education in the State varies 
greatly.166 The differences are most visible in available programs and 
the quality of facilities.167 For example, Loudoun County now offers 
computer science courses in elementary school.168 Meanwhile, in Pu-
laski County, located in the southwestern Appalachian Region,169 
some middle school classrooms have only one electrical outlet.170 Fair-
fax County provides all elementary school children with weekly art 
and music classes; Dickenson County cut both.171 Arlington County 
elementary schools have choruses; Dickenson County has none at any 
level.172 Tragically, Flatwood Elementary of Lee County (the state’s 
poorest county) sets out trash cans to catch rain when it pours in 
through the leaky roof.173 At the same time, the wealthier Prince Wil-
liam County considers spending hundreds of millions to advance its 
own educational facilities.174 Unfortunately, there is a limit as to how 
much money Virginia’s poorer counties can raise on their own to put 
towards education.175 Here, the courts would be an effective avenue 
for necessary change.   
 	
166 Thro, supra note 94.   
167 See generally Lauren Camera, In Most States, Poorest School Districts Get Less Funding, U.S. NEWS 
(Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2018-02-27/in-most-states-poorest-
school-districts-get-less-funding (describing school districts that serve large proportions of poor students 
as being “historically . . . shortchanged when it comes to things like access to high-quality teachers, ad-
vanced course offerings, early education programs and school counselors – resources that are directly 
linked to the amount of funding available”). 
168 See Does the Rest of Virginia Care How Unequal Rural Schools Are?, ROANOKE TIMES (Jan. 29, 
2018), https://www.roanoke.com/opinion/editorials/editorial-does-the-rest-of-virginia-care-how-une-
qual-rural/article_8b2ccf52-d776-53dd-814f-931fe58557a3.html.   
169 See Counties in Appalachia, APPALACHIAN REGIONAL COMMISSION, https://www.arc.gov/appala-
chian_region/CountiesinAppalachia.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).  
170 See Does the Rest of Virginia Care How Unequal Rural Schools Are?, supra note 168 (noting that 
Pulaski County “can’t even run some technology, much less teach it”). 
171 Id.   
172 Id.   
173 Id. Advocates for change, including newspapers like the Roanoke Times, ask whether “anyone [can] 
insist . . . that water cascading through the schoolhouse roof constitutes ‘an education program of high 
quality’.” Id. 
174 Emily Sides, Trailers No More? Prince William To Weigh $143 Million Plan To Eliminate ‘Portable 
Classrooms’, INSIDENOVA (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.insidenova.com/news/education/prince_wil-
liam/trailers-no-more-prince-william-to-weigh-million-plan-to/article_5ef4c42c-ec26-11e8-b06e-
9f4fa2cdee92.html.  
175 Does the Rest of Virginia Care How Unequal Rural Schools Are?, supra note 168.  
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C. Why Virginia’s 2018 Accreditation Standards Should Not 
Be Considered as Reflecting Educational Equality 
 
           Opponents of a finance litigation case in Virginia would likely 
rely on the State’s recently improved and updated accreditation stand-
ards. The Board of Education recently rolled out new accreditation 
standards revised to shift away from test scores and towards an empha-
sis on growth and progress.176 Out of the schools across the state, 
ninety-two percent were accredited under the new system, up six per-
centage points from 2017.177 The Board did not deny a single Virginia 
school some type of accreditation.178 In comparison, the Board denied 
eighty seven schools (including nineteen of Richmond’s public 
schools) under the old standards.179 The outlook of the State is repre-
sented well by Superintendent of Public Instruction James Lane’s re-
cent statement, “These ratings show that – in the vast majority of our 
schools – most students are either meeting or exceeding Virginia’s 
high standards, . . .”180 Here, the State relies on these lower standards 
to show that increased accreditation is a result of increased quality and 
performance.181  
 
           This argument fails to consider the deceptive nature of low 
standards as a measure of educational equity specifically. As George 
W. Bush famously mentioned, an implicit form of bias in education 
policy is “the soft bigotry of low expectations.”182 Under Virginia’s 
system, schools will only be denied accreditation when they fail to im-
plement a corrective-action plan.183 This is a stark contrast to the pre-
vious standard that required the Board to deny accreditation if a school 
had four consecutive years of poor performance.184 Supporters of the 
new plan point to improved factors, which consider disadvantaged 	
176 Justin Mattingly, Schools Across Virginia Fare Better Under New Accreditation Standards, RICH. 
TIMES-DISPATCH (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.richmond.com/news/local/education/schools-across-vir-
ginia-richmond-region-fare-better-under-%20new-accreditation/article_ecaddfcd-9a08-534d-960f-
9ab5266fc3cb.html.  
177 Id. In 2017, only eighty-six percent of Virginia schools were fully accredited. Id.  
178 Id. The state ranges accreditation to various types of “modified” accreditation. Id.  
179 Id.   
180 Id.   
181 Id.  
182 President George W. Bush, Address at the NAACP’s 91st Annual Convention (July 2006). 
183 Jane Hammond, Over 90 Percent of Virginia Schools Accredited Under New System, DAILY PRESS 
(Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.dailypress.com/news/education/dp-nws-accreditation-results-2018-
story.html.  
184 Mattingly, supra note 176.  
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students more than Virginia’s previous plan.185 Still, new ratings can-
not cover up the fact that while accreditation numbers improved, stu-
dent test scores fell.186 Like Virginia’s old standards, the new plan does 
not put enough weight on achievement disparities by socioeconomic 
class or race.187 As many scholars warn, low standards of quality 
simply hide educational disparities instead of remedying them.188 
 
 
V. Remedying Insufficient Funding for Virginia’s Localities 
 
           An adequacy suit would work to remedy the unsatisfactory edu-
cational situations in Virginia’s poorest localities. Still, changing the 
Virginia public education finance formula would likely require a court 
order. While the General Assembly of Virginia has changed its for-
mula in the past, it has failed to do so in a way that addresses the State’s 
apparent performance and financial disparities.189 Legislators are 
driven by their own local interests.190 Plus, school finance litigation 
	
185 Compare Hillary Holladay, Passing Grade, DAILY PROGRESS (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.dailypro-
gress.com/orangenews/school_news/passing-grades/article_4bda2f26-e843-11e8-a204-
f3938b248efc.html (explaining how Virginia’s new standards consider disadvantaged students), with 
Andrew Rotherham, Virginia’s ‘Together and Unequal’ School Standards, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 
2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/virginias-together-and-unequal-school-stand-
ards/2012/08/24/ad0d3e06-ed4e-11e1-b09d-07d971dee30a_story.html (describing how Virginia’s ac-
creditation standards at the time only considered percent pass rates by school, which put issues regarding 
disadvantaged students to the side as long as a certain number of total students passed state-issued ex-
ams).  
186 Hammond, supra note 183; Debbie Truong, Fewer Virginia Students Passed Statewide Tests Last 
Year, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/fewer-virginia-
students-passed-statewide-tests-last-year/2018/08/22/06adfa80-a61d-11e8-a656-943ee-
fab5daf_story.html.  
187 Truong, supra note 186 (noting that “students from economically disadvantaged families . . . had pass 
rates that fell below the state average”). Interestingly, test results showed that while other areas of the 
state declined, northern Virginia’s “largest school systems mostly outperformed or remained on par with 
state averages.” Id.  
188 See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1223, 
1247–50 (2008) (warning that using standards as a measure of adequacy would incentive legislatures to 
lower standards, funding requirements, and test difficulty). 
189 See Moriah Balingit, Report Says Virginia Is Shortchanging Public Schools $800 Million Each Year, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/report-says-virginia-is-
shortchanging-public-schools-800-million-a-year/2016/01/24/11bcda42-c126-11e5-9443-
7074c3645405_story.html (describing Virginia’s cuts to the public education budget in the face of a re-
cession by readjusting the State’s finance formula); see also Delja, supra note 5, at 199–200 (describing 
a new formula adopted by the State in 1986 that “had as many problems as the old one”).  
190 See, e.g., Cory Turner, Is There a Better Way To Pay for America's Schools?, NPR (May 1, 2016), 
https://www.npr.org/2016/05/01/476224759/is-there-a-better-way-to-pay-for-americas-schools (urging 
that “[h]elping low-wealth schools requires buy-in from voters who live beyond those districts' borders. 
And it requires lawmakers to look past their local interests”).  
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risks voter backlash as it works to equalize public funds.191 Here, 
courts are a prime avenue for change given their greater political au-
tonomy.192 
Virginia’s finance formula creates gross inequities in a number 
of ways. First, the formula caps local contributions to the SOQ cost at 
eighty percent.193 This cap results in districts with a high ability-to-pay 
receiving significant state funding when these funds could be redi-
rected to poorer districts with a higher dependency on state support.194 
Additionally, while the State’s SOQ provides funding for some facili-
tating costs (such as teacher and personnel salary), the SOQ does not 
reference actual facilities.195 Constructing and maintaining school 
buildings is extremely financially burdensome. Some argue that a 
number of Virginia’s poorest localities cannot provide an adequate ed-
ucation given their considerably inadequate facilities.196  
 
1. Redistribution 
 
           As previously discussed, the LCI reflects a district’s ability to 
pay the projected SOQ amount.197 Throughout the state, districts with 
a high ability-to-pay receive 20% of state funds despite their ability to 
pay the potential full cost of the SOQ.198 This includes counties with 
significant cost, such as Arlington County.199 If the cap was increased 	
191 Hess, supra note 102, at 14. Still, authors that spotlight voter and taxpayer backlash as a serious issue 
concede that the threat of backlash could be mitigated if there is convincing evidence that resources are 
adding value, being put to good use, and providing real social benefits. Id. at 46.   
192 See William E. Camp & David C. Thompson, School Finance Litigation: Legal Issues and Politics of 
Reform, 14 J. EDUC. FIN. 221, 237 (1988) (describing the courts as “a powerful force in stimulating 
change”); Delja, supra note 5, at 199 (noting that Virginia’s process of nominating judges who never 
“face the voters” in retention elections is unique). Still, recent studies show that appointed judges uphold 
state education finance schemes more often than elected judges. Delja, supra note 5, at 215 (citing Ka-
ren Swenson, School Finance Reform Litigation: Why Are Some State Supreme Courts Activist and 
Other Restrained?, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1147, 1174 (2000)). This may hold true in Virginia especially as 
“critics and reformers have long contended that the [Virginia] justices are selected on a partisan basis, 
rather than on a professional and quality basis.” Id. at 216.  
193 DICKEY, supra note 29, at 15.  
194 Notably, poorer localities receive more state funding than their wealthier counterparts. See Does the 
Rest of Virginia Care How Unequal Rural Schools Are?, supra note 168. Still, dependency on state 
funding is not equal between the two extremes. See id.  
195 See VA. CODE § 22.1-253.13:1 (2020).  
196 Does the Rest of Virginia Care How Unequal Rural Schools Are?, supra note 168.  
197 See supra Section I.C.  
198 DICKEY, supra note 29, at 15–16.   
199 VA. DEP’T OF EDUC., COMPOSITE INDEX OF LOCAL-ABILITY-TO-PAY (2017) [hereinafter COMPOSITE 
INDEX]. The Virginia Department of Education documents the Average Daily Membership (“ADM”) of 
each locality. The ADM, documented March 31, is the sum of the total daily enrollment for the previous 
seven months divided by the number of school days in that period. DICKEY & LOGWOOD, supra note 7, 
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by even a few percentage points, excess funds could be diverted to 
poorer localities appropriately.200 By changing the local contribution 
cap, the State could make education funding more equitable without 
increasing the overall education budget.201  
Wealthier districts would likely contest this remedy, arguing 
that the SOQ are a state requirement and demand state funding. Article 
VIII, section 2 supports this notion, requiring the State to “provide for 
the apportionment of the cost of [the SOQ] between the Common-
wealth and the local units of government comprising such school divi-
sions.”202 Therefore, critics would argue that mandating localities to 
fully fund the SOQ cost is unconstitutional. In the past, when redistri-
bution was recommended, senators in the General Assembly worried 
that such a plan would be difficult for the northern Virginia legislators 
to support.203 Given today’s increased inequities and disparities, this 
remedy is more appropriate and critical than it may have been in 1991, 
prior to the Scott case.204   
 
Additionally, this remedy offers a narrow modification to the 
State’s finance formula. An assumption that all affluent districts would 
be adversely affected would be incorrect. The remedy would only ap-
ply to districts able to meet more than eighty percent of the SOQ cost. 
Although this does apply to some of Virginia’s wealthiest districts 
(such as Arlington and Falls Church City), not all of the State’s high-
median-income districts fall in this category. Notably, Fairfax County 
is more than .1 beneath the state-imposed cap.205 The cap would impact 	
at 5. With this in mind, Arlington County has an ADM of 24,210. See COMPOSITE INDEX, supra note 
199.  
200 Delja, supra note 5, at 203. Notably, when the Scott case was filed in the early 1990’s, “budgeted lo-
cal expenditures exceeded the mandatory local expenditures by an average of 118 percent.” Id. at 198 
(citing Bill of Compl. at 2, Scott v. Commonwealth., CH92C00577 (Va. Cir. Ct. Richmond filed June 11, 
1992)). Some localities exceeded their mandatory local expenditure amount by 242 percent. Id.   
201 Id. at 203. Some scholars argue that poorer localities are even further disadvantaged because it takes 
more educate students in poverty than those not. Camera, supra note 167 (noting that the disparity be-
tween high-median-income and low-median-income school districts is exacerbated by a “federally de-
fined assumption that it takes forty percent more to educate a student in poverty than a student not”).  
202 VA. CONST. art VIII, § 2.  
203 See id. (describing a 1991 recommendation by the “Disparity Commission” to remediate Virginia’s 
public education inequities); see also Delja, supra note 5, at 203.  
204 For example, Buchanan County spent $4,945 per student in the early 1990’s; now, the county pays 
only $3,776 per student. Does the Rest of Virginia Care How Unequal Rural Schools Are?, supra note 
168. “Meanwhile, in the early 1990s, Falls Church was paying $9,139 per student — not quite twice as 
much as Buchanan. Today, it’s paying $16,619, more than quadruple what Buchanan does.” Id.    
205 COMPOSITE INDEX, supra note 199; Delja, supra note 5, at 239 (noting that [d]uring the Scott litiga-
tion, . . . Fairfax complained that they must educate more free-lunch kids and more kids for whom Eng-
lish is a second language, making their costs higher and justifying the greater expenditure on their 
schools.”).  
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all of the counties with a higher ability-to-pay, as well as those with 
ability-to-pay due to relatively low student populations.206  
 
2. Redefine Adequacy: Changing the SOQ 
 
           Advocates have a convincing argument that the current SOQ do 
not provide an adequate education.207 The SOQ focus on both intrinsic 
and tangible requirements including student skills, student-teacher-ra-
tios, and requirements for diplomas and certificates.208 Still, evidence 
suggests that Virginia’s SOQ may be “too minimal to provide a quality 
foundation program.”209 Notably, Virginia’s SOQ does not have any 
specific requirements for educational facilities.210 In fact, localities are 
responsible for constructing, equipping, and maintaining all public ed-
ucational facilities.211  
 
Due to this local financial burden, some would argue that the 
most visible signs of Virginia’s funding inequities are the age and con-
dition of school buildings.212 In the Commonwealth, a new elementary 
school costs nearly $20 million.213 Middle schools and high schools 
cost significantly more—at $40 to $60 million.214 Should a district 
choose not to update their facilities, the cost to maintain an older build-
ing is still significant.215  
 
          The SOQ does not represent any baseline for an adequate school 
building. Still, inadequate facilities have the potential to be problem-
atic enough to disrupt the educational process, especially in an 	
206 COMPOSITE INDEX, supra note 199 (capping Bath County, Virginia at .8000 and comparing the 
county’s revenue indicators with its population of only 4727). 
207 Delja, supra note 5, at 243–44. 
208 Id. at 196.  
209 See id. at 202 (citing Suzette Denslow, Education Finance: Implications for Disparity (U. OF VA. 
NEWSLETTER 1, 2 (Nov./Dec. 1995)).  
210 See VA. CODE § 22.1-253.13:1–13:10 (2020).  
211 See DICKEY & LOGWOOD, supra note 7. 
212 See Time To Address State’s Aging School Buildings, NEWS ADVANCE (Sept. 2, 2018), 
https://www.newsadvance.com/opinion/editorials/time-to-address-state-s-aging-school-buildings/arti-
cle_3362cf64-ad5d-11e8-8282-abce717bca22.html; see also Duncombe & Cassidy, supra note 10 (not-
ing that one of the effects of Virginia’s lack of sufficient funding is deteriorating facilities, along with 
fewer teachers and increased class sizes).  
213 Time To Address State’s Aging School Buildings, NEWS ADVANCE (Sept. 2, 2018), 
https://www.newsadvance.com/opinion/editorials/time-to-address-state-s-aging-school-buildings/arti-
cle_3362cf64-ad5d-11e8-8282-abce717bca22.html.   
214 Id.  
215 Id.   
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increasingly technological world.216 If a court is not convinced of re-
distribution, advocates should argue for a change in the SOQ that 
would require more state support for the realities of funding an ade-
quate education. 
 
           Attempting to change the SOQ would impose a greater burden 
on plaintiffs. Instead of proving that state funding is insufficient to 
meet the SOQ, the court would require complainants to show that the 
SOQ violate plaintiffs’ fundamental right to education.217 The argu-
ment would rest on the same evidence as the previous remedy of redis-
tribution but with a lower chance of convincing the court.218 Still, a 
court may be more compelled to order this remedy as it would simply 
require a finding of a violation of a right while leaving the formula 
revisions to the legislature to decide.219 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
          Throughout history, the value of a quality education has re-
mained prevalent and deeply rooted in American society. In Virginia, 
the state Constitution explicitly provides minimum standards for the 
General Assembly to ensure are met in each locality with state-funding 
support. While Virginia’s education funding formula remains the 
same, gross inequities between districts escalate throughout the state.  
 Although researchers detail a number of inherent issues in the State’s 
educational funding formula, the most prevailing discrepancies arise 
when analyzing the SOQ finance structure. The General Assembly ap-
portions funds to each locality to meet the SOQ, which are inherently 	
216 Verstegen & Knoeppel, supra note 96, at 575–77. Advocates argue against this rationale, noting that 
the definition of an “adequate” education is constantly changing, and a minimum education is insuffi-
cient to provide the tools for success in the changing landscape of education in a new global economy. 
Id. at 577. Other courts have supported the idea of increased standards, explaining that “[y]esterday’s 
bare essentials are no longer sufficient to prepare a student to live in today’s global marketplace.” Id. 
(citing Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 396–97 (1997)).  
217 See Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994). 
218 The Supreme Court of Virginia’s precedent shows only a willingness to hear cases in which a district 
alleges funding is insufficient to meet the SOQ. See, e.g., id.    
219 Here, this may be only the beginning of remediating Virginia’s educational inequities. See James E. 
Ryan & Thomas Saunders, Foreword to Symposium on School Finance Litigation: Emerging Trends or 
New Dead Ends?, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 464 (2004) (noting that after holding a finance for-
mula unconstitutional, numerous states have gone through multiple rounds of litigation). Some critics 
note that “school finance litigation neither begins nor ends in the courthouse.” Id. at 465. Still, this Com-
ment articulates why a remedy is necessary given Virginia’s increasing educational inequities despite 
the threat of continued litigation. 
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vague and marginal requirements. While some districts depend strictly 
on state financing, other districts receive twenty percent of their pro-
jected SOQ cost because of a relatively arbitrary state cap on local con-
tribution. Additionally, the SOQ are silent as to any requirement of an 
adequate facility for the purposes of instilling a quality education in 
students across the state.  
 
           Because of these shortcomings, Virginia is prime for a modern 
adequacy lawsuit. The Supreme Court of Virginia’s precedent in Scott 
v. Commonwealth provides a basis for such a case, ruling implicitly 
that state funding must be sufficient for each locality to meet the SOQ. 
Although critics may object, courts are qualified and powerful avenues 
for change in the realm of educational equity. Further, when analyzed 
today, the Scott factors reveal shocking disparities across the state in 
spending per pupil, teacher salaries, and spending on instructional ma-
terials.  
 
           Given Virginia’s growing disparities, it is time for the Supreme 
Court of Virginia to reconsider whether the State’s finance formula is 
not only sufficient, but also whether it enables every locality to facili-
tate an adequate and quality public education.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
This comment will explore the concept and prevalence of Birth 
Control Sabotage in the realm of domestic violence. This comment ar-
gues that Birth Control Sabotage is a rampant part of domestic violence 
and therefore should be covered by domestic violence law. Seeking to 
highlight the importance of recognizing Birth Control Sabotage as a 
form of domestic violence, this comment will explore current intimate 
partner abuse statutes and propose avenues for which Birth Control 
Sabotage can be included within those statutes. Lastly, this comment 
will examine and present the possibility of a stand-alone criminal stat-
ute to combat Reproductive Coercion. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Almost two decades ago, when Dr. Liz Miller was working in 
a medical clinic in California, she encountered a young woman who 
came in and requested a pregnancy test.1 When the test came out neg-
ative, Dr. Miller asked the patient if she wanted to be pregnant, to 
which the patient responded, “no.”2 Dr. Miller then asked the patient 
if she was using birth control; again, the answer was “no.”3 She then 
asked the patient whether she felt safe in her relationship, to which the 
patient shrugged and replied “yeah.”4 Dr. Miller handed the patient a 
brown bag full of condoms and encouraged the patient to return when 
she decided what birth control method would work best for her.5 Two 
weeks later, Dr. Miller encountered that patient again, but this time in 
her hospital’s emergency room.6 The young woman had been rushed 
in with a severe head injury, having been pushed down the stairs by 
her boyfriend.7 Dr. Miller realized she had completely missed that this 
patient was in an abusive relationship, one in which the patient’s boy-
friend forced her to have sex, refused to wear a condom, and prevented 
 
1 Dr. Liz Miller, Abuse by Birth Control Sabotage, BEDSIDER (Dec. 19, 2012), https://www.bed-
sider.org/features/252-abuse-by-birth-control-sabotage.   
2 Id.    
3 Id.    
4 Id. 
5 Id.    
6 Id.    
7 Id.     
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her from taking birth control.8 Since that encounter, Dr. Miller has fo-
cused her work on protecting victims of domestic violence from a very 
unrecognized, yet extremely harmful mode of abuse: reproductive co-
ercion and birth control sabotage.9 
 
Stories such as the one of Dr. Miller’s patient are much more 
common than one would expect. Common narratives include: 
 
He would throw away my birth control 
pills. I then, with help from my doctor, 
managed to secretly get an IUD which 
was fine for a while until he discovered 
it in which he then forcefully ripped it 
out of me. Once I fell pregnant, he then 
refused to let me have an abortion.10 
 
I gave a friend of mine some condoms. 
Then the next night or something, I had 
her call me saying, “look, I’ve just 
found pin holes in the condoms.”11 
Destroying (burning) my whole pre-
scription for contraceptive pills and 
physically preventing me from seeing a 
doctor or chemist (or anyone).12  
I tried the pill but when he found them, 
he got mad and put them down the sink. 
The time I put my foot down with con-
doms, he poked a needle through some 
 
8 Id.  
9 Id.; see also Elizabeth Miller et al., Pregnancy Coercion, Intimate Partner Violence and Unintended 
Pregnancy, 81 CONTRACEPTION 316, 316 (2010); Elizabeth Miller et al., Reproductive Coercion: Con-
necting the Dots Between Partner Violence and Unintended Pregnancy, 81 CONTRACEPTION 457, 457 
(2010); Ann M. Moore et al., Male Reproductive Control of Women Who Have Experienced Intimate 
Partner Violence in the United States, 70 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1737, 1738 (2010). 
10 NAT’L COLLECTIVE OF INDEP. WOMEN’S REFUGE, INC., REPRODUCTIVE COERCION IN AOTEAROA 
NEW ZEALAND 16 (2018), https://img.scoop.co.nz/media/pdfs/1810/Reproductive_Coercion_Study.pdf. 
11 Id. at 11.  
12 Id.  
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and mixed them all up. Told me “good 
luck.”13 
Then, there was another time I started 
using the Ring…and he pulled it out of 
me14 
          While the medical community has recognized reproductive co-
ercion as a prevalent and dangerous form of intimate partner violence, 
the legal community has given this issue very little attention. The lim-
itation of a women’s control over her reproductive health has been in-
creasingly recognized as a critical tool employed by abusers to main-
tain power and control over their victims.15  
 
Reproductive coercion is defined as a “male partner[’s] at-
tempts to promote pregnancy in their female partners through verbal 
pressure and threats to become pregnant (pregnancy coercion), direct 
interference with contraception (birth control sabotage), and threats 
and coercion related to pregnancy continuation or termination (control 
of pregnancy outcomes).”16 Common characteristic behaviors of re-
productive coercion include: attempts to impregnate a female partner 
against her wishes by methods of verbal threats to become pregnant, 
coercing a partner to have unprotected sex, sabotaging a partner’s at-
tempts to use birth control, and controlling the outcomes of a preg-
nancy.17 There are three major periods when reproductive coercion 
takes place: (1) pre-intercourse, in the form of pregnancy coercion, 
where the male partner uses verbal demands, threats and physical vio-
lence to put pressure on his partner to become pregnant; (2) during 
intercourse, in the form of birth control sabotage, where the male part-
ner uses direct acts to ensure a woman cannot use contraception or to 
render the contraception ineffective; and (3) post-intercourse, in the 
form of controlling pregnancy outcomes, where the male partner uses 
 
13 Id.   
14 Ann M. Moore et al., Male Reproductive Control of Women Who Have Experienced Intimate Partner 
Violence in the United States, 70 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1737, 1741 (2010). 
15 Elizabeth Miller et al., Pregnancy Coercion, Intimate Partner Violence and Unintended Pregnancy, 
81 CONTRACEPTION 316, 316 (2010). 
16 Sara A. McGirr et al., An Examination of Domestic Violence Advocates’ Responses to Reproductive 
Coercion, J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1, 2 (2017). 
17 Id. at 3.  
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threats or acts of violence to ensure a woman complies with his wishes 
regarding the decision to continue or terminate a pregnancy.18  
 
          This article will focus on the second period of reproductive co-
ercion, birth control sabotage. Birth control sabotage is defined as an 
“active interference with a partner’s contraceptive methods in an at-
tempt to promote pregnancy.”19 Such active interference may include 
behaviors such as “hiding, withholding, destroying, or removing fe-
male-controlled contraceptives (e.g. oral contraceptives, intrauterine 
devices, contraceptive patches), deliberately breaking or removing a 
condom during sex, or failing to withdraw in an attempt to promote 
pregnancy despite a female partner’s wishes to prevent pregnancy.”20  
 
          Throughout this article, the perpetrator/abuser is intentionally 
identified as male, and the victim/survivor as female. This choice is 
not intended to ignore experiences of men who have been misled or 
tricked into unwanted parenthood. Traditional cultural stereotypes 
have long recognized the tale of the “deranged” woman who pokes 
holes in her partner’s condoms, or misleads her partner into having 
unprotected sex on the basis that she was on the pill when she was not, 
in an attempt to trap her partner in the relationship.21 Reality, however, 
offers a different view: it is more often the male partner who attempts 
to trap his partner by tampering with her birth control methods.22 
 
18 AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMMITTEE OPINION NO. 554: REPRODUCTIVE 
AND SEXUAL COERCION 1 (2013); id. at 2; Miller et al., supra note 16, at 316; Moore et al., supra note 
14, at 1738.  
19 AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMMITTEE OPINION NO. 554: REPRODUCTIVE 
AND SEXUAL COERCION 1 (2013). 
20 McGirr et al., supra note 16, at 3.   
21 Rachel Camp, Coercing Pregnancy, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 275, 289 n.93 (2015); Nickeitta 
Leung, Education Not Handcuffs: A Response to Proposals for the Criminalization of Birth Control 
Sabotage, 15 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 146, 146 (2015). 
22 Nickeitta Leung, Education Not Handcuffs: A Response to Proposals for the Criminalization of Birth 
Control Sabotage, 15 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 146, 146 (2015); Press Release, 
Nat’l Domestic Violence Hotline, 1 in 4 Callers to the National Domestic Violence Hotline Reported 
Birth Control Sabotage and Pregnancy Coercion (Feb. 15, 2011) (“While there is a cultural assumption 
that some women use pregnancy as a way to trap their partner in a relationship, this survey shows that 
men who are abusive will sabotage their partner’s birth control and pressure them to become pregnancy 
as a way to trap or control their partner.”). This has also been depicted in pop culture and on television 
shows. In the first season of “Desperate Housewives,” Carlos and Gabby cannot agree on whether or not 
to have a child. Carlos, wanting to be a father, replaces Gaby’s birth control pills with sugar pills, caus-
ing Gabby to become pregnant and eventually lose the baby. Desperate Housewives: Fear No More 
(ABC television broadcast May 1, 2005). Five seasons later, Carlos tricked Gabby into getting pregnant 
again when he lied about having a vasectomy. Desperate Housewives: Mirror Mirror (ABC television 
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Additionally, the prevalence of reproductive coercion and the resulting 
harms are particularly unique to women. It is the woman, not the man, 
who ultimately becomes pregnant and has to bear the child as a result 
of birth control sabotage. The impact on a woman’s physical health, 
financial position, dignity, reproductive autonomy, safety, and long-
term stability compels identifying birth control sabotage as primarily 
a female experience.23 
 
          This article hopes to foster recognition of birth control sabotage 
as a form of domestic violence, and argues that all states have the re-
sponsibility to take the initial step to combat birth control sabotage in 
the realm of domestic violence by codifying birth control sabotage as 
a form of domestic violence within their domestic violence statues. 
Further, this article argues that states should take an additional step to 
criminalize birth control sabotage as its own stand-alone statute.  
 
          Part I of this article will explore the connection between birth 
control sabotage and intimate partner violence. This section will argue 
that birth control sabotage is a major part of intimate partner violence 
and will review the various studies linking birth control sabotage and 
intimate partner violence. The data will show just how rampant birth 
control sabotage is within the dynamics of an abusive relationship. 
This section will also discuss why such methods of birth control sabo-
tage are employed by abusers, and the lasting effects and harms it be-
falls on female victims.  
 
          Part II of this article will argue the importance of states’ statu-
tory recognition of birth control sabotage as a form of domestic vio-
lence. It will analyze the domestic violence statutes of all fifty states 
to determine whether birth control sabotage falls within current do-
mestic violence statutes or whether new language needs be incorpo-
rated within these statutes to include birth control sabotage as a form 
 
broadcast Oct. 26, 2008). In the second season of “Weeds,” Silas and Megan’s relationship is threatened 
when Megan gets accepted into Princeton and anticipates moving across the country. In an attempt to 
prevent Megan from leaving for college, Silas pokes holes in their condoms. Weeds: Last Tango in 
Agrestic (Showtime television broadcast Aug. 28, 2006). 
23 Rachel Camp, Coercing Pregnancy, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 275, 290 (2015); Shane M. 
Trawick, Birth Control Sabotage as Domestic Violence: A Legal Response, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 721, 724 
(2012). 
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of domestic violence. This section will advocate that birth control sab-
otage need be incorporated within the domestic violence statutes of all 
states, as it does not explicitly fit into the crimes currently included in 
domestic violence statutes.  
 
          Part III of this article advocates for the enactment of a separate 
criminal statute to combat birth control sabotage. This section will con-
sider the need for states to adopt a standalone criminal statute for birth 
control sabotage. This section will offer a critique of two proposed 
model statutes and assess the feasibility of their adoption to protect 
victims of intimate partner violence. 
 
I. The Link Between Intimate Partner Violence and Birth Con-
trol Sabotage 
 
A. Prevalence of Birth Control Sabotage in Violent Intimate 
Partner Relationships 
 
One in four women in the United States has experienced or will 
experience some form of intimate partner violence in their lifetime.24 
Intimate partner violence is defined as “physical violence, sexual vio-
lence, stalking, and psychological aggression (including coercive acts) 
by a current or former intimate partner.”25 Numerous studies have 
found serious adverse effects of intimate partner violence on women’s 
reproductive health, including unwanted pregnancy, rapid repeat preg-
nancy, contraction of sexually transmitted diseases, miscarriages, and 
abortion.26 Reproductive coercion, particularly birth control sabotage, 
is a concept that helps explain the link between intimate partner vio-
lence and negative reproductive health outcomes of victims.27 Studies 
have shown a correlation between reproductive coercion and intimate 
 
24 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NATIONAL 
INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2016 SUMMARY REPORT INFOGRAPHIC (2017), 
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/NISVS-infographic-2016.pdf.  
25 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, INTIMATE 
PARTNER VIOLENCE SURVEILLANCE: UNIFORM DEFINITIONS AND RECOMMENDED DATA ELEMENTS 
(2015), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/ipv/intimatepartnerviolence.pdf.  
26 McGirr et al., supra note 16, at 1–2; Miller et al., supra note 15; Moore et al., supra note 14, at 1737.  
27 Miller, supra note 1.  
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partner violence.28 Women who experience reproductive coercion 
have increased odds of experiencing intimate partner violence; and 
women who experience intimate partner violence are more likely to 
also experience reproductive coercion.29  
 
          The prevalence of birth control sabotage within the context of 
intimate partner violence is a topic which has garnered great attention 
from the medical community for some time. In one of many studies 
conducted by Dr. Miller, a sample of sixty one adolescent females, 
between the ages of fourteen and twenty years old, with known histo-
ries intimate partner violence, were interviewed.30 Of the sixty-one fe-
male adolescents interviewed, fourteen females reported their abusive 
male partners tried to get them pregnant through interference with their 
contraceptive methods.31 In another study by Dr. Miller involving 
1319 family planning clinic patients, 53.4% of the sample reported 
having experienced intimate partner violence, and 15% of the sample 
experienced birth control sabotage.32 Out of the 191 women who re-
ported birth control sabotage, 151 (79%) women also reported intimate 
partner violence.33 In another study conducted by Jody Raphael, using 
surveys completed by 474 teen mothers who experienced intimate 
partner violence, 66% of the sample reported experiencing birth con-
trol sabotage by their partner.34  
 
A study conducted by Heike Theil de Bocanegra showed that 
over half of the fifty three women at four domestic violence shelters in 
the San Francisco area reported reproductive coercion and birth con-
trol sabotage.35 Twenty-one of these women reported being told not to 
use birth control, while in half of those cases, their partners prevented 
them from obtaining birth control prescriptions or refilling their 
 
28 Karen Trister Grace & Jocelyn C. Anderson, Reproductive Coercion: A Systematic Review, 19 
TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 371, 371 (2018). 
29 Id.; see Miller et al., supra note 15, at 382.  
30 Elizabeth Miller et al., Male Partner Pregnancy-Promoting Behaviors and Adolescent Partner Vio-
lence: Findings from a Qualitative Study with Adolescent Females, 7 AMBULATORY PEDIATRICS 360, 
361 (2007). 
31 Id. at 362–63.   
32 Miller et al., supra note 15, at 318.  
33 Id. at 319.  
34 Jody Raphael, Teens Having Babies: The Unexplored Role of Domestic Violence, 12 PREVENTION 
RESEARCHER 15, 17 (2005). 
35 Heike Thiel de Bocanegra et al., Birth Control Sabotage and Forced Sex: Experiences Reported by 
Women in Domestic Violence Shelters, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 601, 605–06 (2010). 
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existing prescriptions.36 In addition, eleven women reported having to 
conceal their birth control use from their partner.37 Lastly, in a survey 
of 3,000 callers to the National Domestic Violence Hotline, 25% of 
callers reported having experienced reproductive coercion: their part-
ners would either prohibit them from using birth control or sabotage 
their birth control methods.38 
 
B. Aims of Abusers Employing Birth Control Sabotage Meth-
ods 
 
Based on all of these findings, it is apparent that birth control 
sabotage has become a common tool of intimate partner violence. In 
combatting this action, it is important to understand the reasons abus-
ers choose to employ this method of abuse. The underlying dynamic 
in the intimate partner violence relationship is often the abuser utiliz-
ing a number of tactics in an attempt to create vulnerabilities in his 
victim, as well as to achieve power and coercive control over his vic-
tim.39 In short, birth control sabotage is just another variation of an 
abuser’s exercise of domination and control over his victim.40 
 
          A woman’s use of birth control and contraception is linked to 
her right to own her physical self and be free from bodily control, mas-
tery, or possession by another.41 As domestic violence is about owner-
ship and control, birth control sabotage directly allows a perpetrator to 
eliminate a victim’s self-ownership, thereby exercising his ownership 
and control over the victim.42 While birth control sabotage can be done 
without the direct use of violence, it falls within the broad categories 
of behaviors that are defined as coercive control.43 Coercive control 
includes acts that “create or exploit conditions that leave the woman 
vulnerable to control; undermine the woman’s resistance by depleting 
 
36 Id. at 605.   
37 Id.   
38 Press Release, Nat’l Domestic Violence Hotline, 1 in 4 Callers to the National Domestic Violence 
Hotline Reported Birth Control Sabotage and Pregnancy Coercion (Feb. 15, 2011). 
39 Grace & Anderson, supra note 28.  
40 Shane M. Trawick, Birth Control Sabotage as Domestic Violence: A Legal Response, 100 CALIF. L. 
REV. 721, 732 (2012). 
41 Leah A. Plunkett, Contraceptive Sabotage, 28 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 97, 112–13 (2014). 
42 Id. at 112.  
43 Rachel Camp, Coercing Pregnancy, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 275, 286–87 (2015). 
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her tangible, social, or personal resources; and establish and exploit 
her emotional dependency.”44 
 
          Birth control sabotage falls within the category of exploitive and 
dependency-making behaviors that constitute coercive control. Abus-
ers use the possibility of pregnancy as a means of control in order to 
dominate their victims and prevent them from not only leaving, but 
also from engaging in other romantic relationships, led by the belief 
that their pregnant female partners would be viewed as less desirable 
to other men.45 The abuser is “marking” a victim as his, believing that 
the visual of a pregnant stomach is an obvious indication that the 
woman is involved in an intimate relationship.46 
 
          Additionally, abusers use birth control sabotage and pregnancy 
as a means to confine or “trap” their partners in the relationship and 
claim ownership over them.47 Studies show that, once pregnant, the 
victim is more vulnerable to violence as pregnant women experience 
abuse more frequently and more severely than women who experience 
abuse before pregnancy.48 Pregnant women may also experience in-
creased financial, emotional, and physical dependence, which may be 
exploited by her abuser in an effort to more easily and effectively dom-
inate and control his partner.49 In sum, regardless of the means of birth 
control sabotage, an abuser’s aim in employing birth control sabotage 
is the same as employing any other means of intimate partner violence: 
to maintain power and control over his victim. 
 
C. Effects of Birth Control Sabotage on Women 
 
The obvious harm on a woman victimized by birth control vi-
olence is an unwanted pregnancy and child, but this is just a drop in 
the bucket in regard to harms women face when experiencing birth 
 
44 Id. at 287.  
45 Trawick, supra note 40, at 730; see also Moore et al., supra note 14, at 1740 (“In a number if situa-
tions, the abusive partner was being sent to prison and his stated reason for wanted to make his partner 
pregnant was if she were pregnant, he saw less chance of her leaving him while he was imprisoned be-
cause she would be seen as less desirable by other men and invested in maintaining a relationship with 
the father of the child.”). 
46 Camp, supra note 43, at 287–88.  
47 Id. at 287.  
48 Id. at 291–92.  
49 Id. at 287.  
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control sabotage. As stated above, women who experience abuse in 
their relationships are vulnerable to intensified abuse during preg-
nancy.50 Such increased abuse can have significant harms on both the 
mother and her child.51 These harms include low birth weight, anemia, 
infections as well as psychological consequences including depression 
and anxiety.52 
 
          Further, birth control sabotage is a direct attack on a woman’s 
right to self-ownership and female autonomy and disrupts her self-
identity.53 This autonomy involves not only the choice of partners with 
whom to engage in sexual conduct, but also the right to control the 
circumstances and character of that sexual contact.54 When a woman 
experiences pregnancy under conditions imposed on her rather than 
chosen by her, a women’s authority to construct pregnancy and moth-
erhood for herself is stolen.55 Such theft can be extremely damaging to 
a woman’s basic sense of self, “for this denial of decision making di-
vides women from their wombs and uses their wombs for purposes 
unrelated to women’s own aspiration.”56 This theft limits or eliminates 
a victim’s ability to make informed choices regarding her physical and 
reproductive health, as well as the choices regarding the future she en-
visioned for herself.57 This detrimental attack not only impacts a sur-
vivor’s dignity, but her mental and physical health, her financial sta-
bility, and further entangles her and her child into a violent 
relationship.58  
 
II. Recognition of Birth Control Sabotage as Domestic Violence 
 
          The frequency of birth control sabotage within the dynamics of 
violent intimate partner relationships calls for statutory recognition of 
the act as a form of domestic violence. In order to create an adequate 
 
50 Id. at 291–92.  
51 Id. at 294.  
52 Id.  
53 Trawick, supra note 40, at 724.  
54 Athena Katsampes, A Rape by Any Other Name? The Problem of Defining Acts of Protection Decep-
tion and the University Solution, 24 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 157, 173 (2017). 
55 Camp, supra note 43, at 298.  
56 Id. at 299.   
57 See Katsampes, supra note 54, at 172.  
58 Trawick, supra note 40, at 724.  
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legal response, lawmakers need to recognize the interplay between do-
mestic violence and birth control sabotage. By incorporating birth con-
trol sabotage into domestic violence statutes, lawmakers can create av-
enues for domestic violence survivors to get needed legal relief for 
themselves and their children.59 This section will explore current do-
mestic violence statutes and how birth control sabotage might fit 
within those laws. This analysis will show that birth control sabotage 
is not readily prosecutable under current laws and will emphasize the 
need for states to incorporate language specific to birth control sabo-
tage as a crime with unique characteristics and harms.  
 
A. Survey of State Domestic Violence Definitions and Statutes. 
 
 
While the data shows that birth control sabotage is a prevalent 
tool of domestic violence, to date no state law has addressed reproduc-
tive coercion or birth control sabotage.60 Through examination of the 
domestic violence/domestic abuse statutes of every state, I found that 
the statutes fall into one of two categories. The first category of do-
mestic violence statutes focuses on injury/acts of violence by generally 
defining domestic violence through acts of assault, endangerment, co-
ercion, placing the victim in reasonable apprehension of serious bodily 
injury, kidnapping, and harassment.61 The second category of domes-
tic violence is more of an umbrella provision which offers broader def-
initions of domestic violence to include acts outside of force and vio-
lence.62 These statutes include acts of violence, as well as trespassing, 
menacing behavior, destruction or theft of property, unauthorized dis-
semination of private images, and interference with freedom.63 Within 
 
59 See Jane K. Stoever, Access to Safety and Justice: Service of Process in Domestic Violence Cases, 94 
WASH. L. REV. 333, 346–47 (2019). While this article focuses on criminal remedies, the incorporation 
of birth control sabotage within domestic violence statutes will allow victims of domestic violence to 
receive both criminal and civil legal remedies. Namely, such incorporation will be especially helpful for 
victim’s seeking protective orders under the civil system. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Pro-
tection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1503–04 (2008) (noting that civil protective orders are the “most effective 
legal remedy against domestic violence”).  
60 Domestic Violence/Domestic Abuse Definitions and Relationships, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. 
(June 13, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/domestic-violence-domestic-abuse-defi-
nitions-and-relationships.aspx#1.  
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
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these categories some statutes include provisions covering theft or de-
struction of personal property as well as sexual assault or offences.64 
 
64 Id. In Figure 1 below, I have created a chart from my survey of state domestic violence statutes.  
Figure 1: 
State Statute Injury/Violence 
Focus 
Umbrella 
Provision 
Covers Per-
sonal Property 
Covers Sexual 
Assault 
      
Alabama ALA. CODE § 30-5-2  x x x 
Alaska ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990  x x  
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601  x x x 
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-302 - § 5-
26-309 
x    
California  CAL. FAM. CODE § 6203 x x  x 
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-101  x x x 
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b – 38a x    
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 10 § 1041  x x x 
District of Columbia D.C. CODE § 16-1001  x x  
Florida FLA. STAT. § 741.28 x   x 
Georgia GA. CODE  ANN. § 19-13-10 x    
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 x  x  x 
Idaho IDAHO CODE § 18-918 x    
Illinois 750  ILL. COMP. STAT. 60 § 103 x    
Indiana  IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1.3 x    
Iowa IOWA STAT. § 236.2 x    
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102 x    
Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 x   x 
Louisiana LA.  STAT. ANN. § 46:2132  x  x 
Maine ME. STAT. TIT. 19-A § 4002  x  x 
Maryland MD. FAMILY CODE § 4-501 x   x 
Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS 209A § 1 x    
Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS  § 750.81 x    
Minnesota MINN. STAT. § 518 x   x 
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 x   x 
Missouri MO. REV. STAT. § 455.010 x    
Montana  MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206 x    
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-323 x    
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.018 x  x x 
New Hampshire N.H. REV.  STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1  x x x 
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19 x   x 
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 x  x x 
New York  N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812 x  x  
North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1 x   x 
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01 x   x 
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 x   x 
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. TIT. 22 § 60.1 x    
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. § 107.705 x   x 
Pennsylvania 23 PENN. CONS. STAT. § 6102 x   x 
Rhode Island 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1 x   x 
South Carolina S.C. CODE  ANN. § 20-4-20 x   x 
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS  
§ 25-10-1 
x    
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601 x  x  
Texas TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.004 x   x 
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-102 x    
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          A significant majority of states fall within the first category, fo-
cusing their domestic violence statutes on acts of violence and acts 
causing injury.65 Some states such as California and Hawaii also in-
corporate some kind of catch-all language.66 A small minority of states 
fall within the second category, creating a larger umbrella of domestic 
violence. Within both categories, some states define coercion, within 
their definitions of domestic violence, as compelling a person through 
force, threat of force, or intimidation to engage in conduct which the 
person has the right or privilege to abstain from.67 A little more than 
half of states, falling within either category, include sexual assault 
within their domestic violence definitions;68 while a small minority of 
states also cover destruction or theft of personal property.69 These var-
iances bring about the possibility of fitting birth control sabotage 
within the current domestic framework. As will be shown, any attempt 
to do so is ultimately unavailing.  
 
B. Birth Control Sabotage as Sexual Assault  
 
While there have been no cases in the United States recogniz-
ing birth control sabotage as sexual assault, Canada has addressed this 
topic, namely the action of condom removal during intercourse.70 In R 
v. Hutchinson, the defendant, Hutchinson, was found guilty of 
 
Vermont  VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 15 § 1101 x   x 
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 x   x 
Washington WASH. REV. CODE § 10.99.020 x  x x 
West Virginia W.VA. CODE § 48-27-202 x   x 
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. § 968-075 x   x 
Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN. 35-21-103 x   x 
 
65 Id.  
66 CAL. FAM. CODE § 6203(b) (2019) (“Abuse is not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or 
assault”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1(2) (2019) (“Any act which would constitute an offense under sec-
tion 709-906”). 
67 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-101(2) (2019) (“‘[C]oercion’ includes compelling a person by force, threat 
of force, or intimidation to engage in conduct from which the person has the right or privilege to abstain, 
or to abstain from conduct in which the person has a right or privilege to engage.”); ME. STAT. tit. 19-A 
§ 4002(C) (2019) (“Compelling a person by force, threat of force or intimidation to engage in conduct 
from which the person has a right or privilege to abstain or to abstain from conduct in which the person 
has a right to engage[.]”); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.010(1)(c) (2019) (“‘Coercion’, compelling another by 
force or threat of force to engage in conduct from which the latter has a right to abstain or to abstain 
from conduct in which the person has a right to engage.”). 
68 See Domestic Violence/Domestic Abuse Definitions and Relationships, supra note 60.  
69 See id.  
70 R. v. Hutchinson, [2010], 286 N.S.R. 2d 331, para. 1 (Can. N.S.C.A.). 
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aggravated sexual assault for pricking holes in condoms prior to inter-
course.71 The defendant confessed to the victim that he “wanted a baby 
with [her] so bad [that he] sabotaged the condoms.”72 As a result of the 
sabotaged condoms, the victim became pregnant, chose to terminate 
the pregnancy, and experienced infection, extreme bleeding, and se-
vere pain as a result.73 The trial court granted the defendant’s motion 
for a directed verdict of acquittal, but the Nova Scotia Court of Appeals 
reversed, holding that the facts presented justified the defendant’s con-
viction for aggravated sexual assault.74  
 
The court outlined the three elements for actus reus of sexual 
assault: (1) touching, (2) sexual nature of the touching, and (3) absence 
of consent.75 The Court then examined two key statutes regarding con-
sent: the first applying to assaults generally,76 and the second applying 
only to sexual assaults.77 The Court found that the words “voluntary 
agreement . . . to engage the in sexual activity in question” in § 273.1, 
meant more than consent to the use of force under § 265.78 By sabo-
taging the condoms, the defendant altered the nature of the sexual ac-
tivity in question and, as a result, the victim’s consent could not have 
been reasonably informed and freely exercised.79 Based on this inter-
pretation, the Court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that 
the victim in this case consented to the application of force, while sim-
ultaneously finding an absence of consent to the actual sexual activity 
which took place: unprotected sexual intercourse.80 Accordingly, this 
lack of consent led to a finding of aggravated sexual assault as the 
pregnancy created grave bodily harm for the victim.81 
 
71 Id. at para. 25.  
72 Id. at para. 6.  
73 Id. at para. 8–9.  
74 Id. at para. 16, 38–40.   
75 Id. at para. 21; Trawick, supra note 40 at 724.  
76 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46 § 265(3) (Can.) (“(3) For the purposes of this section, no consent 
is obtained where the complainant submits or does not resist by reason of (a) the application of force to 
the complainant or to a person other than the complainant; (b) threats or fear of the application of force 
to the complainant or to a person other than the complainant; (c) fraud; or (d) the exercise of author-
ity.”). 
77 Id. § 273.1 (“(1) Subject to subsection (2) and subsection 265(3), consent means . . . the voluntary 
agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question.”). 
78 Hutchinson, [2010], 286 N.S.R. 2d at para. 34. 
79 Id. at para. 38.  
80 Id. at para. 37–38.  
81 Id. at para. 1.  
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          Here, in the United States, some have called for birth control 
sabotage, specifically the acts of condom removal during intercourse 
without the partner’s permission or knowledge and pricking holes in 
condoms, to be charged as sexual assault under existing statutory 
frameworks.82 Advocates argue that such actions vitiate consent as the 
victim has only consented to intercourse when a condom is used.83 
While this call is appropriate, issues arise when trying to categorize 
birth control sabotage as sexual assault. First, and most importantly, a 
majority of state statutes either do not define consent, or, those that do, 
limit the notion of consent to the use of force.84 Additionally, prose-
cuting birth control sabotage as sexual assault only covers one form of 
birth control sabotage and ignores the actions of tampering with, de-
stroying, hiding, or stealing a women’s birth control methods. 
 
          The Hutchinson interpretation of birth control sabotage would 
be an unworkable framework if adopted by the United States. In reach-
ing its finding, the Hutchinson Court broadened its interpretation of 
consent beyond strictly applying to sexual intercourse.85 In doing so, 
it extended consent to apply to the specific type of sexual intercourse, 
therefore a sexual partner could consent to intercourse but not consent 
to unprotected intercourse.86 Unfortunately, such interpretation does 
not fit within United States jurisprudence as many states do not define 
consent in their statutes, and a majority of those that do rely on the idea 
that consent only applies to the sexual act itself.87 Without this broad-
ening of the definition of consent beyond the use of force, charging 
birth control sabotage as sexual assault is ultimately unworkable.  
C. Birth Control Sabotage and Destruction or Theft of Per-
sonal Property 
 
Another approach may be attempting to fit birth control sabo-
tage, specifically the actions of stealing, destroying, or hiding birth 
 
82 See Alexandra Brodsky, “Rape-Adjacent”: Imagining Legal Responses to Nonconsensual Condom 
Removal, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 183, 183–84 (2017). 
83 Id. at 190.  
84 Trawick, supra note 40, at 748.   
85 Id. at 750.  
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 746–47 (2012); see also Note, Acquaintance Rape and Degrees of Consent: “No” Means “No,” 
but What Does “Yes” Mean?, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2341, 2346 (2004). 
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control methods, within the crimes of destruction or theft of personal 
property. Unfortunately, despite some domestic violence statutes in-
cluding such causes of action, this is a nonviable route. First, many of 
these statutes have specific requirements of what types of personal 
property are considered to equate to theft and it is unlikely that birth 
control methods would not be covered.88 Additionally, prosecuting 
birth control sabotage through destruction or theft of personal property 
only covers a subset of birth control sabotage actions which leaves 
other actions, such as condom removal and poking holes in condoms, 
unactionable.  
 
          While a few state statutes do include theft or destruction of prop-
erty within their domestic violence definitions, such statutes have 
monetary value thresholds that must be met to be considered personal 
property.89 Within Washington’s domestic violence statute,90 mali-
cious mischief in the first, second, and third degrees offer redress for 
destruction of property in conjunction with domestic violence.91 
Within each degree of malicious mischief, the statutes criminalize the 
knowing and malicious destruction of property of another in the 
amount of five thousand dollars (first degree)92 or seven hundred and 
fifty dollars (second degree).93 The third degree of malicious mischief 
is a catch-all, including knowing and malicious destruction of property 
of another, “under circumstances not amounting to malicious mischief 
in the first or second degree.”94 Similarly, New York’s domestic vio-
lence statute includes grand larceny in the third and fourth degrees.95 
New York’s grand larceny statutes require values of property that ex-
ceed one thousand (fourth degree)96 and three thousand (third degree)97 
dollars. Further, other statutes, such as New Mexico’s, limit such 
 
88 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2(2)(f) (2019) (defining domestic abuse as including criminal 
damage to property); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-15-1 (2019) (allowing damage to property to fall 
within the domestic violence statute but only as a petty misdemeanor unless the value of the damaged 
property exceeds one thousand dollars).  
89 25 AM. JUR. 2D Domestic Abuse and Violence § 2 (2019). 
90 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.99.020 (2019). 
91 Id. §§ 9A.48.070–48.090.  
92 Id. § 9A.48.070(1)(a).  
93 Id. § 9A.48.080(1)(a).  
94 Id. § 9A.48.090(1)(a).   
95 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812 (2019).  
96 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.30(1) (2019). 
97 Id. § 155.35(1).  
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actions to criminal damage to property.98 Criminal damage to property 
“consists of intentionally damaging any real or personal property of 
another without the consent of the owner” and is only a petty misde-
meanor unless the value of the damaged property exceeds one thou-
sand dollars.99  
 
          Based on these cost limitations, it is unlikely that the destruction 
or theft of birth control methods could not be prosecuted under these 
laws. While the costs of birth control methods vary based on type, 
brand, and insurance, it is inconceivable that they would meet the 
amounts required under these statutes. According to the U.S. News and 
World Report and the American Pregnancy Association, the yearly 
costs of birth control methods include: $360 to $420 for the NuvaRing, 
$20 to $800 for birth control pills, $0 to $1,300 for an intrauterine de-
vice, and $360 to $420 for the birth control patch.100 Based on these 
estimates, it is obvious that, besides the intrauterine device,101 theft or 
destruction of a partner’s birth control methods could not be prose-
cuted under existing domestic violence laws. 
 
D. Need to Recognize Birth Control Sabotage as an Independ-
ent Form of Domestic Violence 
Based on the above analysis, it is clear that birth control sabo-
tage does not fit within current domestic violence statutes. Therefore, 
all states need to take the first step of incorporating additional language 
in their domestic violence statutes to include birth control sabotage as 
its own cause of action. States should do this by including birth control 
sabotage within their list of crimes that count as domestic violence and 
also include a definitional component of birth control sabotage to ac-
company the statute.102 I suggest states use two sources in creating this 
 
98 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2(2)(f) (2019). 
99 Id. § 30-15-1.  
100 Susannah Snider, The Cost of Birth Control, U.S. NEWS: MONEY (May 2, 2019), https://money.us-
news.com/money/personal-finance/family-finance/articles/the-cost-of-birth-control. 
101 If an intrauterine device was torn out of the female partner, there would be more severe criminal stat-
utes available, such as assault, rendering the need to prosecute under theft and destruction obsolete. See 
VA. CODE. § 16.1-228 (2019). 
102 An example of such an inclusion would be as follows, pulling from VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 
(2019):  
“Family abuse” means any act involving violence, force, or threat that results in 
bodily injury or places one in reasonable apprehension of death, sexual assault, or 
bodily injury and that is committed by a person against such person's family or 
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definition of birth control sabotage. The first source is the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologist’s (ACOG) definition of 
birth control sabotage. The second source is Shawn Trawick’s pro-
posed model statute to accompany the ACOG’s definition and provide 
guidance of what acts of birth control sabotage would include. Below 
is an example of this definitional component: 
 
“Birth Control Sabotage” means an “active interference with a 
partner’s contraceptive methods in an attempt to promote preg-
nancy.”103 Acts of Birth Control Sabotage include: 
 
a) knowingly or recklessly tampers with 
a chemical or barrier  
contraceptive device, against his or her 
sexual partners will, with the specific in-
tent of inducing pregnancy; or, 
 
b) knowingly or recklessly fails to with-
draw, or cooperate with withdrawal, be-
fore ejaculation with the specific intent 
of inducing pregnancy. Subsection 
(1)(b) shall apply only if both parties 
have agreed in advance that the male 
shall withdraw prior to ejaculation and 
the female has agreed in advance to co-
operate with withdrawal.104 
 
This definition is recommended because it includes a definition 
of the act created by the ACOG, and also provides guidance as to what 
an “active interference” includes.105 Following the ACOG’s definition 
of birth control sabotage is preferable because it categorizes birth con-
trol sabotage as a subset within the larger category of reproductive 
 
household member. Such act includes, but is not limited to, any forceful detention, 
stalking, criminal sexual assault in violation of Article 7 (§ 18.2-61 et seq.) of Chap-
ter 4 of Title 18.2, [birth control sabotage in violation of Article x (§ 18.2-x)], or 
any criminal offense that results in bodily injury or places one in reasonable appre-
hension of death, sexual assault, or bodily injury. 
103 Plunkett, supra note 41, at 141–43.  
104 Trawick, supra note 40, at 755.  
105 Plunkett, supra note 41, at 104.  
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coercion and assists in developing a principled legal response that pro-
motes consistency between medical and legal professionals.106 This 
consistency is best because professionals in the medical field have 
been exploring this phenomenon for some time and can assist the legal 
community in gaining insight and understanding of the prevalence of 
and harms created by birth control sabotage. Additionally, this pro-
posed statute covers the acts that would fit within the definition and 
the mental states required for acts of birth control sabotage to be an 
“active interference.”107 Subsection (1)(a) encompasses acts such as 
poking holes in condoms, stealing or hiding birth control pills, rings, 
intrauterine devices, and patches, and replacing birth control pills with 
placebo or sugar pills.108 Though this subsection does not explicitly 
state these actions, it allows just enough room for interpretation re-
garding other acts not mentioned without creating an all-encompassing 
definition. Subsection (1)(b) specifically covers the act of failure to 
withdraw before ejaculation when withdrawal is the agreed upon 
method of birth control.109 Both of these sections require the acts to be 
committed knowingly or recklessly and with the intention of inducing 
pregnancy.110 These requirements fall squarely within the meaning of 
active interference and support the definition created by the ACOG. 
 
III. Birth Control Sabotage as a Stand-Alone Crime  
 
While birth control sabotage is a much more a common occur-
rence in the context of violent intimate partner relationships, it also 
exists in non-violent sexual relationships.111 Recognition of birth con-
trol as a widespread but widely ignored problem has led some scholars 
to advocate for a stand-alone criminal statute to address birth control 
 
106 Id. at 105.  
107 Id. at 104.  
108 See Trawick, supra note 40, at 755. Subsection (1)(a) states, “1. A person is guilty of the crime of re-
productive coercion if he or she: a) knowingly or recklessly tampers with a chemical or barrier contra-
ceptive device, against his or her sexual partner’s will, with the specific intent of inducing pregnancy[.]” 
109 Id. Subsection (1)(b) states the following: 
2. knowingly or recklessly fails to withdraw, or cooperate with withdrawal, before 
ejaculation with the specific intent of inducing pregnancy. Subsection (1)(b) shall 
apply only if both parties have agreed in advance that the male shall withdraw prior 
to ejaculation and the female has agreed in advance to cooperate with withdrawal. 
110 Id.  
111 Miller et al., supra note 15, at 320.  
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sabotage.112 This approach of criminalization of birth control sabotage 
would be beneficial to both victims and society as a whole. 
 
A. Arguments for Criminalization 
 
The additional criminalization of birth control sabotage will 
help protect the victim from further abuse as bringing birth control 
sabotage into the criminal law realm would allow convictions to result 
in incarceration.113 The incarceration of an abuser would secure the 
protection of a victim and her potential child from her abuser.114 The 
forced separation of a victim and abuser, caused by incarceration, 
would give the victim time to make arrangements to leave or further 
escape her abuser, without the worry of her abuser showing up or tak-
ing actions to further restrict her from leaving.115 Further, putting a 
stop to an abuser’s actions of birth control sabotage will help the victim 
regain her reproductive autonomy and repair the dignity violations she 
has suffered as result of her abuser’s actions.116  
  
Additionally, as the central purpose of “criminal law is to reg-
ulate human behavior to reflect society’s condemnation of certain ac-
tions,” criminalizing birth control sabotage signals to society that these 
actions are morally reprehensible and intolerable.117 This symbolic 
function would send the message that the act of birth control sabotage 
violates acceptable societal norms.118 Further, such criminalization 
emphasizes that birth control sabotage and violence are public and so-
cietal problems, instead of private, individual problems.119 Moreover, 
this signaling will clarify acts for victims. While many women feel 
some kind of violation or harm as a result of birth control sabotage, 
many do not know what to call the harm, nor do they have a name for 
the practice.120 Criminalizing birth control sabotage would assist vic-
tims in identifying the practice and validate the harm they experience. 
 
112 Plunkett, supra note 41, at 98; Trawick, supra note 40, at 746.  
113 Trawick, supra note 40, at 745–46.   
114 Id.  
115 Id.  
116 Id. at 745.  
117 Id. at 746.  
118 Katsampes, supra note 54, at 180–81.   
119 Trawick, supra note 41, at 754.   
120 Brodsky, supra note 82 (“Their stories often start the same way: “I’m not sure this is rape, but…”’). 
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Finally, distinguishing birth control sabotage as its own crime would 
avoid the confusion of trying to fit the act within an already established 
crime, such as theft or sexual assault, which as discussed above, is un-
workable. 
 
B. Leah Plunkett’s Proposed Model Statute 
 
In one of few calls on the legal community to address the prob-
lem of birth control sabotage, Professor Leah Plunkett offers a pro-
posed addition to the Model Penal Code which could serve as a model 
for states to adopt for the offense of birth control sabotage: 
 
It is unlawful for an individual: 
 
(1) with the purpose of inducing 
pregnancy in a sexual partner 
who he or she knows uses or 
plans to use a contraceptive de-
vice or medication to decrease 
the risk of pregnancy resulting 
from sexual intercourse 
 
(2) with the knowledge that his 
or her actions are practically cer-
tain to induce pregnancy in a 
sexual partner who he or she 
knows uses or plans to use a con-
traceptive device or medication 
to decrease the risk of pregnancy 
resulting from sexual inter-
course 
 
(3) who is aware of and ignores 
a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that his or her actions will 
induce pregnancy in a sexual 
partner whose use or planned 
use of a contraceptive device or 
medication to decrease the risk 
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of pregnancy resulting from sex-
ual intercourse he or she is aware 
of and ignores 
 
(4) who should have been aware 
of a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that his or her actions will 
induce pregnancy in a sexual 
partner whose use or planned 
use of a contraceptive device or 
medication to decrease the risk 
of pregnancy resulting from sex-
ual intercourse he or she should 
have been aware of 
 
[. . .] to engage in conduct that creates a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk of 
damaging, destroying, or otherwise ren-
dering ineffective the contraceptive de-
vice or medication resulting in a sexual 
partner becoming pregnant from sexual 
intercourse with that individual. 
 
 ‘Creates’ applies only to the degree of 
risk that sexual intercourse would result 
in pregnancy in a sexual partner that the 
defendant ‘knows/recklessly disregards 
a risk/should have known’ exceeds the 
degree the sexual partner established or 
planned to establish through use or 
planned use of contraception. That the 
sexual partner consented to the physical 
act of sexual intercourse itself is not a 
defense to the crime of contraceptive 
sabotage.121  
 
 
121 Plunkett, supra note 41, at 129–31.   
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          Plunkett’s proposed statute allows each state adopting the pro-
vision to decide which mental state is requisite to establish culpability 
for birth control sabotage.122 As birth control sabotage is an abuser’s 
attempt to possess control over his partner’s autonomy (through her 
reproductive capacity), Plunkett suggests that out of the four mental 
states provided in the Model Penal Code, the first three: purposely, 
knowingly, and recklessly, adequately cover such intent.123 However, 
the fourth mental state, negligence, would not be sufficient to establish 
culpability as it does not reflect the abuser’s intent to control and pos-
sess his victim.124 In addition to the requisite mental states, Plunkett’s 
proposed statute requires multiple elements to be satisfied in order for 
a court to a find birth control sabotage has taken place. The statute 
requires the perpetrator: (1) knowingly or intentionally disregard 
knowledge of their partner’s contraceptive use or planned use; (2) en-
gage in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct to damage, destroy, 
or render contraception ineffective; (3) have purposeful, knowing, or 
reckless intent to induce pregnancy; and (4) such acts result in the vic-
tim’s pregnancy.125  
 
           While Plunkett’s statute thoroughly reflects the mental states 
 
122 Id. at 131.  
123 Id. at 129–31 (2014); see MODE PENAL CODE § 2.02(2), stating, in part:  
(a) Purposely. A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an 
offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result 
thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause 
such a result; and (ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is 
aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. 
(b) Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an 
offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant 
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circum-
stances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware 
that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. (c) Recklessly. 
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element 
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree 
that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circum-
stances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of 
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.  
124 Plunkett, supra note 41, at 131; see MODE PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d), stating:  
(d) Negligently. A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an 
offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it, considering the nature and 
purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross de-
viation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the 
actor’s situation.  
125 Plunkett, supra note 41, at 133–36.  
124
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and actions required to establish culpability, states will be unlikely to 
adopt such a statute. First, Plunkett’s statute requires that a perpetra-
tor’s actions actually result in a pregnancy.126 As women, not men, are 
the only ones that can get pregnant, this statute only protects women 
from such actions of birth control sabotage.127 It is true that birth con-
trol sabotage is very unique to women as women are the main victims 
of the act and the pregnancy they suffer is a harm that only women can 
bear. However, the adoption of a statute that categorizes men as the 
perpetrators and women as the victims, will give rise to Equal Protec-
tion claims, which will likely dissuade states from adopting the stat-
ute.128 Additionally, Plunkett’s statute is too broad, as it does not de-
fine or provide examples of acts that would count as disregard of a 
partner’s contraceptive use or render birth control as ineffective.129 As 
a result, Plunkett’s terminology could include acts besides those in-
volving birth control sabotage. 
 
C. Shane Trawick’s Proposed Model Statute for Criminaliza-
tion of Birth Control Sabotage
 
Shane Trawick’s article Birth Control Sabotage as Domestic 
Violence: A Legal Response, was the first call to the legal community 
to act on this egregious conduct.130 In his call to action, Trawick pro-
posed a model statute for criminalization of birth control sabotage: 
 
1.A person is guilty of the crime of re-
productive coercion if he or she:  
 
a) knowingly or recklessly tam-
pers with a chemical or barrier 
contraceptive device, against his 
or her sexual partners will, with 
 
126 Id. at 129–30.  
127 Id. at 138.  
128 But see M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (a statutory rape law that punished only males for 
sleeping with underage women was not void on equal protection grounds, as the state had a strong inter-
est in preventing underage pregnancies). 
129 See generally Plunkett, supra note 41.  
130 See generally Trawick, supra note 40.  
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the specific intent of inducing 
pregnancy; or, 
 
b) knowingly or recklessly fails 
to withdraw, or cooperate with 
withdrawal, before ejaculation 
with the specific intent of induc-
ing pregnancy. Subsection 
(1)(b) shall apply only if both 
parties have agreed in advance 
that the male shall withdraw 
prior to ejaculation and the fe-
male has agreed in advance to 
cooperate with withdrawal. 
 
2.Consent to protected sexual inter-
course shall not be construed as consent 
to unprotected sexual intercourse. 
 
3.Past consent to unprotected sexual in-
tercourse, unprotected anal intercourse, 
unprotected oral sex, or other unpro-
tected sexual touching shall not consti-
tute current consent to unprotected sex-
ual intercourse. 
 
4.Consent to unprotected anal inter-
course, unprotected oral sex, or other 
unprotected sexual touching during the 
current or previous sexual transaction 
shall not constitute consent to unpro-
tected sexual intercourse. 
 
5.Attempted use of chemical contracep-
tives or a barrier method of birth control 
shall serve as evidence that the victim 
did not consent to unprotected sexual in-
tercourse.  
 
126
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6.A court shall consider all relevant ev-
idence, including evidence related to 
prior or simultaneous acts of domestic 
violence, in determining the occurrence 
of reproductive coercion.131 
          This article argues that Trawick’s proposed statute is the favor-
able option and could (and should) be implemented by states. First, 
similar to Plunkett’s statute, Trawick’s proposed statute incorporates 
the mental states of knowingly or recklessly which sufficiently capture 
an abuser’s intent to possess or control a victim’s autonomy.132 This 
statute also requires the specific intent of inducing pregnancy, which 
goes right to the heart of the ACOG’s definition of birth control sabo-
tage.133 
 
          Trawick’s statute narrowly defines and limits acts that could be 
deemed birth control sabotage to tampering with chemical or barrier 
contraceptives and failure to withdraw as agreed between partners, be-
fore ejaculation.134 The former would include stealing, hiding, or 
flushing birth control pills; removing intrauterine devices, rings or 
patches; poking holes in condoms, and removing condoms during in-
tercourse; as acts that would constitute contraceptive tampering.135 
This narrow definition allows states to address conduct at the heart of 
birth control sabotage epidemic without overreaching into the private 
decisions of individuals.  
 
          Under the proposed statute, both men and women can also be 
perpetrators and victims of birth control sabotage which effectively 
eliminates the risk of Equal Protection claims. Again, though birth 
control sabotage is primarily an act against women, including both 
men and women as perpetrators and victims, Trawick’s statute shields 
states from potential Equal Protection actions. This shield provides an 
 
131 Id. at 755.  
132 Id.  
133 Id.  
134 Id.  
135 Id. at 730.  
127
et al.: General Topics
Published by UR Scholarship Repository,
Do Not Delete 4/14/2020  1:16 PM 
118 RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW  [Vol. XXIII:iii 
 
incentive for states to adopt such birth control sabotage criminalization 
statutes. 
 
          Further, the statute addresses specialized issues of consent that 
most state sexual assault statutes lack. As discussed above, many states 
do not address consent in their sexual assault or rape statutes, outside 
consent to the use of force. This proposal, similar to the Canadian 
court’s finding in R. v. Hutchinson, allows courts to expand the notion 
of consent to include both consent to the sexual act itself, and consent 
to the manner of the sexual act.136  
 
          Lastly, the statute puts birth control sabotage within the context 
of domestic violence. Subsection 6 allows consideration of all relevant 
evidence related to prior or simultaneous acts of domestic violence 
when determining the occurrence of birth control sabotage.137 As this 
article argues, it is tremendously important to recognize birth control 
sabotage as a form of domestic violence. This subsection accomplishes 
this goal by effectively bringing birth control sabotage within the 
realm of domestic violence.138 States that adopt this statue can simply 
list birth control sabotage in their domestic violence statutes and refer-
ence this statute. Besides providing relief to women and men who are 
in violent intimate relationships experiencing birth control sabotage, 
this statute also offers relief to men and women who are not. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
          For over a decade medical professionals and domestic violence 
advocates have been researching the prevalence of birth control sabo-
tage as well as brainstorming and implementing responses in the 
healthcare field.139 To date, the legal community has failed to act on 
this harmful phenomenon in any manner. Within the last decade, there 
 
136 R. v. Hutchinson, [2010], 286 N.S.R. 2d 331, para. 37–38 (Can. N.S.C.A.); id. at 755.  
137 Trawick, supra note 40, at 755.  
138 Id.  
139 AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, supra note 19.  
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have only been a handful of articles by legal professionals calling on 
the legal community to act, and the response has been minimal to non-
existent.140 The high frequency of birth control sabotage, documented 
by medical professions, exhibits the dire need for a legal response. As 
shown, birth control sabotage is not a concept that can fit within any 
of the crimes currently on the books. Birth control sabotage is the theft 
and deprivation of a women’s autonomy and has unique and dire 
harms. As such, birth control sabotage needs to be treated differently; 
it needs to be treated as its own crime, simply because it is so distinct. 
This article calls on states to recognize the prevalence of this abhorrent 
act and to enact a legal remedy. As no state currently offers any viable 
route of redress, all states need to modify their domestic violence stat-
utes to include protections against birth control sabotage. Further, 
states should strongly consider criminalizing birth control sabotage in 
a stand-alone statute, namely Shane Trawick’s proposed statute. 
Whether including birth control sabotage in their domestic violence 
statutes or adopting a standalone statute, it is incumbent of all states to 
take the first step to address this growing problem. In doing so, states 
will not only give domestic violence victims a route to seek assistance 
but also will signal to society that this act is reprehensible and will not 
be tolerated. Most importantly, such actions will allow us to move 
closer to ending domestic violence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
140 See Brodsky, supra note 82, at 210; Camp, supra note 43, at 318; Katsampes, supra note 54, at 184; 
Nickeitta Leung, Education Not Handcuffs: A Response to Proposals for the Criminalization of Birth 
Control Sabotage, 15 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 146, 169 (2015); Plunkett, supra 
note 41, at 141–43; Trawick, supra note 40, at 760.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause of the United States 
Constitution prohibits the government from taking private property 
for public use, without paying the property owner just compensation. 
In 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States held in Koontz v. St. 
Johns River Water Management District that monetary exactions are 
subject to heightened scrutiny under the Nollan/Dolan “essential 
nexus” and “rough proportionality” test. This comment argues that 
time will reveal that Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion in Koontz 
was correct: monetary exactions are not unconstitutional conditions, 
subjecting monetary exactions to the Nollan/Dolan test is ultimately 
ineffective, and the Penn Central test should instead govern monetary 
exaction takings claims. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
           The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause of the United States Con-
stitution prohibits the government from taking private property for 
public use, without paying the property owner just compensation.1 So 
long as the government pays just compensation, it is authorized to ex-
ercise its eminent domain power pursuant to the public health, safety, 
morals, or welfare.2 In addition to physical takings, the Supreme Court 
of the United States has articulated several regulatory takings tests to 
determine when takings that demand just compensation occur.3 Unlike 
ordinary regulatory takings, which are subject to the three-part Penn 
Central balancing test,4 the Court held that land exactions are subject 
to heightened scrutiny under the Nollan/Dolan two-part “rough pro-
portionality” test in order to prevent the government from attaching 	
1 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
2 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). 
3 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992); Loretto v. Teleprompter Man-
hattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432 (1982); Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 124 
(1978). 
4 Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104.  
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unconstitutional conditions to land-use permits.5 In Koontz v. St. Johns 
River Water Management District, the Court extended the Nollan/Do-
lan framework to monetary exactions.6 
 
           Today, the Nollan/Dolan “rough proportionality” test governs 
cases where monetary exactions serve as the basis of takings claims.7 
In application, however, Fifth Amendment takings are rarely found 
when the government demands monetary payment in exchange for de-
velopment-permit approval. A review of the post-Koontz cases reveals 
that takings claims based on a monetary exactions are almost always 
unsuccessful under the Nollan/Dolan test.8 This imparts the lesson that, 
no matter how “heightened” the level of scrutiny, the regulatory tak-
ings framework for monetary exactions still tilts heavily in the govern-
ment’s favor, and that subjecting monetary exactions to the “rough 
proportionality” standard is ultimately ineffective. 
 
          The thesis of this comment is that time will reveal that Supreme 
Court Justice Elena Kagan’s dissenting opinion in Koontz, where she 
argued that monetary exactions should not be subject to the Nollan/Do-
lan “rough proportionality” test, was correct.9 Specifically, this com-
ment supports Justice Kagan’s argument that monetary exactions are 
not conditions requiring property owners to forfeit their constitutional 
right to just compensation, and thus do not violate the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine.10 
 
           Part I of this comment discusses the Koontz decision, including 
Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion. It then dissects the Nollan/Dolan 
two-part “rough proportionality” test and the alternative regulatory 
takings tests. Next, Part II describes relevant distinctions between real 
and personal property, explains the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine in the land-use context, and identifies the different perspectives 
on monetary exactions. Part III then analyzes lower court applications 	
5 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 622 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (ex-
plaining tests set forth in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) and Dolan v. City 
of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)). 
6 Id. at 612 (majority opinion). 
7 Id. at 599. 
8 Levin v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 71 F. Supp. 3d 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
9 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 483 (1987) (citing Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) (illustrating how dissenting opinions 
are sometimes adopted as the majority opinion in later Supreme Court cases). 
10 Koontz, 570 U.S. at 625–26 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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of the Supreme Court’s Koontz holding. Finally, Part IV concludes 
with reiterating that time will reveal that Justice Kagan’s dissenting 
opinion in Koontz—arguing that monetary exactions should not be 
subject to the “rough proportionality” test—was correct. 
 
I. Understanding Koontz & Alternative Regulatory Takings 
Tests 
 
A. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District 
 
1. Statement of Facts and Procedural History 
 
In Koontz v. St. Johns, the Supreme Court extended the appli-
cation of heightened scrutiny under the Nollan/Dolan two-part test to 
monetary exactions.11 
 
A Florida resident named Coy Koontz (“Koontz”) purchased 
14.9 acres of undeveloped land, in an area mostly classified as wet-
lands, the same year that the Florida legislature enacted the Water Re-
sources Act.12 The Act divided Florida into five Water Management 
Districts, and authorized the Districts to regulate construction that 
would impact the “waters in the state.”13 The Act required landowners 
to obtain a construction permit from their district, which was author-
ized to impose “reasonable conditions” to construction permits to en-
sure that construction would not damage the district’s water re-
sources.14 The Florida state legislature then passed the Henderson 
Wetlands Protection Act, which made it illegal to “dredge or fill in, on, 
or over the surface waters” without a Wetlands Resource Management 
Permit.15 St. Johns River Water Management District (“St. Johns”) re-
quired permit applicants seeking to construct on wetlands to offset en-
vironmental damage by creating, enhancing, or preserving wetlands 
elsewhere.16 
 
	
11 Id. at 612 (majority opinion). 
12 Id. at 599–600. 
13 Id. at 600. 
14 Id.  
15 Id. at 600–01. 
16 Id. at 601. 
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           St. Johns had jurisdiction over Koontz’s land.17 Koontz wanted 
to develop his property and sought a permit to dredge and fill about 
three acres of his parcel.18 To comply with Florida law, Koontz offered 
to give a conservation easement on another part of his land.19 St. Johns 
determined that Koontz’s proposal was insufficient to offset the envi-
ronmental impact of construction and instead demanded that Koontz 
either (1) reduce development on his property to one acre, deed a con-
servation easement on the remaining 13.9 acres of his property, and 
eliminate a dry-bed pond from his proposal and install a more expen-
sive subsurface storm-water system; or, (2) develop 3.7 acres of his 
land and hire a contractor to improve wetlands several miles away.20 
The latter option was a requirement to spend money rather than a re-
quirement to relinquish his property rights. Koontz rejected the coun-
teroffer and sued St. Johns, arguing that St. Johns’ mitigation demands 
failed the Nollan/Dolan “rough proportionality” test on the basis that 
St. Johns’ counteroffer was excessive compared to the potential envi-
ronmental impacts that his construction proposal would cause.21 
 
The Florida Circuit Court held that requiring Koontz to miti-
gate the impacts of his construction project lacked both an “essential 
nexus” and “rough proportionality.”22 The Florida District Court of Ap-
peal affirmed, and the Florida Supreme Court reversed.23 
 
2. Justice Alito’s Majority Opinion 
Justice Alito, writing for the majority, held that the Nollan/Do-
lan framework must apply to monetary exactions—even when the gov-
ernment denies a land-use permit, and when the government demands 
money instead of a real property interest.24 The Court remanded the 
case.25 
 
Justice Alito found that monetary exactions were the functional 
equivalent of other land exactions, and to hold otherwise would allow 
local governments to “evade the takings clause by charging a fee” 	
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 601–02. 
21 Id. at 602. 
22 Id. at 603. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 612–13. 
25 Id. at 619. 
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instead of “demanding a property right.”26 Further, the Court reasoned 
that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is violated when the gov-
ernment conditions permit-approval on a monetary payment that 
simply “burdens” a property owner’s use of his property (e.g., devel-
oping a portion of his property).27 In this case, the Court found that 
because the money at issue operated upon a specific property interest, 
the payment burdened Koontz’s land ownership.28 In an attempt to pre-
vent the government from wielding its “substantial power and discre-
tion” in the land use permitting process, the Court applied the Nol-
lan/Dolan framework to monetary exactions.29 
 
3. Justice Kagan’s Dissenting Opinion 
 
In contrast to the majority’s reasoning that a condition “bur-
dening” an individual’s land ownership is sufficient to trigger the Nol-
lan/Dolan framework, Justice Kagan would have held that the consti-
tutional right to just compensation is only violated when the 
government conditions a land use permit on an actual transfer of a real 
property interest.30 
 
Justice Kagan agreed with the majority’s conclusion that a 
property owner may challenge the government’s denial of his land use 
permit conditioned on the conveyance of a property interest if the con-
dition fails the Nollan/Dolan “essential nexus” and “rough proportion-
ality” requirements.31 She agreed that in this scenario, the property 
owner is entitled to removal of the improper condition, and is possibly 
entitled to monetary compensation, if created by state law, for such an 
improper condition.32 However, Justice Kagan disagreed with the 
Court’s conclusion that the government’s demand for a payment or ex-
penditure of money (i.e., a monetary exaction) that an applicant rejects 
triggers the Nollan/Dolan framework.33 
 
	
26 Id. at 612. 
27 Id. at 606. 
28 Id. at 613 (citing E. Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998)). 
29 Id. at 614. 
30 Id. at 619–20 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
31 Id. at 620–22. 
32 Id. at 620. 
33 Id. 
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Justice Kagan argues several points in her dissenting opinion. 
First, she argues that the majority failed to distinguish between permis-
sible taxes and monetary exactions.34 She also argues that the Koontz 
case could have been decided under the Penn Central three-part bal-
ancing test for regulatory takings.35 Additionally, she contends that the 
Court’s decision to require analyzing monetary exactions under Nol-
lan/Dolan heightened scrutiny deprives state and local governments of 
the “necessary predictability” of local land use regulation.36 
 
However, the most important aspect of Justice Kagan’s dissent-
ing opinion for purposes of this comment is that requiring Koontz to 
fund repairs of public wetlands was not a taking because it did not af-
fect a “specific and identified property right,” but instead “simply im-
pose[d] an obligation to perform an act”—i.e., to pay money.37 Justice 
Kagan reasons that the monetary exaction was not an unconstitutional 
condition because St. Johns merely informed Koontz that his permit 
application did not meet the legal requirements for approval, offered 
him several suggestions to bring his application into compliance with 
Florida law, and even solicited additional proposals from Koontz to 
approve his application.38 Because Justice Kagan found that the mone-
tary exaction was not a condition, it thus would not have constituted a 
taking outside of the land use permitting process, and did not even im-
plicate the Nollan/Dolan test.39 
 
In short, Justice Kagan argues that because government de-
mands for monetary payments during the land use permitting process 
arise from that process rather than a specific property interest, the Nol-
lan/Dolan “rough proportionality” test does not apply to monetary ex-
actions.40 
 
B. Exactions Jurisprudence: The Nollan/Dolan Rough Pro-
portionality Test 
 
	
34 Id. at 627. 
35 Id. at 632. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 624. 
38 Id. at 635. 
39 Id. at 626. 
40 Id.  
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To understand the implications of the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Koontz, it is also helpful to understand the application of the 
two-part test that the Court established in deciding Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard. 
 
1. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission: The “Es-
sential Nexus” Requirement 
 
In Nollan, the Supreme Court held that a taking occurs when 
the government demands an exaction (i.e., when the government de-
mands a property right by attaching a condition to a land-use permit 
application) that lacks an “essential nexus” with a police power objec-
tive.41 In other words, the Court found that there must be a sufficient 
connection between the exaction as the means, and the state interest as 
the end.42 
 
The Nollans owned a beachfront lot in California, part of which 
a dilapidated house covered, and the rest of which consisted of a 
beach.43 California law required that the Nollans obtain a special 
coastal development permit in order to build a new home on the lot.44 
The state coastal commission granted the Nollans’ permit application 
subject to the condition that the Nollans dedicate or grant an easement 
allowing the public to cross their lot so people have full access to the 
public beach because such a public access easement would allow the 
public to cross the dry sand part of the Nollans’ lot during high tide.45 
The Nollans argued that the public access easement condition was a 
taking, while the Commission argued that three state interests sup-
ported the easement: (1) protecting the public’s ability to see the beach, 
(2) helping the public overcome a psychological barrier to using the 
beach, and (3) avoiding beach congestion.46 
 
The Court reasoned that the easement had no relationship with 
the state’s argued interests, and although the Nollans’ new house might 
adversely affect these state interests, the easement condition did not 	
41 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Com, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 827. 
44 Id. at 828. 
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 829, 835. 
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prevent or mitigate this problem.47 The Court found that the easement 
condition had no logical connection to the “view from the street” or 
“psychological impact” interests, and thus decided this was an uncon-
stitutional taking.48 Absent this connection, the government needed to 
pay the Nollans just compensation for the easement; otherwise, the 
easement would be an unconstitutional condition that violated the Nol-
lans’ right to just compensation. 
 
2. Dolan v. City of Tigard: The “Rough Proportional-
ity” Requirement 
 
Moreover, in Dolan, the Supreme Court built upon the “essen-
tial nexus” requirement when it held that a government demand that 
lacks “rough proportionality” to the impacts of the proposed project is 
an unconstitutional taking.49 Dolan owned a store and planned to dou-
ble its size, pave a gravel parking lot, and construct an additional retail 
building on her land, all of which was consistent with the city’s zoning 
scheme.50 The city granted Dolan’s application for a building permit, 
but imposed two conditions: (1) because her project would increase the 
amount of impervious surface on the land—thus increasing storm-wa-
ter runoff into the adjacent creek—Dolan was required to dedicate to 
the city the part of her land lying within the creek’s 100-year flood-
plain; and (2) because the expanded store would attract additional cus-
tomers—thus increasing traffic congestion on local streets—the city 
insisted that Dolan also dedicate an easement for a pedestrian/bicycle 
pathway over a fifteen-foot strip of her land.51 These conditions effec-
tively required her to dedicate about ten percent of her land to the city.52 
The Supreme Court reasoned that the dedications the city demanded 
lacked the required degree of connection with the impacts of the pro-
ject.53 The Court found that a less intrusive condition, allowing Dolan 
to retain title to the floodplain land, could satisfy the city’s interest in 
flood control while prohibiting future development.54 Further, there 
was no evidence that the pathway easement was adequately related to 	
47 Id. at 838-39. 
48 Id.  
49 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). 
50 Id. at 379. 
51 Id. at 379–80. 
52 Id. at 380. 
53 Id. at 394–95. 
54 Id. at 393–94. 
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the increased traffic that the project would cause.55 The Court thus held 
that this was an unconstitutional taking.56 
 
In turn, the Supreme Court created the two-part Nollan/Dolan 
“rough proportionality” test, to apply to land exactions: (1) when the 
government demands an exaction, it must have an “essential nexus” 
with a police power objective;57 and (2) the government demand must 
be “rough[ly] proportional[]” to the proposed project.58 In Koontz, Jus-
tice Alito noted that Nollan and Dolan involved a “special application” 
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the Fifth Amendment 
right to just compensation because land use permit applicants are “es-
pecially vulnerable to the type of coercion that the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine prohibits.”59 He reasoned that the government often 
has broad discretion to deny a land use permit if an owner does not 
“voluntarily giv[e] up property for which the Fifth Amendment would 
otherwise require just compensation,” and that “many proposed land 
uses threaten to impose costs on the public that dedication of property 
can offset.”60 
 
This is a higher level of scrutiny compared to the level of scru-
tiny to which ordinary regulatory takings are subject under alternative 
regulatory takings tests, such as the three-part Penn Central balancing 
test, and the categorical exception established in Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council. 
 
C. Alternative Regulatory Takings Tests 
 
1. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City: 
The Three-Part Balancing Test 
 
           In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the Su-
preme Court adopted a less stringent regulatory takings test, prior to 
its Nollan and Dolan decisions, that tilts more in the government’s fa-
vor.61 	
55 Id. at 395. 
56 Id. at 396. 
57 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Com, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
58 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.  
59 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 604–05 (2013). 
60 Id. at 605. 
61 Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
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           In Penn Central, the eight-story Grand Central Terminal was 
considered historically significant and was designated a landmark un-
der the city landmarks preservation law.62 Under this law, any change 
in the exterior architectural features of a landmark, or construction of 
any exterior improvement on a site, required advance approval from a 
city commission.63 However, the city ordinance also allowed the owner 
of a landmark to transfer unused development rights from the landmark 
parcel to other nearby parcels.64 In this case, the owners of the Penn 
Central terminal property leased the airspace above the terminal to 
UGP Properties for a fifty-year term.65 Without the lease, the existing 
terminal provided Penn Central with a reasonable return on its invest-
ment, but the lease would provide millions of dollars of additional in-
come each year.66 UGP’s plan to construct a fifty-five-story office 
building in the airspace above the terminal required approval from the 
landmarks commission, which rejected both the initial design and the 
fifty-three-story alternative proposal, based mainly on aesthetic con-
siderations.67 Penn Central filed suit, alleging that the application of the 
landmarks law to the property was an unconstitutional taking.68 
 
The Supreme Court held that a three-part balancing test applies 
to determine when a regulation constitutes a taking.69 The three factors 
under this ad hoc approach include: (1) the economic impact of the 
regulation on the property owner; (2) the extent to which the regulation 
interferes with the property owner’s distinct investment-backed expec-
tations; and (3) the character of the government action.70 The Court 
reasoned that under the first prong, even without the office building, 
Penn Central could derive a reasonable return on investment operating 
as usual.71 Additionally, Penn Central could still seek to construct a 
smaller office building in the airspace or transfer the valuable devel-
opment rights to another parcel.72 Under the second prong, the Court 	
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 115–16. 
64 Id. at 113–14. 
65 Id. at 116. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 116–18. 
68 Id. at 119. 
69 Id. at 124. 
70 Id.  
71 Id. at 136. 
72 Id. at 137. 
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reasoned that the law did not interfere with Penn Central’s primary in-
vestment-backed expectation concerning use of the parcel (i.e., oper-
ating the terminal as it was already used for the last sixty-five years).73 
Finally, under the third prong, the Court found that the landmarks law 
was a regulation reasonably related to the promotion of the general 
welfare rather than a physical invasion by the government.74 
 
In contrast to the Nollan/Dolan approach, the Penn Central test 
imports a lesser level of scrutiny for reviewing ordinary regulatory tak-
ings because generally applicable statutes trigger the test, and such 
statutes tend to serve a broad purpose for the public welfare (e.g., en-
suring sufficient affordable housing, mitigating environmental im-
pacts).75 The Nollan/Dolan approach considers the means used to 
achieve the government’s end, which is a higher level of scrutiny be-
cause it considers specific impacts that certain conditions have on 
property owners’ rights.76 However, lower court cases have demon-
strated that local governments tend to legislatively enact monetary de-
mands for development approval to bypass heightened scrutiny.77 As a 
result, regulatory takings claims are typically resolved in the govern-
ment’s favor.78  
 
2. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: The Total Economic 
Wipeout Exception to Penn Central 
 
           Furthermore, the Supreme Court described a categorical excep-
tion to the Penn Central standard in Lucas: the ad hoc, case-specific 
inquiry that Penn Central requires is not necessary where the govern-
ment “denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.”79 
 
In Lucas, a real estate developer paid Lucas 975 thousand dol-
lars for two beachfront lots in a residential development located on Isle 
of Palms in South Carolina.80 At the time, a state statute required that 
owners of certain coastal lands—including beaches and areas adjacent 	
73 Id. at 136. 
74 Id. at 138. 
75 Id. at 124–25. 
76 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 615 (2013).  
77 Id.  
78 Id. 
79 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). 
80 Id. at 1006. 
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to sand dunes—obtain a permit before developing their property.81 Be-
cause Lucas’s lots were 300 feet away from the beach when he pur-
chased them, the statute did not apply.82 However, for years, the lots 
were either part of the beach or flooded regularly by the ebb and flow 
of the tide.83 Two years after Lucas’s purchase, South Carolina adopted 
a more comprehensive statute to preserve its shoreline and beaches, 
and the state legislature explained that by preserving the beach/dune 
system as a barrier to hurricanes and other storms, the statute would 
protect life and property form serious injury.84 The statute thus prohib-
ited all construction along a long stretch of shoreline, including both 
of Lucas’s lots.85 The trial court found that a regulatory taking occurred 
since the value of Lucas’s lots were reduced to zero and awarded more 
than $1.2 million in compensatory damages.86 The South Carolina Su-
preme Court reversed, finding that the statute was a valid exercise of 
police power to prevent nuisance-like activities.87 The Supreme Court 
then carved out a special exception to the Penn Central standard: if 
regulation causes loss of all economically beneficial or productive use 
of land, unless justified by background principles of property or nui-
sance law, a taking will be found.88 The Court reasoned that the statute 
clearly eliminated all economically beneficial or productive use of Lu-
cas’s land and remanded the case to determine if the statute could oth-
erwise be justified under background principles of South Carolina law, 
although the Court expressed that this seemed unlikely.89 
 
The Court noted that if the only economically productive use 
of personal property is to sell it or to manufacture it for sale, then the 
property owner ought to be aware of the possibility that government 
regulation may render his personal property worthless without trigger-
ing a taking, since the government retains a high degree of control over 
commercial dealings.90 Relying on the historical value of land, the 
Court then reasoned that there was an implied limitation on the gov-
ernment’s ability to eliminate all economically valuable use of land 	
81 Id. at 1007–08. 
82 Id. at 1008. 
83 Id. at 1038. 
84 Id. at 1037. 
85 Id. at 1009. 
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 1009–10. 
88 Id. at 1019 n.8. 
89 Id. at 1027. 
90 Id. at 1027–28. 
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because doing so is inconsistent with the Takings Clause and “consti-
tutional culture.”91 Thus, the Court in Lucas distinguished between the 
constitutional value of real and personal property due to the distinct 
historical value of each.92 Since money is personal property, the 
Court’s distinction in Lucas is important for considering monetary ex-
actions under the Nollan/Dolan regulatory takings framework. 
 
D. Important Background Concepts for Understanding Appli-
cation of the Koontz Decision  
 
 Before analyzing lower federal and state court applications of the Su-
preme Court’s Koontz decision, it is helpful to understand how the Su-
preme Court has historically given greater value to real property than 
to personal property. It is also useful to know how the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine fits within the land use context and to be aware of 
the differing perspectives on monetary exactions. 
 
1. The Value of Real vs. Personal Property 
 
 Historically, the Supreme Court has distinguished between the value 
of real and personal property93 because of the uniqueness and immo-
bility of land.94 For instance, the Court has held that the government’s 
permanent physical occupation on real property constitutes a taking,95 
and regulatory takings that deprive a landowner of his real property 
trigger a takings violation.96 As mentioned above, the Court in Lucas 
distinguished between the historical constitutional value of real and 
personal property, reasoning the government’s authority to regulate 
commerce potentially allows it to render personal property that is only 
sold (or is only manufactured to sell) valueless, without violating the 
Takings Clause.97 
 
However, in Horne v. Department of Agriculture, where the 
government required raisin farmers to relinquish a portion of their 	
91 Id. at 1028. 
92 Id. at 1027–28. 
93 William S. Macdaniel, No Appropriation Without Compensation: How Per Se Takings of Personal 
Property Check the Power to Regulate Commerce, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 509, 524 (2017). 
94 Craig A. Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 281, 307 (2002). 
95 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). 
96 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–28. 
97 Id.  
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raisins as a condition for approval to engage in interstate commerce, 
the Court held that actually taking possession and control of tangible 
personal property gives rise to a per se physical taking in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment.98 The property owners in Horne relied on the 
narrow, categorical framework established in Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV—that a “permanent physical occupation” destroying 
every strand in the bundle of property rights is an unconstitutional tak-
ing.99 Justice Sotomayor vehemently dissented, arguing that retention 
of even one property right (i.e., the rest of the raisins) defeats a per se 
physical takings claim.100 She instead maintained that the Penn Central 
regulatory takings test should govern Horne’s claim against capping 
production of tangible personal property sold in interstate commerce.101 
Because the government was not “storming raisin farms in the dark of 
night to load raisins into trucks,” and was instead simply requiring the 
Hornes to set aside a portion to limit the number sold on the market 
and to arrange “the orderly disposition” of raisins that would otherwise 
exceed the cap, Justice Sotomayor found that these regulatory purposes 
should have been analyzed under Penn Central.102 This emphasizes a 
point that the Court construed in the earlier Andrus v. Allard case, 
where Justice Brennan reasoned, “where an owner possesses a full 
‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bun-
dle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its en-
tirety.”103 Justice Sotomayor cited Andrus in her dissent to highlight 
that reducing property value is not necessarily equated with a taking.104 
 
The Court’s discussion in both Horne and Andrus is relevant to 
monetary exactions and the Koontz decision because property owners 
whose land use permits are denied as a result of failing to—or rejecting 
the government’s demand to—pay money to mitigate the impacts of 
their development proposals still retain the rights to their land. The de-
mand for money is an independent personal property interest not tied 
to the actual development of real property. Such a demand merely 	
98 Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2428, 2430 (2015). 
99 Id. at 2437 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426).  
100 Id. at 2437–38.  
101 Id.   
102 Id. at 2438, 2442 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
103 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65–66 (1979) (holding that no unconstitutional taking occurred where 
the Secretary of the Interior prosecuted appellee artifact owner for selling artifacts composed of feathers 
from birds statutorily protected, prior to the enactment of the protective statutes). 
104 Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2439–40 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Andrus, 
444 U.S. at 66–67). 
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arises from the land use permitting process, which Justice Kagan ar-
gued is not a sufficient basis upon which to claim an unconstitutional 
taking.105 This is in line with the idea that reducing property value, such 
as not approving a development permit, is not necessarily a taking.106 
 
Moreover, in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, the Court held that 
the retroactive application of a federal statute that required a former 
mining company (Eastern Enterprises) to pay large sums of money for 
retired employees’ health benefits was a taking that did not pass con-
stitutional muster under the Penn Central balancing test.107 Most nota-
bly, Justice Kennedy argued in his Eastern Enterprises opinion (con-
curring in part and dissenting in part), that no taking occurred because 
the law did not “operate upon or alter” a “specific and identified prop-
erty or property right,” and that the law “simply impose[d] an obliga-
tion to perform an act, the payment of benefits.”108 He further noted 
that the law did not “appropriate, transfer, or encumber an estate in 
land, a valuable interest in intangible property, or even a bank account 
or accrued interest.”109 This case is significant because it emphasizes 
that a government demand for a monetary payment cannot be equated 
to an encumbrance or an actual transfer of property rights.110 Justice 
Kagan relies on this point in her Koontz dissent to underscore that or-
dinary government-imposed financial obligations are permissible and 
do not trigger Takings Clause protections.111 
 After considering the value of real versus personal property, it is help-
ful to understand how the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is ap-
plied in the land use context. 
2. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine in the Land Use 
Context 
 
 Speaking broadly, when the government withholds a benefit because 
an individual exercises a constitutional right, or because an individual 
refuses to forfeit his constitutional right, the government violates the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.112 	
105 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 613 (2013).  
106 Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66–67. 
107 E. Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 503, 538 (1998). 
108 Id. at 540 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). 
109 Id. at 503, 540 (1998). 
110 Id.  
111 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 620 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
112 Id. at 604–05 (2013) (majority opinion). 
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Land use permits are benefits issued at local governments’ dis-
cretion.113 Thus, in the land use context, when local governments attach 
conditions to land use permits, they implicate the unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine because such conditions may require a property owner 
to forfeit his right to just compensation.114 It does not matter whether a 
local government denies a permit because it rejects conditions that the 
permit applicant proposed, or whether the government denies a permit 
because an applicant refused to accept conditions that the government 
imposed.115 Regardless, the government cannot leverage a property 
owner’s development permit approval against his right to just compen-
sation without violating the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 
 
3. Differing Perspectives on Monetary Exactions 
 
           From the property owner’s perspective, the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Koontz was a victory because it eliminated the distinction be-
tween a government demand for real property or money, thus requiring 
any condition attached to a land use permit to pass constitutional mus-
ter under Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny.116 Koontz limited the gov-
ernment’s ability to use permitting processes and other land use re-
strictions as leverage to force property owners to perform various 
public services.117 Without the Court’s Koontz decision, the govern-
ment could practically wipe out property owners’ rights by refusing to 
allow them to develop their land unless they meet the state’s de-
mands.118 
 
From the local community’s perspective, if redevelopment pro-
jects are successful, there might not be sufficient affordable housing 	
113 Brandon L. Bowen, An Overview of Local Government Land Use Regulation, JENKINS, BOWEN AND 
WALKER, P.C., jbwpc.com/Artciles/Zoning-and-Land-Use-The-Basics/AN-OVERVIEW-OF-LOCAL-
GOVERNMENT-LAND-USE-REGULATION.shtml (last visited Feb. 20, 2020). 
114 Peter A. Clodfelter & Edward J. Sullivan, Substantive Due Process: Through the Just Compensation 
Clause: Understanding Koontz’s “Special Application” of the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions 
by Tracing the Doctrine’s History, 46 URB. LAW. 569, 596 (2014). 
115 Id.  
116 Aaron McKean, Local Government Legislation: Community Benefits, Land Banks, and Politically 
Engaged Community Economic Development, 24 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 133, 
149 (2015). 
117 Ilya Somin, Two Steps Forward for the “Poor Relation” of Constitutional Law: Koontz, Arkansas 
Game & Fish, and the Future of the Takings Clause, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2012-2013, at 
216 (Ilya Shapiro ed., 2013). 
118 Id. at 217. 
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infrastructure to offset the economic forces that push low-income res-
idents out of their neighborhoods in the wake of Koontz.119 Thus, the 
Koontz holding—that the government must satisfy heightened scrutiny 
under Nollan and Dolan when it imposes monetary exactions on con-
struction permits—raised residents’ concerns about development pro-
ject impacts on, e.g., affordable housing and environmental impacts.120 
 
From the local government’s perspective, Koontz restricted 
municipalities’ ability to fund infrastructural maintenance and im-
provements.121 Revenues that local governments collected from mone-
tary exactions financed the necessary improvements that new develop-
ment created, such as managing growth as more residents utilized 
public transportation and maintaining public parks.122 Infrastructure 
and buildings form a city’s character for years to come, and requiring 
developers to finance infrastructural maintenance or improvements to 
offset development impacts can significantly improve cities.123 Local 
and municipal governments have tight budgets and must be able to 
fund public improvements.124 Thus, both property owners and develop-
ers should share the publicly generated costs to help local governments 
pay for bridges, transit systems, parks, affordable housing, and other 
improvements.125 
 
II. Lower Court Applications of Koontz 
 
On remand, the Florida District Court of Appeal held consistent 
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Koontz after applying the 
Nollan/Dolan “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” test.126 
However, one of the judges dissented, heavily echoing Justice Kagan’s 
dissenting opinion in Koontz.127 
 
Other than Koontz on remand, nearly all of the post-Koontz 
cases involving monetary exactions and the “rough proportionality” 	
119 McKean, supra note 115, at 161–62. 
120 Id.  
121 Id. at 148. 
122 Lourdes Germán & Allyison E. Bernstein, Land Value Capture: Tools to Finance Our Urban Future, 
LINCOLN INST. LAND & POL’Y (2018). 
123 Id.  
124 Id.  
125 Id.  
126 St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 183 So. 3d 396, 398 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
127 Id. at 399–403 (Griffin, J., dissenting). 
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test were unsuccessful.128 This reveals that even under Nollan/Dolan 
heightened scrutiny, a takings claim based on a monetary exaction is 
highly unlikely to prevail as courts still usually decide in the govern-
ment’s favor. Further, this magnifies Justice Kagan’s dissenting point 
that monetary exactions should not be subject to the “rough propor-
tionality” test in the first place since they are not unconstitutional con-
ditions that violate the Takings Clause.  
 
After analyzing the one successful post-Koontz case, several 
unsuccessful cases are also analyzed to help understand that time will 
continue to reveal that Justice Kagan’s dissent was correct: monetary 
exactions are not unconstitutional conditions, subjecting monetary ex-
actions to the Nollan/Dolan test is ultimately ineffective, and the Penn 
Central test should instead govern monetary exaction takings claims.129 
 
A. A Successful post-Koontz Case: Key Takeaway 
 
In Levin v. City & County of San Francisco, the court held that 
imposing monetary exactions on a property owner for withdrawing its 
apartment units from the rental market did not satisfy the Nollan/Dolan 
two-part test and was thus an unconstitutional taking.130 
 
The city and county of San Francisco enacted an ordinance re-
quiring property owners who wished to withdraw their rent-controlled 
property from the rental market to pay a monetary sum to tenants 
evicted as a result of their withdrawal, which essentially cost the prop-
erty owners hundreds of thousands of dollars per unit.131 The city gov-
ernment’s rental control plan restricted rent increases to a rate lower 
than inflation, which decreased property owners’ return on invest-
ment.132 The plan also required landlords to pay relocation expenses for 
tenants undergoing no-fault eviction.133 In addition to the problematic 
aspect of the ordinance that required landlords to pay such large 
amounts to no-fault evicted tenants, the ordinance required property 
owners wishing to withdraw from the rental market to apply to the city 	
128 See, e.g., Edwards CDS, LLC v. City of Delray Beach, No. 9:15CV81405(DMM), 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 188544, at *16–17 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2016). 
129 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 604–05 (2013). 
130 Levin v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 71 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1082–84 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
131 Id. at 1074. 
132 Id. at 1075. 
133 Id. at 1075–76. 
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for a permit authorizing them to do so.134 As a condition of permit ap-
proval, the ordinance required property owners to pay tenants who 
were evicted from the withdrawn unit the lump-sum amount.135 Failure 
to pay allowed tenants to continue occupying their apartment units.136 
 
In applying the Nollan/Dolan “rough proportionality” test, the 
court held that the statute was an unconstitutional taking because it 
conditioned property owners’ right to withdraw their property from the 
rental market on a monetary exaction not sufficiently related to the im-
pact of the withdrawal.137 The court reasoned that San Francisco’s pay-
out requirement lacked an essential nexus and was not roughly propor-
tional to withdrawing from the rental market, because the requirement 
to pay money in order to receive permit approval was “directly linked 
to the property owner’s . . . use of a specific, identifiable unit of prop-
erty” (i.e., an exaction).138 Further, the court found that property owners 
should not have to pay for a broad rental-market problem they did not 
create.139 
 
However, the court’s reasoning is flawed. For instance, in An-
drus, the Supreme Court held that the retention of even one property 
right defeats a takings claim.140 In Levin, because the property owners 
retained the rights to their apartment units—whether they fulfilled their 
monetary obligation to withdraw from the rental market, or not—a re-
quirement to pay evicted tenants as a condition of the owners’ with-
drawal should not be considered an unconstitutional condition under 
the Nollan/Dolan framework.141 As Justice Kennedy persuasively men-
tioned in his Eastern Enterprises opinion, monetary payment cannot 
be viewed the same as an encumbrance or a transfer of property 
rights.142 For instance, in Levin, the statute required payment to exit the 
rental market, rather than payment to offset development impacts.143 
This is beyond the scope of the Nollan/Dolan test because a statutory 	
134 Id. at 1081. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 1074. 
138 Id. at 1083. 
139 Id. at 1086. 
140 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65–66 (1979). 
141 Levin, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1076. 
142 E. Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 503, 568 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). 
143 Id.  
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use restriction requiring monetary payment is outside of the land use 
permitting process, and is thus distinct from deeding over a property 
right or conditioning individual permit approval on financial obliga-
tions.144 Such a requirement should instead be evaluated under the Penn 
Central regulatory takings framework because a statutorily imposed 
monetary obligation broadly applies to benefit the public and is not 
equal to an individualized municipal board demand for money in ex-
change for permit approval.145 
 
Therefore, application of the Nollan/Dolan “rough proportion-
ality” test is not necessary in a case like Levin because the fee was 
legislatively imposed in an attempt to control the housing rental mar-
ket. Justice Kagan stated in her Koontz dissent that the Penn Central 
test balances the government’s need to pass laws that may adversely 
affect economic values with the longstanding recognition that some 
regulation goes too far.146 In Levin, the city’s regulation of the rental 
control market should have thus been analyzed under the Penn Central 
approach since it ultimately diminished the property owners’ return on 
investment without encumbering ownership of their apartment units. 
 
B. Unsuccessful Post-Koontz Takings Claims: Key Takea-
ways 
 
           In addition to Levin, there are several lower court cases illustrat-
ing that Justice Kagan’s Koontz dissent was correct in concluding that 
demands for monetary exactions in exchange for development permit 
approval are not unconstitutional conditions. The unsuccessful mone-
tary exactions cases shed further light on the idea that takings claims 
based on monetary exactions should be resolved under the Penn Cen-
tral test.147 
 
For example, in Home Builder’s Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. 
the City of Chicago, the city demanded a real estate developer to either 
pay a 200,000 dollar fee or to dedicate two housing units for rent or 	
144 Levin, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1085. 
145 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 630–32 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
146 Id. at 621. 
147 Id. at 632; see, e.g., Bldg. Indus. Ass’n – Bay Area v. City of Oakland, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1058–
59 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Home Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. City of Chicago, 213 F. Supp. 3d 
1019, 1024, 1026 (N.D. Ill. 2016); Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 992–94 
(Cal. 2015).  
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sale to low-income residents in order to comply with a city ordinance 
after the developer purchased commercial property and sought rezon-
ing to obtain a building permit.148 The court held that the monetary fee 
in lieu of setting aside two of the housing units under the ordinance did 
not violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, reasoning that a 
property use restriction does not require just compensation unless it is 
a regulatory taking under the Penn Central test.149 The court found that 
a permissible use restriction that does not violate the Takings Clause 
under the regulatory takings framework could not possibly be an un-
constitutional condition and thus would not even require consideration 
under the Nollan/Dolan test.150 Therefore, the court did not apply the 
“rough proportionality” test to the Chicago ordinance at all because the 
property owners just assumed that the “rough proportionality” test ap-
plied without first alleging that the ordinance was a regulatory tak-
ing.151 
 
Additionally, in California Building Industry Association v. 
City of San Jose, the city enacted an inclusionary housing ordinance 
that required new residential development projects of twenty or more 
units to sell at least fifteen percent of the for-sale units at an affordable 
housing price for low- and middle-income households.152 As an alter-
native, the developer could instead: 
 
(1) construct off-site for-sale affordable housing units, 
(2) pay an in lieu fee based on the median sales price of 
a housing unit affordable to a moderate-income family, 
(3) dedicate land equal in value to the applicable in lieu 
fee, or (4) acquire and rehabilitate a comparable num-
ber of inclusionary units that are affordable to low- or 
very low-income households.153 
 
          CBIA filed suit, claiming that the inclusionary housing ordi-
nance was an unconstitutional condition in violation of the Takings 
Clause.154 The California Supreme Court held that the ordinance was 	
148 Home Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago, 213 F. Supp. 3d at 1021. 
149 Id. at 1024, 1026. 
150 Id. at 1026.  
151 Id. at 1025. 
152 Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 351 P.3d at 978. 
153 Id. at 982–83.  
154 Id. at 996. 
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not an unconstitutional condition and was also not a taking.155 The court 
reasoned that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is not implicated 
unless the government requires a property owner to convey an identi-
fiable property interest—i.e., an exaction—to the government.156 Here, 
the court held that the price control restriction was not an exaction, 
finding that if a restriction on property use does not constitute a taking 
outside of the permit process, then the permit applicant is not forced to 
give up its right to just compensation.157 The court reasoned that valid-
ity of the inclusionary housing ordinance in this case did not depend 
on whether the price controls were reasonably related to the develop-
mental impact on affordable housing (i.e., heightened scrutiny), but ra-
ther depended on whether the ordinance was “reasonably related to the 
broad general welfare purposes for which the ordinance was enacted” 
as a regulatory taking.158 Here, the court decided that price controls 
could be impermissible if they constitute a regulatory taking under 
Penn Central (although not so in this case), but price controls are not 
exactions subject to heightened scrutiny.159 
 
Moreover, in Building Industry Association – Bay Area v. City 
of Oakland, the city ordinance required developers to display or fund 
art as a condition of project approval.160 However, if an affordable 
housing developer could show that compliance costs would make its 
project economically infeasible, it did not need to comply with the or-
dinance.161 The property owners brought a takings claim alleging that 
the ordinance was an exaction that violated the Nollan/Dolan test.162 
The court held that the Penn Central framework applies to broad reg-
ulations like this one, reasoning that the exactions doctrine only applies 
to individual, adjudicative decisions rather than to generally applicable 
land use regulations.163 
 
The unsuccessful post-Koontz cases teach us that legislatively 
enacting an ordinance requiring property owners to pay money to de-
velop their property, instead of delegating that authority to land use 	
155 Id.  
156 Id. at 990. 
157 Id. at 991–92. 
158 Id. at 1000–01.  
159 Id. at 991–94. 
160 Bldg. Indus. Ass’n – Bay Area v. City of Oakland, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1057 (2018). 
161 Id.  
162 Id.  
163 Id. at 1058. 
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officials who condition individual permits on monetary payment, al-
lows local governments to essentially bypass the Nollan/Dolan “rough 
proportionality” standard.164 Overall, these cases also demonstrate ju-
dicial reluctance to subject monetary obligations regarding property 
regulation to heightened scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan. 
 
In conclusion, both the successful and unsuccessful lower court 
applications of Koontz illustrate that Justice Kagan’s dissenting opin-
ion was correct. Monetary exactions are not unconstitutional condi-
tions that should be subject to the Nollan/Dolan “rough proportional-
ity” two-part test and can rather be decided under the Penn Central 
three-part balancing test to determine whether statutorily-imposed 
monetary obligations violate the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.165 
With respect to the facts of the Koontz case, this is true because the 
court could have evaluated the Florida state law, which authorized the 
St. Johns Water Management Board to condition permit approval on 
monetary payment to mitigate environmental impacts of development 
on public wetlands, under the Penn Central balancing test for regula-
tory takings.166 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
           After understanding Koontz and the alternative regulatory tak-
ings tests, it is apparent that Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion in 
Koontz was correct.167 Most notable are Justice Kagan’s propositions 
that monetary exactions are not unconstitutional conditions and thus 
can be decided under the Penn Central three-part balancing test.168 Ad-
ditionally, greater regulation of personal property than real property is 
historically justified. Finally, the different perspectives on monetary 
exactions clarify that the government has a serious interest in offsetting 
certain development impacts.169 From a public policy standpoint, this 
supports Justice Kagan’s conclusion that monetary exactions should 
be subject to ordinary scrutiny under the Penn Central framework 
which is applicable to regulatory takings. 	 	
164 See, e.g., id. at 1056.  
165 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 632 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
166 Id. at 601 (majority opinion).  
167 Id. at 630 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
168 Id. at 632. 
169 Germán & Bernstein, supra note 121. 
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EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPTION 
 
MaryAnn Grover: Good morning everyone. We’re just about the get 
started. Um . . . So, I’d like to welcome you to “A New Era for the 
Equal Rights Amendment.” My name is MaryAnn Grover, and I’m a 
member of the planning committee for this event. I have the distinct 
pleasure of welcoming you all to my alma matter, the University of 
Richmond School of Law. Thank you all for joining us to . . . today 
to explore the legal implications of the Equal Rights Amendment. It 
is our hope that Virginia becomes the final state required to enact the 
Equal Rights Amendment. The passage of the ERA in Virginia, 
though, raises the questions we’ll examine throughout the day today, 
like “what legal challenges is the ERA likely to face?” and “what ef-
fect will the ERA have once it is passed?” The brilliant speakers and 
panelists we have with us today have and continue to contribute to 
the larger equality movement. They have so much to teach us and we 
are honored to have them with us. So, we thank them, and you, for 
being here and being willing to engage in this dialogue. I’d be remiss 
if I also didn’t take a moment to thank a few women who were inte-
gral in the planning of this event. Particularly, I’d like to thank 
Michelle Callhan, our fearless leader, who has been running around 
all morning and helping plan this event, Katie Hornock and the whole 
VA Ratify ERA Team, who provided us with the institutional support 
we really needed to put on this event, as well as Brittany Jones Rec-
ord and Chris Shwallace who were indispensable in the planning of 
this event and the coordinating of all of our panelists. Finally, I’m 
thrilled to thank our keynote sponsors: the ERA Coalition, Feminist 
Majority Foundation, the McIntosh Foundation, Paul Weiss, Rethink-
ing Eve, and Winston & Strong, as well as our Community Sponsors.  
 
Moderating our first panel is Jessica Mary Samuels. Jessie recently 
joined Virginia’s Office of the Attorney General, where she works as 
an assistant Solicitor General litigating on behalf of the Common-
wealth. Jessie grew up here in Richmond and then attended Dart-
mouth College and Yale Law School. After graduating law school, 
she clerked on the District Court of Connecticut and the 2nd Circuit 
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Court of Appeals. Jessie also spent two years litigating class actions 
and financial services cases at Covington & Burling in D.C. before 
moving to Richmond this fall.  
Without further ado, Jessie. 
  
Jessica Mary Samuels: Thank you. Good morning everybody. 
Thank you for being here. 
We’re so glad you’re here, um, and we’re really excited for this 
event, um, so thanks for coming out on a Saturday morning. Um, it is 
my great honor to moderate this first panel that we have up for you 
which, um, I want to reiterate . . . reiterate is some amazing expertise 
that we’re excited to share with you. Um, this morning we’re going to 
be covering, um, some basic background on the ERA, um, the ratifi-
cation process, um, the fight for the ERA here in Virginia, um, and 
just kind of going over some background basics to set the stage for 
the rest of the day. Um, so, I will introduce our panelists and then get 
us started. Um, our first panelist is Toby Heytens, um, who is the, uh, 
sixth Solicitor General here in Virginia. He previously spent eight 
years as a professor at the University of Virginia School of Law 
where he served as co-director of the Supreme Court Litigation 
Clinic, coached the three-time national champion undergraduate trial 
advocacy team, and received an “All University” teaching award in 
2016. Toby previously spent three years at the Office of the Solicitor 
General in the United States Department of Justice where he argued 
six cases before the U.S. Supreme Court. A former law clerk to Jus-
tice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Chief Judge Edward R. Becker, Toby 
is a graduate of McAllister College and the University of Virginia 
School of Law, and I’ll also add that he’s a great boss.  
 
[Audience laughter] 
 
Um, our next panelist this morning is Kate Kelly. Um, Kate is a zeal-
ous advocate and passionate activist. She has a J.D. from American 
University Washington College of Law, the only law school in the 
world founded by, and for, women. She is a vocal women’s rights 
champion in the U.S. and around the world. In her legal career, she 
has worked in several incredible positions, including as an Ella 
Barker fellow at the Center for Constitutional Rights, a law clerk at 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, a post-grad fellow at the 
Women’s Refuge Commission, an attorney at the RFK Center for 
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Justice and Human Rights, and she’s currently a human rights attor-
ney at Equality Now. Kate has been actively engaged in the move-
ment to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment since 2012, and she’s 
been engaged in multiple unratified states, including Virginia. She 
has written on the ERA in Teen Vogue, “Why the United States Con-
stitution Needs an Equal Rights Amendment,” and in The Advocate, 
“The ERA is Queer, and We Are Here for It.” She recently appeared 
in the MSNBC documentary “The Happened,” about the original 
fight for the ERA and is creating a podcast about the ERA called 
“Ordinary Equality” to be released in January 2020.  
 
Um, our final panelist this morning is Representative Abigail Span-
berger. Um, U.S. Representative Abigail Spanberger represents Vir-
ginia’s 7th Congressional District, which is comprised of ten counties 
throughout central Virginia. She began her career in public service, 
first serving as a federal agent with the U.S. Postal Inspection Ser-
vice, investigating money laundering and narcotics cases, and then 
serving as a case officer with the Central Intelligence Agency. In the 
private sector, Representative Spanberger worked with colleges and 
universities to help them diversify their student bodies and increase 
graduation rates. Representative Spanberger serves on the U.S. House 
Committee on Agriculture and the U.S. House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs. Representative Spanberger grew up in Henrico County, uh, 
with the ERA in her DNA. Um, her mother was, and still is, a leader 
for the cause in Virginia and throughout the nation. She earned her 
B.A. at the University of Virginia and her M.B.A. at a dual degree 
program between Purdue University’s Krannert School and the 
G.I.S.M.A. Business School in Hanover, Germany. Representative 
Spanberger resides in Glen Allen, Henrico County, Virginia, with her 
husband, Adam, and their three children.  
 
So, thank you again, all, for being with us this morning. We’re 
pleased to have you. Um, I thought I would start us off with a ques-
tion to Toby. Um, could you tell us what the ERA is and what it is in-
tended to accomplish? 
  
Toby Heytens: Well, thanks. Um, that’s both a big question, and a 
question that I suspect many people in this room know far more about 
than I. Um, but, in . . . in the hopes that it is less familiar to some of 
you, because I think this is an outreach event, and we’re hoping to 
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bring in people, so in . . . in the hope that it’s less familiar to some 
people in the room, I’ll give some basic background, uh, just to make 
sure that we’re all on the same page for the rest of the day. Uh, the 
Equal Rights Amendment is a proposed amendment to the United 
States Constitution. It’s quite short. It’s quite simple. I’ll just read it. 
Uh, Section One says, “The quality of rights under the law shall not 
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account 
of sex.” Section Two said that, “Congress would have the authority to 
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” 
And then, Section Three said that it would take effect two years after 
the date of the ratification. Um, so, I mean, it’s pretty short. It’s pretty 
straightforward. The text is pretty clearly modeled on a number of 
amendments that are already in the United States Constitution, uh, 
and that is not an accident, that was by design. The drafters of the 
ERA very deliberately modified it after some existing, uh, quality ex-
tending amendments that are already part of the Constitution. Um, 
and this is sort of a really interesting on-going constitutional story be-
cause the ERA was proposed by Congress, uh, in 1971, uh, in 1972, 
and there was an active ratification period between 1972 and 1979, 
uh, in which thirty-five states ratified the ERA. Uh, thirty-Five is un-
fortunately less than thirty-eight, which is the number needed to rat-
ify a constitutional amendment. Um, there was originally a deadline, 
that deadline was extended, uh, at least once, possibly more, but then 
the deadline eventually . . . the most recent deadline expired, uh, in 
1982. Since then, though, there have been efforts, uh, to get addi-
tional states to ratify. In terms of the question of what, um, the 
amendment was intended to accomplish, uh, I . . . I think it’s pretty 
straightforward. Uh, it’s in the text of section one. It is intended . . . 
because the sur— . . . it’s surprising to at least a number of people, 
and it was surprising to me when I first learned it, that with the ex-
ception of the guarantee of the right to vote, there is no express tex-
tual commitment to sex equality in the U.S. Constitution outside the 
19th Amendment, which after all wasn’t ratified until the 20th cen-
tury, so I think the first and foremost goal, I think in the words of my 
former boss Justice Ginsberg, is simply to recognize the principle of 
sex and gender equality expressly in the text of the United States 
Constitution. Um, and even if you didn’t think it would change any 
legal doctrine whatsoever, I think you could take the view that that is 
an important thing to do in and of itself. Um, but there are of course 
other goals. The goals, of course, once it’s in the Constitution, it’s in 
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the Constitution, and it’s not subject to being interpreted out of the 
Constitution. Um, and there’s a lot of other questions, but I think 
that’s . . . that’s the basic big picture idea, and I’ll kick it back to Jes-
sie. 
  
Samuels: Great. All right. Thank you. We’ve got another background 
one for you.  
 
Heytens: Great.  
 
Samuels: Um, [laughter] could you, again, just maybe bring some of 
us up to speed about, generally, how is the Constitution amended?  
 
Heytens: Sure. Uh, fairly straightforward. I’ve talked about it a little 
bit. So, there are actually two ways, although in practice one of them 
is only ever used. So, there’s essentially two parts to creating a Con-
stitutional Amendment. There’s the proposal, and there’s the ratifica-
tion, and actually the Constitution in Article V sets out two different 
options for both proposing and ratifying, but in practice we tend to 
only use one of them. Um, so, at the proposal, it says that either, uh, 
Congress can propose it by a two-thirds vote in both houses. This 
doesn’t go to the President, it’s not legislation. So, the President, un-
like legislation, has no role in the Constitutional ratification process. 
So, it needs two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress. Alterna-
tively, the States can petition Congress to establish a Constitutional 
Convention to propose Amendments. That has never actually hap-
pened. Um, and not just hasn’t happened with regards to the ERA, to 
the best of my knowledge it has never happened. Um, but one story. 
A former student of mine wrote a paper about this when he was an 
undergrad at UVA, and it was basically, the sense is that both the 
States and Congress are afraid of what a Constitutional Convention 
might do. If anybody ever empowered a Constitutional Convention to 
propose Amendments, I think the fear is, God only knows what those 
people would propose, so let’s just not let them do that. Um, so then 
the process after that is ratification by the states, and this is the place 
where the ERA has been stopped for a while. Um, the Constitution 
requires three-quarters of all States to ratify. Obviously, as the num-
ber of States increased, the number of States to ratify required. So, in 
our fifty State, uh, world, it’s thirty-eight states you need to ratify. 
And again, there’s an interesting thing, um, the Constitution says you 
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can do that in one of two ways, uh, and this is actually at the election 
of Congress, you can either have ratification by state legislatures, 
which is the route Congress chose for the ERA, or you can have rati-
fied by conventions within the States. Um, I don’t know how often 
that option’s been used, that wasn’t the option selected for the ERA. 
Um, so, basically two steps: proposal, ratification. The ERA is cur-
rently stuck in the ratification, uh, part of that.  
 
Samuels: Excellent. Thank you, um, for giving us some goo—. . . 
helpful background with that. Um, Kate we are going to turn it over 
to you, if you could tell us kind of more specifically about the history 
of the ERA itself, um, and the three-state strategy. 
 
Kelly: Yeah. Good morning, everyone. [Throat clearing] Sorry about 
that. Um, so, . . . first a tiny bit of background, um, about the, just the 
Constitution in general. Um, the constitution, uh, as originally written 
and as Toby pointed out, excluded women, but this was actually an 
intentional choice not just, uh, sort of happened because of the times 
and blah blah blah. Um, the original Constitution, as pointed out in 
the book Equal Means Equal, which if you are very interested in the 
Equal Rights Amendment, you should read. It’s by Jessica Neuwirth 
and talks about the history of the ERA as long . . . as well as, uh, the 
many ways in which, uh, it could potentially, uh, help women. And, 
in the book, it talks about the original Constitution was in part mod-
eled after what the Iroquois Confederacy, and that tribe, uh, included 
women as full participants. Uh, they were equals in all council and 
tribal matters, uh, and so, essentially what the founders . . . or the 
framers of the Constitution did was copy and paste that idea but strip 
out women. Uh, in fact Benjamin Franklin brought two representa-
tives from this tribe to the original Constitutional Convention, and 
they asked where women were. Um, they were concerned or inter-
ested that there would be any sort of a gathering with only men. Uh, 
and in addition to that, Abigail Adams, uh, wrote famously letter to 
her husband about the Constitution, and she said, “Where are the la-
dies?” Uh, in fact, if you read that letter, it’s much much much more, 
uh, power— . . .  powerful and assertive. It goes on to say that 
women will not beholden . . . be beholden to a Constitution in which 
they are not represented. Uh, and, so, there were women advocating 
at the time to be included in the Constitution, and those cries for, uh, 
full inclusion were ignored. So, women were intentionally left of the 
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Constitution upon its framing. This was not an oversight. Um, I think 
that’s important to understand because what we’re doing is not only 
fixing, you know, this accidental oversight. What we are doing is 
the . . . uh, fixing this intentional exclusion, and this foundational 
mistake of leaving women out. Um, and, so, uh, the Equal Rights 
Amendment was written and envisioned before the 19th Amendment 
as part of this ongoing, uh, . . . ongoing crusade to include women in 
our most foundational document. So, Alice Paul, who was a big, uh, 
part of the suffrage movement and a large reason as to why we have 
the 19th Amendment, why we can vote in this country, uh, she fol-
lowed Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady-Staunton and all the 
other women, uh, who fought to get the original 19th Amendment 
with a more powerful tactic and some really extreme . . . or they 
viewed as extreme . . . uh, ways of doing and being an activist that 
she learned in the U.K., she came back and then really ramped up the 
fight for suffrage here.  
 
So, Alice Paul went to law school, um, at American University 
Washington College of Law, um, my alma mater. She went to law 
school specifically to learn about the Constitution and to learn how to 
write the Equal Rights Amendment. So, she wrote the Equal Rights 
Amendment and, uh, . . . with other people in the movement at the 
time, she wrote the Equal Rights Amendment and then they proposed 
it publicly for the first time in 1923 in Seneca Falls. Seneca Falls is 
where the very first Women’s Rights Convention, uh, and so, this 
was the anniversary of Seneca Falls, they proposed the Equal Rights 
Amendment. The Equal Rights Amendment was introduced in every 
Congress until 1972 and for all of that time, for most of that time, 
was on both political parties’ platforms. So, it was not seen as a parti-
san issue until 1972, it was on the Republican Party platform, and, so, 
it was supported . . . it had wide support in the women’s movement, 
really it picked up in the 1960s and ‘70s, so did the support for the 
Equal Rights Amendment, and it was passed in 1972 in Congress. 
Um, as we have learned, uh, there . . . they fell three states short. So, 
the deadline, uh, was extended in 1978 before it expired in 1979, and 
they . . . they extended to 1982. The reason they extended it to 1982, 
which seems like kind of a weird period of time, like, we’re just go-
ing to do it from ‘79 to ‘82, like, why that period of time? Um, and as 
I’ve been going through on my podcast, I’ve been interviewing a lot 
of folks who fought for the original, um, Equal Rights Amendment, 
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and the reason that they did that, it was sort of a concession because 
the state senates would go longer than that period, so they knew that 
they could extend that deadline, but it wouldn’t threaten the people in 
the seats in the state senates that were blocking ratification. So, es-
sentially, like, it’s a concession because there were hundred of thou-
sands . . . literally one hundred thousand people marching on Wash-
ington, demanding a deadline extension, but then they knew [snaps] 
the state senates would not be in danger, those seats would not be in 
danger, and they wouldn’t actually ratify. So, it was actually a . . . 
sort of a dastardly deed in order to extend but not get it ratified. And 
all of these political decisions, that seem sort of random, are actually 
very intentional to leave women out, and I think its really important 
to under— . . . understand that context.  
 
So, we fell 3 states short, um, or we were intentionally, uh, . . . 
the . . . the . . . the anti-ERA movement really ramped up and it . . . 
that was the same time when all of these culture war arguments were 
really reaching this crescendo, and, so, there were anti-ERA move-
ments, um, in all the unratified states that just picked up a huge 
amount of momentum, led by many, uh . . . by many groups includ-
ing, uh, Phyllis Schlafly’s Stop ERA. So, we fell 3 states short. Fast 
forward a long time . . . essentially the movement, for all intents and 
purposes, saw a lull. There were many people who never gave up, 
um, but they . . . the huge, massive movement for the ERA . . . if 
you’re born after 1982 . . . you probably don’t know about the ERA, 
and that’s not your fault, it’s just that the movement really, uh, hit 
this lull, or died. Um, and so in, uh, fast forward . . . I’ll skip 
along . . . and I could talk about this for a long time but listen to the 
podcast. Um, but, uh, fast forward, uh, the Madison Amendment. A 
lot of folks have heard about the Madison Amendment. So, the Madi-
son Amendment was originally posed . . . proposed by James Madi-
son, uh, and, he, uh, . . . it was about congressional pay and when, uh, 
Congress can extend their own pay. Uh, that . . . it actually owes, 
law . . . this is a fascinating story . . . a law student did a paper about 
the Madison Amendment and got a “C,” was outraged, um, that this 
law professor said that, you know, it was this totally outlandish idea, 
blah blah blah, so started a campaign to ratify the Madison Amend-
ment, which worked. Uh, and, so, additional states . . . the Madison 
Amendment was originally written 203 years later, uh, in the early 
1990’s, the Madison Amendment was amended, and, and . . . 
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successfully amended and added to the U.S. Constitution. So, this 
sort of re-sparked the imagination and, um, drive between . . . behind 
the ERA folks, which had originally said, “Oh so much time has 
passed,” and, you know, “It’s been since 1982, and its been a dec-
ade,” and “It’s too late.” Um, and then an Amendment that has ex-
isted for over 200 years gets ratified, and ERA are like, no, ok, if 200 
years is not too much, ten is not too much, neither is twenty, neither 
is thirty. Um, so that really re-sparked what’s called the three state 
solution discussions  
 
Um, so the three-state solution . . . the idea behind the three state so-
lution is to get those additional three states that we were lacking in 
the original ratification process . . . and we can talk more about um, 
you know, the deadline issue and the rescissions issue, and there are, 
you know, euphemistically, some outstanding legal issues. [Laughter] 
Um, that’s what I tell people. I’m like, if you want to know more, I’ll 
tell you more, but there are some outstanding legal issues. [Laughter] 
Um, so the idea to get the additional three states to ratify and then put 
the sucker in the Constitution. Um, Nevada ratified . . . Pat Spearman, 
who is here and going to be speaking later, is a senator, uh, a queer, 
black, incredible senator from Nevada. She, uh, ramped up the effort 
to get the ERA ratified in 2017, kind of out of nowhere, like, uh, you 
know . . . 8I was in Utah at the time, and I wrote the ratification bill. 
We also had one in Utah in 2017, didn’t get out of committee. Um, so 
they were successful, but out of nowhere, a new state ratifies, and 
everyone is like the three state solution is . . . maybe real? Like, uh. 
Then, in 2018 . . . and we have Linda Coberly and other folks here 
from Illinois . . . Um, in 2018 Illinois ratified, and all of a sudden, 
we’re one state away from ratification. There are 13 states left. Um, 
our . . . I’ve . . . I have worked in many of the states, um, including 
Arizona and Utah and Georgia and North Carolina and let me tell 
you, Virginia is our best bet. Um. [Applause] Uh, I applaud the ef-
forts in all of the states, and all of them are vitally important, and 
even after we get the 38th state, we need people to continue to ratify, 
um, but the most realistic, most vibrant, most, uh, possible state is 
definitely Virginia. 
 
Samuels: Great, thank you. On that note, um, you . . . can you fill us 
in on where are we in Virginia, what’s the history in Virginia?  
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Kelly: Yes!  
 
Samuels: Um, why . . . why are we in this, uh, important position 
that we are in?  
 
Kelly: Sure. I’ll be brief because I’m not from Virginia, um, so alt-
hough I did live here for five years, uh, during law school but I, uh, 
so . . . interestingly enough, Virginia has an interesting history with, 
um, ratifications in general. Relevant is that the 19th Amendment, uh, 
which gave women to the right to vote, was not ratified in Virginia 
until February of 1952. Um, so that’s after 1920, uh, when everyone 
else ratified it. Uh, so, uh, so the Virginia legislature decided that 
women, uh, deserved the right the vote in 1952 uh, it is, uh, nev— . . . 
better late than never, I guess, um, when it comes to ratification, and I 
think it’s a really great, important, uh, historical movement, to be this 
38th state, to be really key, um. So, the ratification, uh, in Vir-
ginia . . . correct me if I’m wrong, Eileen Davis and other people 
know much more about this, um, but has already passed six times in 
the Virginia senate, uh, so . . . and that’s with a Republican, um, ma-
jority in the Senate and uh, uh, Sturtevant was the Senate GOP spon-
sor last year, so again not a partisan issue. Republicans support this 
issue in Illinois. It also had, um, a Republican, uh, co-sponsor, Steve 
Anderson, who will be speaking later . . . so, uh, it’s passed six times 
in the Virginia Senate but never been voted on by the House of Dele-
gates. Um, we came very, very, very, heartbreakingly close last year. 
Um, and, uh, because of this one-seat majority and because of the 
leadership in the specific . . . not the party, but the leadership of the 
house, uh, the Virginia House of Delegates did not actually vote, uh, 
last year, so there’s an exciting possibility with, um, upcoming elec-
tions, again, I will say, not always on party lines. Um, pro-equality 
candidates in Virginia are going to put this across the line, um, and 
that includes, uh, people of both parties. Um, I’m not just saying that 
because I work at a non-profit that’s a nonpartisan organization. I 
think it’s really important for the larger national fight, for us to 
acknowledge that people, um, across party lines can support equality 
and should support equality because we have to get . . . as Abigail 
will speak about . . . we have to get these deadline elimination bills 
across the finish line, um, and that will include, uh, people of both 
parties as well.  
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Samuels: Okay, thank you. Um, so, Congresswoman Spanberger, I 
was wondering if you could tell us, um, what it was like kind of here 
on the ground, um, growing up in a home fighting for the ERA in 
Virginia [laughter] and if you have any stories you might want to 
share with us [laughter].   
 
Spanberger: [laughter] Uh, so I am so pleased to be here, the panel 
has been amazing so far. I could listen to you both speak for quite 
some time, so, um, thank you. Thank you for putting this event on. 
You know, it’s interesting, uh, and and . . . your question is a clear 
reference to the fact that my mother is Eileen Davis, who has been, 
um, involved in the ERA ratification here in Virginia for a very, very 
long time. So, thank you. [Applause] But the interesting this is, um, 
I’m the oldest of three daughters, and when I was growing up, uh, my 
mother was involved in a variety of different forms of advocacy, al-
ways with a pretty clear feminist orientation, um, and that’s her back-
ground, that’s her pivot, the fact that she has three daughters probably 
was part of that motivation. Um, but, it was actually when I went off 
to school that she got really heavily, heavily involved, and so from a 
story telling standpoint, I would remember coming home to visit, and 
there’s these buttons everywhere, and there’s these fake dollars eve-
rywhere, and I’m thinking isn’t that counterfeiting money, are you 
sure you can you do that? Um, and then I would hear from all of 
these different people about, you know, seeing my mother lug her 
suitcase around on the roll-y cart. Um, but I think that the example 
that she set, and that so many women who have been working on this 
for a really long time set, is that when there’s tenacity involved in a 
fight for basic equality, um, you’ll always be on the right side of his-
tory, and it may take a while, decades, perhaps, um, but . . . but I 
think what I have witnessed in Virginia first as, as a, as a . . . as an 
observer, then as someone getting involved in politics, and then now 
as an elected official, there’s been a tremendous shift in Virginia, and 
I remember a time where it was a couple women, uh, kind of moving 
into retirement, carrying around . . . you know who you are . . . 
[laughter] carrying around their papers and their pins, like knocking 
on doors about the Equal Rights Amendment. And people saying, the 
what? And, and I think from a legislative perspective, and certainly 
now having had the experience of running for office and now being 
in office, there seems to be this idea that we have equality, right? 
Cause we have women in Congress, less than a quarter of us are 
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women, but we have women in congress, we have women doctors, 
and women attorneys, and you have women sort of everywhere, so 
people think we’re at this place, but we’re at this place in part be-
cause we have put this patchwork of laws together, both at the state 
level and at the federal level, to try and protect women in a meaning-
ful way, to try and ensure equality in a meaningful way, but at our 
most basic level, which is the Constitution as the foundation of every 
law written in the United States of America, we do not have constitu-
tional equality. And, so, it’s been interesting to watch the shift that’s 
occurred here in Virginia when it was for a time, uh, . . . and you 
mention anyone born after a certain year of time just never really 
heard about it . . . when there, there was this, uh, this group of 
women, predominately women, who continued this fight, and then 
you hear, uh, different members and I’ve heard them in, in the Vir-
ginia state legislature, getting involved, saying I remember, uh, when, 
uh, when my mother . . . I remember as a child going with my mother 
to rallies in the ‘70s, and I’ve heard Virginia state legislators say 
these things. And, so. at . . . over time, the conversations changed. 
And, what’s been interesting, politically speaking, is now we have 
reached a point where it’s a conversation topic that people in the 
Commonwealth lead with. Uh, I was just at an event recently on be-
half of some state candidates, and I was talking about the, the value 
of getting good legislation out of committee, and I was talking, you 
know, in the federal level, because we saw change in leadership in 
the House of Representatives, we’ve gotten good bills out of commit-
tee, and once you get them out of committee, you can vote. And the 
reason that the Equal Rights Amendment has not passed is because it 
hasn’t gotten a vote, because in the House of Delegates, if it got a 
vote, it would pass. And so, it’s . . . it’s understanding even the rules 
of how things work in our legislative bodies, and, so, you have a bill 
that has bipartisan support, bipartisan support, that literally cannot get 
a vote on the floor of the House of Delegates, because it never gets 
out of committee . . . and, so, I was at this event, and I was talking at 
the federal level, we’ve gotten great bills out of committee: gun vio-
lence prevention bills, the equality act, uh, variety of bills that are re-
ally important, that have bipartisan support but have previously been 
killed in committee in prior congresses, and, so, I said, uh, the value 
of making a real change in the House of Delegates and in the state 
senate is we’ll be able to get these good bills out of committee, and I 
start saying, you know, related to healthcare, related to gun violence 
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prevention, and related to the environment, and somebody pretty 
much heckled me from the back, and said “and the ERA” as though I 
was remiss because it was not the first thing I had mentioned [laugh-
ter]. Um, so I’m admitting that to you cause you’ll probably get a 
phone call, mom, [laughter] just want to make sure you’re aware. 
Um, but this is a super shift because I remember when it was a lonely 
endeavor for people who were committed to equality where they 
were starting in the basement, pretty much, saying this is what the 
Equal Rights Amendment is, so it’s this thing that happened in the 
‘70s, but it never really got over the line, and it’s this thing that peo-
ple should really care about. Um, and, so, now we’ve gotten to a 
point where you can be in a room full of Virginians, pretty much any-
where, and you will hear people talk about the Equal Rights Amend-
ment, and so this shift, and, and, and this movement, has been tre-
mendous, um, and I . . . I think it is amazing what a bipartisan issue it 
is, and it is really amazing how people are now recognizing that some 
of our rights are fragile, and, and much of what we’re seeing in our 
country and in our world, we . . . we want to make sure that, as 
Americans, our most basic rights are in the Constitution and that we 
can put a patchwork of protections in place but when they expire, and 
when congress doesn’t vote on reauthorizations, or when there’s a 
change in leadership, be it with our legislative bodies or within our 
White House, all of that becomes far more tenuous. And, so, I think 
it’s been really amazing to watch this shift, right here in the Com-
monwealth of Virginia, and knowing that we can, and will be, the 
38th state to ratify, is really powerful.  
 
Samuels: Excellent. Thank you. Um, and on that note, um, you’ve 
explained that we’re in a hopeful moment now and, um, that there 
may be some procedural issues we need to, you know, work through, 
but, um, do you see any other kind of issues or challenges on the 
horizon that we should be focused on between now and February? 
 
Spanberger: Um, well, so, um, I’ll speak as a Virginian, as a legisla-
tor who represents folks in Virginia, and then I’ll also speak on the 
federal side. I think it’s important that we continue to make this an is-
sue. Uh, I think your point was excellent, that this is a bipartisan is-
sue. This is, uh . . . this is a legislative priority that we should make it 
known that we as voters are voting on, that we, as constituents of our 
state delegates and state senators, recognize and that we make it clear 
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that this is a vitally important issue to the people of Virginia. Um, be-
cause, while I do think there will be a substantial shift in who is rep-
resenting the Commonwealth of Virginia come January of 2020, it is 
important that every person who is in the state legislature understands 
that this is a priority issue, regardless of party, regardless of their his-
torical support, or lack thereof, that they recognize that the will of the 
people is one of equality, and the will of the people is that we, as Vir-
ginians, demonstrate what is important and what we want to see. 
Now, at the federal level, we’re seeing a shift on this. And, and . . . I 
guess that shift is perhaps not the right word, but an increased, uh . . . 
an increased acknowledgement of where we are. Um, and, and 
that . . . we have two bills in the House of Representatives, one is, uh, 
an ERA amendment . . . so it’s basically a start over . . . is one of the 
bills. We also have a ratification deadline elimination. Um, and that 
is . . . it has tremendous support in the House. Even this year we’ve 
done a number of press conferences and events around it, uh, Con-
gresswoman Speer, uh, is the one who is leading that because there is 
some of this . . . and I’ll let the attorneys speak to it a bit more . . . but 
there is an excuse that you see so frequently at the state levels, “Oh, 
well there’s a deadline, and we missed the deadline, so why . . . we 
just can’t. Sorry, guys, we can’t.” Um, and, so, at the federal level 
there’s a movement among us, uh, to remove that ratification dead-
line and to make it clear that we . . . we won’t let that be the excuse, 
um, that equality really has no deadline, that equality should’ve been 
done decades ago, but that if it hasn’t, that we’ll still move forward 
on that. And, so, I’m proud as a federal legislator to be part of that ef-
fort. Um, but I . . . I think that to really make the change, we need to 
be vocal in the fact that this is an issue that is of the utmost priority, 
that anyone [laughter] who knows a woman really should care about 
the fact that there’s equality, uh, within the world, um, and, and cer-
tainly within the United States Constitution, as an American, that’s a 
priority. Um, yep. 
 
Samuels: Great, thank you. Um, Kate, I have a question for you. So, 
um, say we happen to be, or you charge forward successfully, what 
changes? Um, are, are there changes to the law, or are we, um, is it a 
basic kind of statement or are there technical changes that are on the 
horizon? 
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Kelly: Um, so this is actually one of the hardest. Folks have been on 
the ground working on the ERA . . . this has actually one of the hard-
est things to talk about because, um . . . especially as a lawyer be-
cause I’m like, well on one hand, it could do this, on the other hand, 
it could do this . . .  
Um, because it’s a constitutional amendment, it’s not a concrete piece 
of legislation, so when you think about other amendments and what 
they mean, it took many, many years, if not hundreds of years, um, in 
order for them to become what they are today. The First Amendment, 
the Second Amendment, you think about the amendments that people 
know about, this take . . . took years of legislation and litigation, um, 
to make them what they are. So, um, what will change from day to 
night in the equal rights, uh . . . with the Equal Rights Amendment, I 
think are two things, one thing is that, we, . . . in the United States 
Constitution, when a kid picks it up, in school and reads it, um, gen-
der equality will be clearly reflected as an American value to every 
American. Um, and that is a huge, monumental, very, very key 
change. Um, when I ask people, you know, uh, is gender equality an 
American value, the vast majority of people say yes, that they value 
equality, that that is re—, re— . . . reflected in our values as an Amer-
ican people, so that will change from day to night. I think the second 
thing that will, and that lawyers like to talk about a lot, uh, is the level 
of scrutiny. So, um, a lot of you are in law school, um, or lawyers, uh, 
and even if you are, you might not have even understood scrutiny be-
cause it’s very intentionally opaque, um, and difficult . . . difficult to 
understand. Uh, and, so, essentially though, what that means is that 
the cat . . . the only category that exists now for what’s called inter-
mediate scrutiny, uh, is, is gender, um, and every other category 
that’s protected under the fourteenth amendment, um, either re . . . re-
ceives this lower rational basis or this higher strict scrutiny, so 
that’s . . . strict scrutiny is race, religion, national origin, these other 
categories, it gets harder to keep those laws on the books. For inter-
mediate scrutiny, um, essentially, it’s just easier to pass and keep sex-
ist laws on the books, um, so that will change, uh. For all intents and 
purposes, the hope is that will, the equal, . . . the passage, ratification, 
and full integration into the Constitution of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment will put gender into this, uh, strict scrutiny category. I think, 
um, and I argue in the piece that I wrote, um, called “The ERA is 
Queer,” that the ERA will protect, uh, not only women, but people of 
all marginalized genders, uh, and that is something that we can aspire 
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to, um, for the future. But, uh, I think those are the two things that 
will change immediately, and then, um, I think the . . . we’ll have to 
spend the time, and effort, and build an infrastructure . . . I call the 
ERA, a foundation, um, the ERA is a foundation upon which we can 
build the scaffolding and the structure of permanent protections . . . 
permanent, robust protections for women and people of all marginal-
ized genders in the future. So, we can litigate, and, the second clause 
of the Equal Rights Amendment doesn’t quite get as much airtime, 
um, but I think it’s like the special surprise of the Equal Rights 
Amendment, um, which is that Congress can pass laws to enforce the 
Equal Rights Amendment. Right now, Congress . . . our Congress 
members are bound by a pretty limited restriction of what they can 
pass laws on. For example, I work on many issues and one of them is 
female genital mutilation in the United States. Um, it’s a much wider 
problem than most people recognize, and there is a federal law that 
was passed in the ‘90s to ban female genital mutilation. It was re-
cently struck down by a district court judge, um, who said that not 
that FGM is okay, or that it’s permissible, or any of those things, but 
that the law was unconstitutional because it has nothing to do . . . or, 
not enough to do with interstate commerce. So, there are only certain 
things that the federal government can do, and according to this 
judge, banning female genital mutilation is not one of them. And, so, 
the Equal Rights Amendment will give incredible, new, energetic 
legislators with great ideas, a hook, a base, from which to pass an en-
tirely new slate of robust laws to protect women, and that doesn’t ex-
ist now. So, this is like, opening a huge door, violence against 
women, you know, Title IX, Title VII, all of these things that are un-
der attack, or being reduced, or limited, are kind of these temporary 
protections, and not, uh . . . not as, as comprehensive as we would 
like. The Equal Rights Amendment will give these new, young, in-
credible, female legislators an opportunity and, um, the possibility of 
passing more robust legislation to protect us all. That will take time, 
um, but without the ERA, it’s not possible. 
  
Samuels: Great. Um, on that note, let’s stay kind of on the forward-
looking logistics front. Um, Toby, a practical question for you. Say 
we call a special session and ratify tomorrow, um, what happens? 
What happens the next day? 
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Heytens: So, I think this is a place where it’s important to sort of rec-
ognize that, uh, fights for rights, for advancing equality, are never 
over, one makes progress, but they’re never done. Uh, and I really 
mean this not as a downer, but as a . . . as a call to action. Um, it’s not 
going to be over the day after this happens. I hope very much that it 
does happen at the beginning part of next year, but it is important to 
realize this will not be over, uh, in January of 2020, or in February of 
2020. Uh, Virginia would be the 38th state to ratify, uh, but then 
there would be, shall we say, a number of unresolved legal issues. 
Um, but . . . but this is a place where there is an interaction between 
the legal and political issues because it’s also true that continued ac-
tion and continued activism could take some of these issues off the 
table. So, one of the issues: Virginia would be the 38th state to ratify. 
Um, there are five states that have purported to rescind their ratifica-
tions. Now, there’s, uh, . . . so during the process, the lengthy process 
of the ERA, the ratification process and the fight for it and the fight 
against it, during that period of time, five states that had ratified pur-
ported to un-ratify, and there’s some difficult and interesting legal is-
sues about the legal effectiveness of rescission, but that could be 
mooted, because if we just have six more states ratified that issue 
drops off the table. Um, so, I mean, there’s two routes: there’s de-
fending the argument that the existing ratifications are invalid, and 
there’s the political route of just ratifying five more states, and that 
issue drops of the table.  
 
Similarly, there’s been this discussion about the deadline. There is a 
question about the validity of the deadline in the first instance, and 
we can try to argue that the deadline is itself invalid, but if the dead-
line extends . . . if congress were to pass a re— . . . resolution extend-
ing the deadline, the question about the validity of the expiration 
would drop off the table and no longer be an issue. Now, there would 
still be another issue about whether the continued expansion would 
be valid or not but then there’s the other solution, which is to start 
back at the beginning and ratify again because that would elimi-
nate . . . Now, there’s tradeoffs to all of these things. Some of these 
things take longer, some of these things are more in the policy realm, 
some of them more in the legal realm, but I, I think the bottom line is, 
um, it’s not going to be over, over, over until it’s over, over, over, 
[laughter], and until it’s over, over, over . . . I mean, it’s over, over, 
over when it’s in people’s pocket Constitutions, and I guess my 
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advice there would be, until it is over, over, over, the answer is which 
strategy should we pursue? I would say: all of them. Pursue all of 
them until it’s over, over, over, because you don’t really know.  
 
[Applause] 
 
Samuels: Excellent, thank you. Um, we will maybe wrap up this 
morning with, um, hearing from all three of you on, um, lessons from 
the history of the ERA movement that you want to share, um, . . . in 
particular, if you have, um, I guess Toby . . . maybe another message 
for, um, young lawyers or professionals that . . . to take away, kind 
of, from our chat this morning. So, uh, why don’t we start with the 
Congresswoman?  
 
Spanberger: Sure, thank you. I think the . . . the thoughts that I 
would want to leave you with today are to continue what you are do-
ing, to ensure that people in your community recognize that this is an 
issue that motivates you as a voter, that this, as a constituent, is an is-
sue that you want your legislators to prioritize and find as important 
as you do. And, and, that should be done in advocacy, in letter writ-
ing, in phone calls. Uh, as a member of congress, I can tell you that 
those letters, those phone calls, they matter. Understanding what it is 
that people I represent care about matters. And, so, while this issue 
has come to the forefront in discussions throughout the Common-
wealth of Virginia, you cannot over state how important this issue is, 
and, so, I recommend that anyone as an engaged constituent, as a citi-
zen, as a voter, make this a priority issue, and make sure that people 
understand why it’s important. I think that much of the, the female 
genital mutilation, uh, aspect, or, example, is a really good one. So, 
anytime we were putting forth legislation, we have to get a report that 
it’s constitutionally valid, right? That any legislation we are propos-
ing has a constitutional nexus, and this is a tricky one, because you 
end up looking at interstate commerce as a reason why you’re trying 
to protect children and women from mutilation, right? Where it could 
be much simpler, it could be more basic than that, it could be really 
that you shouldn’t . . . that on the basis of sex, someone should not be 
treated differently. Um, and, so, it’s a very basic issue. Voices matter 
on this issue. Um, this is a place where we have seen a large shift in 
the conversation, to Toby’s point, we need to continue, because even 
if . . . or, even when the General Assembly votes and this gets out of 
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committee, and the House of Delegates, it isn’t over. At that point, 
now, we are opening the conversation far beyond the boundaries of 
the Commonwealth of Virginia, and it becomes a national issue 
again. Um, because once Virginia ratifies, it will be a national discus-
sion, and so it’s going to matter in 2020. It matters what our senators 
think of this. It matters what our members of Congress . . . well if you 
live in the seventh district, you’re good, I promise, um . . . but beyond 
that, it matters that our members of the House recognize that while 
this may not have been an issue, um, in their state for decades, either 
because they ratified, or because they killed it and didn’t talk about it 
for decades, that in fact, it is now a national issue, it’s an important 
one, and it’s an important one because Virginia led the way. And I’ll 
end with a little story. Um, in the . . . I have a dear colleague from 
New Jersey, and we sometimes talk a lot about what’s happening in 
each other’s states, and I said that, uh, the 2019 elections are so, so 
very important because as goes Virginia, so goes the nation. I said, 
you know, as people say. And she says, no one says that. [Laughter] 
And I said, well, in Virginia we say that. [Laughter] Uh, so . . . so 
when we’re thinking about this, you know, as goes Virginia, so goes 
the nation, this is our chance to really be an example, to stand up for 
equality, um, to stand up for gender equality and, and, and to stand up 
to make sure that our voices are heard on this issue. But it is just the 
very, very beginning of the discussion that will continue because, you 
know, the discussions related to . . . to equality do not stop and end 
with constitutional equality regardless of sex. It continues on beyond 
that, and it’s a long-term conversation that we need to continue hav-
ing. Um, and we’re getting it started in Virginia, and it will be a na-
tional issue once the ERA is ratified in early 2020 . . . er, excuse me, 
passes in the state legislature in early 2020. Uh, but at that point we 
need to continue, uh, because that’s when the conversation pivots na-
tionwide, and, so, be prepared for that longer conversation. It’s going 
to be an exciting one, and it’s valuable, and it’s valuable to everyone 
in this room, and it’s valuable to the next generation because the 
basic point of when we’re . . . the next time I visit a middle school 
and I have 7th graders . . . and this is true . . . pull out their Constitu-
tions because they’re studying civics in the 7th grade and 8th grade. 
The idea that there would be a room full of kids, boys and girls, that 
see that there’s Constitutional equality for women, that is powerful, 
that is important, and that . . . that will change and improve upon the 
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culture of this country and the recognition that anyone can be any-
thing and can do anything. 
 
[Applause]  
 
Kelly: I would say two things. One is, uh, the Equal Rights Amend-
ment is the only chance, uh, any of us are probably going to have to 
change the U.S. Constitution. Um, it’s unlikely there’ll be a Constitu-
tional Convention anytime soon, despite how many people in Vir-
ginia like talking about that, um, uh, and in other states. Uh, this is it. 
This is the chance that we have to change the Constitution. This is the 
most consequential vote any legislature will have in their lifetime. 
Uh, this is a chance we have to put our self in the most foundational 
document in our country. I think a lesson that we can learn from the 
past, and it is vitally important going forward, is, um, the concept of 
intersectionality. I think we need to be open and inclusive when we 
talk about who will be protected from the Equal Rights Amendment, 
and we have to make that a reality. Um, the reality on the ground is 
the . . . the Equal Rights Amendment does not include the word 
“women.” It says on the “basis of sex,” and, so, that, I think, is sort of 
this interesting legacy that we adopted from Alice Paul, our problem-
atic fave, um, who did many wonderful things but was also, uh, not 
very inclusive and racist and did things that were, um, troubling and 
set back the movement. And, so, I think we need to think about the 
history of the Equal Rights Amendment and how we can use, um, 
what happened in the past and make it different going forward. So, uh 
one thing is that the . . . the language of the Amendment is on the 
“basis of sex.” I think we need to advocate for that to include all peo-
ple of marginalized genders, including, but not limited to women. 
Um, if you . . . there was a hearing, the first hearing in thirty-six years 
in Congress, um, in the Subcommittee on the Constitution and in the 
Judiciary Committee, and all three of the witnesses for the Equal 
Rights Amendment explicitly acknowledged multiple times that, 
uh, . . .  for example, the they, uh, . . . aspire that the Equal Rights 
Amendment will include transgendered people. I was very proud of 
all the people because they were really being grilled, um, by Republi-
can opposition on that Committee about that issue, but they stood 
firm, and I think we need to stand firm because what we say in Com-
mittee, what we say in the movement will, uh, contribute to how the 
Equal Rights Amendment is in . . . interpreted in the future. So, it’s 
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important to keep in mind a more expansive future. And then, sec-
ondly, I will also say, um, that in every state where I work on the 
Equal Rights Amendment . . . in fact, every state where there is a bill 
now, black women are the women who are, uh, the chief sponsors of 
all the legislation. So, that includes North Carolina, that includes Vir-
ginia, that includes Georgia, that includes, um, . . . in Utah, it’s an 
Asian-American woman. In Arizona, it a native woman. So, women 
of color are really leading the way. I feel like the Equal Rights 
Amendment gets, um, uh, . . . all of the media images about the Equal 
Rights Amendment are largely historical and mostly white women, 
um, but that’s actually not reflective of the people who are paying the 
price and who are really taking this forward, so I think we need to be 
more expansive both about what “on the basis of sex” means and also 
about who is paying the price, who is taking this forward, and whose 
leadership we need to follow into the future.  
 
[Applause] 
 
Samuels: Great, Toby, you have any last words for us? 
 
Heytens: Nope. That was great. 
 
Samuels: Excellent. I think—do we have some questions? 
 
MaryAnn Grover: One question in the audience. 
 
Samuels: Excellent. Thank you. Alright, this is for Representative 
Spanberger. “Do you anticipate that the Resolution eliminating the 
deadline will pass? If so, when? And will it pass in the Senate?” 
 
[Laughter] 
 
Spanberger: Who can predict what the Senate will do? Um, so I 
think this is a which comes first, the chicken or the egg? The House 
of Representatives has been very, very active on a variety of issues. 
Issues of equality are incredibly important to the current, uh . . . the 
current members of the House of Representatives. We passed the 
Equal . . . the Equality Act this spring, which is the largest, most sub-
stantial Civil Rights legislation that we have seen in decades. Um, 
and, so, I do believe that is would absolutely pass the House of 
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Representatives. Um, some urgency might be pushed our way, uh, 
when Virginia passes it. So, at this point we’ve been rocking and roll-
ing on a variety of different focuses. You may not know that if you 
watch the news, but everything from prescription drugs, to, I mean, 
broader healthcare issues, to election security, to gun violence pre-
vention, to environment, to protecting animals. I mean, we . . . the 
gamut of it is our focus, um, but I, I, . . . I do think that the elimina-
tion of the deadline, uh, will be of the upmost importance when Vir-
ginia kind of forces our hands to move on that. It will absolutely pass 
in the House of Representatives. Um, this Senate is one that leaves 
me, uh, questioning whether or not that is in fact the case, but this is 
where we can start now. As constituents, as people who demand that 
our Representatives understand the issues that important, it is never 
too soon to make sure that our Senators recognize that this is an issue 
that’s important to us. It is never soon for your friends in other states 
to let their Senators and their House members know that this is an is-
sue, and very clearly, call out, this is a bill I want you to support, this 
is a bill that is about the equality of people across this country, um, 
and the Constitutional equality of people across this country. Uh, so, 
I, . . . I feel as though it is never good to wage bets on what the 
United States Senate will do in its current . . . it its current, uh, state, 
but I know what we can do, which is we can advocate, advocate, ad-
vocate and make it a real, real issue. Because we’ve seen that. In Vir-
ginia, in 2019, this is one of the number one issues that is driving 
people to the polls, and there’s a lot of issues that are driving people 
to the polls in 2020, but this can certainly be one of them as well. 
 
Samuels: Alright. 
 
Kelly: Um I just want to say . . .  
 
Samuels: Sure, absolutely  
 
Kelly: Um, very quickly. Um, but, uh, so, the, uh, the House Joint 
Resolution 38 is the Resolution to extend the deadline and . . . er, 
eliminate the deadline. Sorry, I always say extend, and I get in trou-
ble. Eliminate the deadline. Um, and then our Senate Joint Resolution 
9 in the Senate is sponsored by Senator Cardon, and he has a biparti-
san sponsorship approach, so the . . . your resolution has, I think, 208 
sponsors, co-sponsors at this point, and the Senate resolution only has 
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four sponsors because he will only add an additional Democrat when 
there is an additional Republican, and there are two Republican co-
sponsors right now, so Markowski and Collins have both signed on, 
but they are desperately looking for additional senators, republican 
senators, to sign on to the bill. And, actually, it won’t take that many. 
I think it’s two, like they need two more, um, and so it’s . . . it’s im-
portant as the issue ramps up, as the House passes it, as the pressure 
extends, um, that folks reach out to republican senators or people 
who are middle of the road or people who support equality or whose 
seats are in danger, or whatever. Uh, it . . .  whatever it takes, uh, in 
order to get those additional . . . because you really don’t know 
what’s going to happen in the Senate, especially leading up to 2020, 
and its going to become a, oh, you know, hopefully it’s going to be-
come a presidential issue in the presidential election, so we can push 
Senators on the, um, on the deadline elimination bill, um, and hope-
fully, you know, cross our fingers. 
 
Spanberger: And this speaks to Toby’s point earlier, which is, you 
know, we should be doing everything. Um, this is something that we 
can be doing now. We don’t have to wait for Virginia to pass the 
Equal Rights Amendment in the state legislature to then turn to the 
federal, uh, side of things for resolution on this kind of outstanding 
question related to the deadline.  
 
Samuels: Great. Well, thank you. I know I learned a lot. I’m sure that 
our attendees did, too. So thank you to our panelists. Please join me, 
uh, in thanking [inaudible] [applause].  
 
MaryAnn Grover: Thank you. We’ll now invite our panelists for 
our next panel to come up. While they are getting settled if you want 
to run to the restroom really quickly. We’re going to pull up a Power-
Point, get them settled, and then we’ll get started on our next panel. 
 
Mary Ann Grover: Hello everybody. Welcome back. I hope you all 
enjoyed your lunch as well as our breakout sessions. Um, I know I 
enjoyed my breakout session with Delegate Jay Jones. It was interest-
ing learning about women in prisons and women incarceration a little 
bit more. Our next panel focuses on equality from the perspective of 
those who have been in the trenches in the equality movement. Mod-
erating this panel will be Michelle Kallen. It’s my distinct pleasure to 
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introduce Michelle, as one of my former bosses and one of my cur-
rent mentors. Michelle is the Deputy Solicitor General for the Com-
monwealth of Virginia. As such, she’s represented the Common-
wealth before the Supreme Court of the United States, the Virginia 
Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit, and other courts. She is a zealous 
advocate for the Equal Rights Amendment and has been the fearless 
leader in planning the event for this team. Please help me in welcom-
ing Michelle, who will introduce our panelists. [Applause]  
 
Michelle Kallen: Thank you. Um, so I’m excited to introduce our 
panel, um, that will talk about the Equality Today and Tomorrow. 
Um, so starting from . . . from closest to me, we have Carol Jenkins. 
Carol is the co-president and CEO of the ERA Coalition and the Fund 
for Women’s Equality. Um, she is a writer, a media analyst, com-
mentator, and speaker on media issues. She was the founding presi-
dent of the Women’s Vegan Center and was on the board of the Afri-
can, um, Medical Research Foundation. Um, Ms. Jenkins enjoys a 
thirty-year award-winning tenure with several New York City news 
departments, including twenty-three years at WNYW-TV, where she 
co-anchored the pivotal six p.m. newscast. She’s also hosted her own 
daily talk show, um, a . . . Carol Jenkins Live on WNYW-TV. 
Um . . . anything you wanted to add?  
 
Carol Jenkins: I think that’s plenty. Thank you. [laughter] 
 
Kallen: Um, next to her we have Andrea Miller. Uh, she is the co-ex-
ecutive director and IT Director at People Commanding Action. Uh, 
and she was the democratic nominee in 2008 for the House of Repre-
sentatives in Virginia’s Fourth District. Um, she was part of Con-
gressman, uh, Dennis Kucinich’s presidential campaign, and, uh, she 
currently co-hosts and organizes, um, and programs PDA’s Blog Talk 
Radio Show. Um, so join us in welcoming Andrea Miller [applause], 
Next to her we have Emilia Couture. She is the outreach director at 
Generation Ratify, which is a youth run group that empowers young 
people to take political action and, they’ve been very active on the, 
um, Equal Rights Amendment. She’s a first-year student at the Uni-
versity of Virginia, and she is, um, a field organizing intern for Parisa 
for Justice. Join us in welcoming Emilia [applause]. And . . . and then 
finally next to her we have Ellie Smeal. Um, she is the, um, uh, Presi-
dent of the National Organization for Women, and she led the cry to 
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ratify the Equal Rights Amendment. Um, she’s also an author, she 
wrote “How and Why Women Will Elect the Next President.” She’s 
been at the forefront of almost every major women’s rights victory 
from the integration of Little League, newspaper help wanted ads, 
and police department, uh, . . . to the passage of landmark legislation 
such as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Equal Credit Act, Civil 
Rights Restoration Act, Violence Against Women Act, just to name a 
few. So, join me in welcoming Ellie [applause].  
 
So, we’re hoping after having these, um, these very, you know, sub-
stantive conversations to just have a panel that tells a little bit of sto-
ries . . . you know, stories, um, of where we were, uh, in terms of 
working on the ERA, um, back in the 1970s and before that and bring 
us to today and see what’s motivating young advocates today, and 
how we can then . . . can help empower and motivate the next genera-
tion of ERA advocates. Um, so to start us off, um, I would just like to 
get a sense from, from . . . from the group how you became interested 
and involved, uh, in the ERA, so, uh, Carol, if you don’t mind start-
ing us off.  
 
Jenkins: Sure, sure. Um, well this is a long story [laughter]. Uh, I 
was born, uh, on a farm in Lowndes County, Alabama in the early, 
uh, . . . in the mid 1940s . . . I’ll say the late 1940s, anyway you get 
the point, the ‘40s. So, imagine rural, poor in Alabama. Uh, uh, I was 
born into a farming family. My grandfather and my grandmother, es-
pecially, actually had fifteen children, uh, one of whom was, uh, my 
mother. Uh, and, uh, we always talked about my feminist grandfather 
because he had nine girls and six boys and from this rural farm in 
Lowndes County, Alabama, he sent all nine girls to college, uh, and 
all six boys stayed, uh, on the farm. And so my, uh, experience, uh, 
in . . . in being in a feminist family like that, where everybody . . . all 
the women went to college, all of the women were expected to work, 
all of the women became the heads of their families, and the next, 
uh, . . . were in charge of the next generations. I saw first hand, uh, 
what, uh, was possible if women were given the same opportunities 
that generally men are given, uh, to be educated, to go into the work-
force, uh, and to be powerful and persuasive, and all of the women in 
my family were . . . you know, were extremely, uh, persuasive in-
cluding our, uh, . . . the one of the oldest sisters, the aunt, who, uh, 
for those next generations, uh, helped raise her younger siblings, 
179
et al.: General Topics
Published by UR Scholarship Repository,
Do Not Delete 4/15/20  2:01 PM 
170 RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW  [Vol. XXIII:iii 
helped sent . . . I had forty first cousins . . . helped send all of us to 
college. And that could be anything from a savings bond to zipping 
up skirts, you know, half-way. I can’t tell you how many skirts I had 
when I went to my freshman year of college that my aunt had sewn 
up on her sewing machine. Um, so, uh, I . . . so that’s the story of . . . 
of seeing what the difference, uh, makes. And then, uh, I spent so 
much time as a reporter, and I saw and covered the stories of inequal-
ity, and it’s, uh, sometimes tragic ends. Uh, so that’s my experience 
with feminism and therefore perceiving the ERA, the Equal Rights 
Amendment, to be the only solution, really, to the remaining prob-
lems that we have. So, you know, I would expect from the 1940s in 
rural Lowndes County, Alabama that we would be farther along now, 
but here we are. So, that’s what I’m working for. 
 
Andrew Miller: Uh, well I didn’t grow up in rural Alabama. I grew 
up in suburban Chicago, and my mother was one of those wild, crazy 
leftist people. Um, she identified as a socialist, but there weren’t any 
socialists in our immediate area. So, I grew up, um, with the com-
munists because that’s who my mother chose to hang out with, and I 
can remember being twelve years old, and my mother shuttling me to 
another very, very affluent white suburb so that we could attend a 
meeting on the Equal Rights Amendment. And, so, um, I remember 
literally for years, we would be the only black faces there. So, one 
day, I asked my mother, “Why do we have to keep going to all these 
places?” And, she said, “well” . . . she said, “We have to keep going 
because as women, we really are superior, but we’re going to have to 
settle for equality.” [Laughter] 
 
Emilia Couture: Um, hi, I’m Emilia. Uh, I’m 18. And, so, my femi-
nist awakening was actually rather recently, um, in 2017 in the wake 
of Donald Trump being elected, unfortunately. Uh, I recall one time I 
was running in my neighborhood, which is fairly affluent, faily lib-
eral in Atlanta, where I grew up, and after the election . . . before the 
election there had been nothing but printed signs . . . and then after 
the election I saw a Donald Trump sign, and I was running, and I was 
thinking like, what are these people teaching their children and like 
what rhetoric are they kind of employing to them? Because I had 
been living in somewhat of a bubble, that I had this kind of illusion of 
equality, and I thought that all of the people around me thought the 
same as I did and thought that I was equal and thought I was equal as 
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a woman and deserved the same rights, uh, but that made me realize 
that I did not and then attending the Women’s March made me kind 
of realize the extent, that this is like a collective pain that people have 
been experiencing for a very long time, and I’m just now coming into 
it. And then when I moved to Virginia, two years ago, I got, um, 
aware of the ERA and the struggle to ratify the ERA in Virginia. And 
then this past summer, my sister founded Generation Ratify, and I 
came on as the Outreach Director. And, so, I’d also like to take this 
moment to thank, um, everyone . . . all the people in this room for be-
ing here, but, specifically, Katie Harnow, uh, Michelle Kallen for in-
viting me to speak on this panel. Eileen Davis, I’m not sure if she’s in 
here, but she’s been an amazing support, and also, um, Kate Kelly as 
well because I am very young, and I so appreciate the support of eve-
ryone and the work of everyone who has come before me because 
that is so very important. Thank you.  
 
Jenkins: And I told her, and I said, you know, you’re the reason 
we’re doing all of this, and you know, she’s proving that it’s worth it, 
right. [laughter] 
 
Kallen: Ellie, do you want chime in about what . . . what initially mo-
tivated you to get involved? 
 
Ellie Smeal: Well, um, it’s a long time so, um. I’m trying do a . . . do 
a thing, do it short. Um, I probably would’ve been a lawyer if I had 
been a man, but I was talked out of law school and I ended up, 
um, . . . because they said that, uh, women would only be able to do 
research or, um, teach or be a law librarian. I didn’t like any of those 
options, so I ended up going to graduate school, uh, in political sci-
ence and, um, . . . and basically I studied the women’s movement be-
fore, um, I had, uh, my chief, uh, doctoral committee person, who 
wanted me to do the women’s studies. I was convinced . . . I wasn’t 
convinced if I should do women’s . . . the women’s movement or do 
environmental, uh, problems because I was living in Pittsburgh by 
this time, and, um, it was a mess, environmentally. Gas was one of 
the names of the group you couldn’t breathe, uh, etc. So, anyway, and 
I . . . but I was looking for the women’s movement, and I couldn’t 
find any. [laughter] So, I went to environmental . . . uh, I can’t . . . I 
think it was Environmental Action, some name like that . . . no, it was 
Environment Pittsburgh, and they wanted something done routine 
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and . . . which isn’t what I wanted to do exactly, but they said, could I 
bring this piece of . . . a document and get it copied . . . and in those 
days you couldn’t get things copied so easily . . . I go there and this 
woman says to me . . . it was supposed to be KNOW which I didn’t 
know what it was . . . and she says to me, “Uh, what’s a good woman, 
nice woman like you doing something like this? We need you for the 
women’s movement.” And I said, “Well, I can’t find it in Pittsburgh.” 
[laughter] And, uh, anyway, it was, . . . uh, her name is . . . was Dr. 
Joanna Vinsgarner, and once you meet Joanne, you became involved 
in the National Organization for Women. Um, so this was 1970, um, 
and I . . . I joined on the spot. I . . . I found the woman’s movement. 
God knows what exactly what it was right that time, um, but anyway, 
it was a hot chapter. We were doing everything. We were litigating. 
Uh, we were suing, we were demonstrating, we were picketing. Um, 
everything from GC Murphy’s, which was a five and dime type store, 
they don’t even have them anymore . . . uh, and, uh, to little league, 
uh, domestic violence, uh, you name it, um, and the Equal Rights 
Amendment. And, as a matter of fact, the national coordinator for the 
ERA, uh, was living, at that time, in Pittsburgh. And, so, uh, invaria-
bly, we got involved in all of it. Uh, and it was Pittsburgh’s chap-
ter . . . I wasn’t there that day, I was a member but I don’t know 
where I was . . . is that they, uh, disrupted . . . about eleven, twelve 
women . . . disrupted the Birch Bayh hearings to, uh, . . . on the 18 
year old vote and said, how can you do this, and you haven’t even 
heard the Equal Rights movement. It was that disruption, uh, Bayh 
didn’t want to throw these women out, so he came out of the room 
and promised to have a hearing on the ERA. But, anyway, I’ve been 
involved on the campaign, if you want to add it . . . it’s 50 years. Uh, 
so . . . [applause]. It’s good . . . so I . . . I’ve been very lucky to be on 
NOW’s board since 1973, uh, and President of it. I’m not president of 
NOW, I’m chair . . . co-chair of its advisory board, but president and 
founder . . . co-founder of the Feminist Majority, and the Feminist 
Majority Foundation. We have always had . . . NOW’s always had, 
and the feminist majority since it was formed, has always had an 
ERA program. We believe that it’s absolutely essential for full equal-
ity for women. And, why we were so drivem . . . and I think this is 
important, and this whole discussion on what gets you . . . what gets 
you going, is we, for whatever reason, who knows exactly why, this 
particular chapter and now at the time in the ‘70s, we were suing al-
most everybody. I remember when we were doing . . . we were sitting 
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in, in, uh, in a room in Illinois and said, “Why do they hate us so 
much?” We were trying . . . we were working on the ERA, and we, 
we actually sat down and said, “Wait a minute, who are we suing in 
this city?” And we went down all the places we were suing and . . . in 
Chicago, it was the police, it was Harris Bank, it was, uh, you know, 
different television, radio stations, it was State Farm, which was lo-
cated in Illinois, it goes on, the list goes on. And then we said, “Oh. 
It’s a wonder they don’t hate us more.” Uh, so, anyway, but . . . it 
was the cases, it was the litigation, it was the action that drove us to 
be so militant on the ERA because what you learn is what we won, 
but we were also losing, and sometimes we felt like the pied pipers 
because the laws were not strong enough, and we had to have more 
strength. That’s it. I see you leaning forward.  
 
Kallen: Well, and . . . and Ellie you, you, you knew Alice Paul, the 
kind of original drafter of the Equal Rights Amendment, what . . . 
what was it like to know her and do you have any interesting tidbits 
to share? 
 
Smeal: Yeah. Yeah, I can’t say I knew her intimately or anything like 
that, but, definitely, I knew her as the Alice . . . Alice Cohen is in this 
in the audience. Um, what happened is that . . . [sighs] I’m trying to 
say it short. But we were now out of the House of Representatives . . . 
and by the way we were working on two levels here . . . we were try-
ing to pass state ERAs at the same time we were trying to ratify, or to 
get, uh, . . . remember, at this time, when I start in this area, it hadn’t 
come out of Congress yet. Ok. But we . . . so anyway, uh, . . . and 
there’s a couple names that I don’t think get any credit and everybody 
in the world should, and in the United States, certainly should know 
them and in the women’s movement. Martha Griffiths figures out 
how to do a discharge petition, uh, eventually to get the ERA out, and 
the reason why all this is important is, um, the ERA gets out of House 
first and then out of the Senate, okay. Once it got the discharge peti-
tion, Emmanuel Sellers, who was a Democrat, uh, in the, uh, Judici-
ary Committee was sitting on it and wouldn’t allow it to have hear-
ings. And she gets to discharge petition, gets majority of the House to 
sign it, and she is also the woman who put Title VII, the sex discrimi-
nation, uh, . . . no discrimination employment into, uh, the Civil 
Rights Act. It . . . she’s a congresswoman from, uh, Michigan. But 
anyway, is that now it’s in, uh, . . . trying to get on the Senate floor, 
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and, so, the Pittsburgh chapter . . . and so did a lot of others . . . de-
cided to . . . okay, we would do direct action, and we would do a, uh, 
24 hour picket, but silent picket, you couldn’t talk. Don’t ever do 
that. That . . . that’s torture. [Laughter] Uh, uh, but we . . . we were 
taking eight hour shifts standing on these steps to the Senate, um, and 
we, the, the, . . . one of the bonuses, if you could live through this, is 
that you could stay at Alice Paul’s house, which was the National 
Woman’s Party, which is right next to the Hart building, and, so, you 
do your shift and then you go over to the house. And our shift, for 
whatever reason, was the night shift, and, so, we were going to sleep 
there, which was an even bigger bonus. And, so, we . . . we didn’t 
know what we were getting into, and this is the story . . . is that you 
get done with the shift, um, and we go to this house . . . and I kept 
worrying because it was really late, and I said, “What? You know, 
they’re older people do you think we should go there this late?” “Oh, 
no, this is all arranged, all arranged.” So, we get to the door, and if 
you’ve ever seen . . . if you haven’t been to the Belmont Zoo, Bel-
mont House, you should go. Um, it was all dark and I said, and I said 
well there’s . . . “It’s okay, it’s okay. It’s a big house and there’s . . . 
they’re waiting for us.” I didn’t want . . . I wanted to go to a hotel by 
now. I was terrified that we were going to wake up people. It’s crazy, 
I don’t know what we’re doing here, but, anyway . . . after this crazy 
silent visual. Anyway, we knock . . . knock on the door . . . I didn’t 
do it, one of the … Anne Pride, who was at that time the editor of 
NOW Time, she’s knocking on the door, and I’m saying “Anne, stop 
it, would you already, yeah, they’re not there or they’re asleep or 
whatever.” Finally, the door opens just a little bit, and, um, it’s a . . . 
very . . . I used to say a little old lady, but now that I am getting in 
this age group, I don’t like that description [laughing] . . . I really re-
sent anybody saying that, so I’ve changed the script . . . a woman 
opens the door [laughter] and is . . . you could tell, honestly, that she 
was elderly . . . but, anyway, and . . . and she had night clothes on 
and, uh, a nightgown in fact, and I said, “See Anne, Anne just say 
we’ll come back in the morning.” I was now just absolutely terrified. 
I . . . I just thought that it was very upsetting, or embarrassing, or why 
are we doing this? Anyway, she says, “Are you the NOW woman?” 
And we said, “Yes,” and she swings the door open and she says, 
“Come in, come in,” and we go in a little bit, and she takes from the 
wall a bell, and she’s ringing the bell and, and I’m saying to Anne all 
the time, “See what you’ve done, what are you doing, they’re waking 
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everybody up,” and she’s running up the stairs . . . there’s a winding 
stairs, and we not . . . none of us have ever been in this building, and 
it was all dark, and there was these busts of women on either side of 
this hallway as . . .  so we are saying what in the hell, why are we 
here? And then she’s running up the stairs, and you can see these, 
um, you know… what would you call them . . . placards, no not plac-
ards . . . um, banners that say “Votes For Women,” and all this stuff 
from the suffragists movement. Um, and by the way there are busts of 
Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and at the end of the 
hall . . . the one that really got me . . . was there was a statue of Joan 
of Arc. Okay [laughter]. Anyway, and while all this is happening, I 
am saying, “We’ve got to make our apologies and leave . . . nicely.” 
Um, Anne turns to me and says, “Ellie, you’d be excited too if you’d 
been waiting fifty years for reinforcements.” [Audience “aws”]. And, 
so,  anyway we had breakfast there, they came all down, we had . . . 
we ate with them, we stayed there that night, and it started a relation-
ship between our organization and the women’s party,  
 
Audience member: Alice Paul was the ringer of the bell.  
 
Smeal: Oh yeah, oh yeah. I forgot the punch line . . . it was Alice 
Paul [laughter]. 
 
Audience member: Thanks, Alice! 
 
Smeal: She’s stealing the punch line, yeah, she’s heard it a million 
times . . . and, um, anyway, she was . . . uh, Alice Paul was very gen-
erous with us, of her time, and I want you to know she was very, very 
active . . . she’s in her eighties at that time, uh, . . . with this fight to 
get it through the House and the Senate, and, um, I could tell you 
some other stories about her, but her heart and her soul was in this 
movement  
 
Jenkins: And could I just help, have you tell the, the story about her 
crying, uh, [inaudible] . . . yeah.  
 
Smeal: yeah, well, the . . . we now we get to the time that it’s the 
vote in the Senate, and, um, we filled the galleries, and, um, and 
all . . . but . . . she wasn’t there, and we . . . we thought that was odd, 
but we also thought maybe she wasn’t feeling good, we had all kinds 
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of excuses why she wasn’t there, but we . . . when we left, having 
won, we obviously win the vote . . . and, by the way, if you haven’t 
heard Marlo Cooke’s or any of that discussion, it was, its in-
structi— . . . it’s very instructive. Um, and then, we all went back to 
the house because there was to be this big party, and, um, she . . . Al-
ice Paul is nowhere to be seen. And, um, one of our colleagues, Phyl-
lis Weatherby, also from Pittsburgh chapter, says, “I’m finding her,” 
and we say, “You can’t do that Weatherby, you know, it’s a house, 
right?” Anyways she goes, and she’s sitting in the back room at a 
desk . . . and we found out later, it was Susan B. Anthony’s desk . . . 
that desk is still in that building . . . Anyway, sitting at the desk, and 
she’s crying, and we thought well, you know, she’s . . . she’s been 
working on this since 1923, you’d be crying too, I mean, you know, 
emotional, the whole thing. No, she was very upset about its passage, 
and we couldn’t talk her out of it. But she said that Martha Griffiths 
and the chief sponsor in the Senate, . . . who just died recently, Sena-
tor Birch Bayh, and both of them democrats, . . . and, um, she said 
that Birch, uh, Bayh and Martha Griffiths were fooled by Sam 
Ervin . . . Sam Ervin, who became very famous during the impeach-
ment trials, um, was, um, the leading voice against the Equal Rights 
Amendment. He was a segregationist . . . we know him as a good guy 
because his for impeaching Nixon, but he wasn’t. Um, he was, uh, in 
the impeachment, uh, he was, um, . . . he was a leading segregation-
ist. And, um, anyway, um, she said he tricked her by putting in two 
things. Uh, one is, if you will look at the, the, the clause, the second 
clause, the Enforcement Clause, says that Con— . . .  Congress has 
the power to enforce. She said that he put that in there so that they 
could stop this in the South on states’ rights argument, that was not 
originally in there. And secondly, . . . because originally, the way she 
wanted it, it was given to Congress and the states rights . . . uh, and 
then the second thing was that in the preamble, there was a time limit, 
and she said that was never there, it was never supposed to be there, 
and they let that sneak in there because, oh, it doesn’t matter, we’re 
going to pass it right away. She said, “They will stall, and stall, and 
stall, until we lose our momentum, “and, in many ways, she right on 
both.  
 
Kallen: So, so, so one . . . we’ll move into kind of speaking about 
losing the momentum from here, but just to put in a pitch, the, um, 
Bellmont Paul House in D.C., if folks haven’t been there, I highly 
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recommend going there, it’s actually uh, uh, a formally a monument, 
and it has, um, political cartoons all the way from, you know, the, the 
ratification of the 19th Amendment, um, through, uh, these efforts to 
ratify the ERA. Um, the busts are still there, and the desk is still 
there, so I highly, highly recommend going to check it out if you 
have the opportunity. Um, but speaking about momentum, um, An-
drea, can, can you chip in, in terms of momentum and then, and then 
momentum losing steam, Um, do you have any thoughts about that or 
any personal experience, uh, involving that? 
 
Miller: I was gone from the ERA for a long time when I started my 
career, got married with children, and then I got involved again in 
Virginia in 2009, and, so, then I was looking at, we passed in the Sen-
ate, failed in the House, and some people that I didn’t know contacted 
me about wanting to remove the ratification deadline, and they had a 
petition. So, this would be about 2009, they were trying to get Presi-
dent Obama’s attention, and that was when . . . after they had 
launched whitehouse.gov. Any petition that got 30,000 signatures, the 
President would take a look at it, and I thought, ok, how many signa-
tures do these people have? Um, they had about seven thousand sig-
natures, so I thought, alright, um, we’re going to need a lot of signa-
tures to get to thirty thousand, so I called some other folks I knew at 
other organizations. Would you be willing to do a mailing to try to 
get this thing up to 30,000 signatures? So, we did it, we eventually 
got to about 31,000 signatures, and then the waiting game began. So, 
I looked at the legislation that we had, and Congressman Rob An-
drews of New Jersey had a bill, remove the ratification deadline from 
the Equal Rights Amendment. And that bill . . . actually, this is prob-
ably closer to 2011 by now . . . that bill historically had never had 
more than 47 co-sponsors, it wasn’t a real mover. And again, because 
the deadline had passed, we also had legislation from Congress-
woman Maloney about starting the process all over again. So, that 
meant we had two federal bills, start over and remove the ratification 
deadline. So, when I look at the bills, we have a lot of support on start 
over, didn’t really have very much support on remove the deadline. I 
looked at the states that we had already, our 35 states, and I was like, 
the odds of us getting them again on start over, and the number of 
states that wanted to rescind, we’re better off just trying to get three 
more states, and we’ll fight it out in court and see where we end up. 
So, I was like, alright, this is really what we are going to do. So, 
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when Rob Andrews left the House, I had the opportunity, when peo-
ple were saying who should be the new co-sponsor, um, I had spoken 
to Jackie Speier, and I suggested Jackie. And the main reason that I 
suggested Jackie was that Jackie fought for her bills. We had worked 
up to a 104 co-sponsors on the Andrews Bill and, because it was a 
constitutional amendment in the House, that meant that when he left 
Congress, we were going to be back at zero, and we were going to 
have to start all over again. So, when I was talking to Congress-
woman Speier, I said, we will help you get the 104 co-sponsors back, 
and she said, “Not necessary.” She said, “I can get the original 104 
co-sponsors.” She said, “The new market that you have, keep on 
working with those.” So, we were doing a briefing, Senator Cardon 
had the Senate version of the bill . . . we were doing a briefing, and 
Representative Speier was coming, and Molly Fishman came over 
with a note, “We’re at 110.” [Laughter] So we did better. Today, we 
are at 213, so the momentum on removing the deadline is very, very 
strong. Really, really buoyed by the fact that Nevada, in 2017, rati-
fied. Thank you Senator Spearman. [Applause]. I watched you live. I 
watched you. And then Illinois turned around and did us the same fa-
vor the following year, and, Virginia, we had really hoped that in 
2019 [applause]. Steve, uh Steve where are you? Where are you? Oh, 
oh, you’re hiding behind Eileen, Steve. So yes . . . so yes, Illinois. 
And then we had really hoped to be, um, the ones to ratify in 2019. 
That didn’t work. Uh, we are going to need to throw a few members 
of the House out, replace them with real human beings, [laughter], 
and so Virginia will ratify in 2020. It is ours. [Applause].   
 
Jenkins: Well, I want to say I have been on the phone with this 
woman, uh, hearing about her work and getting, getting out the vote. 
Are we on? Getting out the vote. Uh, and, uh, what you’ve done is 
truly extraordinary. Um, uh, the ERA coalition is fortunate enough to 
have most everybody in this room, yeah, no . . . a few people in this 
room as, uh, as members because the way we describe the Coalition 
is that we have a staff of three people, but we have a Coalition of 
over 100 organizations, and I always say, uh, if you want to talk 
about power, talk about these organizations, like, you know, uh, the 
Feminist Majority and NOW, and you know, uh E— . . . Equality 
Now. I mean all of the organizations that have some part of their 
work . . . they may be doing international work or other work . . . but 
they are working for the, uh, ratification of the Equal Rights 
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Amendment. So, with those, uh, 100 organizations, we are . . . have 
been keeping up on the work in the House and in the Senate. Uh, 
Betina and her interns in D.C., you know, emailing and going up to 
the Hill and, you know, making sure we just had somebody else to-
day, right? Who, uh.  
 
Audience member: John Lewis.  
 
Jenkins: Right, John Lewis . . . [laughter]. So, so that . . . that is our 
work as well. Uh, you know, we want Virginia to work, and we are 
trying to do everything that we can. Uh, we want the, uh, Bill in the 
House to pass, and we . . . we were on the phone, uh, just last week, 
and we were given . . . we can’t go, if, you know, Capitol Hill, you 
know you can’t talk about promises, but we were given the indication 
that this would happen hopefully before the year ends, uh, the actual 
mark up and vote. Uh, so we are looking forward to that. The Senate 
is another matter, as you know. Uh, Senators Cardon and Ratajkow-
ski, uh, working on that bill to also eliminate the deadline . . . elimi-
nate, not just extend, but eliminate it . . . uh, the feedback that we just 
gotten recently is that, uh, the, uh, Republicans, um, have, uh, uh . . . 
dug in some, so there needs to be a little more persuasion, so we are 
still continuing to, uh, to work on, on that. But, um, I, I also wanted 
to pick up on a comment that, uh, that, that Ellie was talking about, 
the . . . when Elizabeth Holtzman, you’ll remember, that she was the 
one who replaced the . . .  
 
Smeal: [inaudible] 
 
Jenkins: Yeah, or, the Congressman who was holding up the . . .  
  
Smeal: Manny Cellars.  
 
Jenkins: Manny Cellars. It was Elizabeth Holtzman who replaced 
him, Elizabeth Holtzman who got us the first extension. Uh, in the, 
uh, deadline, so that’s the way, you know, the world works. But, uh, 
you know, uh, we are very, very, very optimistic. One of our, uh, new 
board members has an 11 year old daughter, speaking of this, and 
she’s . . . this new board member had successfully fought a case in 
the Supreme Court, a death row case, and her daughter used to be 
proud about that, and now she goes around telling everybody, “My 
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mother is working to get the ERA ratified.” You know, that’s her 
bragging . . . that’s her bragging point now, so we think that this will 
happen, and it will happen soon.  
 
Couture: Yeah, um, yeah, I can definitely speak to the momentum 
that is starting to be gained. Uh, it makes me very happy to hear you 
talk about that story where you were saying that Alice Paul, how she 
was kind of waiting for, uh, reinforcements, and they are still coming 
[laughter and applauce]. So, they continue to come, and, um, they 
will be continuing to come. So, as I said, uh I am an outreach director 
for Generation Ratify, so basically I am kind of building on a lot of 
the work that you all have already been doing for so many years, um, 
and very similar to VA Ratify ERA, but we are doing it with a youth-
based focus, really trying to get in with mobilizing young people, uh, 
to support pro-ERA candidates, uh, lobby legislatures, and also honor 
the intersectionality within the movement. So, those are kind of the 
three pillars that are at our focus. Um, and I just want to say if anyone 
would like to come up to me afterwards about how they can get youth 
kind of more engaged in their movement, specifically in any of your 
particular organizations, I would so happy to talk because we are all 
working towards the same thing. As I said, Generation Ratify is just 
coming specifically from a youth angle, um, but really it’s just kind 
of been incredible for me to see it blossom and bloom because I’m 
the oldest member, actually, at 18, of the organization, [laughter] so 
it’s interesting to be in this room, um, but, um, . . . and really like, our 
original goal was very Arlington based because that’s where I’m 
from, but through our use of social media, through our outreach, uh, 
we have actually now have ten chapters developing in four different 
states, mostly in Virginia, but we also have a chapter developing in 
Maryland, Florida, and Georgia as well, and I think one of the main 
reasons that the momentum has been lagging a little bit is because 
people, young people, are just not as educated. I think that once they 
become aware of the issue, they can get riled about it, they want to 
get motivated, they want to take action, but it’s just something that 
they even know is a problem, and so I think that as Generation Ratify 
grows and as we are promoting all of your work and joining together, 
more and more people are finding out about it, and more and more 
people are getting motivated. So, I look forward to continue working 
with all of you because we want to help, and we want to take action.  
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Jenkins: We’re signing you up right away.  
 
Couture: Yes, I’m so happy.  
 
Jenkins: Campus ERA day that the ERA Coalition does, and we 
hook up colleges around the country for virtual discussion. Jerry 
Nadler actually came to our last Campus ERA day and announced a 
hearing that the Coalition, uh, helped put together, the first one in 36 
years, so, uh, we need you.  
 
Couture: Yes!  
 
Jenkins: It’s a date in April. Uh, we will be in touch [laughter].  
 
Smeal: One thing I want to say about the deadline, though, is that, re-
member the preamble . . . the deadline is in the preamble. What does 
that mean? The states didn’t vote on it. So, a lot of people we’re defi-
nitely working to remove it. Why not? But they also think we don’t 
have to. And we’ve had high . . . lots of Constitutional scholars feel 
that way because the states . . . it’s not what was ratified. What was 
ratified was the 52 words that . . . none of them have anything . . . 
says a thing about the deadline. And, by the way, it’s the reason . . . 
and I wanted to say this at this law school and, and, uh, with young 
people . . . is that the people who got the idea to remove the, uh, 
deadline the idea were two young, uh, first years, law school stu-
dents, from Whittier College, uh, Law school, who went to the presi-
dent of NOW in New Yo— . . . whatchya call it, in LA with the idea 
and because they got this idea because they were studying, and they 
said, you know, it’s just in the preamble, and you don’t need it any-
way, and, anyway, it was that. And then we went to Liz Holtzman, 
who’s another name that really should be remembered, and, and she 
is still active in this, uh, um, she, uh, is . . . knows the importance of 
this, of this amendment. And, um, and then Liz put everything she 
had into it, and, and it got through it. But I don’t want us to get dis-
couraged, and Virginia is key, and we are going to go for ratification 
with or without this damn deadline [laughter]. Hopefully we remove 
it, it’s a good organizing tool, but we don’t think we have to.  
 
Kallen: So, Emilia, you talked about, um, about how you think part 
of, part of the, uh, growing momentum comes about from people 
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becoming more and more educated about the ERA. Uh, both you, 
and, and other folks, do you find that a lot of the . . . you know, to the 
extent that you encounter any apathy, does that arise from lack of, of 
knowledge about the ERA, it’s history, and, and, um, . . . I heard an 
interesting study that, you know, that an overwhelming percentage of 
Americans already think that we have an ERA in our Constitution . . .  
 
Miller: That’s our research [laughter].  
 
Jenkins: And, and, and in fact the Coalition did, did . . . this extraor-
dinary . . . First of all, the people who did the polling were shocked 
because they said we can’t get this kind of agreement on anything, 
and there was over 94% of everyone, and no matter what the political 
party, the age, the ethnicity, 94% of the people believed that . . . in 
constitutional equality. You know, it takes a really strange person . . . 
I want to know who those other 6% are, you know, who would actu-
ally say, “No, I don’t think there should be equality.” Uh, but 94%, 
uh, believe in it, but 80% think that it exists already, you know, that, 
of course women have the same rights as men. And, so, that’s our ob-
stacle. You know, the sort of making people aware, you know, that, 
no, there is an underlying reason why you see the discrepancy in 
rights and privileges between women and men, and that is they were 
not included in the Constitution . . . along with other groups, as well, 
not thought of then, or imagined then. Um, so, that I think that that is 
one of our main obstacles is that people, especially . . . many, often, I 
will say this, young women, you know, who, uh, are coming through 
the ranks, and they think that they do have the rights, you know, and 
people, uh, always say . . . ask me, well, what do you say to those 
women? I said, I really hate to tell them that, no you do not. At some 
point you are going to reach a barrier, and you’ll be standing around 
wondering, what happened to you, and it will be, uh, this lack of 
equality. And, you know, what we think at the Coalition is that, we 
have been through . . . and I’m of the generation where we used to 
talk about the Pipeline, oh this is fantastic, women are in the Pipeline, 
and the year so and so, things will be all equal. Well, that year is now 
fifty or sixty years beyond us sitting here tonight. So, the, the only 
real change for that . . . I don’t want to go through these yearly, you 
know, uh, pay equity, oh, it’s black women, it’s Latino women, it’s, 
uh, almost a year later, they’ve been, uh . . . we’ve been doing that 
too long now. I’m almost for . . . don’t even talk about it anymore, 
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it’s so upsetting. Uh, just pass the Equal Rights Amendment, and in 
that statement of equality, it will change everything. I’m not saying 
that, automatically, you know, everybody . . . everything will be 
changed, but it will change . . . we are used to thinking of women as 
second class citizens, and that being engrained in the psyche of girls 
and boys and women and men, you know, makes for this reality of, 
uh, of, uh, discrimination, uh . . . of out-right discrimination, and that 
really just has to stop.  
 
Couture: Yeah, I think, um, it’s definitely important to discuss the 
past when talking about the ERA because it helps you realize what 
it’s rooted in and kind of the issues that it’s led to, but I also think it’s 
very important, in order to engage young people, to talk about the fu-
ture, and the implications that it will have on their future. And, so, I 
feel like often a lot of conversations that I hear happening about the 
ERA, in both activism circles and just in general, are about the his-
tory, which is awesome because that educates people, but to really 
get them motivated and engaged, it’s how this is going to affect them 
in the future. So, like, really having solid concrete examples and just 
kind of, like, explanations on why this should matter to you, not just 
that Alice Paul was this amazing person, and this is the foundation 
that she laid, and this is why it didn’t get passed, but, like, here’s how 
we’re going to pass it now, and once it’s passed, this is what will be 
more available to you when it isn’t already. 
 
Kallen: And, Emelia, what have you found as you, kind of, become 
pass— . . . as you’ve become knowledgeable and passionate about 
the issue, what were the tidbits along those lines that you found was 
persuasive and have helped inspire you?  
 
Couture: Well, I think just hearing about different, uh, women’s, 
like, personal experiences and hearing about specific court cases 
where it’s come up and even just hearing about the Lilly Ledbetter 
Act in more depth and realizing it’s kind of, like . . . thank you, Ei-
leen Davis, um, we had a wonderful lunch over the summer where 
she educated me about that . . . it’s like a band-aid over a big gaping 
wound, you know, it really doesn’t actually fix anything, so it’s easy 
to point to these things and be like, oh, things are better for women, 
but actually, fundamentally, foundationally, and constitutionally, they 
are not. And, so, once you realize that, you can help other people 
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realize that, and I think that’s really empowering, and I think also, an 
important thing when trying to inform the youth about things is ac-
cessibility. For example, this conference, was so amazing, incredible, 
I’m not sure where that video is going, but I hope it’s going to get 
posted online because that’s a great way to reach young people. Um, 
and one of the things that Generation Ratify really tries to do is, we 
have, as I said, our chapters, which are spread out throughout the 
state, because it’s important that we don’t just have one canvassing 
event, we need to go to where people are because young people, not 
only can we not vote, but often we can’t drive, you know, so it’s, 
like, we just don’t have access to get to these events where these 
wonderful people are speaking. Kate Kelly, we hosted a collaborative 
webinar, um, which was really awesome on Instagram, so I suggest 
people doing things like that to be educational, uh, to young people in 
a more accessible way. 
 
Kallen: Awesome. Do other folks on the panel, if you’ve had, kind 
of, exper . . .  
 
Smeal: We have actually also, uh, a lot of organizations now are, be-
cause of the power of the student folk, yeah, um, you all can put it 
over the top for sure, I mean, uh, I, uh, there’s now campus 
groups . . . literally, we have campus groups in forty-seven states. 
NOW has campus groups in a lot of states. Uh, we should get a coali-
tion of all the groups, Generation, uh, Action would be working . . . 
uh, uh, the, um . . . the group that is just registering everybody 
here . . . I, uh . . . Generation . . . Environment, I don’t know what it 
is. 
 
Couture: Next Gen.  
 
Smeal: Next Gen, I knew it was Generation! Yeah, Next Gen is reg-
istering. In other words, I think that a coalition of all these groups 
would be fantastic, and, um, I also feel that we have a weapon this 
time we didn’t have, and, and . . . before. Before, they said, you have 
equality, and they would refer to Title IX and Title VII, particularly. 
But what happened when the ERA went down . . . we didn’t go 
down, we’re going to pass it . . . but one, uh, we reached that deadline 
of 1982, um, by 1984, they eviscerated Title IX. Everybody . . . no 
one believed they would ever do that, and, then, of course, they 
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eviscerated. The reason we needed the, uh, the Lilly Ledbetter Act is 
the Robert’s court, that’s now, eviscerated, uh, Title VII, so we know 
that these statutes can be changed if a right-wing person comes in and 
takes over both houses of Congress, and we start all over again be-
cause we’ve lost several years of our lives, uh, uh, trying to put Title 
IX back on the books. Uh, I was one of the . . . lucky enough to be 
one of the people who led that campaign, but it took another whole 
energy of several years, and, by the way, in just those four years it 
was off the books, the, the registration of women in, in law schools 
went down because discrimination went up. Uh, and I . . . we only 
did that on law schools, I’m sure it was in all schools. And then on 
Title VII and the Lilly Ledbetter, it took us even longer to restore. 
And so, basically, we now can say, oh come on, these are just acts, 
for example, we got into the Affordable Care Act, a clause that says, 
“You cannot discriminate in pricing, or in ch – . . . or in, benefits of 
health insurance on the basis of sex,” but they have been trying to re-
peal that act—nine times, ah, nine times . . .sixty-nine times. That af-
fects every girl, every young person, and every person, every woman. 
Uh, now you have access to birth control, you have access to mater-
nity, you could lose that in a minute, maternity coverage.  
 
Kallen: Well, and that’s, you know one of the interesting differences 
between, you know, legislation, um, and a constitutional amendment. 
I mean, how, how often do we see the Constitution, you know, really 
being changed? And particularly, removal of a constitutional amend-
ment, and so, when people think about, you know, acts . . . various 
forms of legislation, state and federal, that we have that protect peo-
ple, um, there is a, a real difference between that and having a consti-
tutional amendment. And even, you know, to the extent that, that, the 
Fourteenth Amendment has been, um, has been understood to protect 
against, um, sex-based discrimination, there’s also a difference be-
tween kind of ex – . . . you know expanding on an existing amend-
ment, or understand an, uh, existing amendment in one way versus 
another and having a dedicated amendment, um, and so, so, it’s these 
sorts of nuances, though, that I don’t know that, that, we teach, you 
know, our, our middle-schoolers and high-schoolers about these sorts 
of differences, and, so, that’s why it’s so exciting and inspiring to see, 
you know, Generation Ratify and, uh, folks who are starting out their 
college careers, who are still in high school, becoming 
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knowledgeable and interested. Um, so we have a couple minutes left, 
I wanted to open the door for, for questions. Yeah?  
 
Audience member: I just want to remind everybody about the Vio-
lence Against Women Act. That sunsetted Friday before Christmas. 
This is a room full of people that are . . . know enough to be here and 
probably half of you don’t even know that, it just sunsetted. And 
since then, Congress voted it back in, but guess what it’s doing in the 
Senate? Nothing. So, guess what? The Violence Against Women Act 
has not been re-authorized.  
 
Smeal: That’s right.  
 
Audience member: So, we’re sitting here thinking, oh, they’ve got 
the Violence Against Women Act. Nope, gone. We have Title IX. 
Nope, gutted. We’ve got Title VII. Nope, gutted. All of these inter-
mediate laws . . . alright, it’s a showing. Without the Constitution, it’s 
a showing. That’s all I have to say. 
 
Smeal: Absolutely.  
 
Kallen: Do we have any, do we have any, any questions? Sure.  
 
Audience member: Um, Amelia, I want to hear from you. Um, you 
said that people can approach you, which is great, but also can you 
just tell us a little bit about how, you talked about this earlier, but 
how best to reach young folks, and how we can include younger peo-
ple in the movement. I worry about this a lot. Sometimes in ERA 
meetings, I bring the median age down, [Audience laughter] um, by 
a lot [inaudible]. Um, and so I feel like . . . I feel a lot of, uh, anxiety 
and panic about including younger people, getting younger people in-
volved, uh, bringing younger people to the table, um, and so, yeah. 
Give us all the answers.  
 
Kallen: Were folks able to hear the question, in the, in the back? No? 
Um, so, so the question was how do we get younger people to the ta-
ble, how do we get them motivated?  
 
Couture: Yeah, ok, well that’s an excellent question. Thank you, 
Kate, and I will say that that is something that Generation Ratify is 
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also still working on because, like, it can definitely be difficult to get 
young people motivated, interested, and coming, but the interest is 
definitely there, so don’t give up, please, even if you find it kind of 
difficult. Um, as I said, accessibility is a big thing because young 
people often may be interested, but they may not be able to drive to 
an event, um, so just making it in a centralized location that’s as easy 
to get to as possible, make sure the information gets out widely, pro-
vide transportation, even, if you can, um, doing something online is 
important. Also, something that is very much at the front of young 
people’s minds right now is intersectionality and also inclusivity. An-
other thing that we can all always be working on, um, and that we’re 
working on as a Generation Ratify Board ourselves, but it’s so im-
portant to be queer inclusive, racially inclusive, something that I defi-
nitely work on more and become more aware of, as we all can. Um, 
like, I have my pronouns on my thing, I wrote that in, I use she/her 
pronouns. Um, but that’s just like people, queer people, for example, 
trans people might not even know how the ERA could affect them 
because it’s all . . . we phrase it all about women empowerment but 
just using language like gender empowerment, you know, or empha-
sizing that sex means all sexes, you know, this applies to everyone, 
um, is a way to get people engaged. And also, I’d say, um, yeah . . . 
just promoting awareness over things like social media, which is a 
platform that a lot of young people use and going into spaces like 
schools and contenting clubs where young people actually are in or-
der to get them involved.  
 
Jenkins: You say social media, which is the most affective? I, I, I’m 
interested in . . .  
 
Couture: I would say Instagram is probably the most effective for 
young people, but also the amount of engagement that you get as far 
as likes and stuff may not actually be reflective of how many people 
are seeing your material. So, for example, like, my personal Insta-
gram gets many more likes than my Generation Ratify Instagram, 
but, still, a lot of people are seeing . . . those posts, and even if they 
don’t see it and come to an event, they see it, they’re getting curious 
about it, they might tell their friends, they might ask their mom about 
it. You know, you just want to promote the buzz . . . [ 
 
Kallen: I don’t know where that’s coming from. 
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Couture: Like even just getting the word out there in any way is so 
helpful.  
 
Kallen: Great. 
 
Smeal: Uh, we have some other students here, uh, too, uh, one of 
‘em . . . from VCU, represented pretty strongly in the back.  
 
Carol Jenkins: Yeah, why don’t you stand up back there so we can 
see . . . they’ve been . . . they’re working on the colleges. Great, 
great, great [applause].  
 
Kallen: Okay, one, one, one last . . .  
 
Audience member: I just have a follow-up question [inaudible] is, is 
that, um, I’m interested to hear that [inaudible]. One of the things, I 
think, a lot of times people who are not your generation, you guys are 
just a little bit older, um, understand are the issues that you as a per-
son have faced, because in their mind your lives are so much easier 
than theirs. I’m sorry, I’m trying to [inaudible] and so, so they don’t 
understand, um . . . they don’t understand that there’s this idea that 
younger women are, um, [inaudible]. There’s a lack of understanding 
of the issues that you face, so, so talking to people who may not un-
derstand what it is that will get your needle to move into acting, what 
are those things that you experienced, that in your daily life would 
make our conversations with the other women resonate?  
 
Couture: That’s a very good question, and I think it varies kind of 
from community to community, which is why it’s important to con-
tact a lot of different young women. Um, but, I think just understand-
ing the legal implications of it for all women makes it helpful because 
I think, in general, most people, even though while they only experi-
ence their own experiences, have a great capacity for empathy and 
compassion, so when they hear about this issue is going to be impact-
ing many other women and many other women in the future, I think 
that gets their compass moving, kind of, but I mean I’d suggest that, 
if you’re planning on hosting an event at a specific location, like 
reach out to youth organizers in that area to kind of understand what 
issues are important to people in that area. 
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Kallen: Well, awesome, we . . . our panelists, um, hopefully folks are 
comfortable . . .  
 
Smeal: Can, can we call on VCU people too because they’ve kind 
of . . .  
 
Kallen: So, we’re actually out of time, but what, what we can do is 
we can kind of step out and be available to answer individualized 
questions afterwards so long as folks are comfortable with that . . . 
[inaudible].  
 
Smeal: We can take a few more minutes 
 
Kallen: Well we have our folks from our, from our next panel are al-
ready here. 
  
Miller: The Attorney General’s here [laughter].  
 
Audience Member: Quick question from the audience [inaudi-
ble] . . . how are you soliciting more men to the fight [inaudible].  
 
Couture: I think, I think, um, that’s really valid question. I’d also 
like to answer the question from VCU if I can because I know 
they’ve been patiently waiting back there, so I’d like to hear them 
speak, also . . . No, don’t be nervous, I’m a college student, too. 
We’re all in here together. 
 
Audience member: This wasn’t necessarily a question, it’s more of a 
comment [inaudible].  
 
Smeal: Stand up, stand up.  
 
Audience member: I just want to stress the importance of, you 
know, kind of targeting the college students because, I don’t know, 
I’m a . . . student of color, and I go to a school, a predominately white 
school, and a lot of the time it seems like the, ERA . . . ERA people 
don’t understand how that it’s inclusive and that [inaudible], espe-
cially young people [inaudible] don’t have to single it out. So, I think 
it’s really important to target them and chase them down if you have 
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to, to let them know, this is for you, this is for the next college gener-
ation, because I think this is my third event, but for someone who has 
never been to any events like this, I think it would be great to see 
more young people at events like this because a lot of them are uned-
ucated and haven’t gotten to know what the Equal Rights Amend-
ment is about [inaudible]. I want to see them at the polls, I want to 
see them at events, I want to see them marching, canvassing, and eve-
rything else [applause].  
 
Kallen: Well, thank you so much to our panel, we really appreciate 
you guys all being here. 
 
[Applause].  
 
MaryAnn Grover: So, I’d like to go . . .  
 
Audience member: We have a week and a half left until the elec-
tions. Make a difference. Volunteer. Volunteer on campus. Volunteer 
with the feminists who are already in here now. Volunteer with Vir-
ginia Ratify. Vote [inaudible]. Volunteer for a particular candidate. 
We can make a difference . . . [applause].  
 
MaryAnn Grover: So, I’d like to go ahead and invite down our next 
set of panelists, we’ll go ahead and get them started, um, in just a few 
moments once they get seated.  
 
Hello everyone, I am going to ask you all to take your seats, please, 
so we can begin our next panel. So, now that we’ve heard about the 
ongoing fight for equality, we’ll turn specifically to the fight for the 
ERA in kind of the last three years as it has played out in Nevada, Il-
linois, and Virginia. Moderating our panel on the success of recent 
ratifiers in the ERA is Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring. At-
torney General Herring became the 48th Attorney General for Vir-
ginia in 2014. Throughout his terms, he has worked to keep Virginia 
families safe in their communities and neighborhoods, promote jus-
tice, equality and opportunity for all Virginians, and provide legal 
services to the people of Virginia and their government. Prior to serv-
ing as Attorney General, General Herring served for eight years in the 
senate of Virginia doing invaluable work to provide technology based 
economic development to the northern Virginia region, secure 
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transportation funding for needed projects, and make both state and 
local governments more accountable to the citizens of Virginia. 
Please help me in welcoming Attorney General Herring.  
 
[Applause].  
 
Attorney General Mark Herring: Good afternoon everyone. Thank 
you for the warm welcome. Um, it feels great to be back in my alma 
mater. It was . . . I was fortunate and privileged to go to law school 
here, um, and it was a great experience, uh, mostly [laughter] and uh, 
um . . . I am really glad to be, uh, moderating this panel because it’s 
a . . . it’s . . . learning from the experiences of some, uh, recent, uh, 
states that have, uh, passed the ERA, and, of course, we’re all hoping 
that Virginia is going to be number thirty so . . . um, I’d like to first 
take a moment and introduce, uh, our two panelists, first Senator Pat 
Spearman. She’s got an incredible, uh, resume [applause] and in . . . 
and, incidentally, a very important connection to Virginia. She holds 
a degree from Norfolk State University, so, uh, we’re . . . we’re glad 
to welcome her back to Virginia, and she also, uh, is an ordained 
minister, she’s a retired lieutenant colonel, she holds a Doctorate in 
Business Administration, so she’s incredibly smart, um, and she’s 
also a state senator from Nevada. And, uh, and I’m also glad to be 
joined, uh, with, uh, Representative Steve Anderson. He is a retired 
member of the Illinois House of Representatives, and he was ap-
pointed, uh, floor leader for the House of Representatives’ republican 
caucus, and oversaw all of the, uh, floor debate on the House floor. 
They also share a few, uh, uh, similarities . . . uh, obviously they both 
have experience in their state’s legislature, they are both advocates of 
ERA, and they also hail from states that have great Attorneys Gen-
eral, uh . . . Aaron Ford from Nevada, and Quami Rahul from Illi-
nois . . . both of whom also served in their states’, uh, legislatures be-
fore becoming attorney general, so, uh, please give them both my 
best, they’re doing a great job. [Applause]. And in a, in a minute, I’m 
going to ask, uh, each of you just to sort of walk us through the path 
of, uh, you know, ratification in your state, how you all were person-
ally involved in that, you know, what the big challenges were, but I’ll 
just say, for me personally, I, I grew up in the ‘70s, probably before 
most of you were born, and, uh . . . and my parents divorced when I 
was young, I was raised by a single mom, I had an older sister, so you 
bet in the 1970s, I also was a huge advocate for the ERA, as they 
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were, and I saw firsthand how, uh, their opportunities had been lim-
ited, how my mom had been discriminated against, opportunities, uh, 
had been, you know, closed to her, and so for me, I could see at a 
young age, why it was important that equal rights for women was 
constitutionally guaranteed. So before we talk about, you know, your 
states path to ratification, I was wondering if you could each just say, 
concisely, personally, why ratification of the ERA is important to 
you. 
 
Senator Pat Spearman: So, um . . . the Equal Rights Amendment, 
for me, is another step towards becoming a more perfected union, as 
president Barack Obama said on one occasion. Uh, I’m a woman, all 
my life I have always had to fight, uh, for what I knew, um, I was en-
titled to, and I’m African American, and right here in Virginia, in 
197 . . . 6 . . . 1976 in Petersburg right out, uh, side Fort Lee, um, I 
was chased by a group of young white men in a pickup truck, uh, 
who saw me, went back and forth, and I am convinced that if I had 
not found a ditch, uh, to jump into, and I literally belly crawled for, 
uh, about a half a mile, and, uh, I heard them come back, and I heard 
them call me several names and tell me what they were going do to 
me, and, uh, they kept looking for me and looking for me, I was in 
the fetal position in a ditch, probably about ten yards away from 
them. So, I understand what it means to be Black in a America that 
still does not believe in full equality. Also, as a member of the 
LGBTQ community, I understand what that means because there are 
people who will use the Bible and religion, uh, to try to denigrate us, 
and, so, when I bring all of me to the table, all of me has had to fight, 
all of my life. And so, the ERA is one more step that I believe we 
have got to take . . . we’ve got to take . . . in order to become a more 
perfected union. [Applause].  
 
Representative Steven Anderson: Thank you, that’s powerful. I 
don’t even know how to follow that, um, because it’s such a powerful 
story, well . . .  
 
Herring: . . . I think we rest our case, right? . . . [laughter].  
 
Anderson: . . . I agree, right. I concede the point, we win. Um, for 
me it’s obviously very different then. I grew up a life of privilege in 
every demographic you can imagine, um, and yet this has always 
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been a part of my life, probably because of the way that I was raised, 
and the way I was raised was that self-interest isn’t what drove me. 
Self-interest isn’t what drove my family. Justice was. And the idea 
that, that things are set up on an even keel, that people have the same 
opportunities in life, was more important than motivated self-interest. 
So, why does an old white guy want this? Well, because I honestly 
believe, and I, I, . . . I won’t even say believe . . . I know that when 
more people are brought to the table, in an equal fashion, the universe 
of options, the universe of ideas that come out of that dialogue, is bet-
ter. Picture twelve white guys at a table who all have similar upbring-
ing, right? What are you going to get out of that? Pretty similar an-
swers. Now, intersperse that with women, people of color, the 
LGBTQ community. The universe of options just expanded exponen-
tially. So, it’s not just about women, it’s about everybody, the solu-
tions that we’re making. And I’ll tell you one other thing. This is just 
personal experience. Dealt with a lot of people over in my life. I find 
women to be very reasonable, so I’d like them to be at the table, 
[laughter] but, thank you.  
 
Herring: Well, thank you, Representative. [Applause]. Thank you, 
Representative, and also Senator. And, maybe, uh, Senator, uh, if we 
could start with you. If you could walk us through, uh, the path to rat-
ification in Nevada, uh, how you personally were involved in that ef-
fort, and what some of the big challenges were that you faced, and, 
and, and the advocates faced in that effort. 
 
Spearman: So, thank you. Um, in about, I guess it’s nine days or 
something like that in Virginia, we’ve got an election coming up. Ten 
days? Ten days, um, that matters, because I first brought the bill in, 
um, 2015, and, um, my party was not in charge, and so, they heard, 
uh, the bill in the committee, and on the very last day, um, the very 
last hour that bills had to come out of committee before they died, I 
was told by the then majority leader, “It’s just a symbol, so we de-
cided we’re not going to engage with it. We’re not going hear it,” and 
so the bill died. I was up for re-election in 2016, and that’s what I 
campaigned on. I campaigned on ratifying the ERA. I said, “Get me 
back, and I promise you we can perform.” [Applause]. And, and I 
promised that it would be among the first that I would sponsor, and it 
was the only, uh, bill that was in front of mine, the SJR, Senate Joint 
Resolution, was in front of mine was a bill by the governor, so our 
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resolution was SJR 2. Uh, got it done and, uh, coincidentally, our 
now Attorney General said . . . then he was the majority leader . . . 
said on opening day of the session, he said this session, we will ratify 
the ERA, and we will have an Equal Pay Bill, and he just went right 
down the line, and we, we, we managed to do both of those, and we 
did them, uh, in a manner that I think is befitting of the honor of the 
people who came before us, and so I am . . . I am mindful that, that 
this . . . at this moment in history, we are actually standing on the 
shoulders of people who came before us, who, some of them even put 
their lives on the line, so that, that . . . that’s what motivates me, 
that . . . that’s what really inspires me and gives me the passion that I 
have because there’s so many people before me that lived to see this 
day. And, and if I have anything to do with it, I’m going to do all I 
can to help Virginia make it, and, uh, if you all do what I think you’re 
going to do on November the 5th, it will be, and, so, we were able to 
pass it because those who fought against bringing it to the floor, get-
ting it out of committee . . . we defeated them, we defeated them and, 
and when we ratified in 2017, in the election of 2018, we elected the 
first female majority legislature in the country. [Applause]. That’s 
what happens . . . that’s what happens when women are engaged, and 
we understand what’s at stake.  
 
Anderson: Uh, so our path was probably a little different. Um, for 
me, it started when I was eight. Uh, that was, uh, when the ERA was 
supposed to have passed. Uh, there was two things I was promised 
when I was in grammar school. One was the ERA was going to pass, 
and, two, the metric system was going to take over the United States. 
[Laughter]. Turn . . . Turns out, neither of them were true. So, fast 
forward about 47 years, and, uh, I was sitting in my office, a brand-
new legislature . . . legislator, and a, uh, lobbyist came to my office 
from what we call the [inaudible] Family Institute . . . you probably 
have an equivalent group here . . . and understand who I am, I’m a 
pro-life Republican. I make no apologies for that, that’s what I am, 
but I’m also the most ardent supporter of the ERA you’re going to 
find. Um, so this person comes and says we’ve got this horrible bill, 
you’re a new legislator, we want to make sure you’re aware of it be-
cause its going to come up again, and I said, “Okay, what is it,” and 
they said, “the ERA.” I said, “Hm, you know, I wouldn’t guess that 
that would be such a problem, but I’ll listen to you.” He, uh, gave me 
a sheet, which, uh, was a little three-fold sheet, was called “Stop the 
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ERA” by the Eagle Forum, you may have heard of them. And, uh, so, 
I took the time to read it, and it said uh, some pretty incredible things 
about the ERA, like, I bet you didn’t know that it would legalize mar-
riage at the age of thirteen. Did you know that? I was shocked. Uh, 
that . . . according to this pamphlet. Uh, it also said that women 
would lose all their social security benefits. Uh, and it went on and 
on, but the thing about it was, these claims were so incredulous, I had 
to look them up, you know. I had to figure out where they got this 
stuff. They got it from then-attorney Ruth Bader Ginsburg when she 
worked for the Justice Department and did a, a, a study called, uh, 
“Sex Bias in the U.S. Code.” So, I was able to look up chapter and 
verse of what they were claiming. And what I discovered was, these 
were not mischaracterizations. These were not arguments about what 
these statutes said or might do. These were lies, these were outright 
lies, so, this group . . . you couldn’t mistake this, you couldn’t read it 
any other way, they were lying to people, and that pissed me off, re-
ally pissed me off. I don’t like when people lie. So I did my own re-
search about it and discovered that there’s absolutely no connection 
between their claim of abortion um, and, uh, and, uh, the Equal 
Rights Amendment. So, inadvertently, they created their worst en-
emy, which was me. [Applause]. Thank you. And Illinois’s path had 
been, like I said very, very long and what, what we needed to do, 
though, was, even though we were a democratically controlled House 
and Senate, there’s not enough votes because we have a lot of south-
ern Democrats who are very pro-life and were afraid of that abortion 
issue. So, my job became to convince enough legislators on the Re-
publican side, who were pro-life, uh, that this was a false narrative. It 
was fake, and that’s exactly what I did. It took me about four years, 
uh, of constant arguing and talking and trying to figure out different 
ways to explain it, uh, and then fortunately or unfortunately . . . I’m 
going say fortunately . . . the #MeToo movement happened. It’s un-
fortunate that it had to happen, but its fortunate that it has happened, 
and that was a strong motivator for people to take a look at their vot-
ing record and see, are they voting on women’s issues? Are they vot-
ing correctly? Well, I gave them an opportunity now. I said, this is 
your chance. This is your chance to show that you actually like 
women. Um, and, uh, fortunately, uh, after much fight, right up to the 
last second, it was the last day of our session . . . last evening . . . we 
did it about at eleven o’clock at night . . . we were exhausted after 
hours and hours of debate. Uh, we managed to get it done, and it 
205
et al.: General Topics
Published by UR Scholarship Repository,
Do Not Delete 4/15/20  2:01 PM 
196 RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW  [Vol. XXIII:iii 
passed with exactly one extra vote, but . . . and I could tell that story 
too . . . but it was a wonderful experience.  
 
Herring: So, Senator, it sounds like, um, the . . . some of the biggest 
challenges in Nevada, uh, getting into ratification might have been 
political at a partisan level. Uh, what do you think? Push that over. 
And, then, uh, Representative, for you, as you were coming down try-
ing to dispel myths and, and so forth . . . what do you think, uh, 
pushed that effort over the edge as you were coming down toward the 
end of the session. Senator?  
 
Spearman: So um, I, I want to pick up on something that Repre-
sentative Anderson just said. I, I learned from carrying this bill . . . I 
learned that, once I introduce the bill, I need to sit some place where 
the camera can’t see me. Because I heard . . . um, a lady came to the 
witness table and said with a straight face, um, “If we pass the ERA, 
that will allow women to marry the Eiffel tower.” [Laughter]. Um, 
and the camera was right on me and I was like . . . [laughter]. And 
someone else came to the table and said if we . . . if we ratify the 
ERA then that means that women will be in combat, and I was 
like . . . If we ratify the ERA then women will lose their husbands’ 
social security, and I’m like mmmm. And there were all these things 
that people said, and I was really prepared for everything except the 
Eiffel tower [laughter], and I was like, “Okay, boy, this is a brand 
new one,” okay?  
 
Herring: How’d you answer that? [Laughter].   
 
Spearman: Um, I said, um, I have it on general information that the 
Eiffel tower is probably not available, so we can just eliminate that 
one so. [Laughter]. I said, of course, you know if you want to go and 
prove me wrong, you know, have at it but . . . Um, and, so, since I 
was in high school, I remember them talking about this, and these 
were the same arguments they had over and over and over . . . there 
were really no new arguments except the Eiffel tower, no new argu-
ments. Um, and people who know me, know this about me, once I 
say I’m going to do something, rarely does it not happen because I 
will stay there and stay there and stay there until it happens, espe-
cially when it comes to equality, so it was a matter of dispelling all of 
those myths, um, the first time . . . and the second time, when we 
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came back in 2017, uh, some people still came to the table and tried 
to say some of those same things, but, um, uh, as I walked into the 
hearing room I, I looked at them, and I smiled and I said, “I’m still 
here.” So, um, they weren’t as forceful as they were in ’15, um, but 
those arguments . . . there’s nothing new about that . . . those are 
those arguments . . . and I always tell people, someone who’s drown-
ing will reach for a straw, and, and people know, they know that this 
will happen. They know that it will happen but, but they continue to 
argue facetiously that this is the reason why it shouldn’t happen, and, 
and sometimes I just want to stand up and say, Do your children 
know that you’re standing up making them look like fools in public? 
Do you, do you . . . do they know you’re talking like this? And, and, 
and do people really understand that we’re at a moment in history 
that rarely comes around. I, I . . . there . . . there are very few things 
in the history books where we can look back and say, oh I wish I had 
been there then, and, and, and I looked at the, the, uh, arguments, uh, 
in 1969, uh, when there . . . the vote came, uh, whether or not to fund 
NASA, and there were people who voted for NASA and then there 
were people who did not, and I said this, I said, “You know those 
people who voted to fund NASA when we landed on the moon could 
say ‘I was on the right side of history.’” But forever, forever those 
who did not, all people have to do is look at the history books, and 
they can see who was on the wrong side of history, and, so, ratifying 
really came down to asking this question after all of the other argu-
ments had been presented . . . it really came . . . Are you going to be 
on the right side of history? Or are you going to be standing on the 
sidelines? It’s your choice. It, it . . . it’s your choice because this will 
happen, this will happen, and we will get it done.  
 
Herring: Representative, what do you think, uh, in the end, what 
pushed it over . . . over the finish line?  
 
Anderson: So, it took a lot of different strategies. That was one of 
them, quite honestly, the . . . the being on the right side of history is a 
very powerful thing. Uh, it is rare that a legislature gets to vote on 
something as important as amending the United States Constitution. 
I’m pretty sure I’m only ever going to do it once. And, uh, so, that re-
ally did compel some people, but that wasn’t enough, and . . . and as 
much as I would like to say that good policy will drive things, gener-
ally, it’s a great starting point, but that doesn’t get you votes if . . . if 
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it’s a scary proposition. So, it depended on the person that I was, I 
was trying to whip or . . . or lobby, so to speak . . . um, some people 
were driven purely by the demographics of getting reelected. So, at 
that point, like I said, the #MeToo movement was heavily engaged 
and, uh, . . . and I said, the only way you’re going to survive the 
next . . . the next cycle is if you . . . if you get on this, in other words, 
if you co-sponsor it. That worked with a lot of republican suburban-
ites, uh, more moderate in nature. So, that would work. Um, others, I 
had to spend hours going through the legal analysis of, of why abor-
tion had nothing to do with the ERA, and these were not lawyers that 
I was talking to, but they wanted to understand it. So, we did, and 
some of them I went over it multiple times with. The . . . the diffi-
culty with explaining it is that in . . . in my experience in the legisla-
ture, uh, if you have to explain something, you lose. Um, that is typi-
cally, you know, . . . if you get into a long-winded explanation, 
people stop listening, uh, so, you have to be able to shorten it up, so I 
tried to give them some of the arguments in essence as well as in de-
tail, uh, to try to . . . to try to deal with that. So, uh, there was that. 
There was, uh, another strategy that worked was outright pressure at 
the last moment. Uh, one of the, uh, . . . one of the things I didn’t ex-
pect was we were . . . we were finishing the bill, we were voting on 
it, you know . . . in our chamber, uh, the chair has to say, “Have all 
voted who wish?” three times before he can lock out the button that 
registers everybody’s vote. Until that time, you can toggle: yes, no. 
So, there were two gentlemen down in the front who hadn’t voted at 
all, and we had gotten to 69 votes, and we needed two, we needed 71 
votes. So, we got down to these last two, and these two gentlemen 
had not voted at all, and, so, one of my colleagues down in the 
front . . . a guy named Marty, Marty is very loud . . . uh, Marty just 
got up and started berating them and yelling at them and said, “Are 
you kidding? You want to run for judge, and you want to get 
reelected, and you think all the women in your district are going to 
vote for you after you remained silent on this?” He just screamed at 
them. Uh, and, you know what, sometimes that works, because they 
both quietly voted green. They . . . they quietly voted green. And 
then . . . and then, so, like I told you, 71 was the magic number. Well, 
we hit 71, and then the speaker locked out the vote. Everybody 
screams and shouts and is excited, and I look up at the board, and it 
says 72 votes. I’m like, wait a moment, what happened? Who did . . . 
who’d I miss? And, so, I look, and it’s my leader, the Republican 
208
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [], Art. 2
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol23/iss3/2
Do Not Delete 4/15/20  2:01 PM 
2020] “ERA Conference” 199 
Leader of the House, a guy named Jim Durkin, a great man by the 
way, and I went to Jim afterwards, and I’m not telling the schools . . . 
the tails out of the school . . . he’s talked about this publicly, I said, 
“What happened? I though you weren’t going to vote for this because 
of the caucus?” He goes, “Couldn’t do it to my daughter. Could not 
do that to my daughter.” So, every different reason, every different 
strategy, I used them all to . . . to try to get this thing done. And in the 
end, we did it.  
 
Herring: Uh, Representative, you know you had, um . . . were talk-
ing about how some of the arguments were . . . you talked about, uh, 
some representatives thinking, well, for my daughter I’m doing this, 
uh, equal rights for women . . . you talked about how important it was 
to have that . . . constitutionally guaranteed. Uh, is this just for 
women or can men benefit from this, too? 
 
Anderson: No, I, I it . . . it’s for everyone. Um, it doesn’t distinguish. 
It doesn’t say equal rights for women. It’s, uh, non-discrimination 
based on sex. Um, and, in fact, if you go back in the history books, 
in . . . in Fourteenth Amendment case law, you will find that, uh, 
then-attorney Ginsburg, who, again is, in my mind, just brilliant, 
brought most of the cases that she tried to get, uh, women’s rights 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, in which she partially suc-
ceeded. Um, most of those were based on male circumstances where 
men were being discriminated against, so I have no difficulty believ-
ing that this can also benefit men in a direct way. Give you an exam-
ple that I ran into last week . . . I was talking with, uh, uh, city of Chi-
cago, um, uh, Police Superintendent and something about hair styles 
came up, and he said, well, we have a hairstyle requirement for men 
and for women. I said, why aren’t they the same? And, he said, well, 
because we let women grow their hair longer because they like that, 
and I said well ok, that’s fine, but that’s not right. Think about it 
though. Hairstyles, textures, all those sorts of things are in play right 
now. Maybe men would like to wear their hair a little longer. That 
could advantage them in the future under the ERA. That’s just a very 
small example, but I think it’s a . . . it’s a personal expression item 
that’s important to a lot of people. That’s an area that . . . where you 
can . . . you can see that potential. 
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Herring: Well, what about on the flip side. Could it be detrimental? 
Do you think in . . . to women? 
 
Anderson: To women? I would argue, theoretically yes, but practi-
cally no. Uh , and the way I would say that is, you know, things that 
could arguably be threatened are, uh, set asides, right? Priority 
cont . . . in . . . priorities in contracts. There’s women in minority 
owned business enterprise legislation in most states, at, at least that 
I’m aware of, where there are priorities given to make sure that we 
are being inclusive. Could those be set aside? Could those be de-
clared unconstitutional under the ERA? If everything is equal, if we 
actually get to equality someday, which we aren’t anywhere near 
with any protective classification, yeah, I suppose it could, but we 
aren’t there, and we’ve seen that the Fourteenth Amendment itself 
sustains and allows minority set aside programs. So, I see no differ-
ence in the analysis here, that it would allow the same things to com-
pete. But, I will say this . . . and, and I’m quoting to a friend of mine, 
her name is Representative Kathleen Willis, a strong advocate for the 
ERA . . . she said, “you know what, if I lose a couple of things to gain 
overall equality, I’ll take that, I’ll take that. Because I’d rather be 
equal than be put on a pedestal, so to speak.” 
 
Herring: So, Illinois was the 37th state, Nevada was 36, and there 
were a lot of years before where, uh, there hadn’t been ratification. 
Uh, Senator, what . . . what do you think, um, got Nevada going, uh, 
after such a long period of time? Because people are asking that, you 
know, here in Virginia, too.  
  
Spearman: So, um, when Janette Dean, who was then in Nevada, 
and she now is in Minnesota, um, she had partnered with a number of 
people, and I think, Eileen, you were one of those. There were several 
people around the country, and, um, they were doing the three-state 
strategy, and Janette came to me and asked me if I would carry the 
bill, and I will tell you I thought it was dead. I was like oh my, I, I . . . 
it didn’t get ratified in time. And she said, well, it didn’t get ratified, 
but there’s not . . . time is not the problem, it’s the problem getting it 
introduced, and so . . . Once I . . . once I learned that it had not been 
ratified and that we had an opportunity in Nevada, um, to make this 
historic step, it was a no brainer. Um, I mean it was . . . like I said, 
you know, I . . . any place I go, I bring my whole self to it, and my 
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whole self has been discriminated in some form or fashion all of my 
life. Uh, I was discriminated, um, when I was first was, uh, commis-
sioned in the military because I was a woman. Uh, they didn’t want 
women in there. They certainly didn’t want black women in the Mili-
tary Police Corps. Uh, so discrimination is one of those things that 
I’ve . . . I fought for, um . . . fought against all of my life. Um, the 
other thing that I’ll say is we had to . . . we also had to get over the 
hump of symbolism, and I don’t think I heard that when I was in Illi-
nois when it was being, uh . . . when we testified before the Assem-
bly . . . but symbolism. So, we had people who said, well, this is sym-
bolic, and, you know, why are we wasting the people’s time on 
symbolic things and . . . and it doesn’t mean anything. So, what? We 
ratify it, it won’t mean anything, and so I . . . everybody goes around, 
and they say what they need to say, and, um, I noticed that, um, all 
with exception of one of my Republican colleagues were going to 
dwell on the symbolism and talk about how silly it was that we were 
wasting time with this symbolic action, um, and, so, when it was my 
turn to get up and, and8 close it out I said this . . . I said, “Listen, you 
all can denigrate symbolism all you want to, but every day we come 
into this chamber, before we get started, we have a prayer and then 
we have the pledge of allegiance. I pledge allegiance to the flag of the 
United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands. 
Short version: symbol. That’s what it is, the flag is a symbol. Chris-
tians wear crosses, members of the Jewish faith, you know, wear 
Stars of David, you know, Muslims wear, uh, uh, the moon. They . . . 
anybody who is walking around and who understands the value of 
what they believe in, they believe in those symbols, and symbols ac-
tually point to something stronger and bigger than we are, but that 
symbol animates and tells the world what our belief is. So, don’t talk 
to me about symbols being unimportant.” I said, “Every one of you 
that stood and gave that facetious argument about it’s a symbol, and 
it doesn’t mean anything, I need you need you need to look at your 
left hand . . . because on your left hand your spouses are sitting on 
your hand. You have a ring on your hand, and anyone who sees that 
ring on your hand, that is a symbol that this person is married, so if 
symbols don’t mean anything, then we should not say the pledge of 
allegiance. If symbols don’t mean anything, then take your ring off 
and, and go explain to your wife why you did that.” [Laughter]. So, 
symbols are important. They, they, they are important, but, you 
know, we . . . we were able to get it done in Nevada because we just 
211
et al.: General Topics
Published by UR Scholarship Repository,
Do Not Delete 4/15/20  2:01 PM 
202 RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW  [Vol. XXIII:iii 
stuck with it. We just . . . we would not give up, and, like I said, you 
know, they didn’t hear it . . . they heard it in the ‘15 but wouldn’t 
vote it out of committee, and we were bound and determined, we’re 
going to get this done. We’re going to get this done, and the thing 
that I have said to people in Virginia . . . and I have said the same 
thing to people in Arizona, I’ve said the same thing to people in 
North Carolina, and in Georgia, wherever people have asked me to 
come and speak about this . . . listen, if you have people in your legis-
lature that do not understand the importance of your equality, if you 
can’t change their minds, change them. [Applause]. If you can’t their 
minds then change them because . . . because it be . . . it becomes 
painfully obvious that either, number one, they don’t understand the 
job they have been elected to do, or, number two, they understand it, 
and they simply choose to be derelict in their duty, and so for any-
body who did not support us getting the ERA out of committee, all of 
those people were defeated. All of ‘em were defeated. [Applause].  
 
Herring: If I am ever in a legislature fight again, I want you . . . in 
the chamber. [Laughter]. And for the historians out there who are 
thinking about time, uh, I would note that the, uh, 27th Amendment 
governing congressional pay raises was ratified in 1992 after first be-
ing proposed in 1789. So, um, but, uh, this year or next year is going 
to be the year in Virginia. Um, so, uh, any other particular arguments 
that you felt, uh, that . . . that we in Virginia might be hearing that 
you can help us, uh, counter like . . . like the symbol argument, or, 
uh, the abortion issue . . . any other, uh, issues that you remember be-
ing especially prevalent that you had to work extra hard to combat? 
 
Spearman: Sure. So, um, what Representative Anderson said, the 
piece about someone voting for this for their daughter, um, and that 
was also something I said in my closing arguments, you know, you 
have daughters, um, you have mothers, there are women in your life 
who are important. And if they are that important to you, isn’t it im-
portant that their rights, their equal rights, are codified in the Consti-
tution? And whenever you ask that question, it’s like . . . the silence 
is deafening because you cannot say that you want to have a better 
world for your daughter, your granddaughter, or you want one day 
want to be able to honor the sacrifices of your mother, your grand-
mother . . . you can’t say that and then vote against the Equal Rights 
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Amendment. You just cannot do it. They’re incompatible. Incompati-
ble. 
 
Anderson: We had, uh . . . we had a couple of other arguments that 
we had to get past and it’s important to know . . . know about them, 
and I think you probably heard them. Uh, but one is that this will 
open up everything, uh . . . unisex bathrooms, unisex shower rooms, 
you know, just absolute equality, no distinctions between men and 
women whatsoever. Uh, we all must dress alike, we all must look 
alike, you name it. Uh, that was one, you know, that we actually had 
to deal with, and, fortunately, I have always said to the people that 
have raised that, I said take comfort in history, and that history is that 
in about, uh . . . I think we talked about in one of the earlier ses-
sions . . . about 26 states have ERAs or ERA-like statutes, including 
Illinois, and we’ve had it for 40 years. Guess what? We have separate 
bathrooms, uh, our children don’t have to shower together, um, 
they . . . they definitely do not dress alike. Um, so history is our 
guide. It hasn’t happened. It’s not going to happen because it hasn’t 
happened. Those . . . that’s just fearmongering, um, and it’s nothing 
more than that. So, that one I felt pretty good about getting past. One 
of the harder ones, and I, I . . . I think it’s . . . it’s a legit question that 
you have to address, is, for example, all of them are . . . like I said we 
have an ERA, we have about the most robust protections for all pro-
tective classifications in the country, us, New York, and Califor-
nia . . . um, so people say, “Why do we even need this? We don’t 
need it. Illinois already has all this. So, we don’t have to go with 
this.” And that’s . . . I mean, that’s something that you have to con-
front. You . . . I don’t think you have to confront it because you’re 
not quite as robust as our protections, but, um . . . [laughter].  
 
Herring: Not yet. 
 
Anderson: Not yet, not yet. But, it’s still a question, and . . . and I 
think the answer is really this, is, do women in the state of Virginia 
like to travel? Do you like to go to other states? ‘Cause if you do, you 
lose those protections. Women in Illinois, if they move to Virginia, I 
guess, right now, don’t have the same protections. Do we really want 
to, um, live our lives on the basis of where . . . where women are 
equal and where they aren’t? I think the answer is no, and, also, even 
in the state of Illinois, those, those laws, our Constitution, does not 
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extend to federal laws. So, if there are federal laws that discriminate, 
then we have nothing to say about that with our state constitutions, so 
even within our state there’s a problem. But that was something that 
was a question that did come up often, was, tell me why we need this. 
We don’t need it, we already have it. So, I . . . you know, an answer 
to answer your question, those are two that were very common that 
we had to confront. 
 
Herring: As I look out around the room, I see a lot of young people. 
Uh, do either of you have anything that you would like to . . . like the 
young people in particular, uh, to know about the Equal Rights 
Amendment or the experiences in your states? 
 
Anderson: Um, sure. So, yes. Um, uh, uh, Amelia who spoke earlier, 
uh, talked quite a bit about what motivates young people, and I really 
listened and, uh, appreciated the comments, and I also understand 
that every generation has a different culture and a different attitude 
towards life. In fact, there’s a great book that I would commend to 
any of you to read called The Big Sort by a gentleman by the name of 
Bill Bishop, and it talks about how we all self-sort, and what that 
means is that we tend to want to live with people who think like we 
do. It doesn’t mean look like we do but think like we do. More lib-
eral, more progressive, more conservative, we tend to self-sort our-
selves. Well, what we experience is that, in Illinois, we attract a 
young demographic. Now, we are actually losing population, just by 
a very small amount, but we are, um, but, where we are growing is in 
highly compensated young people. Young professionals want to live 
in Illinois, particularly in the Chicago area, because it is a place that 
reflects their values, and so what I try to argue is that, for young peo-
ple in particular, you want to come to a state that has adopted this. It 
sends a message, a symbol, that says we are open for business for 
young people. We want you here. We are not some old curmudg-
eonly state that . . . that, uh, doesn’t . . . doesn’t care about equal 
rights. So, I think, I think that message is critical for young people so 
that, you know, you want to come to a place that passes laws like 
this. 
 
Spearman: So, um, and we heard the piece about you know start 
dressing alike. Well, that ship sailed a long time ago, okay? Because 
it . . . it really depends upon how people feel on that day. Uh, I 
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remember a few years back, maybe twenty years back, if you had 
Hilfiger, uh, jeans on, you had a Hilfiger t-shirt. You had Gloria Van-
derbilt something, you had Gloria Vanderbilt, so people didn’t mix, 
you know, the names. You had . . . you had one name, that name was 
on you head to toe. Now, you know, it’s like Walmart jeans and, you 
know, you know, Hilfiger, or Polo, or whatever, so it really doesn’t 
matter, and . . . and there are more styles now, um, for unisex, and, 
so, young people today they don’t care about that stuff. They, they, 
they don’t . . . they really don’t, and they don’t care about that stuff. 
And . . . and, and when you stop and you think about the fact that . . . 
and here’s what I said, too, to get, uh, a lot of our, uh, younger people 
on board, there once was a time when you could not get credit if you 
were married unless your husband signed, and you couldn’t have a 
bank account unless your husband signed, and, and there were places 
that you could not really go, and even shop, unless your husband . . . 
and they looked, and they were like, really? I said yes, yes, and peo-
ple fought to make sure that those crazy things went away, and what I 
am asking you all to do today is to fight to make sure the craziness of 
discrimination based on sex, based on gender, make sure that goes 
away. The . . . this, this . . . we cannot allow this generation to go 
away without getting this done. We just can’t. It has lingered too 
long, and . . . and, you know, when you, when you vote on the fifth of 
November, you know, take, take everybody and la de da de, take eve-
rybody, okay. Take everybody. Your friends, your enemies, whoever 
it is. Take them to the polls and make sure that they vote and help 
them to understand that state laws can be overturned, so, there’s noth-
ing, there’s nothing really guaranteed just because we have a state 
law. The state law can be overturned depending upon who’s in 
charge, and, and, and, and sometimes even federal law can be over-
turned, as we have come to see. There’s some things we have tool for 
granted that said oh, well that will never go away, and we’re seeing 
right now that they’re under attack, and so, we must get that done in 
this generation. We have to. It is a moral imperative. We must get it 
done. And if my generation alone is not willing to step up to the 
plate, then I am asking you all: join us, join us, young people join us 
because we have to get it done, and we need you. We have to get it 
done. It’s a moral imperative. 
 
Herring: Well, Senator, you are, um, getting to where I would kind 
of like to, uh, conclude this part, and in Virginia, we have been 
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working on this for a long time. Uh, we thought we were going to get 
it passed this past January or February, and it ended up not making it 
across the finish line. So, we are all redoubling our efforts. Uh, any 
lessons that you have for us in Virginia as to what we can do to fi-
nally become the thirty-eighth state to ratify the ERA and get it 
passed, uh, in the upcoming session?  
 
Spearman: I’ll just . . . I’ll just say this. Look at the people who 
voted against it and if they’re on the ballot, do what . . . do for them 
what they did for the ERA. Got it? [Laughter and applause].  
 
Herring: Any, any, uh? [Laughter].  
 
Anderson: Oh, yeah, sure. You were . . . asked the senator so I . . . I 
listened. [Laughter].  
 
Herring: Sorry. I would like to ask both of you. Any lessons for us in 
Virginia so that we can follow, uh, your lead?  
 
Anderson: So, uh, one of the things that I . . . I advise on this a lot, 
and in the next ten days, it’s not going to matter, but, um, but depend-
ing on how this goes, is the concept of positive pressure for legisla-
tors, um, is . . . it is one thing to do what the Senator said, which is 
vote people out of office and you can . . . and if you can do it, awe-
some, but you might not always be able to do that. Uh, there are dis-
tricts that are drawn so that it’s almost impossible. So, what you need 
to do for those districts and those senators or representatives is apply 
positive pressure. And what I mean by that is the idea of saying to 
that person, “Senator, ah, you know, I want you to vote for this bill. I 
know it’s a tough bill for you, but I think you know it’s the right 
thing to do. But I also know you’re worried aobut what it’s going to 
do for you, you know, in your next primary. You know, I tell you, 
I’m going to be there for you. So, in other words, I’m not just going 
to push you to vote on my bill and then I’ll . . . you’ll never see me 
again. No, I’ll walk for you. I’ll knock on doors. I’ll collect petitions. 
Um, I’ll support you financially. I’ll walk in your parades, and I’ve 
got a bunch of people who will do it with me.” In other words, there’s 
got to be a commitment on your part to support those people who 
might do it but are wavering. ‘Cause if . . . if the answer is you just 
come to their door and say, “I want you to vote for this thing.” First 
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thing the Republicans are going to say is, “Well, are you a Democrat 
or a Republican? Because if you’re a Democrat, you’re not voting for 
me anyway, so that doesn’t matter, and if you’re a Republican, what 
are you going to do for me?” And I don’t mean that in a quid pro quo 
kind of . . . kind of way, I just mean it in a very legitimate type of 
way. If you’re asking them to do something difficult, and they 
can . . . these are difficult votes, make no mistake, for any legislature, 
these are difficult things to, to decide about . . . if you’re asking them 
to do something difficult, you need to be prepared to do something 
difficult for them, which is to go out and help and commit to them for 
the future because . . . and if you can do it beforehand that’s great 
too, by the way, if, you know, they win . . . now hopefully this won’t 
take too long, but, uh, but if you have to go another cycle then you 
got to get out in front of that and say, “I’ll walk for you now. I’ll 
work for you now.” And, so, I think the idea of positive pressure for 
those districts that are, that are swinging, uh, and that are held by Re-
publicans in particular, uh, that’s an important, uh, important for 
them to think about.  
 
Herring:  Well, Representative, that’s, uh, uh, good segue. We have 
time for one question, uh, and, and then we’ll need to conclude. How 
can the ERA remain bipartisan? And I . . . that’s to both of you.  
 
Anderson: Okay, uh, so I don’t think it’s very difficult for it to re-
main bipartisan, especially in this day and age, but what has to be 
done is the pressure has to be kept on the focus on women’s rights. 
Okay. Uh, you’re half the population. Um, Republicans know that. 
Um, you . . . you exert pressure like nobody’s seen in the last, uh, two 
years, maybe four years. Uh, uh, the women’s movement is . . . has 
been quiet in the past, but that is no longer the case. You are . . . you 
are loud as can be, and I don’t believe it’s going to go away, and I 
hope it’s not ever going to go away, so if you keep doing that . . . if 
you keep positive pressure, but you also keep your voice . . . don’t 
ever lose the powerful voice that you have gained. You force it to be 
bipartisan issue. They have to . . . they have to listen to you, or 
they’re toast.  
 
Spearman: And, and I would say this, and I look at this through the 
same lens that I see, um, some of the contemporary arguments about 
whether our democracy has been put at risk . . . when people talk 
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about things as important as that, and they say that, well, Democrats 
support this and Republicans support that . . . this is not a partisan is-
sue. It is not a partisan issue and, and, and . . . and you cheapen the 
labor of those that have gone before us when you reduce it to that, 
and, so, I still try to remind people, it’s not a partisan issue. It just so 
happens that there are more Republicans who stand against this than 
there are Democrats . . . and we did have, uh, one Republican woman 
who voted with us, and, um, I said to her, I said, “Every place that 
I’ve been all over the country I’ve been going,” I said, “Every place 
that I’ve been, people know your name. They do not know the names 
of those who did not vote with us.” And so, continue to remind peo-
ple, the media may want to reduce arguments about our democracy 
being under attack or not, to Democrat versus Republican, that’s not 
what this is. This is about equality. Period. It’s about equality. Period. 
It’s about . . . it’s about not just my rights, but it’s about two and 
three generations after me. What . . . what are we going to do? What 
kind of world are we going to leave them? Are we going to have 
them come into the world fighting as hard as we did? So, it’s not a 
partisan issue. It’s about equality. Period.  
 
Herring: Please join me in thanking our great panel.  
 
[Applause].  
 
MaryAnn Grover: We are now going to take a fifteen-minute break. 
We have fresh coffee. Some pastries out in the atrium. Feel free to 
grab some snacks, freshen up and we’ll be back here at 4:15.  
 
Cory Amron: Good afternoon, good afternoon. Is everybody awake? 
Everybody needs to, you know, we need to stand up and … just do a 
little calisthenics here. First of all, thank you all for the stalwarts, for 
sticking it out and for being here. You know there’s one more panel, 
so you can’t go home yet. And, um, there’s so much more interesting 
things to talk about and to . . . to hear about. So, thank you again for 
being here. My name is Cory Amron, and I am the president of 
Women Lawyers on Guard.  Um, we were asked to put on a panel 
about equal pay and how it relates to the Equal Rights Amendment. 
Uh, Women Lawyers on Guard is a national network of men and 
women, uh, lawyers and non-lawyers. Um, we are working for a so-
cial justice, we’re working . . . or, are a network, uh, using the law to, 
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um . . . to further social justice, to further equal opportunity. Um, and 
some of the things that we do are we match our volunteers with the 
legal needs of other non-profits. We, uh, work on amicus briefs. We 
send comments in to, uh, . . .  on regulations, we send letters to Con-
gressmen, and, um, uh, . . . on incredibly important issues, not only to 
women, but specifically also women lawyers, and we are really fo-
cusing on sexual harassment in the legal profession. We just closed 
out a survey, a nationwide survey. Guess what? There’s sexual har-
assment in the legal profession. Who knew? Amazing, right? Um, so 
watch for our report. It’s going to come out, uh, at the beginning of 
the year. And we’re also working on equal pay, so, . . . again, in the 
legal profession. Um, so this . . . this afternoon, we have, um, a great 
panel that Courtney is going to introduce to you. Courtney Toomath 
is, um, a litigation attorney, and she has represented many companies 
that you would recognize in valuation disputes, um, recovering mil-
lions of dollars. But even more important than that, Courtney is on 
our board. And, um, she is the chair of our amicus committee, so 
that’s . . . uh, we are . . . we are so pleased to have her . . . to have her 
here, and have her, uh, moderating this panel. Um, so as I mentioned, 
we’ve been asked to put on this panel. We’re going to talk about the 
substance of, uh, the equal pay, uh, issues. We’re going to talk about 
practicalities. We’re going to talk about legislative litigation, uh, is-
sues and solutions, and, of course, we’re going to tie it into the ERA. 
Um, you have at your tables a couple of things, one is, um, a little 
flier about our organization. We have a C3 and a C4. We have, um, 
some . . . an index card. If you have any questions, uh, somebody’s 
going to come around and, um, pass them to me. And, um, Jeff will 
talk about this compensation survey that should also be at your desk. 
So, um, without any further ado, Courtney.  
 
Courtney Toomath: Hi, everyone, Um, so, uh, just before I get 
started, um, I wanted to, uh, especially tell some of the younger, uh, 
feminists that there’s something that my professor, uh, Constance 
Backhouse, who wrote, uh, . . . wrote “Petticoats and Prejudice,” has 
told me, and that is feminism is fun. And one of the wonderful things 
I hope you take away from this conference is that you make, um, in-
credible connections with other women and men who all support, uh, 
equality because that’s really what we’re here to do.  
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Um, our first speaker today, um, on another illustrious panel is Jef-
frey Lowe. Jeffrey is the Global Practice Leader of Major, Lindsey & 
Africa’s Law Firm Practice Group, the leader of the firm’s Washing-
ton D.C. Partner Practice Group, and the Managing Partner of the 
D.C. Office. Jeffrey regularly handles the most significant partner 
placements in Washington D.C. and is widely regarded as one of the 
leading partner recruiters and advisors in the United States. He was 
named to Law Dragon’s 100 Leading Legal Consultants and Strate-
gists in 2016 and 2017. Jeffrey is regularly quoted by The American 
Lawyer, The Wall Street Journal, and Law 360, and his articles have 
been published in the D.C. Legal Times, the New York Law Journal, 
the National Law Journal, the Law Firm Partnerships and Benefits 
Report, and The Texas Lawyer. Today Jeffrey will be speaking 
about, ah, uh, the Major, Lindsey & Africa Partnership Compensa . . . 
Compensation Survey, which you should have, um, a copy of that 
you can browse through. Jeffrey is both the creator and the author of 
the survey, which was first published in 2010 and continues to be, uh, 
produced, uh, by the MLA. The survey is one of the most compre-
hensive efforts ever undertaken to identify ranges of partner compen-
sation and the criteria that law firms use in determining partner com-
pensation. Since its inception, the survey has found male partners 
consistently report substantially higher average compensation than 
female partners. As a result, Jeffery expanded the survey to take a 
more in-depth look into the gender-pay gap, to better understand 
what factors were contributing to that difference.  
 
Our second panelist is Anne Weisburg, and she is the co-author of the 
book “Mass Career Customization: Aligning The Workplace with 
Today’s Nontraditional Workforce,” which was hailed by the New 
York Times as the most important life, work . . . workbook that year. 
She’s also the author of some other books and reports as well, that are 
highly recognized. Anne is recognized as a thought leader and sub-
ject-matter expert in the innovation and design of practices for build-
ing effective and inclusive work environments. As the Director of the 
Woman’s Initiative at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, 
LLP, Anne is responsible for designing and implementing a gender 
strategy that fosters a high performing, inclusive work environment 
for all at the firm. She is also an adjunct professor of management at 
the NYU Stern School of Business, where she teaches a course on in-
clusive leadership. Anne has practiced law and written extensively on 
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the topic of women and the workforce. Today, Anne will be explain-
ing some of the reasons we continue to see the gender-pay gap, and 
she will share some practical strategies for interpreting gender bias in 
the workplace and hopefully overcoming it.  
 
Our third panelist is Andrea Johnson, Director of State Policy, Work-
place Justice, and Crosscutting Initiatives at the National Woman’s 
Law Center. Andrea coordinates efforts to advance state policies 
across NWLC’s workplace justice, income security, education, and 
reproductive rights and health teams. Andrea has been traveling all 
over the country, helping state legislatures deal with sexual harass-
ment issues in the wake of the #MeToo movement, and she works di-
rectly on legislation and litigation and outreach to break down the 
main discriminatory barriers to women’s full and equal workforce 
participation, including sexual harassment, pregnancy, and care . . . 
care . . . caregiver discrimination, and pay inequity. Andrea will be 
sharing her knowledge of current policy and litigation to discuss initi-
atives aimed at achieving equal pay through the courts and legisla-
tures, and she will touch on how the ERA could help move us to-
wards equal pay. So, Jeffery, we’ll start with you, a question for you.  
 
Jeffrey Lowe: Thank you.  
 
Toomath: Can you tell us about the recent survey that Major, Lind-
sey & Africa did on the compensation for partners at the largest law 
firms in the U.S., and what that survey revealed about the compensa-
tion gap between women and men law firm partners?  
 
Lowe:  Sure. So, we undertook the survey beginning in 2010 because 
in my business . . . I’m a headhunter, so, like, it sounds very fancy 
what I do, but I’m a, I’m a headhunter, and I’m also living proof that 
you can be something else with your law degree. I was a partner at 
Hogan & Hartson for a long time before, um, opening up my firm’s 
D.C. office in 2003. Um, and as Andy can tell you, there’s very little 
information out there on compensation about what partners make. 
You probably are familiar with the Am. Law 100, and it’ll list, you 
know, profits per partner, and things like that, but it doesn’t really get 
into any detail. And, so, we undertook the survey beginning in 2010 
to try to understand, um, you know, what is the average partner mak-
ing? How do things split out among cities and among genders and 
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things like that? And from the very beginning, I . . . I noticed that, not 
surprisingly, as my wife, who I met in law school is . . . uh, in the 
back there, will tell you, . . . that men are, on average, making sub-
stantially more than women . . . and, um, year in and year out, we did 
it in 2010, ‘12, ‘14, ‘16, and ’18, and by our 2018 survey, I thought it 
was very important for our firm, as thought leaders in the industry, to 
do some real in-depth analysis, so we hired, um, a research firm 
called Acritas, which is well-known around the world, to undertake 
this analysis for us, and, um, we asked a number of questions and 
sorted the data specifically about pay gap issues, and so, um, over the 
five surveys that we’ve done over ten years, the average pay has dif-
fered between thirty-two to, I think, fifty-three percent between male 
and female partners, which is very substantial. Um, and so this year 
we asked them, for 2018, we asked them questions, what do you per-
ceive the gender pay gap to be? And you’ll see if . . . if you look at 
page 50 of the, uh, Partner Compensation Survey in front of you, the 
average perceived gap, for those who even thought there was a gap, 
was 6%. So, you can see there’s . . . you know, there, there’s very dif-
ferent, um, thoughts out there between what’s happening and, and, 
and what’s being reported. Um, and not surprisingly, uh, 67% of fe-
male partners thought there was a gender pay gap, and 11% of male 
partners thought that there was a pay gap. So, uh, you know, again, 
it . . . it’s not really surprising, but it’s still stark when you see the 
numbers here. And, so, what we asked Acritas to do is do a, a real 
statistical regression analysis. Um, this is . . . writing this report is 
part of what I do, but I’m not, um, I’m not a statistician. I’m not a, a 
research economist or anything like that. It was really out of our 
depth, and I thought it was important for us to have someone look 
into it. And, so, Acritas goes out there, they look at all the factors that 
can contribute to compensation, and guess what? They come back 
and to see this . . . and we included their whole report in there . . . 
they come back, and they call me up six weeks, eight weeks later, af-
ter we have all the data, and they said, um, “The regression analysis 
indicates that there is no influence, um, by gender on compensation.” 
And, I said, “Wow. I really don’t want to be the person to tell that to 
the world, so let’s talk about that a little bit further.” Um, and as 
you’ll see, they’ll . . . they would say, um, it’s not gender that’s caus-
ing the gap, but rather originations and what you charge an hour for 
your work. And, really, all this analysis did was just kick it back one 
step further . . . that becomes very germane to, to women of all ages, 
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particularly those entering the workforce, because what you will 
find . . . and, again, this is a conversation I had with my wife going 
back nearly 30 years as we started our careers together as associ-
ates . . . um, women are ending up in roles at law firms that are tradi-
tionally, um, lower billing roles. It might be things like the education 
practice, or the health care practice, certain regulatory practices, and 
things like that, and they generate lower rates, and if you generate 
lower rates, and you multiply it by a certain number of hours, you’re 
going to be generating less work on your own time. But, more signifi-
cantly, um, women on average are reporting, si . . . um, men, men 
have 75% higher originations, and that’s . . . if you’ve ever heard the 
term “book of business,” their . . . their book of business is 75% 
higher, meaning they’ve got the client relationships, and, in the law 
firm world, that’s what really matters, and there are no shortage of ar-
ticles and discussions about why this is the case, and, if you, um, take 
a situation where law firm partners are predominately male, and they 
might be handing down clients, for example, to young male partners, 
or grooming young male associates, and things like that, you end up 
in a situation where you’re being steered, in some fashion, perhaps, to 
lower, um, billing-rate practice areas, and you’re not inheriting, or 
being taught to develop any of these client skills that will ultimately 
lead and be the two primary factors to your compensation. And, so, 
we were really very proud to be able to, um, publish this report in 
2018, and, as we note in the report, um, these are important issues, 
and, and we want to be part of that conversation and it, it . . . it’s been 
very pleasing for us to see how much, um, how . . . how often it’s 
been picked up around the country, across a wide variety of indus-
tries, that the survey has often cited, um, in the gender pay gap issues. 
So, that’s one of the reasons why we did it. 
 
Toomath: So, um, the survey, I recall, it asked questions, um, of the 
participants, whether firms were actively addressing the gender pay 
gap, or at least people, um, perceived that there was some kind of ad-
dress . . . 
 
Lowe: Right  
 
Toomath: . . . addressing of the issue. Uh, could you speak to us 
about that bit? 
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Lowe: Sure, um, you know, we wanted to know what is your firm do-
ing about it? And, um, the reality is that, um, only 23% said that their 
firm is doing anything to even address the gender pay gap. Um, many 
people . . . again, if you think that there isn't one, you’re not going to 
be terribly inclined to take any action to address it. Um, of the 23%, 
again, just 23% . . . just 60% of those have said that the issues been 
discussed in partnership meetings, 52% in working groups, and 28%, 
um, in internal memoranda. And, of that 23%, um, 50% of the female 
partners did not believe their firm had done anything to discuss it, 
and, um, 40% of males did. So, again, another huge disconnect in 
perception as to what . . . whether there is one and whether the firm is 
doing anything about it. And, then, once a firm has identified a gen-
der pay gap, what . . . what are the firms doing to address it? Um, and 
the three principal things are, um, adding more female members to 
the management committees. Um, again, those . . . think of those as 
the Executive Board of a law firm, typically the most powerful board 
that a law firm will have. Um, 51%, um, said their firms are adding 
more, uh, women to their compensation committee, which is typically 
the second most important, um, board that you'll have at a law firm, 
and 40%, um, indicated that the firms are raising female partners’ 
compensation. So, as, as you can see, as the data shows, there’s just 
tremendous . . . there’s still tremendous disparity out there. There’s 
still confusion out there, and, um, at least now, I think it's getting 
much more recognition, um, across a wide variety of sectors, and I 
think firms are becoming even more sensitive to the issue, and I 
know when I represent female partners, um, I’m very quick to make 
sure that the firm’s I’m dealing with on their behalf know that my cli-
ent is very concerned about the gender pay gap issue, so as you’re 
formulating that offer, we’re going to expect that you do your real 
best here, like you would with a male partner, and, so, we think it’s 
helpful for the female partners to be very forward about this concern 
when they engage in compensation discussions with firms. 
 
Toomath: And, uh, just following up on that, does compensation, 
um, transparency have, uh, a large impact, and does it produce 
greater job satisfaction?  
 
Lowe: Yeah, it can, and we found, um, . . . forgetting genders for just 
a second . . . um, there are three main ways that firms can compensate 
their partners. One’s an open compensation system where everybody 
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knows what everybody’s makin. You know, it’s published, you can 
get access to it. Great. Um, then there's a partially open system where 
you know ranges of compensation, you don’t know exactly what peo-
ple are getting or how it was computed, but you have some sense. 
And then there are closed compensation systems, and, not surpris-
ingly to us because it’s been this way for all five surveys, people in 
closed compensation systems are making on average, um, I think 
about 45% less than partners in open compensation systems. So, you 
know, we would think you’d want to be in an open compensation 
system because you’ll have . . . you’ll be able to benchmark yourself 
against other people and figure out whether or not you’re being 
treated fairly.  
 
Toomath: And, uh, and one last question, which would be a lead-in 
to the video that Anne, uh, has offered to share with us . . . uh, have 
there been any, um, changes or trends, uh, with respect to the gender 
compensation gap since you first released the study in 2010?  
 
Lowe: Um, there really haven’t been any changes, and, and as I said 
initially, the gap has ranged I think from anywhere from 32 to 53%. 
Some years it goes up, some years it goes down, so there . . . there’s 
not a discernible trend, other than, um, it still seems huge no matter 
when you’re mea . . . measuring it, I suppose.  
 
Toomath: So, with that, Anne has offered to share, um, uh, a brief 
clip that her one of her clients produced, uh, for us.  
 
Anne Weisburg: Right, so, uh. Yes, sorry. Uh, this . . . this is a, uh, a 
representation of how many of us in this room have felt for a long 
time, uh, but, it . . . I'll leave it at that. 
 
Toomath: Okay. Thanks, Jeff, and thank you Anne. 
 
MaryAnn Grover: Give me just one second, sorry. 
 
[Video clip is played].  
 
Weisburg: So, thank you. Citi, um, debuted this campaign called 
“The Moment,” the moment that girls find out that, um, women are 
paid less than men, in Times Square last week, and it’s part of their 
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campaign, um, and all the stuff they’re doing internally at the bank to 
close the pay gap. Um, and, so, my role on this panel is really to, um, 
sort of explain that, or at least, um, posit the argument that, even 
though laws are important, they’re necessary, um, no question, I 
don’t think they’re really sufficient to get us to where . . . to gender 
equity in the workplace. Um, and the reason I say that is that the, 
uh, . . . the pay gaps that like Jeff is talking about, they are the out-
come of hundreds, if not thousands, of decisions that are made every 
day about, um, you know, who we’re going to hire, who we’re going 
to promote, um, how people’s performance is, is evaluated. I mean, 
just hundreds of decisions, and all of those decisions are subject to, 
you know, gender bias. Um, so, and before I get into kind of how that 
works, I just . . . to dispel the notion that, you know, it’s only sort of 
in the senior ranks that we see these large discrepancies in, um, in 
pay, or maybe because law firm partner comp is so subjective and, 
um, partnerships, you know there’s, 9there's a lot of different factors, 
maybe that’s why. I just wanted to share a few other statistics with 
you. First of all, um, in in-house legal departments, it’s also true. Um, 
women general counsel are making about 19%, less than male gen-
eral counsels, and that number has been going up, has, uh . . . the gap 
has been widening over the last five years. Um, and it’s not just in the 
legal profession. So, I went and looked at some of the, um, profes-
sions that are, you know, traditionally female to see if, like, maybe 
there’s no gap, maybe that’s the issue is that, you know, that there’s 
gender gaps in professions that . . . or, industries, that are traditionally 
male, but actually it turns out that male nurses, on average, make 
$5,000 more than female nurses, um, and that number hasn’t 
changed, basically, since 1988, according to, um, uh, the UCSF Med-
ical School, which has been tracking those numbers. Even female 
secretaries and administrative assistants make 83% of what men 
make in those jobs. And it’s not just sort of at the top, um . . . the 
American Association of University Women found that women are 
making $7,600 less their first year out of college than men even . . . 
even holding for, you know, uh, grades, um, uh, industry, you know, 
uh, organizations where they go into, women are making $7,600 less 
than one year out of college. So, it’s extremely . . . this is systemic. 
And, again, it’s, it’s systemic, and it influences, you know . . . it, it's 
because of the systems that, um . . . that affect the way men and 
women move through an organization. So, how we think about the 
implicit associations we make about men and women’s abilities, 
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about their ambitions, about their potential, and how that, in turn, gets 
reflected in how, you know . . . who we hire, um, the assignments we 
give people, you know, the opportunities we give people, the way we, 
um, review their performance, and who gets promoted, and on and 
on. So, um, just to give you an example. There was a study done of 
performance reviews, of 18,000 performance reviews, the language 
and performance reviews of men and women in the military. And, 
you would think that the military, it’s, you know, they . . . there’s a 
lot of objective criteria, right, around performance in the military. 
And, um, they found, uh, that the most common, um, positive word 
used to describe men’s performance was analytical. And the most 
common positive word to describe women's performance was? Any-
body want to guess?  
 
Audience member: Attractiveness.  
 
Audience member: Compassionate.  
 
Weisberg: Attractiveness. [Laughter]. Did you say compassionate? 
[Gasp and laughs]. You’re the first person who’s guessed that. Com-
passionate. Okay. So, you're a high ranking, you know, officer in the 
military, and you’re going to promote . . . you have two people in 
front of you, and their records the same, except that one person is de-
scribed as analytical, and the other is described as compassionate. 
Who are you going to promote into a leadership role? I mean, so, you 
know, it’s just everywhere, Um, uh . . . and, actually, it, . . . I think 
what we’re really learning . . . people who do the work that I do, gen-
der in the workplace within the context of any, you know . . . the pri-
vate sector especially, is that this all starts with very early. Um, so 
McKinsey, which is a management consulting firm, hopefully you’ve 
heard of them. Um, they have been, for the last five years, doing an 
annual survey of women in the workplace, um, in partnership with 
Lean In, and their most recent report, which came out like two weeks 
ago, um, basically focused on that entry level and what they . . . what 
they have now coined a new metaphor, glass ceiling is for what’s 
happening at the senior levels, and they’re now calling what’s going 
on at the junior levels “the broken rung” because it turns out that, um, 
the big issue around how women are moving through, uh, the . . . any 
organization is that there are significantly fewer women, and espe-
cially women of color, who are promoted into that first, uh, manager 
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position role. Significantly fewer. And, so, women are getting left be-
hind from the very beginning, and they never catch up. So, they esti-
mated that if we didn't have that broken rung, there would be a mil-
lion more women in senior management roles today because of the 
cumulative impact of this, so, um . . . So, you know, the . . . we’ve 
got a kind of look at how these systems operate and how gender bias 
affects how these . . . systems operate, really from day one.   
 
Toomath: So, um, what can employers do, including law firms, 
[laughter] to interrupt gender bias in the workplace?  
 
Weisberg: Right. So, you know, I think, um, as, as you, as you can 
probably tell by now, I think this is a systemic issue. Um, I think, 
also, in this sort of lean-in world that we’ve been in since, um, Sheryl 
Sandberg published her book, um, a lot of organizations have kind of, 
um, you know, put the burden, frankly, on the women to fix this 
problem, right? Women need to do this, women need to do that, 
women need to lean in. I . . . I mean, I think that women should sort 
of learn how to navigate the workplace given all of what I just shared 
with you, that no question, women have . . . it’s in their interest to, to 
understand what’s going on. But, really, it’s up to employers, and this 
is what I love about what Citi is doing, and that’s why I wanted to 
show you the video, partly because it’s so cool, but partly because I 
want you to see that there are . . . there are, um, employers who are 
really taking this seriously and when Citi says, like, this, you 
know . . . nobody should be, um . . . should, you know, be faced with 
such disparate, um, opportunities, um, and they’re committed to clos-
ing the gap, what they mean by that is that they are really trying to 
move women into, you know, . . . off that sort of entry level, into that 
first line of management, and they’re holding everybody accountable 
every step of the way. Um, and, actually, Acratas who did, um, the 
research for, uh, Jeff’s firm has . . . does a lot of research in . . . in 
terms of the benefits of, um, diversity, including gender diversity, and 
what they have found is that in the legal profession, in particular, 
um, . . . clients rate gender diverse teams, more . . .  more highly. 
Gender diverse teams are . . . actually perform better, and we know 
that. So, I think the first thing, like, and, and again, like, . . . this is 
what, you know, we’re doing at Paul Weiss, and a lot of places that 
are really, are really trying to get this right . . . the first thing is just 
understanding what’s in it for the business. Um, and just like, you 
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know, the, the Senate . . . or the representative from Illinois said, you 
know, we want to make . . . we want to make Illinois a state that's 
welcoming for, you know, young people, like, for . . . in . . . for peo-
ple in companies with, with progressive leadership, frankly, want to 
make their companies a talent magnet for women, um, given, you 
know, the percentage of women coming out of law school and, and 
other professional schools, so it’s part of a talent strategy, they . . . 
it’s got to be strategic, though. You have to have a reason to go back 
and sort of really look at all of these systems and then, I think, you 
have . . . once you have that at the leadership level, um, you need to 
really understand where you have gender gaps in your system and 
then you have to hold people accountable for closing them at every 
level.  
 
Toomath: And just, um, . . . for women who are out there maybe 
looking for their first law job, or a job in general, uh, do you have any 
tips or skills? Understanding that they’re . . . they’re dealing with sys-
temic discrimination, are there any tips that they can use to overcome 
gender bias?  
 
Weisberg: Yeah, so, I mean, as I said, I think, yeah, we can’t wait 
until, um, the, you know, these systems get . . . we take bias out of 
the systems for women to act. I mean, women need to own their own 
careers and, and, um, . . . and learn how to navigate the workplace. 
Um, I think that women should do, or, you know, I would, um, en-
courage women to do three things. First of all, get educated and really 
take advantage of the resources that are out there. So, one of the best 
resources is the American Association of University Women, has free 
workshops on salary negotiations. They’re all over the country. 
They’re on college campuses. Has anybody heard about these? Yeah. 
Okay. So, you should definitely, um, . . . I wrote down the website 
because I wanted to make sure I told people, um. Yeah. Okay. So, 
it’s, um, www.salary.aauw.org. So, they’re free workshops. I mean, 
some of them are in person, some of them are, I mean, you can do it 
also online, I . . . from what I understand. And, um, like, for example, 
the city of Boston has made a commitment to putting 5,000 women 
through salary negotiation workshops that are run by the, um, AAUW 
every year as a way to try to close the gap. So, you know, get edu-
cated and, and take advantage of the resources that are out, that are 
out there, including, um, you know, a ton of resources on the 
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leanin.org website. Um, I . . . another great resource is called, um, bi-
asinterrupters.org that was built by a professor of law, um, named 
Joan Williams, and she’s got tools for both individuals and organiza-
tions. I mean, it’s extremely comprehensive. It looks at everything 
from hiring decisions to assignment decisions to promotion and per-
formance review decisions. So, I would recommend that. Um, the 
second thing I think women need to do is, um, stick together and sup-
port each other, um, and really, you know, sort of, um, raise each 
other up. Um, if you’re in a meeting with one other woman, the other 
thing that the McKinsey report showed was that, um, women are still 
the only, in an . . . in a meeting on a very regular basis. This is not 
something like of the past, um. You know, stick up for each other. 
Um, make sure that you give credit where credit is due, that you, that 
you . . . that women’s accomplishments are recognized. And the third 
thing, I would say, I would, um, uh, advise or recommend or encour-
age women to do is involve men in the conversation because we’re 
not going . . . we’re not going to do it by ourselves, and, um, there’s 
lots of ways to do that, too, but . . . which I have run out of time to 
talk about, but I’ll come back to, or you can ask me.  
 
Toomath: So, Andrea, um, we’ve been, um, armed with, um, the, uh, 
evidence from the survey that Jeff has given us in terms of, uh, com-
pensation transparency and how that is helpful, um. One of the ways, 
um, uh, that we’ve looked at, or that’s being looked at right now, is 
banning prior salary history as a way of helping, uh, deal with gender 
bias in pay. Can you give us a brief overview of what’s currently hap-
pening in state legislatures and in litigation, uh, with respect to prior 
history, uh, . . . prior salary history bans? 
 
Andrea Johnson: Yeah, so I’ll say as a legislative lawyer and as 
somebody who works at the National Women’s Law Center, I’m def-
initely a law person, um, public policy person, and I agree that the 
laws are not sufficient, um, to close the wage gap, but it . . . they are 
really important to incentivizing, uh, good employer behavior, good 
employer practices, and changing culture norms, um, . . . cultural 
norms. And the study that you were talking about, Jeff, is so exciting, 
and it would be so great to see so many more employers doing that. 
And that’s . . . that kind of transparency, incentivizing that, put-
ting . . . requiring it, even better, um, in law is something that we’re 
really looking at that. Uh, a number of countries across the pond have 
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been working on this. The U.K. now has a requirement that employ-
ers need to report about their pay gaps. Um, it’s a pretty crude num-
ber that’s reported of just kind of like women versus men overall, not 
looking at job categories or anything, but re . . . that transparency, re-
quiring that analysis that you all did of looking at your books and fig-
uring out what the gaps are and trying to then, once they have to put 
out that number, they really want to justify it, because oftentimes the 
numbers aren’t good. So, there’s incentives to justify it, which means 
doing the hard work and figuring out what . . . where these gaps are 
coming from, and that is something we want to see all employers do-
ing because that is so important to actually closing the gap. So, the 
Law Center, um . . . I’ll get to salary history in a second . . . but we’re 
doing a lot of work around transparency, um, both at the state level 
and at the federal level. Uh, we have litigation, um, around the EEO1 
pay data, uh, reporting requirement that President Obama had put in 
place and then Trump rolled back, um, and this would require em-
ployers with 100 employees or more employees to report pay data, 
um, to the government and just a really important step in getting 
more of this transparency and really incentivizing employers to do 
what it sounds like good employers are doing, um, by having more 
employers across the board to do this analysis, this pay data analysis. 
That is going to be so important to, to closing the wage gap. And then 
it’s simple things, like, um, making sure employers aren’t asking for 
salary history in the job application process, then relying on that to 
set pay, or to weed out application . . . uh, applicants. Um, Massachu-
setts was the first state to pass that kind of legislation in 2016, which 
was very exciting. We’ve really seen, you know, people since then 
wake up to the fact that this is not just a neutral objective factor in 
which to set pay, that it is often reflective of a past employer discrim-
inating against you, reflective of biases in the market, um, against 
women, against people of color. And when . . . when an employer’s 
relying on that information, that’s going to, that . . . those pay gaps 
are going to follow that person throughout their career, and that is a 
deeply unfair practice, so since Massachusetts passed their law, thir-
teen states now in just the last three years, um, have passed salary 
history bans. New York, to Illinois just recently, woohoo, um, Illinois 
is having a good day here at this conference [laughter] . . . uh, to Ore-
gon, and actually six of those states, uh, including Illinois, enacted 
legislation just this past year. So, I mean this is really a moment of 
culture change, um, around this issue, which is very exciting. We’re 
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seeing bipartisan support for this type of legislation. A number of cit-
ies in, in more conservative places have also passed ordinances like 
Louisville, Kentucky, Columbia, South Carolina, Toledo, Ohio, um, 
just to name a few. So, um, yeah, this is an exciting . . . exciting area 
of reform, uh, and we were talking earlier about how, it’s not just 
about saying, you know, employers can’t ask for the salary history. 
It’s also important to have transparency around salary ranges. Um, 
so, you know, we’re . . . the concern is that if employers are no longer 
asking for salary history, they might ask, “What are your . . .What is 
your desired Salary? What is your salary expectations?” And research 
shows that women tend to ask less than equally qualified male coun-
terparts in negotiation, but when they have more information about 
the context of a negotiation, that helps narrow the gender wage gaps 
that, that arise. So, seeing legislation that not only, um, bans a reli-
ance on salary history but also, uh, encourages transparency around 
salary ranges, they kind of work really well together to help level the 
negotiating playing field.  
 
Weisberg: Can I just say something about that? I mean, this is some-
thing that, again, Joan Williams has found, that if you put salary ne-
gotiable on a job description, literally those two words, have closed 
the gap between what men and women who are applying for that job 
ask for. So, I mean this is, right, uh, . . . there’s of lots of things that 
can be done, um, recognizing that . . .  
 
Johnson: Yeah, Iris Bohnet has a really interesting book that I’m 
blanking on the name of right now, but it looking at . . . 
 
Weisberg: Called, uh, “What Works: Gender Equality by Design.” 
 
Johnson: Yes, so the “By Design” part, and it’s all about de-biasing 
processes, recognizes how hard it is to de-bias minds. But, what can 
we do? How can we look at our practices, uh, that we kind of just 
take for granted, and just assume are fine and neutral? What can we 
do to change those? How are they . . . and that’s what I just love so 
much about the study, is that the initial reaction is like, “Oh no, gen-
der’s not influencing this,” and you say, “No, no, let’s look deeper.” 
And, you found things that maybe could on their front, I mean . . . 
origination, that doesn’t have the word sex in it, [laughter] but, but, 
like, you knew that, that, that, that sex was, um, you know, there was, 
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there was a gender dynamic to all of that. And, I think that’s so im-
portant for all of us to do that deeper analysis, um, and once we find 
that, and we find something like salary history that is, you know, 
shown to have this discriminatory, um, effect, then we need . . . we 
have a responsibility to, uh, change our public policies to stop those 
practices. I know you wanted me to touch briefly on litigation, but I 
could . . .  
  
Toomath: Um, well let’s . . . it, it, since we’re running out on time, 
if, if the . . . enacted, uh, what are ways that the ERA would help us 
achieve equal pay? I think we want to see how, um, in practical appli-
cations it could work. 
 
Johnson: Yeah, so the fight for the ERA is definitely incredibly im-
portant to the fight for equal pay, the fight for a whole host of gender, 
uh, justice issues. And it’s, you know, this push for equality and the 
cultural conversation and the conversations we’re having today, uh, 
that result from that fight. Um, you know, it really helps to break 
down what gender equality means, uh, and, um, it also helps to edu-
cate . . . it plays an educational function to judges, to lawmakers, to 
understand, you know, what equality means, what does gender dis-
crimination looks like . . . so, putting it out there the fact that salary 
history is not this just this neutral thing, but, um, is part of gender dis-
crimination, and what are the ways we need to address it? So, um, 
that’s incredibly important. Then, maybe one thing I do, uh, want to 
emphasize is that, um, it isn’t the case that we need the ERA to pass 
equal pay laws, we can do that already, um, we can do that right now, 
and there are strong . . . there are equal pay laws on the books, and 
we can be strengthening them. Um, and it’s also isn’t the case that if 
we have the ERA, we don’t need these equal pay laws. Um, you 
know the ERA, uh, most directly impacts public or state action, as 
was discussed this morning, and, so, it’s unlikely to eliminate the 
wage gap for women in the private sector. To have that kind of direct 
impact, we still need to be doing the, the hard work of, um, passing 
equal pay laws, passing salary history laws, to encourage employers 
to do the, the right thing. So you know, it all needed, we need . . . I 
feel like we do all the things, um, and, but, you know, as women, 
we’re good at doing all the things, um, uh, but what’s really exciting 
is that all this momentum that we’re seeing around the Equal Rights 
Amendments, um, all this organizing that you’re all doing is, and, 
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and, and the, the sort of explanation of like, what does gender dis-
crimination look like today? And calling that out and naming that is 
so incredibly important, setting the stage for these other laws, um, 
and making sure that they are, um . . . that they stand and are . . . and 
are strengthened over the years. 
 
Toomath: Um, just to touch, if you could touch briefly on one of 
those laws, um, that’s sitting around, the Paycheck Fairness Act, and, 
um, and let everyone know how that, how progress is going on that. 
 
Johnson: Yeah, uh, so the Paycheck Fairness Act is, uh, a bill that 
would strengthen the Equal Pay Act, which was in . . . introduced . . . 
which was passed in 1963. Um, and the Paycheck Fairness would 
build on that and close some loopholes that have been arisen in that 
law and then add some additional protections. Um, and you know as 
Director of State Policy, in a way it’s like, “Oh, it’s all about the 
States! That’s where, um, most of the advances are, because things 
often get stalled in Congress.” But, like, it, it . . . you need these pro-
tections regardless to where you live, um, it’s you know, it’s . . . Con-
gress really needs to be looking at the energy we’re seeing at the state 
level, and the fact that six states last year, or, actually, this year alone, 
passed salary history bans. I think in total eleven states passed laws 
strengthening their equal pay laws, um, just this year alone, and every 
year in state legislatures, almost every state is passing . . . is introduc-
ing some equal pay law. There is a lot of momentum at the state 
level, I think state legislators get that like their constituents literally 
cannot afford to wait any longer for the wage gap to close. We need 
to see that momentum, you know, trickle up to Congress, to move 
things like the Paycheck Fairness Act, so that bill did pass the House, 
um, which was very exciting, and it had, let me see, I have my data 
here, um, . . . it passed the House in April, with the support of every 
Democrat and seven House Republicans, so it got bipartisan support, 
which is very exciting. Um, it would, uh, promote pay transparency 
by ensuring that workers are protected from retaliation for discussing 
their wages, so an important step towards, um, more transparency. 
You can discuss your wages and not be in a situation like Lilly 
Ledbetter, who, for nearly two decades, was discriminated against in 
her pay and had no idea until somebody slipped her an anonymous 
note because her company had a pay secrecy policy. Um, it would re-
quire report . . . uh . . . require employers to report pay data to the 
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EEOC, so, um, putting into law that, that requirement that we’ve 
been working on. Um, and it would also do things like guarantee that 
women receive the same remedies for sex-based pay discrimination 
as are available for race and ethnicity-based discrimination. So, 
things like comp . . . compensatory and punitive damages, um, which, 
usually I’m like, “Oh, that’s wonky lawyer stuff,” but, hey, that’s 
where we are today. Um, I mean, those are really important, um, to 
getting full relief for the, the harm that you’re suffered . . . that you 
have, um, experienced. Um, and it would prohibit employers from re-
lying on salary history to set pay, uh, when hiring. So, some really 
important provisions. Um, it’s stalled presently in the Senate unfortu-
nately, um, but, again, I’m hoping that the drumbeat in the states and 
continuing to talk about this at the state level will then trickle up, um, 
that message, uh, to Congress. 
 
Toomath: And, so, because we’re all here looking for things we can 
do, um, to work toward gender pay equity, um, is there any way the 
audience, um, can engage in this fight? 
 
Johnson: Yes. So I know we’re all kind of just waiting to see what 
happens in the next ten days, but I am, like, ready for next session 
and like . . . things are going to be introduced, as they have,  um, in 
the years passed in Virginia that are so incredibly important that we 
need to be working on, you know, regardless. Um, because a lot of 
these things do get bi-partisan support, um, I think somebody men-
tioned, or, uh, . . . Professor Siegel mentioned during one of the 
breakouts, about pregnancy accommodations and making sure that, 
uh, pregnant workers have reasonable accommodations in the work-
place. That . . . the bias, um, that we see against caregivers, and 
mothers in particular, that plays a large role in the pay gap, and the 
fact that women are still being forced out of work instead of pro-
vided . . . being provided a bottle of water, or allowed to have a bot-
tled water at their workstation, or sit down on occasion while preg-
nant, or take . . . or frequent bathroom breaks, that they’re being 
forced out of work. Um, that is, you know, playing a role in in wage 
gaps. And, so, providing reasonable accommodations, um, for preg-
nant workers is an important piece of legislation, um, that I believe 
has been introduced in Virginia before, and it has been passed in 
places like South Carolina with strong bi-partisan support. Um, so, 
you know, that’s a thing that I’m hopeful about. Uh, there’s been 
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equal pay legislation, uh, introduced in, in Virginia, and I’m look at 
Tricia from AUW in the back, and I know they’ve been involved 
with that. Um, that would do a lot of things that we see in the 
Paycheck Fairness Act. It would ban reliance in salary history, pro-
tect employees, um, who discuss their wages from retaliation, would 
include some back transparency around salary ranges we discussed, 
um, and, uh, and I think it would also extend the Virginia Equal Pay 
Law to more employers, um, which is really important because you 
should not be discriminated against in your pay regardless of the size 
of your employer or the type of employer. Um, so, I think we’ve 
made . . . I don’t need to tell you all that what happens at the state 
level is important because this whole day is about Virginia acting to, 
to pass the ERA, but um, it is, yeah, so incredibly important to be 
talking to your legislators, sharing your own stories, and, yeah, I 
know so many of us have been there and been asked the salary his-
tory question and, like, feel in our gut and know how it is going to 
impact us, and sharing those stories, um, writing Op-eds, testifying. 
It’s all incredibly important and, and makes a difference. 
 
Toomath: And I think, um, around the question of, um, salary his-
tory, um, there has been legislation passed that, um, says, uh, an em-
ployee does not have to answer the question to a potential employer, 
but the problem is, once the question is asked, um, leaving it in the 
air, that’s putting the burden on the potential employee, rather than, 
um, telling the employer that they can’t ask it. So, um, we do have to 
watch exactly, um, how the legislation is being phrased. 
 
Johnson: Can I . . . I would be remiss if I didn’t mention one other 
thing that is a major factor in the wage gap. So, raising the minimum 
wage . . . women are very much clustered in the low-wage work 
force, and I think nationally make up two-thirds of low wage work-
ers, so raising the minimum wage means very much so raising the 
wages of women. Um, and, uh, that sort of occupational segregation, 
seeing women in, in these lower paying jobs is . . . plays a large role 
in the wage gap, so, um, the opportunity Virginia, or is being consid-
ered in Virginia, to raise the minimum wage would be incredibly im-
portant as well. 
 
Toomath: Um, so at this point, I would like to open, um . . .  
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Weisberg: You have some questions. 
 
Toomath: Oh! Our panelist, answer questions from the floor. Won-
derful . . . Okay, so, um, perhaps, Anne, I’ll start with you on this 
one, um, because it was, uh, your third, uh, strategy that you pro-
posed. How do we make men our allies in our fight for equal pay, and 
what are those strategies? 
 
Toomath: Thank you! Whoever asked that question. Um, so, I do 
think, I mean, we, . . . I don’t think we’re going to win, um, the sort 
of battle for equality without the men that, you know . . . it just won’t 
happen without the men. Um, I think there’s, like, small ways and big 
ways, um, you know, you can ask your, uh, male counterparts, um, 
your colleagues, like, how much do they make? Like, would they like 
be willing to share their salary with you? Uh, and I’ll tell you a 
story . . . like, um I, I know this young woman who is an architec-
ture . . . she’s an architect, and she graduated, um, uh, at the same 
time as two of her male colleagues, and they went to this small firm 
in San Francisco. Um, and she had won this award that my family, 
um, uh, started because my mother was an architect, and, um, and so 
she had sort of this award and she had, um, more work experience 
than these two guys, and they were sitting around talking and she 
asked them how much they made, and they told her, and they . . . she 
was making $10,000 less than they were making at the same firm, 
they, they had started on the same day, and she had more qualifica-
tions, and they . . . how would she have known that but for the fact 
that they told her? So, then she went to the firm’s leadership and said, 
like, uh, this, . . . something is not right, and the finally, you know, 
and they did something about it, but, so, you know, you . . . it, some-
thing as small as asking your mentor, “Can you please share with me, 
like, what you make?” And then asking them to advocate and asking 
them, you know, to also be aware of when the gender bias shows up 
in everyday workplace interactions. Ask them, you know, um, 
how . . . how are they getting assignments. Ask them, you know, 
what do, . . . what, how, . . . what happened when they went into their 
performance review. Like, what was important in their performance 
review? I mean, just getting them to share with you what you’re ex-
periencing, what they are experiencing so that you can get some kind 
of level setting. I mean, you know, um, to Andrea’s point, like, it’s 
really hard to know what . . . if you’re not being treated fairly if you 
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have no idea how other people are being treated. Um, you know, I 
think it’s also, uh, there, there’s a growing movement among, um, 
men to kind of become more involved. They really do want to be-
come more involved in the gender equity conversation. It’s in, um, 
business schools, in law schools. Um, if you are part of a women’s 
network in your workplace, invite the men to things, bring men to 
things like this. Like, I tell . . . every time, like, we do something at 
Paul Weiss that’s a women’s network event, like I ask . . . I say to the 
women, bring a male colleague. Like, we’ve got to educate men. 
They don’t really see that, you know . . . I like to say that because 
men are insiders, they’re in the system that’s been designed and built 
for them by them, they don’t see, like, the, the inequality in the sys-
tem. Only the people outside see that. So, you’ve got to make them 
aware of it. That’s, that’s what I would do. 
 
Lowe: Can . . . Can I just add something to that? 
 
Toomath: Absolutely. 
 
Lowe: Um, I just read “White Fragility” about two weeks ago and 
it . . . I mean, it’s really exactly that issue, just as applied to gen-
ders . . .  
 
Weisberg: Right. 
 
Lowe: . . . rather than race. I mean, I think men, as a man, you just 
take for granted everything’s fine, everything’s . . .  
 
Weisberg: Right. 
 
Lowe: . . . great, either willfully, or, um, subconsciously, you are just 
taking advantage of it and you’re not doing anything to change it . . . 
 
Weisberg: Right. 
 
Lowe: . . . or maybe even recognizing that it exists and . . . 
 
Weisberg: Yeah.  
 
Lowe: . . . so I think that that’s great advice . . .  
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Weisberg: I mean, the, the, the gender gap, and the perception of 
whether there is a pay gap . . . 
 
Lowe: Right. 
 
Weisberg: . . . that you found in your study. That’s everywhere. 
Every single study I’ve ever read, if you ask men, like, “Is there a 
problem?” Most of them will say, “No.” If you ask women, most of 
them will say, “Yes.” Because to men, there isn’t a problem, they 
don’t see it because they don’t live it. It’s not their lived experience. 
So, you need to help them see what . . . how . . . what you’re experi-
encing. I don’t . . . I, I personally don’t think there’s, it’s malicious, 
um, I, you know, or intentional, it’s just um . . . you know, uncon-
scious. And I will say this, like, all the research shows that men and 
women equally hold biases about men and women, about gender. So, 
have, have any of you heard about the Implicit Association Test? An-
ybody? Yeah, okay. So, um . . . so, that’s a test that developed by 
psychologists, ones at Harvard and ones at the University of Wash-
ington. It’s been taken by millions of people around the world. I 
highly recommend doing it. IAT.org. Um, Implicit Association Test. 
And, um, . . . and when you, you know, when you look at the results 
for, um, the test around the implicit associates, those sort of split-sec-
ond associations you’re making about women and men, the . . . the 
results, um, from that study, in terms of, when you break down by 
gender, like, whether women have the same implicit associations 
about men . . . women as men do, there’s really not that much differ-
ence because we’ve all grown up in the same society, I mean, 
that’s . . . that’s what that’s reflecting.  
 
Lowe: Mhm.  
 
Toomath: Um, this is . . . this is a question, um, probably for Andrea, 
but, again, I open up to the panel. Uh, how might, um, the ERA help 
close the gender pay gap? 
 
Johnson: Um, so, I mean, so, I’ll emphasize again that I think the, 
the . . . sort of organizing, immobilizing, um, around the ERA and 
the, the education about what gender discrimination looks like, like, 
all of that and getting that sort of political, um, will and, and capacity 
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around this issue, uh, is really important to . . . to a whole host of is-
sues and making sure that we then also put strong laws in the books. 
So, um, yeah, I mean, having the Equal Rights Amendment on, on 
the books . . . I think there were some interesting points made this 
morning, on, on one of the panels about how that can maybe give a 
stronger foundation for some of the, uh, the laws . . . I guess I want to 
be clear that I think, you know, there is . . . we have strong . . . we 
have equal pay laws now, and, um, and we can continue to pass 
strong equal pay laws, and that it’s something we can do right now, 
um, we don’t need ERA necessarily to do that. I think the ERA can 
help provide an even stronger foundation going forward, um, for 
those laws, um, and I . . . it was interesting to kind of hear how simi-
lar Amendments have worked in other countries, um. I sometimes . . . 
uh, yeah, uh. I think Julia was mentioning that, um. But, definitely, 
you know, the . . . the organizing and discussion about sort of what is 
discrimination, um, and, you know, that all provides a sound founda-
tion for, you know, the legislative interest in passing these laws, um, 
that could really, I think, have a good foundation for the laws.  
 
Toomath: Um, so we’re running out of time. I just want to thank the 
panel. Um, Jeff, um. Oh! Sorry! Yeah, one more question. 
 
Audience member: . . . when we talk about pay gap when we talk 
about minimum wage in the industries where minimum wage does 
not apply? 
 
Johnson: Okay I didn’t . . . what was the beginning of the question? 
 
Audience member: You were talking about pay gap, and you men-
tioned with reference to minimum wage, but there are several large 
industries where minimum . . . minimum wage laws do not apply 
where I think gender would be a big . . . I think even bigger factor 
and I was wondering about some of those industries where there’s . . .   
 
Johnson: Hospitality . . . 
 
Audience member: where there's [inaudible] to apply the minimum 
wage to adjudicate or adjust this, uh, pay gap . . .  
 
Johnson: Yeah, I mean . . .  
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Audience member: Like a restaurant business. 
 
Johnson: Well, so, I mean, restaurants, they have the tip minimum 
wage, which is $2.13 an hour at the federal level, um, and then . . . 
which is just abysmal, and the expectation is that you make up the 
rest, uh, based . . . of your income based on tips, and that makes situ-
ations where you’re very vulnerable to harassment, um, and yeah, so 
what’s really important in raising the minimum wage is insuring we 
also are raising the minimum wage, uh, for restaurant workers so that 
we have one fair wage so that everybody is making the, the same 
minimum wage, um, and that we don’t have . . . there are a number of 
carve outs for minimum wage for restaurant workers, um, for workers 
with disabilities, for youth workers, um, and, and those are deeply 
concerning carveouts, and we need to have this one fair wage, and, 
so, that’s definitely the work that we are doing and that . . . I mean a 
lot of restaurant workers are women, um, and will deeply, um, have 
an effect on the, on the wage gap, and we have some good research 
showing of how equal pay laws and, and one fair wage laws and how 
what . . . how the wage gap, um, looks in states with one fair wage 
laws that would . . . was on our website, um, but I think, yeah, that’s 
a really important point.  
 
Toomath: Okay, so, I will wrap it up then, um, as we’re, um, out of 
time. I want to thank everyone. Jeff, you’ve armed us with evidence, 
which we did not have, um, and so this survey is hope, uh, . . . hope-
fully the beginning of many that, that, that reveal, um, the pay gap 
and so that we, we can go forward and have information to bak up 
what we’re saying, um, when we argue for a fair wage, um, and I 
thank Anne for giving us the strategies that we need and the tools to 
look at gender bias, um, and also to argue for ourselves, um, when 
we’re . . . when we’re, um, uh, in our, uh, . . . when we’re seeking 
employment. And, again, Andrea, thank you for giving us all of the 
information that you have on state policy and on legislation, and 
hopefully, um, now that you have all of this information, um, you 
will go out and continue the fight towards equal pay. So, thank you 
so much.  
 
[Applause].  
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MaryAnn Grover: As someone who has been a lawyer for all of one 
week, thank you. I really enjoyed this. This was very helpful, um, and 
something I definitely want to focus on as I progress into my legal 
career. Um, we’re about to move straight into our next panel, so I’d 
like to go ahead and invite those panelists up and then swap ‘em out, 
and we’ll get started. 
 
[Switching panels].  
 
Grover: I don’t know if you guys heard me, but this is the party 
panel. I can report I had dinner with them last night. They’re a blast 
[laughter]. Um, so, before we begin our final panel, though, I’d like 
to invite you all to join us for a little wine and cheese reception in the 
atrium immediately following this panel. Um, this final panel is really 
intended to be a roadmap, um, an exploration of the potential paths 
forward, the paths towards equality and how we get there, um, specif-
ically with the ERA and what it means when we enact it, where do 
we go from there, what are the legal challenges, et cetera. Um, this 
panel is moderated by Trish Wallace. Um, Trish has been an integral 
part in planning this conference, this event, and has been absolutely 
wonderful and a hoot to work with. Um, so I’m honored to be able to 
introduce her now. Um, she is a civil rights activist, writer, and litiga-
tor. Trish’s . . . Trish’s interests include the ERA, technology and the 
practice of law, the use of oral history as evidence of the First Na-
tions Litigation and the rhetorical sophistication of eighth century 
nuns, which makes sense because she has a PhD in Medieval Studies 
from Cornell, as well as a J.D. from the University of Miami. Now, 
please help me in welcoming Trish, who will introduce our panelists.  
 
[Applause].  
 
Wallace: Okay, this is the party panel, but it’s also the brain-trust 
panel. There are some very interesting talent on this panel. Um, and 
one of our . . . our panelists has . . . I think you’re getting close to 
how many degrees I have but, um, spent more time in, in formal edu-
cation than most people. Um, that’s Danaya Wright, who is the first 
one on my right [gestures] . . . which is actually, yeah, right here. 
Wave! [laughter] Um, Danaya, comes from, uh, . . . well, she 
wouldn’t say she comes from Florida. Um [laughter]. She is a, a pro-
fessor of law at the University of Florida. In fact, she’s, you know, 
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this [inaudible] professor of law, uh, but she holds bachelors from 
Cornell, one of my alma maters, uh, and lots of other degrees, includ-
ing a J.D. from Cornell, my alma mater, and, uh, . . . but she also has 
a PhD in Political Science, so one of the things that, um, is attractive 
about Danaya on this panel is that she, you know . . . at least on pa-
per . . . looks like a real strong thinker, um, sort of big picture as well 
as being able to assemble facts to push a, a bigger agenda and bring 
in more people than just litigators, um, or, you know, law students, 
that kind of thing. Right next to her is one of my favorite people, as 
Eileen Davis would say, uh, but the first thing that comes to my 
mind . . . oh, well let me tell you her name first, Linda Coberly. Did I 
pronounce that right? 
 
Coberly: You did! 
 
Wallace: Excellent. Okay. Linda, to me, is the ERA lawyer’s lawyer. 
Okay? Not all of 
the lawyers that are working on the Equal Rights Amendment are 
equal. Um, but [laughter] . . .  
 
Sweeney: Some are men. [Laughter].  
 
Wallace: Yeah. But, I mean Linda is a litigator and an appellate at-
torney, and that means to me that she’s a . . . a strategist, okay? Be-
cause it’s kind of sneaky how you’re sitting there at trial and you’re 
thinking, “Ah, these are the things that I’m going to do because I 
know I’m going to lose this trial, but I’ve got to go to appeal.” Um, 
so it’s a very sneaky brain. Uh. Oh! I’m sorry, a very strategic brain 
[laughter].  
 
Coberly: I’m totally stealing that. That is awesome. 
 
Wallace: Sneaky? Okay.  
 
Coberly: Sneaky 
 
Wallace: Alright, but anyway, so, so she is, like, what I think of as, 
like, this, this . . . she can see lots of different strategies and sort of 
see, okay, if this shifts a little bit, we can move to this strategy, and as 
a litigator and an appellate attorney, you know that you’re just like 
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throwing all kinds of stuff at the wall. So, um, . . . but some of it is 
better than others, but, you know, hey, it doesn’t really matter what 
sticks, it’s what does stick that matters at the end of the day. Um, and 
there are lots of more accolades I could, could describe for both of 
these ladies. Uh, but then there’s Jean . . . uh, I’m sorry, no, uh, but 
you can read about that, um. And then I want to introduce, on my far 
right, your far left, is Jean Sweeney, um, who comes to us . . . um, I, I 
view her as an activist, as well as somebody who’s actually been 
probably more in the real world than an appellate attorney trial litiga-
tor, and, uh, certainly a professor with a PhD. [Laughter]. Um, but 
Jean worked on Wall Street for fifteen years, mutual funds in the fi-
nance industry, so she probably has lots of horror stories that she 
could share with us, um, but also some good stories. And Jean’s been 
very involved in, um, uh, activism, and she’s . . . one of the things 
that, that she brings to the table is sort of, you know, what are . . . 
what is going on in the activists, how do we get started with the 
three-state strategy, and all those good things. Um, I have kind of a, 
a, a, um, . . . I used to be a teacher. Um, and I’d go into my class first 
day, and I’d say, “There are two reasons I teach: one is to increase 
your ability to have pleasure, and the other one is to increase your 
ability to participate in democracy.” So, I figure there are maybe a 
couple students here still. Um, I hope that this panel can help you in-
crease your ability to take pleasure in the world and also to partici-
pate in democracy, and we are extremely privileged to be in the legal 
profession, um, to be educated, to be able to see, you know . . . I 
mean, I learn something new every day, and I would imagine that you 
guys would say this too. Um, I mean there are just all kinds of differ-
ent people, and, and . . . everything. So, put on your pleasure hats for 
the party session, the wisdom here, um, and we’re going to, this 
panel’s going to be a little bit different than some of the other panels 
because we’re going to open it up to sort of an oral question and an-
swer. It’s going to be more of a work session. Um, partly because a 
lot of the topics we were going talk about have already been ad-
dressed today, and we don’t want to put anybody to sleep before 
they’ve had a chance to get some wine. Um, and partly because 
we’ve been through this a lot, too. Um, but you can ask any of these 
people anything related to the Equal Rights Amendment, the Consti-
tution, maybe, because we’ve got a, you know . . . but, anything you 
want. You know, “What should we do? What can we do? How can I 
enjoy working on the ERA more?” Um, you know, “How can I enjoy 
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working with my legislators more?” Uh, I’ve got it wide open for 
you. But, before we . . . we start in on the, the question and answer, I 
just want, um, each person to kind of give you a brief spiel. You can 
either supplement because I left out so much of your biographies, if 
that’s what you want to do. Uh, by the way, my . . . my thesis was 
“Religious Women and Their men” So . . .  
 
Sweeney: [Laughter].  
 
Wallace: So, I’ve got a long history of trying to get male allies. Um, 
but anyway, I 
Want to start with, with Jean, if that’s alright, and we’ll just kind of 
work down the line. Do you want to think a minute?  
 
Sweeney: So, um I, I just thought I’d chat with you about how I got 
to becoming an ERA activist. Um, I have always been very involved 
with the ERA and with, with, um, women’s equality. Um, I was the 
third class at College of the Holy Cross, so when I entered the Col-
lege, there were 1,800 men and 600 women. Um, John Roberts’s wife 
is . . . of the Supreme Court . . . graduated in the class ahead of me. 
Um, and so I’ve always kind of moved along with it. It was really 
when Justice Scalia . . . and I, and I’m an attorney, I was on Wall 
Street and all that . . . but it really was, um, when Justice Scalia gave 
the interview to California Legal . . um, Lawyer Magazine in 2011, 
that I realized that the complacency that we had kind of gotten our-
selves to because we felt that Justice Ginsburg and Justice O’Connor 
on the Supreme Court were kind of working really hard with the 14th 
Amendment and that women, we really were progressing to the place 
that it was kind of like, I knew we didn’t have the Equal Rights 
Amendment, but we were putting in a legal framework that would 
kind of get us where the Equal Rights Amendment would have gotten 
us. And when Justice Scalia was . . . did this, this, uh interview, and 
what he said, and I have to say he’s not one of my favorite people . . .  
 
[Audience laughter]   
 
Sweeney: . . . and I’ve had a very . . . I’ve had a very, um, uh, give 
and take relationship with him over the years. Um, and so he said, 
“Certainly the Constitution does not require discrimination on the ba-
sis of sex, the only issue is whether it prohibits it, and it does not.” He 
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did us an unbelievable favor. I’m kissing this man’s feet because he 
woke up the sleeping dragon, and he said to us, when I . . . when he 
first said it, I was like, “What is he talking about?” And then I went 
back and did my research and realized, he’s right. That, um, the 13th, 
14th, and 15th Amendments when they were placed in the Constitu-
tion, the women, actually, who are the Abolitionists and had created 
the, um, Seneca Fall Conference in 1848, they had all wanted the 
Amendments to go into the Constitution on a gender equal basis, but 
the political backroom deal put the word “male” into the 14th 
Amendment. So, Justice Scalia made us wake up and see, really, you 
know, that we need . . . that we definitely . . . we needed the Equal 
Rights Amendment. So, um, with my time, I have two children, and 
the minute the, uh, last one went away to school in 2014, I became an 
activist on the ERA, and it’s so fascinating because it was 2014 when 
there was this coalescing of Equal Rights Amendment activists. So, 
Camila Lopez was working on her movie. Jessica Neuwirth was writ-
ing her book was “Equal” . . . was, “Equal Means Equal.” The ERA 
Coalition was begun. It was like . . . it was like a moment in time 
where we came from different places to, um, understand that we re-
ally needed to get boots on the ground on this. 
 
Wallace: Professor Wright, can you follow that? 
 
Wright: Oh, goodness, sure. Should I turn the button on? Um, so, 
I’ve only been involved in this for a year and a half, maybe two 
years. Um, a colleague of mine at Florida was asked to develop some 
litigation strategy, use some law students . . . we have two of our 
Florida law students who are here, um, who’ve been doing, uh, amaz-
ing job of helping us research this . . . um, and I saw him one day, 
you know, a couple years ago, and I think he looked at me and said, 
“Oh, Danaya, you’re a woman.” [Laughter].   
 
“Do you want to join us on this ERA project?” And of course, my, 
my first thought was, “What? What . . . the ERA? Eh, that, well, 
that’s dead. What’re the . . . uh, okay, sure, some, some person wants 
to fund research on this, yeah, I’ll do it, okay.” So, I got involved in 
it. Started looking at, at some of the legal issues, and I did what law 
professors do, which is we go surround ourselves with a bunch of 
books, uh, and lock ourselves in our offices, and if, you know, six 
months later, I came out with an article, and I was . . . I was really 
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interested in the legal issues, right? Because, as the first panel said, 
many of these legal issues are unresolved. Uh, as soon as Virginia 
votes, it’s all the “you know what” is going to hit the fan, okay. It’s 
going to go all over the place. It’s going to go national. It’s . . . 
there’s going to be litigation. There’s going to be, uh, political ef-
forts. Everything is going to sort of explode, and my thinking was, 
well as . . . as an academic, I got to get a law review article out there. 
Get the law review article out there. Get the theory, um, uh, . . . get 
ahead of the theory, right? So, when the lawyers, like Linda, are writ-
ing the briefs, they can say, “Oh, well, oh, so experts say blah blah 
blah.” Not that I am even remotely an expert, but I’ll pretend. Um, so, 
I started looking in particular at, uh, both the deadlines and the rescis-
sion issue, right? And we’ve all heard about that. Is this deadline . . . 
we’ve got a seven-year deadline. Where did it come from? What does 
it mean? Why . . . is this thing constitutional at all? And I teach con-
stitutional law and I . . . pff, I’ve never really thought about it, right? 
In fact, I asked my, um, . . . my last class last year, on their exam, I 
gave them the question of the ERA, and the deadline, and I said, there 
is no case law on this subject. None. How would you figure it out? 
How would you figure out an answer to whether Congress over-
stepped it’s, it’s authority in imposing a deadline under Article 5? 
Um, and I actually . . . I got some really good answers, I was quite 
pleased with them. Um, but I did, basically, what I told had them to 
do. I . . . in fact, I followed Justice Scalia’s approach in the Heller 
case, and I said, “Okay, well let’s look at, um . . . lets look at the 
text.” Start with the text of the Constitution. Of course, it’s silent, 
which it’s silent on everything. Um, just about everything important. 
So, the text was silent, then I said, well, lets . . . well, there’s always 
the, the assumption . . . or, not the assumption, the statement over and 
over and over and over and over again, that the federal government is 
a government of limited powers. So, unless it’s expressly stated in the 
Constitution, the federal government doesn’t have this power. So, 
we’re on this . . .  we’re on the side that maybe, maybe Congress 
overstepped it’s bounds when it put this Amendment . . . or put the 
deadline into this proposal. And then I said, well, okay, so, what 
about, um, you know, when . . . when did this happen? So, and it 
started in with the 18th Amendment, uh, in 1917, the Prohibition 
Amendment, the first deadline . . . So, no . . . no deadline had been in 
an amendment prior to that point . . . a proposal, prior to that point. 
And the, um . . . the 18th Amendment, Senator Warren Harding of 
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Ohio, put that deadline in, proposed the deadline in the discussion of 
the Prohibition Amendment, with a clear intention of torpedoing the 
Amendment. It was like he figured it’s going to be unconstitutional, 
and we’re going to get rid of this Amendment and make it go away 
by having this unconstitutional deadline in the Amendment. And Sen-
ators went berserk, right? “Oh, you can’t do this. This is unconstitu-
tional, et cetera, et cetera.” Um, and there was some . . . there were a 
number of arguments . . . you know, arguments multiple different 
ways. One was: well, if you want a constitutional amendment . . . or, 
if you want a deadline, lets have a constitutional amendment that cre-
ates a deadline, right? “All future Constitutional amendment pro-
posals have to pass within X number of years.” And if the states rat-
ify that, then that’s fine, but you can’t just put it in the amendment, 
the text of the amendment itself. So, I’m reading that, and I’m like, 
ooh, ooh, oh, I kind of agree. I don’t, I don’t . . . I think this is a bad 
idea. And then, of course, you’ve got the Tenth Amendment. The 
Tenth Amendment says, um, powers not reserved . . . not expressly 
granted to the Federal Government are reserved to the states and the 
people.” Well, there’s nothing express in Article Five that gives Con-
gress the ability to impose a deadline, so we would assume that under 
Tenth Amendment, broad Tenth Amendment readings, which is what 
the Court’s doing right now, that in fact, um, the deadline is not . . . 
it’s reserved . . . the power is reserved to, um, to the states. And, of 
course, you look at the process itself, right. It’s a process about, you 
know, it . . . there’s both a national and a state component, but all of 
the framers’ history at the time suggests that, um, they were most . . . 
they . . . that the framers were most concerned with the states being 
able to control the amendment process. This was not about Congress. 
In fact, Congress didn’t even have the ability to propose amendments 
in some of the first drafts. It was added after the fact. Um, so, the 
states are necessary and sufficient. The federal government techni-
cally isn’t even necessary at all. Although of course, um, as Hamilton 
noted, most likely we need, um, this, the national government to have 
some power because they’re on the front lines. They’re going to 
know when we need an amendment. Um, so you’ve got all that kind 
of history, um, and you kind of think about it, and it’s like, well, it 
doesn’t really make sense to have a deadline in . . . in a proposal that 
is, um, that’s going to, you know, that, that, the . . . if the states don’t 
ratify it, the proposal . . . the deadline has no meaning. If the states 
ratify it in time, it’s inoperative. So, so what’s the point of this 
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deadline, other than simply to kill the Amendment? Um, so, fast for-
ward, unfortunately, it gets put in, and it gets litigated. Uh, and, un-
fortunate . . . and the Supreme Court, it’s one of the only . . . you 
know, you look to precedent, right. So, to cases. The Supreme Court 
looks at it and says . . . looked at the Eighteenth Amendment, that had 
in fact been fully ratified within the requisite period of time, and the 
Supreme Court says, “Well, the fact that there’s a deadline in there, 
that’s not enough to kill the Amendment.” But this says nothing 
about, uh, an amendment that’s fully ratified after the deadline, where 
the deadline operates to void the will of the people. Um, and, so, you 
know, I just . . . looking at all of these legal issues, I thought, this 
is . . . this is crazy. Of course, the deadline’s unconstitutional, and 
scholars have said that, and, and the 27th Amendment, the Madison 
Amendment, after two hundred years also supports that. So, I . . . I’m, 
I’m optimistic that when we go to court, we have some pretty good 
legal arguments, and the best part is, we have five conservative jus-
tices on that Supreme Court who have all said, state’s rights. We 
value the rights of the states. Congress, you can’t overstep.  
 
Coberly: Except in Bush v. Gore. 
 
Wright: Well, okay . . .  
 
[Laughter].  
Danaya Wright: . . . so, a few minor details. Um, but it only takes 
one, right. ‘Cause the four liberals are going to go on this, um, so I 
think we only need one. I don’t know, I don’t know that we can do it. 
Um, then that gets us to the rescission issue. The rescission issue, 
again, is another, . . . is probably going to be the next piece of litiga-
tion. So, if we win the deadline issue, then we have to deal with these 
rescissions. The rescissions are funky. So, South Dakota, um, they 
just put a sunset on theirs, they didn’t actually rescind. Kentucky, 
there’s a big debate over the, um, the . . . the governor vetoed the re-
scission. So, there’s some funkiness that maybe we may end up hav-
ing to litigate those. Um, but good scholarly questions as to whether 
or not the rescissions, you know . . . it’s a one-way street. Ratification 
is a one-way street. Can people rescind after . . . can states rescind af-
ter they’ve ratified? Eh, you know, again, sitting there in my office, 
not talking to anybody, reading . . . reading the U.S. Reporter, the, 
you know, the Federal Register and all the, the legislative history, I 
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don’t think the rescissions are valid, but, I guess I’m kind of biased, 
too. So, I’m going to stop there, um, ‘cause I think Linda might have 
some different . . . different views on that.   
 
Linda Coberly: I do [laughter]. But not on that last one. So, um, first 
of all, how many law students do we have actually left. We have two. 
A couple, ok. So, um, in my day job, um, I am a lawyer in big law. 
And, uh, I, I work at a . . . one of the largest law firms around. I, I run 
our Chicago office, which has hundreds of lawyers in it, and I’m an 
appellate lawyer. And, so, my job is about persuading people. Be-
cause also, when you run a big office of a big law firm, like, no-
body’s . . . I’m not the boss of anybody, I’m just, it’s . . . it’s purely 
management by consensus building. So, what I do literally all day is 
try to persuade people of things. I persuade judges. I persuade my 
partners. I persuade my kids to do what they need to do. I’m all about 
persuasion. And, um . . . and when I got involved in the Equal Rights 
Amendment, uh, fight, it was quite recent. Um, I got involved actu-
ally for, uh, kind of a funny reason, um, uh. The chairman of our firm 
heard a story on NPR on the way into . . . to the office one day, uh, 
about the state of Nevada, ratifying . . . ratifying the Equal Rights 
Amendment, and he summoned me to his office, and he said, we . . . I 
have something really important to talk about with you right away. 
And it could be twenty things, right? Because this actually happens 
quite often, that I get summoned to his office for very important 
things, and I sat down, and he said we need to talk about the Equal 
Rights Amendment [laughter]. And I, I was a little surprised. Um, 
also, he’s . . . he’s a Republican. He, he’s what we love in Illinois, uh, 
and the representative will know, he’s someone we love to call a 
Double Domer, which means he went to Notre Dame both undergrad 
and law school. Um, so he’s a Republican, and . . .  but he told me, he 
listened to this story, and he thought, um . . . first of all I don’t think 
he realized before hearing that story that the Equal Rights Amend-
ment wasn’t already in the Constitution because an awful lot of peo-
ple, including lawyers, think that the Equal Rights Amendment is 
something that actually happened in the 1970s and ‘80s. Right? Um, 
but also, he knew that it was something that we as a firm should get 
involved in, because, um, we care about equity. Um, we are a tradi-
tional defense firm in a lot of respects. So, we’ve been on all sides 
of . . . all kinds of sides of issues, um, but we care about equity. We 
care about diversity. Um, and we do that work as well. We’re 
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actually also representing the women’s soccer team right now in its 
equal pay suit.  
 
So, um, uh, so, it was consistent with the values that we held, and he 
said we should get involved in that, especially in the state of Illinois, 
which the NPR story informed him had not ratified. And, so, I said 
absolutely, let’s do that. So, we, um, . . .  I did what [laughter] . . . the 
professor did what academics do, which is surround herself with 
books, and, uh, research. I surrounded myself with associates, and, 
uh, we put together some research because I knew that so many peo-
ple, including many of the people you’ve heard from today, have 
been working on this issue for years, and I know better than anyone 
to listen to the people who have been doing this for a while first be-
fore I start talking. So, uh, we wanted to understand what the status of 
things was, and we did a lot of research. It’s a pro bono matter for our 
firm. We don’t have a client. We are just doing it because it’s the 
right thing to do. And . . . so we got involved in the Illinois efforts. 
Um, we wrote, we organized, we brought people together in our of-
fices to organize the activists. Um, we worked with lobbyists. We 
wrote talking points. We did a webinar for legislators. I testified at 
the, uh, committee hearing on the subject. Um, we wrote talking 
points that were used in the final, uh, approval hearing, um, on that 
historic day, and it was the most, uh, satisfying and rewarding thing 
I’ve been involved in in my legal career. But one of the things it told 
me is that there’s a lot of work for lawyers to do, and this is an im-
portant lesson because I think for many years, you know, lawyers 
were getting a bad rap there, right? Um, and there’s a . . . it’s kind of 
a tradition to make fun of lawyers and demonize them, um, but there 
have been some really notable situations, especially in the last couple 
of years, where, I don’t know about you, but I have felt proud and re-
assured that the lawyers are showing up. Right? Like after the travel 
ban passed and lawyers went to O’Hare. And, as an immigration pro 
bono lawyer, which is what I also . . . I do with the rest of my pro 
bono time, is immigration cases . . . I was a little worried about that 
because I know that immigration law is hard and if we have a bunch 
of civil litigators like myself showing up at O’Hare, we could muck it 
up pretty well, uh, unless we have expert help. So, fortunately, there 
are lots of expert agencies who do that work and really know what 
they’re doing and can help lawyers like me do good immigration pro 
bono work. For this, we needed to do some more work. We needed to 
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do the research and really understand what was going on, but there 
was really something to contribute, I felt, because of these important 
issues. When I heard about the deadline, I was actually not inclined to 
get involved in the ERA until I figured out and thought for myself, 
what is the persuasive argument for why the deadline is not going to 
stop, uh, the Equal Rights Amendment. Um, there is a case, and, . . .  
that, uh, the professor mentioned, that there is a case that says that 
Congress has the power to do this kind of thing. That . . . but the ef-
fectiveness of a deadline has never been tested. We’ve never had, in 
our history, a situation where a deadline has actually stood in the way 
of a duly ratified amendment that has been passed by three quarters 
of the states. Um, we also have never had a, uh, uh, uh, a uh, deadline 
tested that was not in the body of the amendment itself, in the stuff 
that the states voted on, right? The amendment, uh, . . . the Equal 
Rights Amendment deadline is contained in the introductory clause, 
which, you know, one way to characterize that is Congress reserved 
for itself the power to change the deadline, because there’s a principle 
in our constitutional system that one Congress cannot bind future 
Congresses. So, there are good arguments for why that deadline can 
be removed. There are arguments for why it is not effective, and we 
should be pursuing all of them. You know, there’s been a lot of de-
bate within the, uh, ERA community about these different strategies. 
Should we just litigate? Is it a bad idea to ask Congress to pass, uh, 
these, uh, deadline removal bills, and there’s a lot of kind of disagree-
ment about the best strategy. My view is, it’s all, it’s all fair game, 
let’s pursue it all. There’s no damage to our litigation position if we 
have gone to Congress and failed. Um, we can still do these things in 
what . . . in lawyer speak, in the alternative. Right? So, one of the . . . 
I loved what I heard this morning that the deadline for some, uh, leg-
islators, or, uh, opponents of the ERA, has just become an excuse. 
Right? Oh, the deadline just makes the whole thing symbolic. Well, 
first of all, as Senator Spearmen talked about, I don’t understand why 
that’s a reason to vote no. Um, it’s a really darn good symbol, right? 
Like, shouldn’t we have . . . if it’s not going to have any impact that 
why not . . . why not pass it, for heaven’s sakes. Right? [Laughter]. 
Um, so there’s that argument. But, you know, let’s remove the bar-
rier, let’s moot the issue. There will still be arguments about whether 
you can remove the deadline retroactively, but there’s no case law on 
any of this, folks. None. It’s all unprecedented. We didn’t have dead-
lines until the 20th century. No deadline has ever actually come close 
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to standing in the way of the effectiveness of an amendment. So, 
there’s no clear-cut answer to any of it. I personally, uh, understand 
and agree with the, the, the logic that tells us that Congress has 
brought power when it’s exercising its power to propose an amend-
ment. So, I think it kind of makes sense that Congress would have 
power to attach a deadline if it chooses to, but if it puts that deadline 
in the preamble of the amendment, it also has the power to change it, 
and there’s also a case, a, a subsequent case in the Supreme Court, 
called Coleman, uh, which some of you may be aware of that says 
something else really important, which is that when Congress, uh, . . . 
which is that the issues relating to the amendment process are funda-
mentally political issues that . . . and, and to some extent, those issues 
are not even justiciable, which means they can’t even be raised in 
court. So, if . . . I believe . . . that if Congress were to remove the 
deadline, we would be able to argue in litigation after that, that a 
challenge to the deadline removable is non-justiciable, that, uh, . . . 
that whatever Congress decided to do with respect to the deadline af-
ter the fact is within Congress’s power, uh, it . . . because it's a politi-
cal question. So, I think some of these . . . but the, the big picture is 
that none of this is clearly established by the case law. It is all open to 
debate and discussion and argument, and lawyers have a really im-
portant role to play in all of that.  
 
The one issue I would have to say that is most clearly established in 
my view is actually the rescission issue, and it’s not established be-
cause there’s a legal precedent on it, there's a historical precedent . . . 
precedent on it. And that is that when the 14th Amendment was rati-
fied, I . . . it was declared to be effective at a time when more than 
one of the necessary ratifying states had, uh, attempted to rescind a 
prior ratification, and yet, all three branches of government treated 
that Amendment as fully ratified as part of the Constitution, and here 
we are today. So, I, I think that the . . . there is a powerful historical 
precedent for the idea that a rescission is not some . . . a ratification is 
not something that can be taken back, there’s no Mulligan on a ratifi-
cation, okay? And, and, to me, the way you get there, in terms of a 
logical argument, is that ratification is something that happens at a 
moment in time, it’s a moment in history. Under Article V, the only 
job of the states is to look at what Congress has sent them and to vote 
on whether to ratify that amendment, and, so, the question for those 
rescinding states is, “Did that happen?” And the answer is: yes. There 
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was a moment in time where that that Amendment was ratified by the 
legislatures of those states, period. The state is done, and they can’t 
take it back later. So, I think that’s a, a, a, a good reading, the best 
reading, of, of what the state’s role is under Article V, and, so, on that 
issue, actually . . . that issue’s the one I feel the, uh . . . the most . . . 
that, that law’s most settled on because of that historical precedent. I 
think the rest of them are open to, uh, discussion and debate, and 
there’s going to be a lot of work to do, no matter what happens.  
 
Wallace: So, it sounds like there’s going to be a lot of fun for law-
yers and . . .  
 
Sweeney: Fun for lawyers! 
 
Wallace: Yup, fun for lawyers! You know they’re, they’re couple 
law students I know who are here, Kate and Allie, um, if they are, 
um, the only ones who ask questions, they’re going to be feeling like 
they’re on the spot. So, I’m going to open up the floor, they don’t 
even know they’re going to be asking a question. See, look at that 
[laughter]. Yeah. So, um, let’s turn it open and uh, get . . . you know, 
if you’ve had burning questions all day. Do you want to start, Tina?  
 
Audience member (Tina): I’d love to!  
 
Wallace: Okay! 
 
Audience member (Tina): So, I can remember when um . . .  
 
Wallace: Hold on, let me interrupt you. Could you just say who you 
are and where you’re from, so we could . . . you know, what organi-
zation or school?  
 
Audience member (Tina): I’m Bettina Hager, and I'm the D.C. di-
rector and CO of the ERA Coalition. Um, so glad to be here at the 
University of Richmond and to ask this question of you all! Um, so 
when the three-state strategy was first kind of . . . I work on this, uh, 
in many different respects including on [inaudible]. When we were 
first doing this Bill, people were kind of like, “Oh, well, lawyers are 
not going to not support it. They’re not going to want to take this case 
if this does get in front of the Supreme . . . the Supreme Court.” This 
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does not seem to be the case at all, which is real . . . and now looking 
at it, these lawyers are having, as Trish said, so much fun. So, is that 
true? Do you think that this is kind of like, you know, like, this is a 
moment where you, if you did this in front of the Supreme Court, you 
could set a precedent? And do you think that you . . . okay, Linda, say 
you wind up at the Supreme Court, do you think you could win?  
 
Coberly: Um, yes. I mean, I think it’s hard . . . look the courts are 
not . . . the court, the court, today, is not a pro-equality court, I have 
to say. So, I think you’d have to make the right arguments, and I 
think a states’ rights argument is one of them. There’s a plain lan-
guage argument, um, there’s a . . . you have to know the audience and 
make the arguments . . . uh, focus on the arguments that are going to 
be more . . . most persuasive. Um, I do think lawyers have been a lit-
tle slow to this table because, um, they need to be convinced. Right? I 
had to be convinced. One of my very good friends is a constitutional 
law professor at a, at a law school in Chicago, and I said, “I’m work-
ing on Equal Rights Amendment.” She's like, “Isn’t that done?” And, 
I had to explain it. When I explained it to her, she was like, “Oh, 
okay. I get it, I’m inUm, but lawyers are coming to the table and what 
I’ll tell you, I’m . . . I’m going to be speaking in November to the Na-
tional Association of Women Lawyers General Counsel Institute, um, 
doing a program, actually, with my partner who’s representing the 
women’s soccer team on equality issues, and it’s going to be a, a big 
presentation. I’m also giving a keynote speech at the, um, uh, ABA 
Women Advocate Committee Conference in Chicago, um, about the 
Equal Rights Amendment. Lawyers are . . . and I’ve spoken at other 
National Association for Women Lawyer events before . . . It’s a re-
ally important, um, constituency, um, of people who have something 
really to contribute and would love to work for, uh, equity in the 
community at large. You know, we spend a lot of time, um, as you 
heard in the last panel, working on equity in the legal profession. I 
just was at a conference earlier this week on equal pay in the legal 
profession, there was a whole conference just on that topic, it was the 
same study that was presented. Um, but it’s really rewarding to be 
able to feel like we’re making, uh, some kind of difference and can 
contribute with our skills to equity in the broader world.  
 
Wright: Let me just add I think it’s . . . I think it’s just a hoot [laugh-
ter]. I am so excited. Um, no, because, I . . . this is a historic moment. 
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How many people are going to be able to argue these cases before the 
Supreme Court to have a constitutional amendment, an equality 
amendment of this importance, um, in our lifetimes? This is a once in 
a lifetime opportunity, so I’ve jumped on it. But, what . . . one of the 
things that I just find just delightful, right, is that Justice Scalia, okay, 
our poster boy of originalism, in the Heller decision, said, right, that 
the preamble to the Second Amendment is unimportant, that it’s only 
the operative language of the second half of the, of the Second 
Amendment that is important. So, to be able to go to the Supreme 
Court and cite their very own favorite originalist for the idea of 
the . . . that the language of the preamble can be justifiably ignored. 
It’s just one of those moments that just makes it all worthwhile 
[laughter]. So, that's why I think it’s . . . I think it’s just great.  
 
Wallace: [to audience member] Yeah, um, introduce yourself and 
please ask your question.  
 
Audience member (Gabrielle): I'm [inaudible] Gabrielle, I’m an un-
dergraduate student here, and I’m also the campus coordinator for the 
Feminist Majority, and I’m wondering, do you have any suggestions 
as to what undergraduate students specifically can do to help the 
ERA?  
 
Wallace: Vote. 
 
Sweeney: Um yeah, I mean, um . . . the challenge with the students is 
they’re living, usually, in a state that there’s not their principal resi-
dence. So, um, they would do absentee voting at their . . . in their 
home state. Um there’s . . . I think there’s a lot of movement to block 
students from voting, so the most important thing is voting. But the 
other thing, I think, is really educating, um, the college students about 
the fact that we’re . . . we are in a, um . . . in a country that is not in a 
true democracy. If you think about this . . . um, when Virginia rati-
fies, and we go forward, and we get an Equal Rights Amendment 
placed, if we were to get a woman president, that would be the first 
President of the United States of America that would be presiding 
over a country that’s fully democratic, where every single person is in 
fact equal under the Constitution, and I think that’s important for 
those college students to, um, be educated about and understand it. 
No, it kind of . . . somebody said it to me, and I, I was like wow, if 
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you think about it, the next president could actually be, as a woman, 
could be actually equal under the Constitution. So, it’s just, it’s just 
kind of playing with the concepts and, and getting people to under-
stand . . . getting the college students to understand because they 
haven't lived through it. You know, it was, it was in the ‘70s, we 
lived through it in the 70s where everybody was talking about the 
ERA, I was in high school. And then it, it . . . I graduated from law 
school in 1982, and that's when the ERA, basically the deadline 
dropped, so it’s part of my lifetime, my history and all that, but for 
the young people, it’s history that’s not there. So, it’s much harder to 
understand it because you haven’t lived it, so it’s just this whole, kind 
of, education, and, and constantly bringing it up so people see it from 
that perspective. That’s my view.  
 
Coberly: I also . . . I also think that, um, your generation can play a 
really big role in educating us. Um, I have found that working with 
my kids. So, I have a daughter who is almost twenty, and a daughter 
who is almost seventeen, and, um, when I brought my twenty . . . al-
most-twenty-year-old to her first ERA event, we did a screening of 
Equal Means Equal, uh, Kamala came, and we hosted a screening in 
Chicago at a theater of the film, uh, as part of the Illinois ratification 
effort. We had a number of activists and, and, um, representatives 
there to speak about it, and she asked the question right off the bat of 
Kamala, um, of, “How is this going to impact trans women?” And 
that was the first time that was mentioned, in the whole conversation, 
and she was really struck by some of the language that we all tend to 
use, we who were, you know . . . those of us of my generation, those 
who have been part of the debate for the last . . . which is very 
woman-focused and sometimes uterus focused, right? And my 
daughter hears that language and says, “Hang on, that’s exclusive,” 
which is something that, when I first hear that, it doesn’t make sense 
to me, and I, and I push back on it a little, but then I try to listen, and 
I try to learn. And, so, what she has taught me, what my . . . what 
both of my daughters have taught me, is how to think about this from 
a more inclusive perspective. How to think about the impact on trans 
women, for example. I mean, it’s always been clear to me that if 
you’re . . . that if a trans woman is discriminated against because the 
law treats her as a woman, she can challenge that, right? She should 
be able to challenge that discriminatory law that, that discriminates 
against women. I also think it’s true that if that trans woman is 
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discriminated against because she was born with male genitalia, the 
Equal Rights Amendment should be able to help her, uh, fight against 
that discrimination. Um, all of these are open issues. All of these are 
issues that haven’t . . . certainly haven’t been decided under the Equal 
Rights Amendment, they are actually being decided for purposes of 
Title VII and Title IX this year in some respects by the Supreme 
Court. Um, but these are really important topics, and it’s very easy 
for . . . for those of us who have been in the conversation for a long 
time to, um, talk about this just the same way that it’s been talked 
about for decades, and we need to be educated, too. So, your voice is 
very important, and I encourage you to share it, including with those 
who have been working on the issue for a long time.  
 
Wright: I . . . I just want to make one more comment, which is that, 
you know, it took a hundred and fifty years, or a hundred . . . or more 
than a hundred fifty years where post, um, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment . . . or I guess we’re barely, yeah, a hundred and fifty years 
since the Fourteenth Amendment . . . and we are still trying to, to de-
velop the jurisprudence and reach the levels of equality that we had 
hoped to achieve, so the ERA is not going to, uh, bring change over-
night. Hopefully, some change will come quickly, but this is a battle 
that is, that is . . . we’re in for the long haul, and it’s going to take 
many generations, I think, to develop the legal issues, develop the 
strategies, to bring society along, and that’s where every generation 
needs to participate.  
 
Wallace: And I just want to add, even though I’m the moderator and 
should keep my gob shut, um, this . . . the Constitution was set up as 
you know a male-centric structure, okay. Um, one of the things I like 
to talk about, um, . . . it’s, it’s not pleasant, but, uh, women in jails 
and prisons, and you think of a prison situation, it’s designed by men, 
for men, you know, everything in that environment is male-centric. 
It’s kind of easy to see that looking outside. We’re living in a legal 
structure that’s male-centric, a social environment that’s male-cen-
tric, economic situation that’s male-centric, but we’re inside it, so it’s 
really hard to see, so this kind of goes to what, what Linda is saying, 
is we need the next generation to say, “Hey, wait a minute, we don’t 
like . . . you know, you’ve got to think about this more broadly,” and 
the, the Equal Rights Amendment, in my mind, has potential of, of a 
tectonic shift in the way our legal world is shaped, and the way our 
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social world is shaped, um, and I think that that’s what’s exciting for 
young people. You can be writing about, maybe not the Equal Rights 
Amendment, but if you’re writing about, you know, a Thomas Hardy 
novel, and you’ve got this, this work of art there that you’re writing 
about, but its what you’re bringing to interpreting that work of art, 
that gives, you know . . . gives the whole project meaning, and, so, 
whenever . . . whatever subject you’re working on or whatever, you 
know, paper you’re writing, just think about, you know . . . listen to, 
well, what perspective am I bringing to this project, and, you know, 
should I change that perspective? And, so, in some ways you can live 
the Equal Rights Amendment and the tectonic shift, you know, on a 
daily basis, in whatever class you’re taking. Alright, Kate, you ready?  
 
Audience Member (Kate): Um, okay, uh, so my name is Kate [inau-
dible]. I’m a student at the University of Florida Law School, and I 
want to pose this question to you, Linda, and sort of ask you to specu-
late, which I’m sure you’ve probably already been doing around in 
your head. Um, let’s say Virginia passes, and you have the National 
[inaudible], he needs to publish it, kind of, where do you see . . . how 
do you see legislation . . . or litigation playing out, who do you think 
is like the best Plaintiff? Do you see a Virginia legislator coming for-
ward? If you could get a little bit into the weeds? 
 
Coberly: Sure, the last panel talked about wonky lawyer stuff, I think 
it’s time . . . that was your line, time for wonky lawyer stuff. Um, 
I . . . so I think there’s lots of different ways this could go. Um, and 
lots of different things that could happen. I do think that the, um, Ar-
chivist could just certify the Amendment. Um, I think it’s maybe not 
likely, um, if I were the Archivist, I might want to ask somebody else 
about that but, um, but, you know, so I think it depends on how the 
Archivist sees, uh, his role, and, uh, whether the Archivist would just 
certify, whether the Archivist would ask the Justice Department or 
seek other kinds of decision-making, or what have you. Um, I think 
there is likely to be litigation, I think the shape of that litigation may 
depend on whether the deadline removal bills have already been 
passed. Um, I don’t personally think it makes a huge difference 
whether, uh, the deadline removal bills are passed before or after the 
last ratification. I think, either way, Congress has the power to, uh, 
remove the deadline. Um, so uh, I’m not sure it makes a huge differ-
ence. I can imagine arguments both ways. And again, I . . . that’s all 
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we’re doing right now is imagining arguments, right? Because there 
isn’t a clear-cut answer in the law. Um, in the first two years after the 
enactment of the . . . if the Equal Rights Amendment becomes a part 
of the Constitution, it will not be enforceable for the first two years. 
That’s because of a, uh, frequently ignored, uh, clause in the Equal 
Rights Amendment, the third clause, that basically gives states two 
years to get their act together after the Equal Rights Amendment be-
comes part of the Constitution. So, I, I think it would be . . . that two-
year window would present a barrier for a lawsuit by a Plaintiff 
who’s trying to sue to enforce the Equal Rights Amendment in the 
first two years, right? Um, because I think . . . you would . . . let’s 
just play that out, if I, if I tried to sue under the Equal Rights Amend-
ment the day after it becomes part of the Constitution, whoever I’m 
suing is going to move to dismiss and say that it’s not right because 
it’s not even enforceable, okay. Um . . .  
 
Wright: . . . So that knocks out the Women’s Soccer Team . . .  
 
Coberly: . . . yeah, well, there’s also a state action problem with the 
Women’s Soccer Team, but. Um, so then you’d have to find . . . and I 
think it’s an interesting question to think about who the right Plaintiff 
would be in that lawsuit when the Equal Rights Amendment becomes 
enforceable right? Because you’re going to want to find someone, un-
like the Women’s Soccer Team, who um, is being affected by state 
action, um, even if, as I, as I heard this morning, you know, there are 
arguments for you know why should we import the same kinds of 
state action limitation into the Equal Rights Amendment that, that, 
then . . . as those that appear in the jurisprudence under the Four-
teenth Amendment, I think that’s an interesting question. Certainly, if 
you were trying to file the first lawsuit, you want to do what litiga-
tion . . . in impact litigation, what we try to do is find the best Plain-
tiff, which means, let’s find someone who doesn’t have these other 
barriers, someone who can just bring the straight-forward lawsuit that 
raises the issue we really care about, which in the first set of lawsuits 
is going to be, is it effective, right? That’s going to be the first set of 
lawsuits. So, it seems to me, it’s probably not going to be best to tee 
up a Plaintiff who also has a state-action problem, or who also has 
some other problem. You’re going to want to find a Plaintiff who is 
really affected by state action, and I think it’s interesting and kind of 
tricky to figure out who the best Plaintiff would be, but a lot of good 
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people are thinking about that topic. Um, another possibility, even 
before the two years though, would be a State Legislator or a State 
Solicitor General, or, um, or, or some . . . some sort of Legislator who 
is able to say, um, look, I actually need to know if this is effective be-
cause we’re going to have to start changing the laws, um, because we 
have two years to comply with the Equal Rights Amendment. Um, 
there might also be a challenge on the other side, um, the . . . some-
one, uh, from one of the rescinded states, for example. One of those 
state legislatures, um, could try to sue. There could be lots of differ-
ent kinds of litigation, and it could all happen at the same time. I 
think it’s important that that litigation be coordinated and that people 
be talking to each other, because you, you want, in any impact litiga-
tion, you want to, um, make sure that, uh, you’re shaping the argu-
ments across the board and developing good precedents. I’ve been in-
volved in impact litigation in the immigration context for, you know, 
for, uh, a pro-immigrant right . . . rights organization who’s in very 
close contact with ACLU who’s doing similar kinds of litigation in 
other courts, and, so, you know, you’re constantly coordinating what 
you’re arguments are, um, but there, there could be a litigation 
across, across all these fronts. There are difficult issues about stand-
ing, ripeness, um, political question, you know. All of these things 
are likely to be issues that are briefed in the litigation. Um, my view 
is, if we can get the, the, um, uh, the deadline removal bills passed, 
what that does is it begins to clear the way. I think that the best possi-
ble scenario would be pass the deadline removal bills and then the lit-
igation will be about whether the deadline can be, can be, um, can be 
removed. Um, I think that’s a, you know . . . I’d rather litigate that 
case than litigate the . . . the deadline isn’t effective to stop the ratifi-
cation. Um, there isn’t precedent on any of them, but just, you know, 
in terms of thinking about what, what case to argue and what order, 
yeah, but we’ll, we’ll cover all these basis, pursue all of them at the 
same time: political solutions, legal solutions, et cetera.  
 
Wallace: And just so you know, I’ve designed a fourteen-week law 
school class on the Equal Rights Amendment and only the Equal 
Rights Amendment, so that’s just fun, fun, fun for everybody for 
weeks on end. Um, Allie do you have a question that you want to? 
 
Audience member: Where do I sign up? [Laughter].   
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Coberly: But you know Trish, that is actually . . . can I say that’s just 
a totally genius idea, actually, because if you think about it, I mean 
what do you want for a law school class, is, um, a situation that will 
tee up all those issues. You would get into issues about how do you 
amend the Constitution, you would get into issues about what is the 
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment and what does it mean, and 
it’s . . . it’s brilliant. I would take the class. 
 
Wallace: And, and is it fun? Would it be fun?  
 
Coberly: It would be fun, Trish. 
[Inaudible from audience].  
 
Yeah . . . [laughter]. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. 
 
Wallace: Well, I’d guess would have to retire to bars and whatnot, 
too. So, um, I don’t know. Um, are there any more questions that you 
guys want to ask or some . . . ? You do! Excellent! Alright. You’ve 
got to . . . and, and please identify yourself and say where you’re 
from. 
 
Audience member: My name’s Allie [inaudible]. I’m a 2L at the 
University of Florida College of Law um, and my question was com-
ing back to Linda again. Was that, since you mentioned immigrants, 
immigrants’ rights, um, how, if at all, would the ERA impact undocu-
mented populations?  
 
Coberly: Um, well I think, uh, equality of rights, there’s nothing in 
the text of the Equal Rights Amendment that talks about citizens or 
talks about people lawfully, um, required to be here, or lawfully per-
mitted to be here. So, I mean, I think . . . on its plain language, if 
there were a law that treated, uh, . . . or a state action of some kind, 
that treated, um, female undocumented, um, people differently than 
male undocumented people, I think it could be challenged under the 
Equal Rights Amendment. Um, also, you know, based on, you know, 
other kinds of discrimination on the basis of sex whether it is . . . has 
to do with pregnancy status or, um, or, um, child . . . other kinds of 
child bearing type issues, et cetera, so, yes, I think . . . I don’t see any 
reason why it would apply less directly to an undocumented person, 
or undocumented populations, and, um, I think the challenge is that 
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case is never going to be litigated because, um, because of, I 
mean . . . for the same reasons that, um, domestic violence against 
undocumented, um, women is so rarely reported to the authorities . . . 
at least under this current environment. 
 
Wright: But you would have your state action. 
 
Coberly: Yeah, you would definitely have your state action, you just, 
you just might have to have a, a, an anonymous plaintiff who doesn’t 
come to court, uh, out of fear that she would be um deported for exer-
cising her rights, which is a whole other set of issues. 
 
Wallace: So, that gives you a law review topic perhaps. Um, do we 
have other questions, uh . . . okay, there’s, um, refreshments . . . yes! 
And . . .  
 
Audience Member: It’s not a question, it’s another idea that I had 
[inaudible] about students . . . [inaudible] . . . this is something done 
in the equal pay space, but I think students . . . so, I know in Virginia, 
the legislators are really proud of the business environment here, and 
I think that when the students speak up as the future talent in the state 
[inaudible] about talents, and I think that, um, made the point of, like, 
you want to be in a state that believes in these principles and that 
would ratify something like this and if not, then we’ll take our talent 
elsewhere. I think that could be kind of a powerful message, and, um, 
I mean, yeah, students testify and speak up as the future of, um, the 
[inaudible].  
 
Wallace: Excellent way to end, but I do have one more point, a very 
important point, okay. Michelle Kallan has organized this thing. Um, 
she was like chief organizer, or chief-ette organizer, chief-ist, um, 
but, anyway, she’s like slam busy at work, and, yet she, um, put to-
gether, you know, this, this great program, um, and before you start 
clapping for her, I, I also want to recognize MaryAnn Grover, um, 
who recently, um, passed the Virginia Bar. Yay. [Applause]. So, once 
we’ve celebrated that fact then we can get back to, um, you know . . . 
and I don’t know if you guys have other people that you . . . but these 
two have just done a phenomenal job under horrendous circum-
stances in some situations, and they’ve handled it with grace and hu-
mor and enthusiasm, and, you know, no matter what kind of job you 
263
et al.: General Topics
Published by UR Scholarship Repository,
Do Not Delete 4/15/20  2:01 PM 
254 RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW  [Vol. XXIII:iii 
do or whatever you do, if you’re handling it with grace and enthusi-
asm and professionalism, you know, it’s, it’s going be much more 
pleasant and pleasurable to everybody around you. So, personally, I 
want to thank them, and then I think, um, everybody here can give 
them a big thanks for all the work they’re done. [Applause]. And I 
was going to thank the panel too, but, uh, they don’t want to be 
thanked, they want to drink, so bravo.  
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